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PREFACE 
According to Darwinism, the biosphere constantly changes. Culture changes as 
well. In the biosphere as well as in the cultural realm, new characteristics arise 
over and over again and some novelties persist and lead to lasting changes. The 
types of entities that are involved in these changes are genes and organisms in 
the case of biological evolution, and cultural units such as ideas, values, 
beliefs, patterns of behavior, and artifacts in the case of culture. Today, 
biological evolution is believed to be explainable by Darwinian evolutionary 
theory.  
Cultural change, however, is thought to arise through creative acts and 
selective choices of individuals, leading to the diffusion of novelties. Culture is 
usually defined as consisting of those characteristics of individuals that are not 
innate but created or learned by individuals during their life. Creativity in its 
basic sense is the human capacity to create new and valuable responses to 
challenges to which humans are exposed to, or to which they expose 
themselves. Those responses that are overtly delivered and are adopted by 
others become part of a certain culture. They spread. This is cultural diffusion. 
Since diffusion is a change in the frequency of certain cultural items, a culture 
as a whole changes as a consequence of the dual process of creativity and 
diffusion. If a creative act builds on past innovations, creativity accumulates 
through the iteration of this dual process and leads to history.  
But how can we explain creativity and diffusion, the two parts that 
make up cultural change? How can we explain that human beings produce new 
answers to new challenges, and how can we explain why certain ideas spread 
and others do not?  
Darwinian approaches to cultural change state that cultural change can 
be explained as an evolutionary process in the Darwinian sense. Such 
approaches are the subject of this investigation. They do not reduce culture to 
genes or other biological processes. They draw an analogy between change in 
culture and change in nature – an analogy between the processes of organic 
evolution, as explained by Darwinian theory, and the processes of cultural 
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change. There are different versions of such Darwinian analogical reasoning 
from nature to culture. I will concentrate on two theories: The Darwinian 
approach to creativity and the theory of memes, usually called memetics. The 
Darwinian approach to creativity states that novelty in culture is created by a 
Darwinian process of blind variation and selection. In being creative, humans 
are – like nature – ‘blind watchmakers.’ Memetics goes even further. 
Memeticists claim that we can eliminate the human mind as the main causal 
force in our explanation of creativity and culture. Memes and not minds are the 
main causal force in cultural change, as genes and not individual organisms are 
regarded by some evolutionists as the main causal force in evolution. The 
claim implied in drawing the analogy between nature and culture shifts from 
the ‘blind watchmaker’ to ‘no one watching.’ Although there are many other 
analogical applications of Darwinian thinking, I will only consider these two, 
since they directly attack our traditional view of creativity and culture, namely 
that humans are the creators of culture.  
I will differentiate between three basic analogies contained in these two 
Darwinian approaches to culture: (1) the ontological analogy – an analogy with 
respect to the entities involved in biological evolution and cultural change; (2) 
the origination analogy – an analogy with respect to the origination of novelty; 
(3) the explanatory units of selection analogy – an analogy with respect to the 
causal role certain entities play. I will also split my critique of these basic 
analogies into three questions: First, are there sufficient similarities between 
culture and the biosphere to justify the analogies as descriptively adequate? 
Second, if so, do the analogies help explain cultural change? Third, if the 
analogies are descriptively adequate and help explain cultural change, do they 
provide new descriptions and explanations of cultural change? I will show that 
the analogies either give wrong or unjustified descriptions and explanations, or 
they give trivial restatements of what we know already.  
 Creativity and culture are topics that are addressed by many disciplines 
and theories. It would be impossible to write a general theory of creativity and 
culture in one single book. My main goal will be a philosophical analysis of the 
Darwinian approach to creativity and of memetics from within these 
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evolutionary theories. For this, I will introduce and combine debates from 
various disciplines – with all the risks involved in doing so. These disciplines 
include genetics, evolutionary biology, psychology, anthropology, and 
philosophy – to name the most important ones. I certainly will not answer all 
the questions that could arise with respect to what these disciplines have to say 
on creativity and culture, but I will answer the question I have set for this 
study: Whether the three basic analogies between biology and culture make 
sense or not. 
I will introduce the whole issue in more detail in chapter 1. In chapter 2, 
I will explain what a Darwinian explanation of change is. The ensuing chapters 
3 – 5 consider each of the three basic analogies separately. I will summarize 
my findings in a short epilogue.  
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1  FROM THE DARWIN INDUSTRY TO THE 
DARWINIAN ANALOGIES 
1.1  THE DARWIN INDUSTRY 
Folk-Darwinism 
At the end of his On the Origin of Species, Darwin writes: „Light will be 
thrown on the origin of man and his history“ (Darwin 1859: 487). Indeed, the 
‘light’ of evolutionary theory shines since then. Today, roughly 150 years after 
the first publication of the Origin in 1859, evolution is almost everywhere. It 
would be no surprise, if Theodosius Dobzhansky’s famous statement – 
“Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution” (Dobzhansky 
1973) – ‘mutates’ to ‘Nothing at all makes sense except in the light of 
evolution’. Almost everything in the social and cultural sphere that is able to 
change and does not change in a sudden and abrupt way is said to evolve. 
Political agendas, partnerships, economies, firms, or acts of any kind – they 
evolve. Stars, galaxies and the universe are also said to evolve. Artists and 
programmers refer to ‘mutants’ of artifacts or programs. Markets are said to be 
dominated by the ‘survival of the fittest’. Everyone has to adapt to this or that.  
As Chris Buskes (1998: 1) emphasizes, this “folk-Darwinism” is 
usually “crude and superficial.” It has nothing to do with Darwinism. It is a 
mere facon de parler, where every kind of gradual change is referred to as 
evolution. The term ‘change’ is merely replaced by the term ‘evolution.’  
Evolution in philosophy, science, and politics 
But the term ‘evolution’ did not only enter our language as a vague idea for 
any kind of change. Evolutionary thinking entered philosophy and scientific 
thinking in diverse and elaborated ways, either as a way of describing and 
explaining our innate human nature, or as a way to export the Darwinian 
paradigm to other domains of research. Social Darwinism, eugenics and racism 
were hotly debated evolutionary endeavors of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
century. Social Darwinism supported the restriction of policy programs: Policy 
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should not help the physically, mentally, or economically weak. It is best to let 
the law of nature rule, the principle of the survival of the fittest. Eugenics 
converted this negative laissez-faire program to an active policy program, in 
order to intensify nature’s principle of the survival of the fittest. Racism drew 
sharp essentialist boundaries between races and interpreted some races as 
evolutionarily ‘superior’. In part, this stems from classical evolutionism in 
anthropology, which regarded the differences between cultures as an effect of 
an ongoing evolution from the ‘primitive’ to ‘civilized’ cultures, an evolution 
from the simple to the complex, relying thereby on a pre-Darwinian concept of 
evolution.
1
 American pragmatists like William James or Charles S. Peirce were 
deeply influenced by Darwin.
2
 Evolutionary epistemology, beginning with 
Georg Simmel (1895) and Ernst Mach (1905), became popular, at least in 
Europe, through the work of Konrad Lorenz (1941). It has been flourishing up 
to the present day.
3
 Evolutionary ethics, evolutionary aesthetics, evolutionary 
economy, evolutionary psychology, evolutionary linguistics… they are all part 
of this ‘Darwin industry.’
4
  
There are also applications of evolutionary ideas in medical biology and 
computer science. The immune system has been shown to be a system that 
changes in a Darwinian evolutionary manner.
5
 Computer science has 
developed evolutionary computing, where programs ‘evolve’ through 
mutation, recombination, breeding and selection.
6
 These applications and the 
above mentioned approaches have different phenomena as research subject.  
                                                
1
 See Sanderson (1990), Carneiro (2003).  
2
 See Wiener (1949); Hausman (1993). 
3
 For review see Bradie (1994). David Hull (1988a, 2001) developed a special variety of an 
evolutionary analysis of science.  
4
 A term I borrow from Ruse (1996). 
5
 Jerne (1955) and Burnet (1957) introduced the so-called „clonal selection theory of antibody 
formation“. See also Jerne (1985). The model was further developed by Susumu Tonegawa 
(1983), who clarified how the immune system manages do guarantee the diversity of 
antibodies. See Cziko (1995: 39-48) for a summary of the developments. For more on the 
clonal selection theory, see Silverstein (1989) or Söderquist (1994). 
6
 Evolutionary computing started in 1966, when Fogel, Owens & Walsh (1966) first 
programmed a simulation of natural selection in computers. It has been further developed by 
Holland’s (1975) ‘genetic algorithms’ and by Koza’s (1992) ‘genetic programming’. See 
Goldberg (1989), Davis (1991), Koza et al (1999) and Fogel (1999) for the theoretical frame 
and important technical applications of evolutionary computing. See Cziko (1995: 237-260) 
and Nickles (2003) for philosophical interpretation in the light of a general selection theory.  
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1.2  LITERAL EXTENSIONS AND ANALOGICAL 
APPLICATIONS OF DARWINISM TO CULTURE 
Culture and Darwinism 
Culture is a phenomenon that has been addressed by a whole cluster of 
theories, developed in the last decades. This cluster consists of sociobiology,
7
 
evolutionary psychology,
8
 and human behavioral ecology
9
 on the one hand. 
They literally extend the Darwinian paradigm. On the other hand, there are the 
analogical applications at issue here, the Darwinian approach to creativity
10
 
and memetics.
11
 A further important analogical application of Darwinian ideas 
to culture has been developed in dual-inheritance-theories (also called gene-
culture-co-evolution-theories).
12
 All these approaches to culture are in some 
way ‘Darwinian’. I will briefly introduce these five schools of thought to show 
the differences between them.
13
  
Literal extensions of Darwinism to culture  
Sociobiology concentrated on social behavior as outcome of natural selection. 
Behavior or values, like the ones that guide altruistic behavior, are explained as 
an adaptive mean for enhancing biological fitness. Sociobiology developed 
further into two main schools: evolutionary psychology and human behavioral 
ecology.  
Evolutionary psychology tries to explain behavior and culture as 
generated and maintained by innate, specialized, and informationally 
encapsulated mechanisms of the mind. These mechanisms are called 
‘modules.’ Modules are innate adaptations to the ‘environment of evolutionary 
adaptedness.’ These modules are not merely learning devices that are 
                                                
7
 Wilson (1975). 
8
 Barkow et al (1992), Buss (2004).  
9
 Cronk (1991), Smith & Winterhalder (1992), Krebs & Davies (1997). 
10
 Most important are Campbell (1987 [1960], 1987 [1974a], 1974b) and Simonton (1999a, 
1999b, 2001a, 20001b). But see also Stein & Lipton (1989), Cziko (1998), Dennett (2004).  
11
 Most important are Dawkins (1976, 1982a, 1993, 1999), Dennett (1990, 1991, 1995, 2001a, 
2001b, 2002), and Blackmore (1999, 2000, 2002).  
12
 Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981), Boyd & Richerson (1985), Durham (1991), Richerson & 
Boyd (2005). 
13
 For a fuller account of the different schools see the extensive comparison in Laland & Brown 
(2002).  
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specialized for certain domains. They contain ‘content’: Some of the things we 
think and do are not acquired, but innate. According to this nativist view, 
individual and social learning is relatively unimportant for the explanation of 
why individuals have certain ideas, values or behavior. Hence, culture, which 
is often defined as relying on social learning and leading to traditions, is 
unimportant for an explanation of our thinking and behavior. Evolutionary 
psychology tends to reduce the influence of the beliefs of others to a mere 
triggering condition for innately specified contents of beliefs, ideas or patterns 
of behavior.
14
  
Behavioral ecology also regards culture, and therefore social learning as 
irrelevant, but for different reasons: For behavioral ecology neither social 
learning nor innate mental mechanisms can explain what we think and do. For 
them, what explains thinking and acting is individual learning. Although they 
assume an innate learning ability, this learning ability is considered to be a 
mere precondition for the actual learning. The mind is filled with content 
mainly through learning. They are nonetheless a literal extensions of 
Darwinism to culture since they regard our thinking and behavior from the 
functional point of view as purely Darwinian in a literal sense: as adaptively 
optimal solutions, i.e., as fitness-maximizing solutions to adaptive problems. In 
each new environmental context, we adjust our thinking and behavior and 
optimize it thus in adaptive ways. As other animals, humans are mere 
biological fitness maximizers, able to overcome outdated traditions in the face 
of new challenges. For that reason, behavior can be predicted and explained by 
typical optimality models that allow us to deduce the behavior that would be 
optimal, given the knowledge about a certain problem in an ‘environment of 
adaptedness.’
15
 
These three literal extensions of Darwinism are all oriented at biological 
fitness maximizing. In addition, they all state that culture in the sense of a 
system of social learning does not play an important role when it comes to the 
                                                
14
 Most explicit on these things are Cosmides & Tooby (1992).  
15
 For a more detailed comparison between behavioral ecology and evolutionary psychology 
see Smith (2000).  
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interpretation and explanation of our thinking and behavior. Even if these 
approaches concede to culture as a distinct domain with a distinct ‘label,’ 
culture is not regarded as important for the explanation of emotions, values, 
beliefs, and behavior, either because culture is considered to be based on innate 
characteristics of the human mind and therefore describable as the effect of 
biological evolution, or because individual learning is assumed to be most 
important for an explanation of our thinking and behavior.  
Analogical applications of Darwinism 
The three analogical approaches go beyond biological fitness and innate 
characteristics of the human mind. And only the analogical approaches regard 
culture as a separate system that cannot be fully explained by reference to 
biological evolution. First, they normally do not assume that new behavior and 
artifacts, created by humans, all serve biological survival and reproduction. 
Second, implicitly, in the case of the Darwinian approach to creativity, or 
explicitly, in the case of dual-inheritance-theories and memetics, it is assumed 
that culture relies on a second system of cultural inheritance, namely social 
learning. Culture is a system of change in its own right, independent of 
biological inheritance and biological fitness values. Culture, in the sense of 
such a system of inheritance, is thus considered as important for explaining 
what we think and do.  
Although analogical applications do not assume that culture can be 
reduced to biological evolution, they assume that culture changes in the same 
way as biological evolution. Analogical applications draw an analogy between 
change in culture and biological evolution. Cultural change is cultural 
evolution. Cultural change relies on a selective process, similar to the process 
postulated by Darwin for the explanation of the origin and change of species.  
Notice that the term ‘cultural evolution’ means that culture evolves 
itself. To ask whether culture is in an analogical sense Darwinian is a question 
about its dynamic. To ask when and how culture arrived at the evolutionary 
stage of our phylogenetic history is a question about the biological origin of 
our capacity for creating culture, i.e., a question about the biological evolution 
of our capacity for culture. To avoid misunderstanding, I will use the term 
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‘cultural evolution’ only for the dynamic of culture. Only cultural evolution, 
and not the biological evolution of our ability for culture, will be at issue in this 
investigation. I will take it for granted that there are some innate phylogenetic 
differences between us and other species. However, these innate capacities 
alone do not explain the process of origination and inheritance of cultural 
novelty, if the analogical approaches are correct in assuming that culture, as a 
separate system of change, is important for explaining what we think and do. I 
will briefly introduce the reasons why I think this assumption is justified in 
section 1.6.  
1.3  THE ANALOGICAL APPROACHES TO CULTURE 
History of Darwinian analogical reasoning 
Darwinian analogical reasoning was used already back in the days of Darwin. 
Cziko (1995: 134) refers to Alexander Bain as the first one stressing an 
analogy between biological evolution and scientific discoveries as early as 
1868. For Bain the key about scientific discoveries was trial-and-error, which 
was interpreted as analogous to the process of biological evolution as Darwin 
described it. Thomas H. Huxley, James M. Baldwin, Chancey Wright, William 
James, Paul Souriau, and Ernst Mach are others that have drawn an analogy 
between evolution and the development of human thought and mind.
16
 William 
James, for instance, wrote in his famous essay on Great Men and Their 
Environment (1880): “A remarkable parallel, which I think has never been 
noticed, obtains between the facts of social evolution on the one hand, and of 
zoological evolution as expounded by Mr. Darwin on the other” (James 1979 
[1880]: 163).  
Despite these forbearers, the historical reference point of Darwinian 
analogical reasoning in the 20
th
 century are two classical papers of Donald T. 
Campbell: Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in 
Other Knowledge Process (1987 [org. 1960]) and Variation and selective 
                                                
16
 See Campbell (1987 [1960], 1987 [1974a]), Richards (1987), Plotkin (1994: 61-72), Cziko 
(1995: 134-140).  
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retention in socio-cultural evolution (1965). The now dominating three schools 
of Darwinian analogical reasoning that are directed towards culture (Darwinian 
approaches to creativity, memetics, and dual-inheritance-theories) developed 
then in different directions.  
The three main analogical approaches to culture 
The Darwinian approach to creativity treats creativity as based on a Darwinian 
evolutionary process – a process of ‘blind’ trial and selection. Donald T. 
Campbell (1987 [1960], 1987 [1974a], 1974b) and Dean K. Simonton (1999a, 
1999b, 2001a, 20001b) will be introduced as the main defenders of this view. 
In creating culture, we are as blind as nature is, the ‘blind watchmaker’ of 
biological evolution. We create culture, but we are blind creators, blind minds. 
This point has caused considerable criticism. It will be of utmost importance 
what ‘blindness’ means in Darwinian thinking and in which sense creativity 
can really be said to be ‘blind’ in a Darwinian sense.  
Memetics and dual-inheritance-theories concentrate less on what goes 
on in one individual. They look more at the overall process of cultural change 
in a group of individuals. According to them, this inter-individual process is a 
Darwinian process, an idea that is only immanent in the Darwinian approach to 
creativity.  
Memetics relies on so-called ‘memes,’ basic building blocks of culture, 
which are considered as having analogous properties and causal roles as genes 
have in biological evolution. Richard Dawkins introduced this idea in his book 
The Selfish Gene (1976). It was mainly Daniel C. Dennett
17
 and David Hull,
18
 
who backed up memetics with philosophical details. Others followed the idea 
with varying sophistication and emphasis.
19
 For memetics, cultural items are, 
like genes, replicators and it is the fitness of the meme itself that accounts for 
the diffusion of cultural items. As evolutionary biology is reducible to the 
replication of genes, cultural diffusion is reducible to the replication of 
‘memes’ – a process that is guided by the fitness of genes or memes alone. 
                                                
17
 Dennett (1990, 1991, 1995, 2001a, 2001b, 2002).  
18
 Hull (1982, 2000).  
19
 E. g. Brodie (1995), Lynch (1996), Balkin (1998), Aunger (2002).  
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Organisms, in the case of genes, and minds, in the case of memes, are mere 
hosts that are built by these replicators. They are mere consequences of the 
replicative power of memes. The thesis implied in the analogy between 
biological evolution and cultural change thus shifts from the postulation of 
‘blind watchmakers’ to the thesis that ‘no one is watching’: We can eliminate 
mind in our account of cultural change – if not ontologically, then as an 
explanatory important unit. Susan Blackmore is, besides Dennett, most famous 
for defending this radical thesis. At the end of her book, The Meme Machine 
(1999) she writes:  
“This is the power and beauty of memetics: it allows us to see how human 
lives, language, and creativity all come about through the same kind of 
replicator power as did design in the biological world. The replicators are 
different, but the process is the same. We once thought that biological design 
needed a creator, but we now know that natural selection can do all the 
designing on its own. Similarly, we once thought that human design required 
a conscious designer inside us, but we now know that memetic selection can 
do it on its own. […] If we take memetics seriously there is no room for 
anyone or anything to jump into the evolutionary process and stop it, direct it, 
or do anything to it. There is just the evolutionary process of genes and 
memes playing itself endlessly out – and no one watching” (Blackmore 1999: 
242). 
In a nutshell, according to memeticists, the unit that plays the main causal role 
in cultural change, and hence an important explanatory role, is not the human 
person, it is the meme itself, which is thought to be a ‘selfish replicator’ as the 
gene.  
In parallel to memetics, Luigi L. Cavalli-Sforza & Marc W. Feldman 
(1981), Robert Boyd & Peter Richerson (1985), and William H. Durham 
(1991) developed the philosophical frame of D.T. Campbell into dual-
inheritance-theories, quantitative theories of cultural change. They use 
Darwinism in the sense that they use the complex mathematical methods 
developed by population genetics to compute diffusion processes and the 
consequent higher frequency of the cultural items in a given population. They 
calculate the effects of different transmission systems in culture and how 
cultural inheritance thereby coevolves with biological inheritance. They thus 
apply the formalized models of population genetics and show in a statistical 
way how biologically maladaptive behavior can evolve on the basis of certain 
cultural transmission settings. Preferences for reduced family size, for instance, 
Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity 
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are maladaptive in the biological sense, since they reduce the reproductive 
output. These preferences can nonetheless spread in a population, if the 
transmission of these preferences is not vertically, between parents and 
children, but horizontally, between peers and unrelated people.  
However, dual-inheritance-theorists do not derive any philosophical 
consequences from this for the traditional point of view that we are the agents 
of culture, consciously and intentionally creating and selecting cultural items. 
Although relying on the idea that culture is a diffusion process that is 
analogous to a selection process in nature, they deny that there is a strong 
analogy between cultural change and biological evolution. According to them, 
cultural items are not like genes, the origination is not ‘blind’, and the selection 
is driven by rational decisions of individuals. Against the Darwinian approach 
to creativity, they insist on ‘guided’ instead of ‘blind’ generation of novelty. 
Against memeticists, they state that memes do not replicate and that they do 
not have any explanatory priority over individuals. They insist that the fate of 
cultural items is determined by a set of multiple factors, including the human 
person and the structure of the social system, which are not themselves memes. 
These factors have an explanatory significance for the task of explaining why 
people exhibit this and not other cultural items. Because of these claims, I will 
not count them as defenders of a strong Darwinian analogy, even though they 
incorporate the general Darwinian analogy that culture is a selection process. I 
will rather take them as critics of the Darwinian approach to creativity and as 
critics of memetics, since the latter two definitely rely on a strong analogy and 
want to draw philosophical consequences from the analogy: That human minds 
with their goals and beliefs have less explanatory importance than thought so 
far, since, first, they create ideas ‘blindly’ and since, second, they are mere 
consequences of the replicative power of memes.  
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1.4  COURSE, PROCESS, AND CREATORS OF 
EVOLUTION 
Fact, course and process of evolution 
To understand the general scope and meaning of the Darwinian approach to 
creativity and of memetics, I want to point to a further contrast not mentioned 
so far. Darwinian theories of cultural change are not merely about the fact that 
culture changes or about the course it thereby takes. They are about the process 
or mechanism of change. This is one of the differences between Darwinian 
theories of cultural evolution and pre-Darwinian classical evolutionism in 
anthropology, as Campbell (1965) has pointed out. The main concern of 
Darwinian theories of cultural evolution is not the macro-evolutionary course 
of cultural change, from simple to complex, from ‘primitive’ to ‘civilized,’ but 
the micro-level process that leads to cultural evolution.
20
 The second main 
difference between Darwinian theories of cultural change and classical, pre-
Darwinian cultural evolutionism in anthropology concerns the pattern of 
change that is assumed. Classical evolutionism was pre-Darwinian, since it 
assumed a progressive, Lamarckian pattern of change, mainly applied to whole 
cultures as the basic unit.
21
 Darwinism assumes a totally different pattern of 
change. The difference between the two patterns assumed in Lamarckian and 
Darwinian evolution will be discussed in the following chapter 2.  
Existence of a creator 
It is also very important to see that Darwinian analogical reasoning from nature 
to culture does not ontologically imply that there is no creator of culture. 
Before Darwinism came to the fore, a different but similar analogy between 
nature and culture was predominant. Our creativity was thought to be 
analogous to the creativity of a perfect creator of the world. This analogy is 
almost as old as philosophy. It started with Plato’s demiurgos in the Timaios: 
God is manufacturing the world like a human craftsman, according to eternal 
forms. The famous argument from design also rests on this analogy. That is 
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 See Carneiro (2003), Sanderson (1990).  
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why I would like to call it the ‘design analogy’. Natural theology used it to 
stress that the origination and the maintenance of the order of the world 
(abiotic and biotic) can only be explained by reference to a designer. He 
created the order of the universe, the order of species, and the order inside the 
organisms. He did this through conscious design: from the scratch, consciously 
and intentionally, with a definite purpose and a foresightful plan for its 
realization in mind. The designer was thought to have done this work of design 
in multiple creative acts or in one great creative act at the beginning of the 
world. In the latter case, the creative act was imagined either as a direct 
creation of all existing biotic and abiotic forms, or as an even greater single act: 
an ingenious, foresightful fixing of the initial conditions and natural laws so 
that each consequent event was pre-designed. In case of the latter, the rise of 
new species would have been the mere unfolding of the plan of the creator, 
who created a perfect creation machine, namely nature. This understanding of 
novelty in nature through the idea of creation or design was paralleled or 
maybe even derived from our understanding of our own creative acts.
22
  
Darwin has shown that novelty in nature can be explained by evolution. 
If this is right, God is not needed anymore to explain the order in nature. That 
is why Darwinism has been taken to refute one of the proofs of the existence of 
God, namely the argument from design. But neither the Darwinian approach to 
creativity nor memetics state that the origin and persistence of a cultural item is 
considered to be explainable without the existence of a creator of culture. These 
theories do not exclude that there is a creator of culture. They do not say that 
humans are not involved in culture, even though Darwinism in its original 
meaning is often understood to exclude that there is a creator of the biological 
world. The Darwinian approaches to culture considered in this investigation 
only state that the process how one individual or a group of individuals bring 
                                                
22
 It is an intricate historical question to find out which idea was the basis for the other: Did we 
derive our image of god from our self-understanding as creative agents, or did we conversely 
derive our self-understanding from our image of god? – This question is a chicken-egg 
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investigation. See Milton C. Nahm (1956: 63-83) on the history of the analogy between artists 
as genius and God’s creativity.  
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about change is similar to biological evolution (in the case of the Darwinian 
approach to creativity), or that individuals are merely epiphenomenal, 
reducible to the causal power of ‘memes’ (in the case of memetics).  
1.5  A CRITIQUE OF DARWINIAN ANALOGIES 
Culture is important 
One aim of philosophy is to show hidden patterns. This is an aim of great 
importance, especially with respect to scientific theories that refer to humans as 
thinking and acting agents. The aim of this research is thus to analyze and 
criticize, when necessary, the hidden patterns of the Darwinian approach to 
creativity and memetics: assumptions, concepts, and their consequences. 
However, there is one assumption that I will not analyze in detail: I will take 
for granted that the analogical approaches are correct in assuming that culture 
consists of a separate system of inheritance that is not reducible to the effects 
of biological evolution. I do this for the following reasons. 
First, the question of culture versus innate characteristics or individual 
learning and creativity, when explaining modes of thought and behavior, is not 
an either-or question. It is a question of relative importance. The contrast 
between nativist extensions of Darwinism and analogical approaches should 
not be taken as an update of the outdated nature-nurture contrast in the sense 
that mind is either a ‘blank slate’ or totally determined by its biological 
heritage. Nobody believes that the mind is a total ‘blank slate’. At the same 
time, nobody believes that there is no individual learning, and nobody believes 
that there is no social learning. For this reason, I suggest that the contrast 
between analogical approaches and the two descendents of sociobiology, 
evolutionary psychology and behavioral ecology, should be taken as a contrast 
with respect to the relative importance of different factors: (i) genes and innate 
mental mechanism, (ii) individual learning, (iii) culture. These factors are all 
relevant for an explanation of human thought and modes of behavior. 
Furthermore, the different explanations and methods of the approaches arise in 
part from different explananda: (i) psychological mechanism in the case of 
evolutionary psychology, (ii) behavioral fitness maximizing strategies in the 
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case of behavioral ecology, and (iii) cultural change in the case of Darwinian 
theories of creativity, memetics and dual-inheritance-theory.
23
  
Second, it is pretty obvious that there is at least some human thought 
and behavior that cannot be explained by reference to changes in gene 
frequencies or by reference to innate content. Culture did change independently 
of changes in the genetic inventory of humans. The invention of script, for 
instance, cannot be explained by changes in our innate and gene-based human 
nature, since no such genetic changes have been shown and I doubt that such 
genetic changes could be shown. Not every mental content is innately specified 
in ‘modules.’ As Kim Sterelny and Paul E. Griffiths say in their book on 
philosophy of biology, there is no innate “weather-prediction-module”, and 
beliefs about weather vary significantly across human cultures (Sterelny & 
Griffiths 1999: 327). At least the changes in culture that occurred over the last 
thousands of years cannot be explained by innate content.  
Third, culture is not reducible to individual learning or individual 
creativity. Culture is not just a ‘cultural’ or ‘social environment’, evoking or 
triggering innate or learned content. Culture is created and maintained in and 
between humans, and only the social process of diffusion guarantees that 
cumulative cultural change can occur. Individual learning and creativity on the 
one hand and social learning on the other are two sides of cultural change. 
They are not opposed to each other. Culture is created by individuals and 
maintained through social transmission. In addition, social transmission 
happens in a society that has a certain communication structure that causally 
influences diffusion processes. Culture is thus not only filling the flexible 
leftovers: Although culture is in part dependent on the products of biological 
evolution, it exists as a second system of origination and inheritance. It is 
therefore in its own right important when explaining our thinking and behavior.  
Furthermore, if we grant that culture is important in this sense, 
analogical applications of Darwinian thinking, which address the question how 
culture changes over time, leads to a much more radical and therefore more 
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interesting thesis, than literal extensions of Darwinian thinking. For Daniel 
Dennett, for instance, the claim that biological evolution has led to this or that 
innate mental characteristics is just “minimal Darwinism” (Dennett 2000: ix), 
since it has to leave at least some space for culture. If there is some space for 
culture that cannot be reduced to our biological heritage, Darwinism cannot 
explain everything. But if culture itself is regarded as a Darwinian evolutionary 
process, everything falls under the umbrella of Darwinian theory. This can 
indeed be called “strong” Darwinism, as Dennett does (ibid.: ix).  
The basic question of this investigation is therefore not whether culture 
exists as something in its own right, but whether it is, as such a system, best 
regarded as a second Darwinian process of change. I will assess the merits of 
the analogical reasoning from nature to culture, in the specific sense stated by 
the Darwinian approach to creativity and by memetics.  
Darwinism, creativity, and culture 
In order to assess the analogies, it is important to be very clear about 
Darwinism as such. What are the characteristics of a system that changes in a 
Darwinian manner? Unless this can be answered clearly, one cannot see in 
which sense the Darwinian theory of creativity and memetics are Darwinian 
theories and what that entails. First of all, Darwinian evolution has to be 
distinguished from change through God-like creation. But it also has to be 
distinguished from Lamarckian evolution, which is as gradual as Darwinian 
evolution, but different in other respects. Furthermore, Darwinism itself has 
changed since 1859, the year of the first publication of Darwin’s Origin. 
Today, there are different versions of Darwinism with different claims. Thus 
some claims of the analogies might rest on a very specific version of 
Darwinism. These issues about Darwinism itself will be addressed in chapter 2 
– a detailed, systematic reconstruction of Darwinian thinking for the purpose of 
this inquiry.  
Three basic analogies 
After this foundational chapter, I will introduce and discuss what I call the 
three basic analogies. They are, first of all, distributed unequally across the two 
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analogical applications at issue here, and, second, they can in principle be at 
the foundation of any version of analogical reasoning from biological evolution 
to cultural change. These three basic analogies are the ontological analogy, 
dealt with in chapter 3, the origination analogy, at issue in chapter 4, and the 
explanatory units of selection analogy, at issue in chapter 5. In the following, I 
introduce them briefly and justify this partition.  
The ontological analogy includes the claim that those kinds of entities 
that are the building blocks of culture share basic features with those entities 
that are the material basis of biological evolution. The entities that are 
discussed today are not complex artifacts as analogous to organisms, but ideas, 
values, or instances of behavior as analogous to genes. An important feature of 
genes is the way they secure their persistence through time. Genes replicate. 
Memes are claimed to do the same. Therefore, both count as replicators, a 
special kind of entity that is claimed to be essential for any evolutionary 
change. The ontological analogy is therefore dependent on the kind of process 
that secures persistence. The ontological analogy includes that the process of 
transmission (and therefore duplication) of cultural units, from one person to 
the next, is similar to the transmission of genes. It includes that cultural units 
are replicators.  
The origination analogy includes the claim that the origin of certain 
features of ideas (and of the behavior or artifacts based on them) is analogous 
to the origin of certain features of organisms. The origination analogy therefore 
refers to the general pattern how certain changes arise. Is the pattern more 
analogous to a God-like creation, to a Lamarckian kind of evolution, or to a 
Darwinian kind of evolution? Even if the origination of cultural novelty can be 
shown to follow a Darwinian pattern in principle, because it involves a 
selection process (the differential spread of cultural items), it still stands to 
question whether this selection process is Darwinian in a more narrow sense, 
namely based on blind variation and selection.  
The explanatory units of selection analogy is that analogy for which 
memetics has become very prominent. It refers to the causal and explanatory 
roles certain entities play, not to the basic properties of these entities, nor to the 
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basic pattern of change. The analogy is a direct transfer of the units of selection 
debate in biology to the cultural sphere. Gene selectionism (also called the 
doctrine of the ‘selfish gene’) states that genes are the units of selection: those 
units that have a causal and explanatory priority compared to others, such as 
organisms and groups. Through the explanatory units of selection analogy, 
gene selectionism becomes meme selectionism: memes have an analogous 
special status in culture. According to this analogy, human individuals are 
merely the effects and the ‘survival machines’ of memes, as they are mere 
survival machines of genes, serving the ‘selfish interests’ of these genes or 
memes. This idea does not only comprise that there are memes, it includes that 
memes and not minds explain culture – as it is genes that explain biological 
evolution, and not organisms and groups, which are secondary for the purpose 
of explanation. In both cases, it is important to ask whether these theories 
distort the causal picture of change, by giving replicators a special causal and 
explanatory status.   
To summarize, (1) the ontological analogy is an analogy with respect to 
the entities involved in the respective changes; (2) the origination analogy is an 
analogy with respect to the kind of pattern accounting for the origination of 
cultural items; (3) the explanatory units of selection analogy is an analogy with 
respect to the causal and hence explanatory roles certain entities play. The 
difference between these three basic analogies also becomes evident, if we look 
at the different questions that can be associated with them: (1’) What is the x 
whose selection and/or evolution is at issue? (2’) How does x come about and 
persist? (3’) Why does x spread and persist?  
The three basic analogies are present to a different degree in the 
Darwinian approach to creativity and in memetics. Darwinian theories of 
creativity are mainly interested in the origination question. Memetics mainly 
addresses the units of selection analogy and is not interested in the origination 
question. All memeticists and some defenders of the Darwinian approach to 
creativity assume that there is an ontological analogy.  
Although the matrix of the three underlying basic analogies adds 
complexity in the sense that it explicitly adds a new layer of analysis, it 
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nonetheless simplifies the issue. First, the three basic analogies make the 
structure of the overall issue explicit. Furthermore, through this procedure one 
should also be able to assess the merits of other actual or potential analogical 
applications of Darwinism to mind and culture, if they draw on one or more of 
the three basic analogies. Last but not least, it has the advantage that one can 
assess each of the three basic analogies separately, in order to show the 
problems of each of them. This also allows to analyze in which way they are 
dependent or independent of each other.  
It might well be, for instance, that the origination analogy and the 
explanatory units of selection analogy are not dependent on the ontological 
analogy. In case of such an independence, the failure of one basic analogy does 
not imply the failure of the other, and the success of one basic analogy does not 
imply the success of the other. One analogy can then not be used to argue for 
or criticize the other one. It might be objected that through treating the three 
analogies separately I might already assume that they are independent. But that 
something can be distinguished from something else does not mean that the 
two things at question are independent. So far, I only stated that the three basic 
analogies can be distinguished and should be assessed separately. Whether they 
are dependent will be addressed in the respective chapters.  
Evaluating an analogy 
Since the analytical goal of this investigation is to evaluate analogies, the 
following methodological question arises naturally: How can one judge an 
analogy? Analogies have long ceased to be excluded as a valuable tool from 
science. One cannot condemn them outright as pure ‘metaphoric’ or 
‘unscientific’ devices. Darwin also used an analogy in his construction of his 
evolutionary theory: He compared natural selection to artificial selection of 
animal breeders. Generally, analogies are judged valuable, if they help increase 
the knowledge of a yet to develop domain by using the knowledge from 
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another well-developed domain.
24
 Darwin’s analogy is a perfect example for 
this.  
Analogies can have such a positive role thanks to similarities between 
the base and the target of the analogy. But analogies never state similarities in 
all respects, i.e., a total equivalence of the base and the target of the analogy. In 
Aristotle’s words, an analogy states “similarity in dissimilars.”
25
 We can 
therefore not condemn an analogy simply because there are differences 
between the base and the target. As Paul Thagard has put it, “there is much 
more to evaluating an analogy between a base and a target than just counting 
their similarities and differences” (Thagard 1988: 101). The evaluation of 
analogies has to be with respect to their “role in problem solving” (ibid.: 101), 
as he puts it. This role must be a heuristic one: The similarities must add 
something that is new and appropriate to our knowledge of the target domain.  
Applied to the issue of this inquiry, the important question is whether 
the Darwinian theory is really a theoretical tool that offers a viable and new 
description or explanation of creativity and culture. Therefore, I will base my 
evaluation of the Darwinian analogies on the following three questions:  
(i). Descriptive adequacy. First, are the analogies descriptively 
adequate? In order to be descriptively adequate, the analogy must lead to a 
correct description of the phenomenon at issue. If the application of the 
analogy fails to give a correct description, then this is because it states 
similarities where only dissimilarities exist. But which dissimilarities between 
a base and a target count as a refutation of the analogy? As just mentioned, not 
every dissimilarity diminishes the value of the analogy. I will solve this 
problem by demanding the following: A correct description of the phenomenon 
must include relevant similarities between the two systems of comparison, in 
our case, biological evolution and cultural change. Relevant similarities are 
central for the phenomena at issue and cited in justification for the analogy. For 
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instance, memeticists state that memes and genes are both replicators. In case 
this leads to a correct description of culture, then the analogy is descriptively 
adequate, even if memes are different than genes in other respects.  
(ii). Explanatory force. Since descriptive adequacy is not the only 
standard that an analogy can be asked to meet, the second question is: Do the 
analogies contain more than a correct description of the phenomenon, i.e., do 
they contain an explanation of the phenomenon? In order to answer this 
question, some account of explanation is necessary. I will not develop or 
assume a general account of explanation. What it means to explain something 
is itself a problem in philosophy that has attracted considerable attention since 
a long time. It continuous to be one of the unsolved problems in philosophy. 
However, I will confront Darwinian analogical reasoning with two standards, 
that can be demanded from it, even if it is unclear what explanations in general 
requires. First, explanations should not be tautological. Some correct 
descriptions of a phenomenon might appear to be an explanation but in the end 
fail to really be one. A famous example is the tautological explanation of why 
opium causes sleep in Molière’s play The Imaginary Invalid: A physician says 
in this play that sleep is caused by a virtus dormitiva, a virtue that causes sleep, 
a virtue supposed to be in the opium. This explanation does not add anything to 
the question asked and is therefore tautological. Second, apart from 
tautological explanations, I will demand the following standard, which the 
analogies have to fulfill in order to have an explanatory value: A thesis 
contains an adequate explanation, only if it reaches the level at which an 
explanation is usually sought for in a certain discipline. If the analogies cannot 
give such an adequate explanation, I will call them trivial in terms of their 
explanatory force. As just mentioned, philosophy has always had and still has 
difficulties with a general concept of explanation – a concept of explanation 
that covers different kinds of explanations at the same time: everyday 
explanations, psychological explanations, historical explanations, explanations 
that involve deduction, explanations that involve inductive statistical 
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inferences, or biological explanations that involve functions.
26
 For the standard, 
with which I want to confront the three basic analogies, we do not need such a 
general account. We only need a comparative account of what kinds of 
explanations are considered as appropriate in the respective disciplines that 
have creativity or cultural change as one of their basic subjects of investigation. 
Psychologists try to explain creativity by pointing towards psychological 
processes or ‘mechanisms’ involved in creative thinking, such as perception, 
conceptual combination and the like. I will show in which sense the origination 
analogy fails to give an explanation comparable to this standard in psychology. 
Likewise, psychology also explains social learning at the level of such 
cognitive processes or ‘mechanisms,’ i.e., in terms of those basic cognitive 
processes or ‘mechanisms’ involved in social learning. I will show that the 
ontological analogy fails, since it rests on an account of learning that is either 
false for most cases of social learning, or does not offer an explanation at the 
level of cognitive processes at all. Note that such explanations, in terms of 
basic cognitive processes, do not entail that these processes or ‘mechanisms’ 
have yet been described and explained at the level of the brain, or that these 
mechanisms can be modeled in a computational way. To point to certain 
cognitive processes is certainly not a full psychological explanation in terms of 
anatomical structures and the causal processes going on at that material level. 
Usually, it does also not allow for prediction, deriving an output from an input-
history according to certain ‘principles,’ ‘laws,’ or ‘rules.’ This is not the 
standard reached so far in typical psychological explanation of how people are 
able to be creative or learn from others. Last but not least, with respect to the 
explanatory units of selection analogy, the standard, with which I will compare 
the analogy, is the standard that is used in social sciences, such as economy, 
sociology or anthropology. When these disciplines explain diffusion of cultural 
items, they refer to choices and judgments of individuals, which are assumed to 
be made by these individuals according to certain beliefs and values. It is a 
standard that does not even reach the level of basic cognitive process, but is not 
necessarily incompatible with any further explanation at a deeper level, be it at 
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the level of psychological processes or at the level of a truly naturalistic 
explanation in terms of causal laws and initial conditions.
27
  
(iii). Heuristic value. Last but not least, the third question on which I 
will base my evaluation of the Darwinian analogies is: If correct descriptions or 
explanations are given at all, are these descriptions and explanations 
heuristically valuable, i.e., ‘fruitful’? In my terminology, they are heuristically 
valuable or fruitful, if they add something to our current knowledge about the 
phenomenon at issue, either through adding a description or an explanation of a 
phenomenon that highlights something that is invisible from another already 
available explanation or description. If they are not heuristically valuable in 
this sense, if they merely reinvent the wheel, I will call them heuristically 
trivial. In such a case, the respective analogical application of evolutionary 
theory would be done by a mere superimposing of a new language on old 
insights. The application would come down to a superficial ‘perspective’ that 
can be chosen, if one wants to, motivated by various reasons, but not by facts, 
since the facts can be described in a Darwinian terms or not.  
To summarize, my evaluation of the three basic analogies will be 
guided by three questions: (i) whether the analogies are descriptively adequate, 
(ii) whether they have explanatory force, and (iii) whether these descriptions or 
explanations have a heuristic value. In case the analogies fail to be 
descriptively adequate, I will consider them wrong with respect to the 
similarity or dissimilarity at issue. In case they fail to have much explanatory 
force or fail to be fruitful, I call them trivial, either in terms of explanation or 
heuristics.  
What is at stake for us 
My critical evaluation of the three basic analogies is guided by a meta-question 
about the general implications of the analogies for our self-understanding: 
What is at stake for us in the description of creativity and culture in terms of 
the resources provided by modern Darwinian evolutionary theory? What role 
does the individual human being play in Darwinian theories of cultural change?  
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The traditional roles of individuals in cultural change are the following: 
Human individuals create cultural items, choose between created cultural 
items, and build on the ones they adopt thereby. In short, humans are the 
creators, the authors of cultural change. This is the traditional vision of human 
beings as agents of culture. We are consciously designing and transmitting 
culture with our creative mind. This vision of ourselves as agents of culture is 
often taken to be at stake when evolutionary theories are applied to culture. It is 
the aspect that makes these applications suspicious for most laymen and 
scholars alike. Many are afraid of these applications. But maybe there is no 
reason to be afraid. It may well turn out that analogical applications of 
evolutionary thinking are not in conflict with this traditional conception, since 
they are trivial in the sense specified above. Maybe “Darwin’s dangerous idea” 
(Dennett 1995) is less dangerous as it appears in the first place. Maybe 
Darwin’s idea is, in the form it is at issue here, a mere restating of what we 
always knew. The usual error in debates about applications of Darwinism to 
culture is to take for granted that the vision of us as the agents of culture is at 
stake. Therefore, to find out in which sense the analogies are indeed in conflict 
is an important philosophical issue. As mentioned above, the conflict is not so 
severe that a Darwinian account of creativity and cultural change denies that 
individuals are involved as creators. But a Darwinian account may have 
implications for the way we conceptualize our creativity and our capacity to 
choose between different cultural items, since it states that we create and 
choose novelty as ‘blind minds’ similar to blind natural selection, and that 
memes and not we direct the diffusion in culture.  
Freud once wrote about the three narcissistic insults of humanity by 
science, honoring his own ‘discovery’ of the unconscious as the third insult. 
The first insult was the Copernican revolution. Darwin’s revolutionary theory 
was the second one, since it means that humans are not the necessary destiny of 
the world, that the world was not created for them by God, that they are just 
animals. Accordingly, the meta-question of this inquiry is whether we have to 
face a fourth insult, a ‘second Darwinian revolution’, where not only our 
human nature, but also culture is explained by the evolution of memes and not 
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by our God-like creativity and ability to choose between cultural items – just as 
nature has been explained as evolution rather than God’s creation in the first 
Darwinian revolution. 
Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity 
24 
2  THE STRUCTURE OF DARWINIAN 
EXPLANATIONS OF CHANGE 
2.1  GENERAL SELECTION THEORY  
Fact, mechanism and formal principles of evolution 
Charles Darwin’s main contribution to our understanding of evolution was 
twofold. First, he managed to gather enough evidence to show the fact of 
evolution. He could convincingly show that species were not independently 
created, that later ones descended from earlier ones and evolved in a gradual 
way. Even more important was, secondly, that he put forward a special 
mechanism for evolution, namely natural selection. This mechanism is 
supposed not only to describe evolution as a gradual change, but also to explain 
the respective change. A Darwinian explanation of change differs significantly 
from its two great rival explanations of the origin and characteristics of species, 
the creationist and the Lamarckian explanation. I will present these alternative 
explanations in more detail in section 2.2 – to show by contrast what a 
Darwinian explanation of change comes down to. Before that I want to point at 
an abstract account of Darwinism, a general selection theory, and at some 
issues that will be addressed later in this chapter.
1
  
A general selection theory provides an abstract, general account of 
evolutionary thinking in the Darwinian legacy. It asks for formal or abstract 
principles that have to be met in order to call the dynamics of a system 
Darwinian. The generality of such a formal account has important merits. First, 
a formal account is indifferent to the ontology of the respective system. The 
account does not distinguish between a biological system, which is based on 
genes, and a computer program, which is based on digits. Hence it does not 
rule out from the start that there are other systems than the biological system of 
                                                
1
 The term ‘general selection theory’, used for instance by Campbell (1997), has gained 
considerable dominance in the last years. The similar terms ‘universal Darwinism’, introduced 
by Dawkins (1983), or ‘universal selection theory’, used for instance by Cziko (1995), can also 
be found frequently. 
 
Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity 
25 
genes, organisms and species that change in a Darwinian manner. If a system 
meets the formal principles, then it can be regarded as changing in a Darwinian 
manner – despite ontological differences. Second, such a general perspective 
serves the task of evaluating analogies, since it avoids disputes about 
differences between culture and organic evolution that are irrelevant for the 
analogy. An example for such a difference would be that culture is not based 
on sexual reproduction, while organic evolution is. Despite this difference, 
both can be Darwinian systems from a general point of view. Although the 
DNA-based biological evolution was the first Darwinian process discovered, 
not all of its characteristics are essential for considering it as Darwinian. 
According to “Campbell’s Rule,”
2
 when drawing analogies between nature and 
culture, one should not directly compare special features of one system with 
the features of another one. Rather one should start with a general theory: with 
general principles that are essential for a Darwinian system and therefore 
relevant for an evaluation of analogical applications of Darwinian thinking.  
What are these general principles? Darwin himself (1859: 343 and 459) 
is often quoted with his formula of the theory of descent with modification 
through natural selection. Today, evolution of a system through natural 
selection is usually described by three principles. If a system contains 
variation, differential fitness and heritability, natural selection and adaptation 
follow. The classic reference for this description of evolution by natural 
selection is Lewontin (1970). According to Lewontin (1970: 1),  
“Darwin’s scheme embodies three principles:  
1. Different individuals in a population have different morphologies, 
physiologies, and behaviors (phenotypic variation). 
2. Different phenotypes have different rates of survival and reproduction in 
different environments (differential fitness).  
3. There is correlation between parents and offspring in the contribution of 
each to future generations (fitness is heritable).  
These three principles embody the principle of evolution by natural selection. 
While they hold, a population will undergo evolutionary change.”  
 
This is the “logical skeleton” (Lewontin 1970: 1) of Darwin’s mechanism of 
natural selection. Note that it leaves out ‘overpopulation’ and the resulting 
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 See Durham (1991: 187 or 425f), who introduced the term. Campbell stated his ‘rule’ in 
Campbell (1987 [1960]). For a recent formulation see Campbell (1997: 6) or Hull (2000: 45f).  
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competition as criteria for natural selection. Competition in this sense is often 
cited as necessary for selection to occur. Contrary to this, Lewontin states that 
“[n]atural selection [of bacteria, MK] occurs even when two bacterial strains 
are growing logarithmically in an excess of nutrient broth if they have different 
division time” (Lewontin 1970: 1). As Lewontin’s example shows, competition 
is not important for Darwinian evolution through natural selection. Even in 
good times the ‘good’ ones will have a higher fitness.  
The essential blindness of Darwinian evolution 
What is, however, of utmost importance, even though it is totally left implicit 
in the three principles, is the so-called ‘blindness’ of Darwinian evolution. If 
the three principles are fulfilled, selection can occur, leading to adaptations as 
products of multiple steps of selection. However, the Darwinian paradigm 
describes, explains and predicts adaptation without a designer. There is no 
‘watchmaker’ or ‘designer’ of organic evolution. This is why the natural 
process of evolution is called ‘blind.’ Even if we describe nature – 
metaphorically – as a ‘watchmaker,’ nature is a ‘blind watchmaker.’ I will 
show in section 2.3 that the common, but metaphorical expression of 
‘blindness’ amounts to different aspects of Darwinian evolution: Darwinism 
explains adaptation with repeated cycles of undirected variation, followed by a 
selective process, which can only proceed ex post facto, i.e., after the 
occurrence of variants, and only in an opportunistic manner. 
Through these aspects of nature’s blindness, Darwin initiated two major 
changes in the understanding of evolution. In Darwin’s theory, the inclusion of 
blind, i.e., undirected variation led to a new pattern of change, namely 
variational evolution. Through this and through the opportunistic manner of 
selection, he completely replaced not only the idea of divine creation but also a 
certain idea of progress. The latter sharply distinguishes the Darwinian concept 
of evolution from Lamarck's theory of evolution, the second grand 
evolutionary theory that arose in the 19
th
 century. Neither in divine creation, 
nor in Lamarckian evolution does blindness play any explanatory role. 
Therefore, blindness, in its different aspects, can be regarded as the 
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distinguishing feature of a Darwinian evolutionary process. Gradualism can be 
part of all three models. Therefore, it cannot count as distinctively Darwinian.  
Explanations of origination and fitness differences 
There are further aspects of Darwinian thinking that are only implicit in the 
skeleton but important for the evaluation of the three basic analogies. The first 
is about explanations of origination and fitness differences. Evolutionary 
theory as a theory about the mechanism of change does not have to address the 
origin of life. Apart from the very first moment of the appearance of biological 
substances on earth, evolution can treat every question of origin as a question 
about the change from one species to another one. Evolutionary theory has, 
however, to answer other questions of origin in order to explain the respective 
change. At each step in cumulative cycles of variation, differential fitness, 
heritability, and consequent selection, the explanation of change must mean an 
explanation of the origin of the novel features that lead to the variation. 
Otherwise it would, first, not really explain the origination of new 
characteristics, but only their maintenance in each cycle of the cumulative 
evolutionary process. Second, it would not even explain the maintenance of 
new characteristics in each cycle, since it would not be able to explain the 
fitness differences leading to a differential maintenance of traits, since fitness 
differences are an effect of novel features.  
The three principles only describe the dynamics of a sorting process. In 
order to explain evolution, evolutionary theory must explain the origin of 
variation that leads to fitness differences and hence fuels the sorting process. 
The first issue about origination is relevant for the origination analogy. It 
shows that the main question about origination is one about the origin of 
variants and not so much about maintenance. The issue about the Darwinian 
account of the origin of variation will dominate section 2.3. However, the 
second issue concerns the Darwinian explanation of the maintenance of 
characteristics, which has been criticized for being tautological. I will explain 
the latter issue in more detail in section 2.4. The issue is important for the 
explanatory units of selection analogy.  
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Ontological generality 
Ontological generality is a further aspect of the three principles that has to be 
taken seriously. As Lewontin states, the three principles can be applied to 
different entities and mechanism of inheritance:  
“No particular mechanism of inheritance is specified, but only a correlation 
in fitness between parent and offspring. The population would evolve 
whether the correlation between parent and offspring arose from Mendelian, 
cytoplasmic, or cultural inheritance. […] The generality of the principles of 
natural selection means that any entities in nature that have variation, 
reproduction, and heritability may evolve” (Lewontin 1970: 1).  
In principle, we just have to replace ‘individuals’ in the above cited threefold 
recipe with another entity, check whether the principles are fulfilled, and we 
get other “units of selection” (ibid.). Groups of organisms as well as cultural 
entities can be such units of selection. Gene selectionism, however, argues that 
neither groups nor individuals can be units of selection in biological evolution. 
This thesis is the main issue of the famous units of selection debate, which has 
been a major concern of evolutionary biology for decades.  
For gene selectionism, there is only one fundamental unit of selection, 
namely the gene. One of the main arguments is that the individual is not 
preserved through evolution, since it dies and since the respective offspring are 
never a copy of one of the parents, even if there is heritability of traits. For 
evolution through natural selection to occur, gene selectionism demands that 
there must be a so-called replicator that persists over time. The replicator and 
only the replicator is the real unit of selection. Evolution is differential 
replication. Thus, heritability, the third of the three principles of evolution by 
natural selection, is regarded as not enough for evolution to occur. Heritability 
between offspring and parents means that ‘like begets like’, that parents and 
offspring are more similar than other pairs of individuals, and that the 
similarity between parent and offspring is due to shared genes and not due to 
environmental influence. In the case of sexual reproduction, heritability does 
not mean, and cannot mean that offspring have all the genes of each of the 
parents.  
I will say more on the argument that organisms cannot be units of 
selection in section 2.5. At this moment, it is merely important to realize why 
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this issue is important. From the point of view of gene selectionism, evolution 
in general becomes replicator selectionism. Whatever change is at issue, the 
unit of selection must be a replicator, be it genes in nature or so-called ‘memes’ 
in culture. Therefore, the units of selection debate is important not only for the 
theory of organic evolution, but also for the analogy to culture, mainly for the 
ontological analogy and the units of selection analogy. Furthermore, it shows 
that there are different versions of Darwinian theory, gene selectionism and 
traditional individual selectionism.  
2.2  PATTERNS OF CHANGE 
Creationism, Lamarck, and Darwin 
In the following two sections, I want to give a detailed picture what Darwinian 
evolution is by showing the difference between three patterns of change: 
creation, Lamarckian transformational evolution and Darwinian variational 
evolution. In this section, I will first introduce the pattern of change that was 
postulated by ‘arguments from design’: divine creation. I will then introduce 
Lamarck’s theory of evolution as an example of a second pattern of change, 
namely transformational evolution. Although transformational evolution does 
not postulate a designer, it still does not imply the aspects of blindness 
involved in a Darwinian variational pattern of evolution, which will be 
presented at the end of this section. The different aspects of blindness will then 
be described in detail in section 2.3.  
Creation 
Ernst Mayr writes that “[n]o consequence of Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection was a source of greater dismay to his opponents than the elimination 
of design from nature” (Mayr 1976 [1962]: 30). In the context of evolutionary 
debates, the term ‘design’ can refer to two different things: (i) to properties of 
an object that is regarded as the designed thing, such as order, adaptedness, 
function, complexity, etc.; (ii) to the process of designing the order, 
adaptedness, function, complexity etc. by a conscious, foresightful plan.  
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What Darwinism eliminated was not (i) design in the sense of 
properties of organisms, but (ii) design as a process that explains the existence 
of (i). The debate about Darwinism and creationism is a debate about the 
question whether we really need (ii), a design process, in order to explain (i). In 
order to prevent confusion about the term ‘design,’ I will henceforth use the 
term ‘creation’ for the idea of a design process.  
The idea of creation is as old as philosophy. In the Timaios (27a ff), 
Plato introduced the demiurgos as the creator of the world of becoming, which 
he regarded as derivative from the eternal forms, templates after which the 
world is created. The creator did not only bring about the adaptive 
characteristics of organisms, but also the harmony of the whole universe, 
which contains the “great chain of being” (Lovejoy 1936), i.e., an order of the 
species that can be depicted as an ascending line.  
In order to elicit what characterizes creation and how it differs from 
Darwinian evolution, I will start with the famous ‘argument from design.’ The 
argument from design goes back to Plato and Aristotle and was advocated by 
Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae as the fifth way to prove the 
existence of God. It has received a devastating critique by David Hume in his 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. It nonetheless survived and had its 
“heyday” in 19
th
 century pre-Darwinian times, when evolutionary thinking was 
already in the air (Sober 2000: 30). William Paley became its spokesman. His 
form of the argument, which was laid down in his Natural Theology (1802), 
became the template for creationist arguments against Darwinism. That is why 
I will concentrate on his version of the argument from design.  
At the center of Paley’s argument from design stands the adaptivity of 
organisms, not the order of the whole universe or the great chain of being, 
although they are important as well. Paley used the analogy between artifacts 
and organisms, as others did before him. Since the opening paragraph of his 
Natural Theology has become the “conceptual center of gravity for the entire 
discourse” (LeMahieu 1976: 5), it should not be withhold from the reader:  
“In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were 
asked how the stone came to be there: I might possibly answer, that, for 
anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever […] But suppose I 
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had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch 
happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer which I had 
before given, - that, for anything I knew, the watch might have always been 
there. […] when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could 
not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for 
a purpose, e.g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and 
that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day […] it requires 
indeed an examination of the instrument, and perhaps some previous 
knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as 
we have said, observed and understood, the inference we think is inevitable, 
that the watch must have had a maker: that there must have existed, at some 
time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for 
the purpose which we find it actually to answer: who comprehend its 
construction and designed its use” (Paley 1825 [1802]: 1-2).  
In a nutshell, the “argument from design” then is:  
“There cannot be design without a designer, contrivance, without a contriver; 
order, without choice, arrangement, without anything capable of arranging; 
subserviency and relation to a purpose, without that which could intend a 
purpose; means suitable to an end, and executing their office in 
accomplishing that end, without the end ever having been contemplated, or 
the means accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of parts, 
subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to a use, imply the 
presence of intelligence and mind” (ibid.: 8).  
This holds for works of human creativity, such as a telescope, as well as for 
“the works of nature”, such as an eye: “[T]he eye was made for vision, as […] 
the telescope was made for assisting it” (ibid.: 12-13).  
Debates about the argument from design are abundant. Some address 
the logical form of the argument.
3
 However, one of the most complicated 
issues is the precise nature of (i), design in the sense of properties of objects. 
What is design? Paley used terms like “purpose and design,” “contrivance,” 
“arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of 
instruments to a use,” “organized,” “complicated,” or “complex.” Dawkins 
uses “adaptive complexity” (Dawkins 1983, 1986). Contemporary creationists 
stress “complex specified information” (Dembski 1998) or “irreducible 
complexity” (Behe 1996). Despite differences, they all more or less stress two 
aspects: complexity and function. In a nutshell, this means that the parts of an 
organism, as well as the parts of a watch, are arranged in a complex way and 
serve a purpose. They have a function. However, it is still unresolved how to 
understand complexity and functions precisely.   
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The latter question would lead us into issues that deserve an extended 
treatment on their own, which cannot be given here. Furthermore, what is 
important in this inquiry is not (i), but the assumptions about (ii), the idea of 
creation as a design activity itself. However, for analyzing (ii), a few words on 
functions are needed, since the idea of creation explains the ‘internal teleology’ 
of organisms (i.e., the functions of organs, which serve the well-being, 
including survival and reproduction, of organisms), as effect of an ‘external 
teleology.’
4
 
Darwinists as well as creationists assume internal teleology. Even if 
Darwinists do not assume a creator, they nonetheless believe that there is 
something special about organisms that needs a special explanation. The 
existence of an organ like the eye has to be explained differently than the 
existence of a stone, as Paley stressed. The explanation uses functional 
language, which enters biology because at least some organs can be explained 
as adaptations.
5
 An eye, for instance, is considered to be an adaptation since it 
has been selected because it enables organisms to see. Because of this selective 
history of the organ, seeing is the function of the eye. Let me explain this. If we 
want to explain why a bird has an eye, we could cite facts about embryological 
development or genetic dispositions for such eyes. But this does not answer 
why the eye came into existence at all, why there are birds with genetic 
dispositions for eyes. Hence, the answer must go beyond this developmental 
point of view. The evolutionary point of view suggests that the eye exists, 
because eyes are good for seeing. In other words, eyes exist because to have 
them was beneficial for the well-being of the bird. It therefore enhanced its 
survival and reproduction. This is meant when it is said that the bird has an eye 
because the eye fulfills a specific function. Thus, when I say ‘function,’ I mean 
what has been called ‘etiological functions’ (Wright 1973). Current debates 
about functional talk distinguish this notion of function, which is linked to a 
selective history, from a notion of function that wants to define function 
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5
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irrespective of selective history, often called Cummins-function, after 
Cummins (1975). Cummins and his followers argue that the notion of function 
should not be linked to adaptation and selective history and that etiological 
accounts of function are mere vestiges of the old idea of creation. I do not want 
to take a stand on the question how function should be properly defined.
6
 What 
I want to say is the following: First, although talk about adaptations might do 
without the term function, they cannot do without talking of beneficial effects. 
Second, the explanation of an adaptive organ rests on the assumption that 
organ has been selected because of its beneficial effects for the survival and 
reproduction of the organism. Both creationism and Darwinism rely on such 
reasoning. The former say that the organs have been created because of these 
effects, the latter that it has been selected because of these effects. The 
difference between ‘created’ and ‘selected’ is not one about internal teleology. 
It is a difference about external teleology, to which I turn now.  
External teleology: The term ‘external teleology’ refers, first, to an 
intentional plan, which is external to the product having a certain function, and, 
second, to an external value of the object – a value for a creator or perceiver.
7
 
That is the point where Darwinians depart from creationists. Creationists 
assume that the functionality, the internal teleology of organisms, did come 
about because a creator designed them to have this internal teleology. God 
created the eye because it enables animals to see. Such explanations refer to an 
anticipation of future outcomes and the planning and desire of these outcomes 
in the mind of a creator. And it is precisely because of the pre-existing external 
anticipation and intention that the eye exhibits a certain function. An external 
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 The second aspect of the concept of ‘external teleology’ is not important here, but see 
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teleology leads to, and consequently explains, the internal teleology of the eye. 
In Darwinian functional explanations, the internal teleology of the eye is not 
understood as superimposed by an external agent. The eye evolved gradually 
through the selective interaction between a lineage of organisms and their 
selective environment. The effects of selection then lead to adaptation or 
function, but it does not involve an intention of a designer. Selection thus leads 
to internal teleology without external teleology.  
Before I explain in a more positive way what such a Darwinian 
selectionist explanation amounts to, I want to say a little bit more about the 
idea of creation and the pattern of change assumed in that idea. Divine creation 
– the designing activity of a deity – is usually understood as unobservable as 
the deity itself. We can only infer the creative process from the products of 
creation. But Paley tried to say something about how God is doing his job and 
about which attributes such a creator must have in order to do his job. 
According to Paley, organisms show – as do artifacts – complexity and 
functions. Complexity shows the designer’s wisdom, and functions show the 
designer’s purposes and benevolence. Let us imagine that God saw, for 
instance, that it would be good for this or that type of organism to have vision. 
He recognized then what is needed for a device that enables a creature to see. 
He thought up a structure of an organism and its parts so that the respective 
organism can have vision. Finally, he created this type of organism. That is the 
idea of God as creator of adaptations. But God’s purpose and benevolence is 
not only visible in the diverse adaptations of the diverse species. It is also 
visible in the order of the species. God created the universe in order and 
harmony. For the biological sphere, the “great chain of being” (Lovejoy 1936), 
a chain from the simplest to the most complex organisms, is the order that 
gives every species its place and secures harmony. This means that the deity 
created the world according to a “rational plan of creation that human mind 
might hope to understand” (Bowler 2003: 28). This “master plan” was not only 
thought to make the biological realm rational, but also to give meaning to life 
and the struggle involved in it (LeMahieu 1976: 71). Whatever happens, it is 
all part of the master plan and makes sense as a consequence of the deity’s 
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benevolence and perfection. Furthermore, since the whole creation is perfect, 
every link in the chain was created or at least planned from the start. Since the 
order that springs from this divine master plan was thought to be perfect, there 
was no place for extinction and evolution of species. Although there might be 
individual differences, species have unchangeable essential characteristics, 
which are perfect and created at the beginning. Individual differences were 
thought to exist, but the variation based on these differences was thought to 
vanish as soon as it comes into existence. Variation was considered as 
negligible noise in the system. From the point of view of the idea of divine 
creation, the biological realm is thus static, perfect and conceived in essentialist 
terms. The pattern of change assumed in such a creationism actually is no 
pattern of change. It is the negation of change; it is a static pattern. Below I will 
show how such a static creationism can nonetheless turn into a deistic 
evolutionism.  
Now, how is the creator doing his job? In the chapter on the personality 
of the creator deity, Paley (1825 [1802]: 284) writes that the creating agency, 
which brings about the adaptations and the chain of being, is “that which can 
contrive, which can design.” It “must be a person,” since contrivance implies 
“consciousness and thought.” This means that there must be a creator who “can 
perceive an end or purpose,” and who has the “power of providing the means, 
and of directing them to their end.” According to Paley, creation is thus 
characterized by at least five elements: personal unity, purpose, power, 
knowledge and foresight.
8
  
In addition, the following points have to be taken into account: Such a 
concept of creation also means (a) that everything is decided by an agency that 
is external to the products, as shown above, and (b) that everything is decided 
already before the actual occurrence of the organisms, and (c) that the deity can 
always start afresh. The latter two points are important for our comparison 
between the idea of creation and the blindness of Darwinian evolution. Because 
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of perfect knowledge and foresight, the creator – if as perfect as God – does not 
have to try or test. God does not make errors. He plans and thinks before he 
acts. Since he knows what is going to happen, he can avoid errors. Everything 
is perfectly designed before the occurrence of the products, thanks to the 
deity’s perfect foresight. As Dawkins writes, “[a] true watchmaker has 
foresight: he designs his cogs and springs, and plans their interconnections, 
with a future purpose in his mind’s eye” (Dawkins 1986: 5). This also means 
that God creates from scratch. Since he can do this all the time, he can start a 
new blueprint for each species whenever he wants. He does therefore not have 
to build on old stuff. As perfect and omnipotent as he is, he does not have to 
tinker. I will show in section 2.3 that nature’s blindness, its lack of foresight, 
condemns nature to errors and to tinkering. At this point, it is important to 
realize that a creator deity can create each species independently of others.  
However, he could as well design a process of development, where one 
species leads to another one, instead of creating all the species independently at 
one moment of time. And indeed such a deistic conception of creation was 
used against evolutionary ideas, after evidence of massive change in the 
biological realm could not be ignored anymore during the late 18
th
 and early 
19
th
 century (Bowler 2003). Independent creation is thus not a necessary part of 
a creationist worldview. And gradualism is compatible with the idea of creation 
through a benevolent creator. It is compatible with his perfection, external 
purposiveness, knowledge and foresight, as long as the outcome is the same 
perfect system of adaptive species. The only thing that happens to adaptation 
and the great chain of being, if gradualism becomes part of the idea of creation, 
is that adaptation and the order of species are temporalized. Deistic creation (or 
evolution, if you prefer the term) assumes a single creative act: an ingenious, 
foresightful fixing of the initial conditions and the natural laws, so that each 
consequent event in the biotic and abiotic world was pre-designed by the 
creator. The rise of new species would have been the mere unfolding of the 
plan of the creator, who created a perfect creation machine, namely nature. 
Temporalized perfection is progress through an unfolding process: evolution 
by creation. Lamarck, to whom I will turn to next, also assumed such a kind of 
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automatic unfolding progress, but he omitted the external creator. For the idea 
of creation it is important to realize the following: Gradualism is compatible 
with the idea of creation. But a concept of change that explains change without 
external teleology, without foresight, and without perfection or progress is in 
direct opposition to it. Deistic evolutionism still includes these three 
parameters.  
To summarize, the idea of creation implies that a deity creates a system 
that is perfect and either static or progressively developing, according to a pre-
determined plan. The deity does this through a conscious design process, with a 
definite purpose and with a perfect, foresightful plan for the realization of his 
plans in mind. The resulting internal teleology of organisms rests on an 
external teleology. Everything is decided beforehand and excludes errors. Each 
species can be created independently of others.  
Transformational evolution  
Lamarck’s theory of evolution, which was the main 19
th
 century alternative to a 
Darwinian theory of evolution, still includes progress. Lamarck omits external 
teleology, but keeps progress – perfection in its gradualist guise – by 
postulating a pattern of change that has been called transformational. One of 
the reasons is that he was still deeply influenced by a kind of essentialism.  
In Lamarck’s theory of evolution, laid down in his Philosophie 
zoologique (1809), the cause of change can be split into two factors: (i) an 
internal drive towards complexity, securing progress in terms of increasing 
complexity, and (ii) a mechanism of adaptation to local environmental 
circumstances through use and misuse of organs. The first factor determines 
the broad phylogenetic ‘destination’ of evolution, leading to a temporalized 
version of the traditional scalae naturae, the great chain of being, with man as 
the most developed and most complex of the various biological species. 
Lamarck explains this drive towards complexity with a normal physical 
mechanism that automatically causes an increase in complexity. The second 
factor is held responsible for the deviations from this destination towards 
complexity. Today Lamarck is mainly remembered for this second factor, since 
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it is connected with the inheritance of acquired characteristics.
9
 It is a 
mechanism that leads to a “strange irregularity in the increasing complexity of 
animal organisation” (Lamarck 1984 [1809]: 107). What Lamarck called 
irregularities would today be called adaptations to the local environment. 
Lamarck formulated the mechanism of this second factor in the form of two 
laws. The first one secures that changes are acquired, the second one that they 
are inherited:  
“First Law. In every animal which has not passed the limit of its 
development, a more frequent and continuous use of any organ gradually 
strengthens, develops and enlarges that organ, and gives it a power 
proportional to the length of time it has been so used; while the permanent 
disuse of any organ imperceptibly weakens and deteriorates it, and 
progressively diminishes its functional capacity, until it finally disappears.”  
“Second Law. All the acquisitions or losses wrought by nature on 
individuals, through the influence of the environment in which their race has 
long been placed, and hence through the influence of the predominant use or 
permanent disuse of any organ; all these are preserved by reproduction to the 
new individuals which arise, provided that the acquired modifications are 
common to both sexes, or at least to the individuals which produce the 
young.” (Lamarck 1984 [1809]: 113; Emph. added)  
To use an organ is an activity of an individual. Consequently the organism is 
not totally passive in this process of adaptation. How can Lamarck then say, 
that the gains and losses are “wrought by nature on individuals” without 
contradicting himself? He saw the point and wrote:  
„I must now explain what I mean by this statement: the environment affects 
the shape and organisation of animals, that is to say that when the 
environment becomes very different, it produces in course of time 
corresponding modifications in the shape and organisation of animals. It is 
true if this statement were to be taken literally, I should be convicted of an 
error; for, whatever the environment may do, it does not work any direct 
modification whatever in the shape and organisation of animals. But great 
alterations in the environment of animals lead to great alterations in their 
needs, and these alterations in their needs necessarily lead to others in their 
activities. Now if the new needs become permanent, the animals then adopt 
new habits, which last as long as the needs that evoked them.“ (Lamarck 
ibid.: 107).  
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 I am taking Lamarckian evolution as a historical suggestion of how to understand change. 
Lamarck’s theory has proved to be wrong. One of the reasons is that the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics seems to be impossible. This was first experimentally tested and 
claimed by Weismann (1892) and still counts as the “central dogma” of Neo-Darwinism (Crick 
1958: 153). A second reason is that Lamarck’s two factors have been replaced by undirected 
‘mutation’ as the sole true factor that introduces novelty into evolution.  
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That Lamarck talks about needs has led to a debate about which roles ‘striving’ 
and will play in the design of Lamarck’s theory. The problem begins 
historically with the mistranslation of French besoin (needs) as ‘wants’ or 
‘desires’ (Cannon 1957) and goes on in current discussions.
10
 However, this 
question is irrelevant here, since there is no important difference between 
Lamarck’s ideas about needs, use and disuse, and other theories of so-called 
direct induction by the environment, to which Lamarck is implicitly referring 
to in the quotation above. According to Lamarck, even if the environment 
cannot have a direct effect on the organism without any intermediary reactions 
of the organisms as a medium, the changes of the organisms are directed by the 
environment. They are ‘wrought by nature on individuals.’ Nature causes 
changes in needs, and these changes ‘necessarily lead to [changes] in their 
activities,’ which lead to new habits and heritable changes in the shape and 
organization of the individuals. Therefore, according to Lamarck, all adaptive 
organic changes are induced or ‘instructed,’ as others have called it, by the 
environment in a directing way.
11
 The response of the organism is determined 
by its environment. Through this mechanism, it is guaranteed that organisms 
adapt to their environment. Given a certain environment, the modifications or 
new characteristics that arise are necessarily adaptive.  
Together, the two factors – (i), the internal drive towards complexity, 
and (ii), the mechanism of adaptation to local environmental circumstances – 
impose a definite direction on evolution by always causing changes in each 
individual in one direction: increase in complexity and adaptedness. Change is 
brought about through directed generation of novelty. Because of the directed 
generation of novelty, increase in complexity and adaptivity, the two outcomes 
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 Considering plants, Lamarck says: “There are no activities and consequently no habits, 
properly so-called, great changes of environment none the less lead to great differences in the 
development of their parts…” (Lamarck 1984 [1809]: 108). In his well-known study of 
Lamarck’s theory, Burkhardt (1995: 175) stresses that only for the most perfect animals did 
Lamarck postulate initiative or will in the narrow sense. See also Mayr (1976 [1972]: 225) and 
Gillispie (1956: 332).  
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 Jerne (1967), Medawar (1982 [1977]: 173), Dawkins (1982a: 167ff, 1983: 410ff), Avital & 
Jablonka (2000: 19-21), to name but a few.  
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of evolution that Lamarck postulated, are guaranteed to arise. They are law-like 
outcomes of evolution. Through this, evolution is secured to be progressive. 
Lamarck also assumed that the two factors act on all individuals of a 
population in the same directing way. Therefore not only some individuals get 
more complex and adapt automatically to the respective environment, but all of 
them. This is important since it leads to a totally different pattern of change: 
Lamarckian evolution is transformational evolution. In transformational 
evolution, variation and selection are superfluous. They are not necessary for 
evolution to occur. Let me explain this step by step.  
As Mayr has put it, between Lamarckian and Darwinian evolution, 
there is a  
„radical difference in the mechanisms by which the environment is effective. 
Lamarck’s conceptualization provided him with no opportunity to utilize 
natural selection. In spite of his nominalistic emphasis on the existence only 
of individuals, not of species or genera, Lamarck unconsciously treated these 
individuals as identical, hence typologically, just as an essentialist would. All 
of his statements on the impact of the environment are phrased in typological 
language: […] If a given environment induces very specific needs, Lamarck 
postulates that different organisms entering this environment will respond 
with the same activities and efforts and thus acquire similar structures and 
adaptations.” (Mayr 1976 [1972]: 241) 
Lamarck thought that all individuals of a given species change in a given 
environment in the same way. In parallel to the idea of creation, even if 
individuals are never identical, individual differences are treated as a mere 
noise that does not influence evolution. Therefore, in Lamarckian evolution 
there is – at a certain point in time, in a given environment – no evolutionarily 
significant variation between individuals of one species. All individuals of one 
type are treated as essentially the same. Through this ‘typological’ view, as 
Mayr calls it, it is not only guaranteed that complexity increases and adaptive 
changes arise somewhere in a population. It is also guaranteed that all of the 
individuals will acquire the same changes.  
Since the two factors, which direct the emergence of novelty, act on 
every individual in the same way, the two factors change the species as a 
whole, which is thereby transformed. Such a pattern of change is what 
Lewontin called “transformational evolution”. For transformational evolution, 
it is the case that, if a system has changed in time, this happened “because each 
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element in the system underwent an individual transformation during its life 
history” (Lewontin 1985 [1983]: 85), as shown in fig_1. Lamarckian 
transformational evolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig_1. Lamarckian transformational evolution: The population changes because each 
individual changes in the direction of evolution
12
 
 
From this it follows that variation and selection are not necessary for evolution 
to occur: First, variation is evolutionarily unimportant. Because of the 
transformational pattern, which rests on the typological view of individuals, 
evolutionarily important intra-specific variation only exists diachronically. 
There is no evolutionarily intra-specific variation in space at a given point in 
time. Second, there is no need for selection for evolution to occur. Since there 
is no evolutionarily variation, i.e., since all individuals are guaranteed to 
change in adaptive ways, there is also no need for selection of individuals in 
such a model of directed generation of novelty. Every new feature is brought 
about by a combination of Lamarck’s two factors (i.e., the directional 
unfolding of the internal trend towards complexity and the induction by the 
environment). Since the generation of novelty was supposed to be directed and 
essentialist, Lamarck’s theory shares an important aspect with the idea of 
creation: There is no waste, no selection of the unfit. Selection is unnecessary 
because the novelties that arise are guaranteed to arise in the direction of 
evolution anyway.  
The idea of creation guaranteed directed generation of novelty through 
the deity’s providence. Although Lamarck did not assume any wise and 
intentional creator, variation is not considered as significant, errors that are 
weeded out are no important factor, and progress is still secured in the 
                                                
12
 Figure is loosely based on Medawar (1981 [1953]: 64f). 
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transformational pattern. As Ruse (2003: 54) has stressed, the idea of progress, 
which first came up with respect to social life and was mirrored then in 
progressivistic evolutionary ideas, was a kind of Ersatz for the idea of divine 
creation. It still made sure that life and effort made sense as part of an 
automatic development of the human species towards perfection.
13
  
To summarize, through directed generation of novelty and the 
typological view of individuals, Lamarck could develop a model of evolution 
that is gradualist, that does not refer to an external teleology – neither for the 
great chain of being, nor for adaptation. There is no foresight involved. There 
is no personal creator that designs organisms so that they are adapted and 
arranged along the great chain of being. There is only an internal drive towards 
complexity, and the lawful instructive influence of the environment on 
organisms. The environment has no foresight, only causal power. This 
distinguishes Lamarckian evolution from the idea of divine creation. But the 
transformational pattern is still progressive, since it relies on directed 
generation of novelty and a typological view of individuals. As a consequence, 
variation and selection are unnecessary in such a transformational pattern of 
change. Denial of external teleology is only half-way to a Darwinian kind of 
change, which can – as a matter of fact – lead to progress, but does not have 
progress built in it – as a guaranteed result of the occurring change – since it 
relies on variation and selection, which are ‘blind’ in ways that will be 
illustrated below. 
Variational evolution 
The core of Darwinian evolution, however, consists of the three principles 
Selection is an essential part of the process: variation, fitness differences, and 
heritability lead to selection. Variation means that individuals of a species 
differ from one another and that the differences can add up in the course of 
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 Even after Darwin had developed his evolutionary model, in which selection was a necessary 
part to explain adaptation, Victorian style so-called ‘social Darwinism’, which was in fact 
inspired by Spencer’s Lamarckian evolutionism, rejected selection. According to Bowler 
(1988: 13f), this was because of the demotivating implications of natural selection. See, for 
instance, Peel (1971: 147ff), Bowler (1988: 38-40), Richards (1987: 291-294), or Rindos 
(1985: 66-68) on the common misrepresentation of Spencer as Darwinian.  
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evolution. This means that individual differences are an essential part of a 
Darwinian explanation of evolutionary change. Variation has evolutionary 
significance. Because of variation there also has to be selection, in order to 
weed out the less fit variants. This is the main difference between a Darwinian 
pattern and a Lamarckian transformational pattern of evolutionary change. 
Darwin can thus be said to be the real ‘inventor’ of the individual. He 
made synchronic intra-specific variation a necessary building block of his 
evolutionary model. Thereby he laid the ground for what Mayr called 
‘population thinking’ (Mayr 1959: 2-4). For the first time in evolutionary 
thinking, he thereby overcame the old philosophical essentialist concept of the 
relation between individuals and a species. Individuals are unique. They vary. 
Their differences are not only real in the sense that there is no real essence of a 
species; individual differences are even necessary for evolution to occur. Since 
Darwin was a gradualist, individuals were not ‘hopeful monsters’ for him. 
They nonetheless were the hopeful reformers – because of their individuality. 
In Lamarck’s theory, however, individuals were hopeful reformers because of 
their lack in individuality.  
On the basis of variation, the change of the whole system comes about 
through a sorting process. This is the basic pattern of what Lewontin called 
variational evolution: The change in the system comes about through a sorting 
process that changes the statistical distribution of different types of variants of 
individuals. The whole “system evolves by changes in the proportions of the 
different types” (Lewontin 1985 [1983]: 86), as depicted in Fig_2. Darwinian 
variational evolution.  
 
 
 
 
 
fig_2. Darwinian variational evolution: The population changes because the statistical 
distribution changes.
14
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Hence, for variational evolution, a sorting process – be it natural 
selection, drift, or artificial selection – is necessary for evolution.
15
 
Furthermore, it is the sorting process that imposes the direction of evolution – 
ex post facto, after the occurrence of new characteristics.  
Conclusion 
Darwin did not only introduce a naturalist and gradualist account of adaptation. 
This is also part of Lamarckian evolution and is not impossible for a creationist 
account. Darwin went further. He introduced variational evolution, a totally 
new model of how change can take place, making variation and selection a 
necessary part of any evolutionary change. The model rests on certain implicit 
assumptions about how the essential variation comes about, and it leads to 
some changes in thinking that have not been addressed so far. The assumptions 
and consequences are all connected with what I above called ‘blindness’ of 
Darwinian evolution. Only through these further aspects, do we understand 
why Darwin was able to omit all the principles contained in the idea of 
creation: not only external teleology and foresight, but also automatic progress 
through directed generation of novelty, which were still part of Lamarck’s 
transformational pattern of change.  
2.3  DARWINIAN EVOLUTION AS ‘BLIND’ 
Blind variation 
As I have just illustrated already, it is common to say that Darwinism rests on 
‘blind,’ ‘random,’ or ‘undirected variation,’ as opposed to Lamarckism, which 
rests on directed generation of novelty. It is yet often unclear what ‘blindness’ 
as undirectedness, the opposite of directedness, means. I will distinguish 
between two slightly different meanings of undirectedness: (i) undirected 
variation as denial of a Lamarckian instructive mechanism of adaptation, 
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 Drift is a sorting process that is neutral with respect to fitness differences and the underlying 
adaptedness of the organisms. It is survival of the ‘luckiest,’ not of the ‘fittest,’ as Kimura 
(1983) puts it. Drift is nonetheless considered as compatible with Darwinism, since even 
neutral evolution can be understood in Darwinian variational terms. For more on ‘drift’ see 
section 2.4. 
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through which the environment causes adaptive changes in organisms; (ii) 
undirected variation as the absence of a statistical correlation, called 
‘coupling’, between the factors that produce novelty and the factors that select 
novelty in biological evolution.  
(i). Undirected variation as denial of a Lamarckian instructive 
mechanism of adaptation. Often, the claim that variation in biological 
evolution is undirected is thought to exclude the above-mentioned Lamarckian 
mechanism of environmentally induced adaptedness. From a philosophical 
point of view, one could also say that in a pattern that excludes a Lamarckian 
mechanism, producing as well as selecting can be instances of ordinary 
causation, but in any case they are part of different contexts of causation. In 
directed generation of novelty the individual variant arises because of its 
adaptive value. If such a mechanism is absent, the cause of the generation of 
new properties is a non-adaptive process, while the cause of preservation lies in 
the interaction with the environment, leading to the selection of the adaptive 
ones. New properties do then not occur because of an adaptive value, even if 
these properties have an adaptive value. In the end, the variants that arise and 
are adaptive will survive. They are adaptations and maybe more complex (as 
products), if they are selected at all, but they are not produced in the first place 
by adaptation as a process. That is why variational evolution has been 
described as a discontinuous “two-step process” (Mayr 1976 [1962]: 33), or as 
consisting of “two separate processes, rather than a single force” (Gould 1979: 
24). Evolution can thus be interpreted as relying on coincidences: a co-
occurrence of events having independent causal histories.
16
 William James 
described this coincidental structure in the following way:  
“There are, in short, different cycles of operation in nature; different 
departments, so to speak, relatively independent of one another, […] The 
causes which operate in these incommensurable cycles are connected with 
one another only if we take the whole universe into account. For all lesser 
points of view it is lawful – nay, more, it is for human wisdom necessary – to 
regard them as disconnected and irrelevant to one another. […] If we look at 
an animal or a human being, distinguished from the rest of his kind by the 
possession of some extraordinary peculiarity, good or bad, we shall be able to 
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 See also Dobzhansky (1974: 313-318) on randomness of mutation as coincidental, leading to 
unpredictability of evolution.  
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discriminate between the causes which originally produced the peculiarity in 
him and the causes that maintain it after it is produced.” (James 1979 [1880]: 
166f).  
Neo-Darwinism totally excludes a Lamarckian mechanism of 
adaptation and rests its paradigm exclusively on mutations as the ultimate 
source of novelty. Mutations are undirected in the just mentioned sense. But 
the total exclusion of Lamarckian mechanisms is not a necessary part of a 
Darwinian system. Directed generation of novelty, a Lamarckian mechanism of 
generating adaptive novelty, is compatible with a Darwinian variational pattern 
of change. There is no principled reason why it should be impossible for a 
variational model to allow for a directing influence of the environment in the 
generation of novelty, as long as the directing force is not the only source of 
novelty, or as long as it does not act systematically on each individual in the 
same way.
17
 What is distinctive for Lamarck’s theory of evolution is not 
Lamarck’s second factor as such, the mechanism of directed adaptation, but 
that this mechanism is thought to act on each individual in the same way, 
leading to a transformational pattern. Lamarck’s assumed pattern of change is 
transformational, because it exclusively relies on directed generation of 
novelty. Consider, for example, that a Lamarckian mechanism of directed 
generation of novelty only acts on one or a few individuals. The new 
characteristics will be adaptive. They will be in the direction of adaptation. If 
these changes can be inherited, these features will spread in the respective 
population, despite the presence of other individuals that do not exhibit these 
new adaptive features. All three central Darwinian principles are fulfilled: 
There is variation, there are fitness differences exhibited in this variation, and 
the differences can be inherited. As long as the Lamarckian mechanism does 
not make selection superfluous, a Lamarckian mechanism of adaptation is 
compatible with Darwinism. In this sense, a Darwinian can be a Lamarckian 
without contradicting himself. Darwin himself is the best example for 
illustrating this compatibility. Darwin’s Darwinism did in part rely on directed 
generation of novelty. Although the importance of directed generation of 
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novelty shifted back and forth over the years, he never gave up his variational 
theory of evolution. At the end of the 1876 edition of the Origins, Darwin 
summarizes his position: 
“I have now recapitulated the facts and considerations which have thoroughly 
convinced me that species have been modified, during a long course of 
descent. This has been effected chiefly through the Natural Selection of 
numerous successive, slight, favourable variations; aided in an important 
manner by the inherited effects of the use and disuse of parts; and in an 
unimportant manner, that is in relation to adaptive structures, whether past or 
present, by the direct action of external conditions, and by variations which 
seem to us in our ignorance to arise spontaneously” (Darwin 1876: 420).  
Darwin considered natural selection, the cause of preservation, to be “aided” 
by three causes of variation: the “effects of the use and disuse of parts,” the 
“direct action of external conditions,” and the “spontaneous” generation of new 
characteristics. According to Darwin, all these novelties can be inherited 
through the mechanism of “pangenesis” (Darwin 1868). Pangenesis allowed 
the inheritance of all changes that occur during the lifetime of an individual, 
irrespective where these changes occur, be it in the somatic tissue or in the 
germ cells. Darwin thought that changes in the somatic tissue, especially the 
ones that result from the use and disuse of parts, are directed, i.e., necessarily 
adaptive. But as Winther (2001: 429ff) has shown, some changes in the 
somatic tissue and most of the changes in the germ cells were thought to be not 
necessarily adaptive, i.e., undirected. Even with respect to individuals of the 
same species, the ‘changed conditions of life’ sometimes “caused one 
individual to vary in one way and another individual in another way” (Darwin 
1875, vol. 2: 260). This cause of variation was designated by Darwin as 
‘indefinite’ or ‘spontaneous.’ Today it would be called ‘undirected.’  
To recapitulate the issue about compatibility: As long as there is some 
indefinite generation of novelty, selection is necessary. What Darwin called 
‘spontaneous’ origin of novelty excludes that a Lamarckian mechanism of 
adaptation operates in these individuals. Darwinian variational evolution does, 
however, not require the exclusion of a Lamarckian mechanism of generating 
novelty for all individuals. It only requires the inclusion of some cases of 
undirected generation of novelty in the sense just specified, since that is 
necessary for variation to occur.  
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(ii) Undirected variation as the absence of a statistical correlation. The 
Neo-Darwinian paradigm, however, excludes any Lamarckian mechanism of 
adaptation. As already mentioned, it has mutation, which is held to arise in an 
undirected way, as the only ultimate source of novelty. In order to give 
‘undirectedness’ a precise meaning that could be tested in experiments, the 
concept of undirectedness was formulated in statistical terms. This statistical 
concept of undirectedness excludes any influence of the selective environment 
on the probability of the occurrence of mutations. On the basis of such a 
statistical concept of undirectedness, Lamarck’s mechanism would amount to a 
probability of 1 that mutations are adaptive. But the statistical concept does not 
only exclude a probability of 1, it excludes any statistical bias of mutations 
towards adaptivity. It is thus a much stronger requirement. If the selective 
environment has absolutely no influence on the occurrence of adaptive 
features, not even a statistical one, the occurring variation is statistically not 
even biased towards adaptivity. The Neo-Darwinian statistical concept of 
undirectedness thus refers to the absence of such a bias. If such a bias is absent, 
variation is said to occur at random and to be in this sense undirected.  
In principle, mutations are said to be random in two senses:  
“First, although we may be able to predict the probability that a certain 
mutation will occur, we cannot predict which of a large number of gene 
copies will undergo the mutation. The spontaneous process of mutation is 
stochastic rather than deterministic. Second, and more importantly, mutation 
is random in the sense that the chance that a particular mutation will occur is 
not influenced by whether or not the organism is in an environment in which 
that mutation would be advantageous” (Futuyma 1998: 282).  
The second kind of randomness is the important one for our purposes here. 
Mutation (and also recombination) is not influenced by the adaptive challenges 
the environment provides for the organism. The kind of randomness and 
independence involved here is what Margaret Boden calls ‘relative 
randomness’:  
“‘Relative’ randomness (R-randomness) is the lack of any order or structure 
relevant to some specific consideration. Poker-dice, for example, fall and 
tumble R-randomly with respect to both the knowledge and the wishes of the 
poker-players – as you may know only too well. They also fall R-randomly 
with respect to the pattern on the wallpaper, but nobody would bother to say 
so” (Boden 2004: 239; Emph. in the orig.). 
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Something is random relative to a certain perspective or state of affairs. 
Biological mutations are r-random: relative to the environment to which they 
must adapt and relative to the functional needs of the organism itself. 
Mutations are therefore not influenced by the fitness that arises for the 
organism from the respective mutation. In formal terms, this comes down to 
the following: Let u be the probability of mutating from A to a and v be the 
probability of mutating from a to A. Mutation is undirected if it is not the case 
that (i) u>v and (ii) u>v because w(a) > w(A), where w(X) is the fitness of X.18  
As Stephen Toulmin said, if new characteristics arise in an undirected 
way, evolution is “decoupled”:  
“... we should notice […] that the twin sub-processes of variation and 
selection can be related in either of two quite different ways. They may take 
place quite independently, so that the factors responsible for the selective 
perpetuation of variants are entirely unrelated to those responsible for the 
original generation of those same variants. Or, alternatively, they may 
involve related sets of factors, so that the novel variants entering the relevant 
pool are already pre-selected for characteristics bearing directly on the 
requirements for selective perpetuation. To mark this difference, we may say 
that in the latter case variation and selection are 'coupled'; in the former case 
“decoupled’” (Toulmin 1972: 337f). 
That is, variation is undirected, random, or decoupled, only if the producing 
factors are not correlated with the factors that determine the selection of the 
variant. If, instead, variation and selection are correlated, the two processes are 
“coupled.” Coupling leads to directed variation: Adaptive new variants are 
more likely to occur because of the influence of the selective environment. In 
such a case, the chance that a particular mutation occurs is influenced by 
whether or not it would be adaptive in the respective environment. 
It is important not to misunderstand this statistical concept of undirected 
variation. It means that there is no statistical correlation between the selective 
and the productive factors. This does not mean that adaptive and non-adaptive 
features are equiprobable.
19
 Although mutation is stochastic, there is no 
equiprobability of specific mutations: It is not the case that every theoretically 
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possible mutation has the same probability. Recall the formal definition from 
above: Let u be the probability of mutating from A to a, and v be the 
probability of mutating from a to A. Mutation is undirected if it is not the case 
that (i) u>v and (ii) u>v because w(a) > w(A), where w(X) is the fitness of X. 
This definition simply says that if there is a higher likelihood of u, it must be 
excluded that this is because of a higher fitness of the mutation from A to a. It 
does not follow that we have directed variation if u>v. Therefore, it does not 
follow that undirected variation requires that specific adaptive trials are no 
more likely to occur than specific maladaptive ones. Undirected generation of 
novelty only entails that the factor that determines selection does not increase 
the likelihood of an advantageous mutation. That is why the following 
statement of Donald T. Campbell must be judged as misleading. Campbell 
wrote that blindness of variation means:  
“[T]hat the occurrence of trials individually be uncorrelated with the solution, 
in that specific correct trials are no more likely to occur at any one point in a 
series of trials than another, nor than specific incorrect trials” (Campbell 
1987 [1960]: 93). 
The statement is misleading, because it suggests that in decoupled evolution 
specific adaptive trials are as likely as specific maladaptive ones. But, as 
shown, in principle there is no kind of equiprobability implied in decoupled 
evolution. In fact, there is no such equiprobability of mutations. First of all, 
different loci or regions of loci in a genome have different mutation rates. 
Second, environmental factors, for instance ultraviolet and other radiation, 
chemical mutagens, or nutrition can increase mutation rate (Futuyma 1998: 
282). Third, as Dawkins (1986: 306) mentions, there is the phenomenon of 
mutation pressure, where the forward mutation rate at a locus is different from 
the backward mutation rate. His example of such a mutation pressure in 
hemoglobin molecules can illustrate the phenomenon: “Form 1 and Form 2, are 
selectively neutral in the sense that both are equally good at carrying oxygen in 
the blood, [but] it could still be that mutations from 1 to 2 are commoner than 
reverse mutations from 2 to 1. In this case, mutation pressure will tend to make 
Form 2 commoner than Form 1” (Dawkins 1986: 307). Last but not least, 
developmental constraints limit the range of variation, i.e., the novelties that 
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can occur, given the effects of previous selection: At a certain point of time in 
evolution, certain variants are not possible or at least very unlikely, since 
evolution is cumulative. Even if a mutation occurred, it would not lead to a 
viable variant since the respective developmental pathways are missing. As 
Futuyma writes,  
“Mutations with phenotypic effects alter developmental processes, but they 
cannot alter developmental foundations that do not exist. We may conceive 
of winged horses and angels, but no mutant horses or humans will ever sprout 
wings from their shoulders, for the developmental foundations are lacking. 
[…] Thus, some morphologies are highly unlikely, or even impossible, for 
reasons that we usually do not understand because of our ignorance of 
developmental pathways. For instance, the numerous ankle bones of a 
salamander can be organized (by fusions and fissions) in many imaginable 
ways, but some conceivable patterns have never been found, either as intra-
specific variants or as species-typical characters” (Futuyma 1998: 276).  
Developmental constraints are compatible with Darwinism. According to 
Dawkins (1986: 307-312), it is a caricature of Darwinism, if Darwinism is 
described as stating that all changes are equally possible and equally likely, i.e. 
that at each point in time, every conceivable variation can occur for selection to 
operate on. Some variations are never available for selection. As Dawkins 
writes in his characteristic prose, "[g]enes can mutate till they are blue in the 
face, but no mammal will ever sprout wings like an angel unless mammalian 
embryological processes are susceptible to this kind of change" (Dawkins 
1986: 311). The species’ past, its history, can act as a constraint on variation. 
History thus restricts the range of variation, i.e. the pathways that are open or 
accessible from the respective starting-point. This limit on the range of 
variation, which also leads to a statistical bias in variation, is compatible with 
Darwinism and has to be distinguished from undirected variation. 
Developmental constraints are an influence of the effects of past selective 
environments. Directed variation is the effect of a current selective 
environment. Darwinism is compatible with the former, but it is – in its Neo-
Darwinian version – not compatible with directed variation in the sense of a 
statistical coupling between factors that cause novelty and factors that select 
novelty. The difference between developmental constraints and directed 
variation is very important and will reoccur in chapter 4 on the origination 
Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity 
52 
analogy, where I will analyze whether creativity is based on undirected 
variation or not.  
In addition to the just mentioned possible misunderstandings about 
equiprobability, it is very important to clearly see the difference between (i), 
undirectedness as the absence of a Lamarckian mechanism that guarantees 
adaptive features, and (ii), the absence of a statistical bias in the occurrence of 
adaptive and maladaptive mutations. Directed variation, i.e., the existence of 
coupling, is often called ‘Lamarckian.’ But, as indicated already, Lamarck’s 
concept of directedness was stronger. With respect to adaptive evolution, 
Lamarck assumed a factor that necessarily produces adaptive features in 
organisms, i.e., that induces adaptive features. In terms of the concept of 
decoupling, leading to undirected variation, and coupling, leading to directed 
variation, Lamarck’s concept of directedness would mean that the coupling is 
100 per cent. It means that the selective factors are the productive factors. In 
terms of the formal definition of undirectedness offered above, Lamarck’s 
concept of directedness contains that u = 1, and u = 1 because of w(a) > w (A). 
While Lamarck’s concept of directedness amounts to 100-per-cent-coupling, 
the Neo-Darwinian concept of decoupling is stronger than the mere exclusion 
of a Lamarckian mechanism of adaptation. It excludes any influence of the 
environment on the occurrence of new characteristics. That is why (i) can be 
subsumed under (ii) in the following way:  
Undirected variation excludes coupling, a ‘Lamarckian’ correlation 
between the factors bringing about new characteristics and the 
factors selecting these new characteristics. It excludes a partial 
correlation as well as a total correlation, as in a Lamarckian 
instructive mechanism that guarantees that adaptive novelty arises.  
This inclusive definition of the concept of undirected variation will be used to 
analyze the origination analogy.  
The question whether a system is based on undirected variation must, 
however, be distinguished from the question whether a system is a variational 
one. First, a system is only transformational if variation is prevented by a 
mechanism that guarantees a unity of response given a certain environment, 
Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity 
53 
e.g. through a Lamarckian mechanism of adaptation. Second, a system can be 
variational, even if variation and selection are coupled (i.e., the origination of 
novelty directed), as long as the coupling is not 100 per cent. Therefore, if one 
wants to ask whether a system is Darwinian the question whether a system is 
variational or not and the question whether it exhibits decoupling or not have to 
be distinguished and addressed separately. This is what I will do in chapter 4. I 
will indicate that culture can be understood as a variational system. However, 
the important question with respect to the origination of variants is whether 
novelty arises blindly in the sense assumed by Darwinian theory, i.e. in an 
undirected way.  
Selection as blind, natural force 
The non-adaptive novelties that occur in a variational change must be 
negatively selected, so that adaptations can gradually evolve. Non-adaptive 
features are ‘trials’ that turn out to be ‘errors.’ Undirectedness of variation thus 
means excess, wastefulness, and death. Yet, wastefulness is only the blindness 
of the productive side of the overall evolutionary process. As illustrated in the 
last two sections, blindness of variation leads to selection after the occurrence 
of variation as a necessary part of the evolutionary process. This shows already 
that selection is also ‘blind’ in a certain way. It cannot be otherwise, since 
Darwinian evolution is a natural process. ‘Natural’ in this case means that 
‘nature’ is not the sort of thing like a deity or another person-like entity with a 
mind, plans and foresight. The blindness of Darwinian evolution in non-
metaphorical terms thus means the absence of a mind with plans, values, 
knowledge and foresight. Undirected variation is one consequence of this. 
However, it has other consequences as well. The absence of plan and foresight 
implies that nature, although discriminating between adaptive and non-adaptive 
features of organisms, has not only no foresight in producing variants, it has 
also no foresight in selecting the variants. If we describe nature in a 
metaphorical way, i.e., as having a mind, its discriminating power could be 
described as a mere shortsighted selection by hindsight. In this sense, nature 
‘sees,’ i.e., discriminates between adaptive and non-adaptive features, although 
it does not discriminate with the help of foresight and planning and is in this 
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sense blind. In non-metaphorical terms, nature does not see anything. The only 
thing nature does is to execute its power to ‘let live or die.’ This has 
consequences that make clearer in which sense natural selection differs from a 
process of creation, or even artificial selection, although both can be conceived 
as forms of selection.  
(i). Selection is not blind in the sense of ‘random’; it is a law-like 
cumulative process. The first kind of blindness of selection, which I want to 
discuss, is one that does not exist. Creationists often mention it. Paley, for 
instance, rejected chance and necessity as an alternative to the creationist 
explanation of design. For Paley (1825 [1802]: 44ff), the idea that something 
comes about by chance, and is maintained or not, is ruled out as a good 
explanation for the origination of complex functional organs, such as an eye. It 
is ruled out, since it is too unlikely that a complex organ arises by a single 
coincidence. The probability that the many parts that have to fall in place in 
such and such a way to build a viable eye, fall in place by chance is very low. It 
is as low as the probability that a tornado blowing through a junkyard produces 
an airliner, as the standard contemporary example goes. In a nutshell, the 
creationist would argue that, since selection is ‘random’ in this sense, a deity 
must have created these entities. If natural selection were operating by such a 
haphazardous single coincidence, it could indeed hardly be used to explain the 
existence of complex functional organisms.  
But natural selection is not random in such a way. This is an outright 
misunderstanding of Darwinian natural selection. The Darwinian answer thus 
contains two parts: (i) selection is not random, it is law-like; (ii) selection is not 
a single ‘coincidence’, but a cumulative process. In sum, natural selection is a 
fitness-driven natural process that makes the improbable possible through 
gradual cumulativity.  
(a). Selection is law-like. Selection itself is in no sense random. It is the 
opposite of randomness. “Natural selection is the antichance factor in 
evolution. […] On the contrary, selection is, as a rule, directed towards 
maintenance or enhancement of the Darwinian fitness,” as Dobzhansky (1974: 
318) puts it. Selection is determined by fitness and fitness is not given by 
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chance, but determined by certain characteristics of the organism (adaptedness) 
and the corresponding environment. Hence, natural selection is determined by 
the relationship between organisms and their contingent environment. 
Nonetheless, natural selection is contingent, but not random, since 
environments vary and “which organisms reproduce more effectively depends 
on what variations they possess that are useful in the environment where the 
organisms live” (Ayala 2001: 236). To summarize this point in the words of 
Mayr: “Nothing succeeds like success […] where survival and differential 
reproduction are concerned, anything but blindness prevails” (Mayr 1976 
[1962]: 34). Nature discriminates in a law-like way between adaptive and non-
adaptive features of organisms.  
(b). Selection is not a single coincidence. Creationists might even admit 
that selection is fitness-driven and in this sense law-like. But they would still 
insist that it is a process of chance that cannot explain adaptive complexity. 
The reason for this is that they regard selection as a single-step coincidence. On 
this basis, they claim that natural selection cannot produce things like eyes, as a 
tornado blowing through a junkyard cannot assemble an airliner.  
They ignore the effect of cumulativity involved in Darwinian evolution. 
Selection is a cumulative law-like process, thereby making the improbable 
probable. Dawkins (1986: 43ff) showed the effect of cumulativity with the old 
example of the monkey, bashing away at random on a typewriter and 
producing finally the works of Shakespeare.
20
 Dawkins discusses the issue with 
respect to the production of only one sentence from Shakespeare: Hamlet’s 
saying “METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL.” Creationists are right: As it is 
very unlikely that the tornado, blowing through a junkyard, produces an 
airliner, it is equally unlikely that the random typing of a monkey on a 
typewriter produces this sentence. The working of the tornado and the 
randomly typing monkey is what Dawkins calls ‘simple sieving’ (ibid.: 44) or 
‘single step selection of random variation’ (ibid.: 47). He compares it to an 
opening of a combination lock with many dials. The typing of the sentence 
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 This thought example of the typewriting monkeys (originally in the base of the British 
Museum) is quite widespread. It was already used by Newell, Shaw & Simon (1957). 
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‘METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL’ is the opening. Each bash on the 
keyboard is comparable to a dial. Now imagine the monkey is a computer-
monkey. Let’s say that there are 26 letters and a spacebar on they keyboard, 
nothing else, hence 27 possibilities for each hit. The sentence has 28 
characters. If we let the monkey start, there are 27
28 
different possible 
sequences. If the process is truly random (i.e., if the probability for each letter 
being hit by the monkey is the same), then the probability that the monkey 
types exactly ‘METHINKS IT IS LIKE A WEASEL’ is (1/27)
28 
– 1 in 27 
multiplied by itself 28 times. As Dawkins writes, “[t]hese are very small odds, 
about 1 in 10000 million million million million million million. To put it 
mildly, the phrase we seek would be a long time coming, to say nothing of the 
complete works of Shakespeare” (ibid.: 47).  
But cumulative selection is much more effective. Dawkins tries to 
illustrate this through a change in the computer-monkey program. The 
computer-monkey  
“again begins by choosing a random sequence of 28 letters, just as before: 
WDLMNLT DTJBKWIRZREZLMQCO P. It now ‘breeds from’ this random 
phrase. It duplicates it repeatedly, but with a certain chance of random error – 
‘mutation’ in the copying. The computer examines the mutant nonsense 
phrases, the ‘progeny’ of the original phrase, and chooses the one which, 
however slightly, most resembles the target phrase, METHINKS IT IS LIKE 
A WEASEL” (ibid.: 47).  
This procedure is repeated over and over again. A test of this program showed 
that the computer-monkey reached the target sentence in 40 generation of 
sentences.
21
 A second run has led to 64 generations. The chances that the target 
sentence will appear after 40 trials or generations of sentences are almost zero 
in single-step selection. But the chances that the target sentence appears on the 
screen in the multiple selection program within 40 trials or generations of 
sentences are quite high.  
Natural selection is such a cumulative selection process. It is repeated 
sieving with memory that operates over many generations: “[T]he results of 
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 Dawkins also developed a more elaborate program that mirrors more accurately what 
happens in biological evolution. This program, the ‘blind watchmaker’ program, also 
integrated the complexities of development. For a d
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one sieving process are fed into a subsequent sieving, which is fed into…, and 
so on” (ibid.: 45). Dawkins concludes:  
“There is a big difference, then, between cumulative selection (in which each 
improvement, however slight, is used as a basis for future building), and 
single-step selection (in which each new ‘try’ is a fresh one). If evolutionary 
progress had had to rely on single-step selection, it would never have got 
anywhere. If, however, there was any way in which the necessary conditions 
for cumulative selection could have been set up by the blind forces of nature, 
strange and wonderful might have been the consequences. As a matter of fact 
that is exactly what happened on this planet” (ibid.: 49; Emph. in the orig.).  
The cumulative selection monkey-program has still to be translated into 
natural cumulative selection. In our example the computer has been given the 
ideal target of evolution. In a more realistic simulation of natural selection, the 
computer would have to realize the fittest trial in an analogous way to nature. 
Such a computer simulation of cumulative natural selection would require a 
“very sophisticated pattern-recognition program” (ibid.: 61), a thing hard to 
come by. However, this is no problem for real world natural selection. Nature 
evidently has such a recognition program. Nature discriminates according to 
fitness. Death and differential reproduction, as a consequence of fitness 
differences, is all that is needed. 
To conclude, cumulative variational evolution is not ‘random’ or ‘blind’ 
in the sense of an undetermined single step coincidence. It can account for 
adaptive complexity through a multiple-step process, consisting of multiple 
cycles of variation and selection. It therefore provides a ‘third’ alternative to 
‘chance’ and ‘necessity’ as conceived as single-step selection on the one hand, 
and creation on the other hand. This alternative combines chance (in the sense 
of undirected generation of novelty) and necessity (in the sense of fitness 
differences leading to differential survival and reproduction), iterated over 
many generations, with memory of the intermediate results. That is how natural 
selection makes the improbable probable: by working in cumulative small steps 
with memory.  
All this happens without the help of foresight in the generation of 
novelty (which would guarantee directed generation of novelty) and without 
the help of ‘mind,’ ‘purpose,’ or ‘foresight’ in the selecting part of the 
cumulative process. Nature does not see anything or have any purposes, when 
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she selects between the different variants available for selection. Natural 
selection is blind in this sense. Differential death because of fitness differences 
just occurs. As Dawkins writes:  
“Natural selection, the blind, unconscious, automatic process which Darwin 
discovered, and which we now know is the explanation for the existence and 
apparently purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind. It has no mind 
and no mind’s eye. It does not plan for the future. It has no vision, no 
foresight, no sight at all. If it can be said to play the role of watchmaker in 
nature, it is the blind watchmaker” (Dawkins 1986: 5).  
The fact that nature does not have a mind to govern evolution by foresight, 
leads to two further aspects. Without foresight in producing new variants 
selection can only happen ex post facto – after the occurrence of undirected 
variation: If nature had a mind, its ‘method’ would be comparable to the 
hindsighted artificial selection of animal breeders. This directly follows from 
undirected variation. In addition, having also no foresight of the long-term 
consequences of undirected variation, nature selects in an absolutely 
opportunistic way: In metaphorical terms, if nature had a mind, she would be 
comparable to a quite myopic breeder, who has no overall plan, does not select 
for future pay-offs, and who tinkers around with what he has. We saw that (i) 
selection is not blind in the sense of a random simple sieving. Let me elaborate 
on blind selection in the sense of (ii), selection ex post facto, and (iii), 
opportunistic selection.  
(ii) Selection ex post facto. In variational evolution, it is selection that 
imposes direction and it does so ex post facto, by ‘hindsight’ after certain 
variants, which are not directed, have come about. Selection ex post facto is a 
consequence of the variational pattern: Since the overall process consists of an 
iteration of two steps – variation and selection – the directing force can only 
exert its directing power by selection of consequences, in metaphorical terms 
by ‘hindsight.’ In Darwinian variational evolution,  
“[p]rogress […] is by trial and error. […] Whatever purposiveness the 
organic world seems to have is thus not a finalistic one but, if I may say so, 
an a posteriori one, or, in other words, the result of past natural selection” 
(Mayr 1976 [1962]: 42).  
Lacking foresight, nature has to wait until some adaptive variants occur, and 
can only impose direction through weeding out the maladaptive ones. 
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Therefore, there is no guaranteed adaptive novelty involved. As I said, 
Lamarckian evolution is transformational because it only consists of instructive 
processes, directing, or ‘instructing,’ and hence securing not only novelty but 
also the course of evolution by acting on every individual. Transformational 
evolution and creation is directed from the start (either by the internal drive 
towards complexity and the directing influence of the environment, or by a 
purposeful creator).  
The difference between direction through a transformational pattern or 
foresightful creation and the direction resulting from blind natural selection is 
important. Ignoring the difference is distorting the actual historical picture. If 
we look from the present to the past and if selection works in one direction for 
a certain amount of time, the surviving species can be visualized as a 
directional lineage. But the direction visible from our hindsight can be 
misleading: It only shows the winning ones and consequently distorts the 
actual historical paths. To ignore the ‘false starts’ would be similar to what 
modern historians call ‘whig-history,’ the technique of interpreting the past in 
terms of the winners and of presenting the change as a necessary development, 
ignoring the actual historical path. The term whig-history derives from the 
Whigs, the political ancestors of the Liberal party in Britain, who were engaged 
in ‘whig-history,’ when they rewrote the country’s history in such a way that it 
vindicated their own values (Bowler 1988: 16). The difference between 
direction by foresight and direction by hindsight can therefore be depicted in 
the way shown in fig_3. Darwinian direction versus Lamarckian direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fig_3. Darwinian direction versus Lamarckian direction 
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In Darwinian evolution, direction is the effect of the overall process of 
Darwinian variational evolution. But to say that Darwinian evolution is 
progressive, that it has a purpose, a predetermined final end, would be – as 
Mayr clarifies – “ludicrous,” since it would be similar to saying “that it is the 
purpose of every individual to die because this is the end of every individual, 
or that it is the goal of every evolutionary line to become extinct because this is 
what has happened to 99,9 percent of all evolutionary lines that have ever 
existed. Indeed, one would be forced to consider as teleological even the 
second law of thermodynamics” (Mayr 1976 [1974]: 388). 
(iii) The opportunistic watchmaker. This leads to the second 
characteristic of natural selection that follows from the fact that nature has no 
mind that can direct by foresight the ongoing evolution. Even if we 
personalized the process of natural selection, by summarizing all the causes 
that make up a selective environment as ‘Mother Nature’, the ‘watchmaker,’ 
the selective activity of this ‘natural watchmaker’ would be necessarily 
opportunistic. The opportunism of natural selection sets restrictions on the 
process that do not hold for creation. Some of the restrictions do not even hold 
for artificial selection.   
In principle undirected generation of novelty as such is compatible with 
creation and artificial selection, as long as we do not assume a perfect creator 
or selector. Yet, if blind generation of novelty is paired with natural selection, 
then the overall process of Darwinian evolution is different from what one can 
expect from the creative or selective activity of persons with certain cognitive 
abilities. The process is different in three ways: (a) since natural selection 
knows no higher goal or progress, only ‘haphazardous,’ local adaptation and 
trends are possible; (b) natural selection does not respect future positive 
effects; (c) natural selection is bound to tinkering. 
(a). ‘Haphazard,’ local adaptation. Nature does not follow a higher 
external and overall progressive plan. The master plan that was part of the idea 
of creation and temporalized in transformational evolution through Lamarck’s 
first factor is missing. Natural selection is opportunistic, or ‘shortsighted’ in 
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metaphorical terms. It always reacts to contingent, local conditions. There is no 
higher or future goal, no master plan, neither diachronically nor 
synchronically.
22
 Natural selection can lead to adaptations, but excludes 
foresight and a goal beyond the variety of adaptations. In transformational 
evolution the overall plan was excluded as an external teleological cause, but 
included as a necessary natural transformational process. In artificial selection, 
the overall plan can be superimposed by selection on the variety at hand. 
Certainly, artificial selection can proceed whimsically as well, but it also can 
exhibit an overall plan. Natural selection is the only mode of producing 
novelty, which totally lacks such an overall plan. As I mentioned already in 
chapter 1, Darwin’s theory was an insult for man (in Freud’s sense) because of 
two aspects of his theory: The first one is the animal heritage; the second one is 
the thesis that evolution is based on a process that knows no higher goal of the 
overall path of evolution. Natural selection was thus interpreted as “casting 
men adrift in a meaningless world” (LeMahieu 1976: 71).
23
   
(b). Natural selection does not respect future positive effects. Natural 
selection is opportunistic in a further sense. If a characteristic of an organism 
does not immediately constitute an advantage for survival, natural selection 
cannot favor it. Even if a change pays in future generations, in case other 
mutations occur that make the trait beneficial, or in case the environment and 
the selection pressure change, nature will ignore these future effects and will 
select against the characteristic. It cannot respect future positive effects. 
“Evolution has no foresight, and a genetic element cannot be selected because 
it might someday be of some help,” Jacob writes (1982: 40). This is because 
“natural selection does not anticipate the environments of the future” (Ayala 
2001: 236). A breeder and a creator can look ahead and select, breed, preserve 
organisms, even if they are not fitter than other ones at the moment of decision. 
                                                
22
 See Dobzhansky (1974: mainly 326ff) or Ayala (2001: 237).  
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 Furthermore, as indicated already, even the local adaptations are not guaranteed to arise 
because of undirected generation of novelty. This also has a consequence for human self-
understanding. Humans are not the necessary destiny of evolution. If the respective 
characteristics that make man peculiar had not arisen or if the local selective criteria had been 
different, it could well be that humans do not exist. 
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In fact, humans can respect future outcomes, for instance, in our personal 
projects as well as in political reforms. Natural selection cannot have this kind 
of ‘patience’ and this has an effect on the outcome. Natural selection always 
punishes ‘arriving at the wrong time or place.’ If a personal decision maker 
selects with foresight, as in creation or artificial selection, this ‘punishment’ 
can be prevented.
24
  
(c). Natural selection is like a tinkerer. In explaining the meaning of 
undirected variation, I mentioned developmental constraints. A creator and a 
breeder, artificially selecting between organisms, could ignore these constraints 
through starting a new blueprint. A creator does not have to build on old 
material. He can ignore cumulativity. In order to design something new, natural 
selection must necessarily build on old material. It cannot go a step back or 
start totally anew “from scratch,” as Francois Jacob once said. Natural 
selection “works on what already exists, either transforming a system to give it 
a new function or combining several systems to produce a more complex one” 
(Jacob 1982: 34). According to Jacob, this process does not resemble 
engineering, a frequent metaphor used to describe natural selection. It 
resembles “tinkering,” the English word for “bricolage” (Jacob 1982: 33-46), a 
term Jacob takes from Claude Levi-Strauss (1962). Jacob describes the process, 
by which the tinkerer brings about novelty, in the following way: “[T]he 
tinkerer picks up an object which happens to be in his stock and gives it an 
unexpected function. Out of an old car wheel, he will make a fan; from a 
broken table a parasol. This process is not very different from what evolution 
performs when it turns a leg into a wing, or a part of a jaw into a piece of ear” 
(Jacob 1982: 35). Furthermore, “in contrast with the engineer, the tinkerer who 
wants to refine his work will often add new structures to the old ones rather 
than replace them” (ibid.: 36). The development of the brain in mammals, 
through which the neocortex got added to the old rhinencephalon of lower 
vertebrates, serves him as an example: It “strongly recalls the way the tinkerer 
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 See also Hull (1982: 318f) on the claim that natural selection differs from artificial selection 
and rational choice of humans in general because it only leads to local adaptations and does not 
respect future effects. Hull refers to Nagel (1977) and Elster (1979) for stressing the difference. 
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works. It is somewhat like adding a jet engine to an old horse cart” (ibid.: 37). 
As Gould writes, with respect to Darwin’s book on Orchids (1862):  
“If God had designed a beautiful machine to reflect his wisdom and power, 
surely he would not have used a collection of parts generally fashioned for 
other purposes. Orchids were not made by an ideal engineer; they are jury-
rigged from a limited set of available components. Thus, they must have 
evolved from ordinary flowers […] Odd arrangements and funny solutions 
are proof of evolution— paths that a sensible God would never tread but that 
a natural process, constrained by history, follows perforce” (Gould 1982: 
20f).  
As a hypothesis, natural selection leads to different predictions then 
creation or artificial selection, as Sober (2000: 39) stresses in his critique of 
creationism.
25
 Natural Selection does not lead to a prediction of ‘perfection’ in 
nature. Hence it can explain why we find differences in functional organs 
although the differences do not contribute to functional optimality. Why do the 
wings of birds and bats differ? Because they are descendent from different 
ancestors. The differences are a consequence of tinkering. Since a tinkerer is 
bound to what he has in hand and cannot ignore already established features, 
there will be – given different evolutionary histories – different solutions for 
wings. From a Darwinian perspective, these differences are evidence of 
ancestry and can be explained by the Darwinian paradigm. From a creationist 
perspective, it is hard to imagine what reason the hypothesized perfect God 
would have had to include the properties that are unnecessary for building an 
organ for flight. Only a trickster God, who consciously and purposively 
behaves as a tinkerer, who builds in the unnecessary differences ‘from scratch,’ 
could be the basis of a creationist prediction of such unnecessary differences.  
Artificial selection is a borderline case. The breeder of organisms can 
also not take parts of an organism and breed the parts, albeit he can select 
organisms for certain traits, i.e., because of certain traits. But the breeder of 
organisms can sometimes go back some steps in the evolution of the respective 
species (if the species is not yet extinct) and begin a new series of breeding 
from an individual that does not already exhibit the traits he wants to leave out. 
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 See also Jacob (1982: 33f).  
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Furthermore, the geneticists of our days can eliminate parts of an organism and 
reproduce the organism without that part.  
Note that the restriction that is imposed on evolution through 
developmental constraints and tinkering stems not only from nature’s 
mindlessness, but also from the fact that nature can only select wholes and 
never separate parts, even if it selects these whole organisms for a certain part, 
a point stressed by McLaughlin (2001: 153-160).  
To summarize the point about nature’s opportunism: Nature is bound to 
shifting goals (bound to the contingences of local circumstances), bound to 
opportunistic exploitation (it can only react to immediate pay-off), and bound 
to opportunistic tinkering (it cannot ignore the past). Natural selection lacks, so 
to speak, reflective distance. Therefore, it often does not lead to perfect 
solutions. What natural selection leads to is relative optimality. The solutions 
of nature are not the best of all possible solutions, but the best solutions of the 
variants that are available at a certain point in time and place.  
Conclusion  
The different aspects of the blindness of variational evolution (undirected 
variation, selection ex post facto, opportunism) are all direct consequences of 
the absence of a mind with plans and foresight. Now, transformational 
evolution does not imply a mind either. Hence, Darwinian as well as 
Lamarckian evolution are both blind in that sense. What is then specific for 
Darwinism, that allows to distinguish it from creationism as well as from 
Lamarckian evolution? Let me summarize this section on Darwinian evolution 
as ‘blind’ with the answer to this question: The difference between Darwinian 
and Lamarckian evolution is that a Darwinian evolutionary pattern excludes 
progress, because of undirected variation and consequent selection ex post 
facto, and because of opportunistic selection – the aspects of blindness 
following from the absence of mind. In Lamarck’s theory of evolution, there is 
no intelligent creator that – by foresight – imposes structure, form, order, and 
adaptivity. There is only a natural (and in this sense blind) process of 
development. Although transformational evolution eliminates a static picture of 
the world through temporalization of the ‘great chain of being,’ 
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transformational evolution still differs in important ways from a Darwinian 
variational evolution. Progress is guaranteed and already immanent in the 
directed generation of novelty. Darwinism instead did not even secure this, 
since it is based on undirected variation and ‘hindsighted’ natural selection of 
the unfit, with opportunistic adaptation – based on local adaptation, immediate 
pay-off, and tinkering – as the only kind of optimality. Blind variation, 
selection after the occurrence of diverse variants, and opportunistic adaptation 
are therefore the distinguishing features of a Darwinian variational pattern of 
change.  
2.4  THE TAUTOLOGY PROBLEM AND THE CONCEPT 
OF FITNESS  
The tautology problem 
In the three-part recipe of Darwinian evolution, introduced in section 2.1, 
differential fitness appears as a necessary criterion for selection to occur. The 
higher fitness of a certain type of individuals, compared to other types of 
individuals, explains the selective part of the overall process of evolution, 
which comprises iterated cycles of variation and consequent selection. The 
result of this evolutionary process is a relative increase of the fitter type of 
individuals, as long as heritability holds. Fitness therefore is essential in 
explaining the change in frequency of types of individuals, and therefore in 
explaining the existence of, or survival of, individuals of this type in a given 
population. This is often summarized under the principle ‘survival of the 
fittest,’ “natural selection’s alter ego” (Ruse 1998a: 11).  
The problem is that explaining the evolution of adaptive organisms with 
the principle ‘survival of the fittest’ has often been criticized as tautological. 
The proposition corresponding such an explanation, based on the principle of 
‘survival of the fittest,’ could be formulated in the following way:  
(1) The existing entities survived because they were those that were fittest 
or  
(2) Those who survive are those that are fittest.  
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If we now ask ‘who are the fittest?’ and answer ‘those that survive,’ then these 
propositions come out to be:  
(1’) The existing entities survived because they were those that survive.  
or  
(2’) Those who survive are those who survive.  
These statements are tautological and are therefore empty. If we want to 
explain why the existing entities are here and not others, these propositions do 
not give an instructive answer. The charge that Darwinian explanations of this 
kind are tautological is similar to the charge that sentences like ‘every bachelor 
is unmarried’ are analytical and ‘tautological’ in the sense that the sentence can 
be translated into ‘every unmarried man is unmarried.’ As the analytical 
character of ‘every bachelor is unmarried’ depends on the definition of 
‘bachelor’ as unmarried man, the tautological character of the principle 
‘survival of fitness’ is the effect of defining fitness in a way that makes the 
propositions tautological. Hence, at the center of the debate about the 
tautological character of Darwinian explanations is the question what fitness 
means.  
Karl R. Popper is famous for making the tautology charge against 
Darwinism. In the section Darwinism as a Metaphysical Research Program, 
which was part of his Intellectual Biography, he wrote:  
“To say that a species now living is adapted to its environment is, in fact, 
almost tautological. Indeed we use the terms ‘adaptation’ and ‘selection’ in 
such a way that we can say that, if the species were not adapted, it would 
have been eliminated by natural selection. Similarly, if a species has been 
eliminated it must have been ill adapted to the conditions. Adaptation or 
fitness is defined by modern evolutionists as survival value, and can be 
measured by actual success in survival: there is hardly any possibility of 
testing a theory as feeble as this” (Popper 1974a: 137).  
Although Popper himself (1978: 344-346) recanted from this opinion, the 
debates about the tautological character have persisted since then.
26
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Relevance for analogical applications 
Since the tautology charge is relevant for all explanations that refer to the 
‘survival of the fittest x,’ it is important to look at it closely. If culture is 
considered to be a process of differential spread of ideas and the spread is 
explained through differential fitness of these ideas, as it is done by memetics, 
culture is not only described as a Darwinian process, but also explained in a 
Darwinian way. If this alleged explanation is, however, by itself ‘tautological,’ 
then it does not add anything to our understanding of culture.  
In order to handle the question about culture adequately, we must first 
understand how the tautology problem is handled for the case of biological 
evolution. For this reason I will provide a short review of the debates about the 
concept of fitness in light of the tautology question. In chapter 5, I will then 
analyze whether memetics is subject to an analogous tautology problem.  
The solution for biological evolution  
As I said, the core of the tautology problem lies in the meaning of ‘fitness.’ 
What is fitness and what role does it play in evolutionary explanations? Popper 
and also my formulation of (2’) assume that fitness means survival value or 
actual survival. Evolutionary theorists have indeed often defined fitness as the 
product of actual survival (viability) and actual number of offspring 
(fertility).
27
 But must fitness be defined this way? No, and it is indeed not wise 
to define it that way, irrespective of the tautology charge, as Susan K. Mills 
and John Beatty (1994 [1979]) have shown in an important paper in 1979.  
The problem with fitness as actual survival and reproductive output is 
best shown by a well-known thought-experiment about two twins: There are 
two identical animals in a forest, just before their reproductive age. They have 
identical physical characteristics and live in the same selective environment. 
Suddenly, one is struck by lightning and consequently leaves no offspring. The 
                                                                                                                            
(Campbell 1987 [1960]: 109). According to Campbell, this is one of the problems Darwinian 
thinking has as a scientific theory. 
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 For examples see Mills & Beatty (1994 [1979]: 4f).  
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other twin survives and proliferates her genes happily.
28
 If we take the above 
mentioned traditional definition of fitness as actual survival, then we have to 
admit that the “lucky twin is far fitter” (Mills & Beatty 1994 [1979]: 7), even if 
there is no physical difference between the two twins, except that one was 
unlucky and the other not. Remember, that this thought-experiment not only 
assumes that the twins have physically identical characteristics. It also assumes 
that they live in the same selective environment. One answer to the thought-
experiment could thus be that actually, looking at the example closely, the two 
twins did not live in the same environment: The environment of the dead twin 
contained the lightning, whereas the environment of the other did not. As John 
Beatty (1992: 116) replies: “Yet, in an important sense the twins do share the 
same environment, one in which the chance of an encounter with lightning is 
rare.” Hence, in this selective environment the two identical twins would 
exhibit different fitness, as long as fitness is defined as actual survival and 
reproductive output. The thought-experiment shows how counterintuitive it is 
to define fitness in terms of actual survival and reproductive output.  
At the same time, the thought-experiments points to the endpoint of a 
development of the concept of fitness that started with what I would like to call 
the qualitative notion of fitness. In Darwin’s time, fitness was closely 
connected to physical properties of individuals that make the organism ‘fitter’ 
in the sense of ‘better adapted’. Darwin himself used the term fitness only once 
in his first publication of the Origin. It meant adaptedness. Only from the 5
th
 
ed. of the Origin (1869) onwards and in his Variation of Plants and Animals 
under Domestication (1868), he used Spencer’s (1864) phrase ‘survival of the 
fittest’ as synonymous to his term ‘natural selection.’ Adaptedness is a property 
of an organism that arises through the relationship between an organism and its 
selective environment. Given an environment with high trees that carry the 
leaves, which a giraffe is able to use for nourishment, a giraffe with a long 
neck is better adapted to this environment then a giraffe with a short neck. 
Adapted organisms fit into the selective environment. To have ‘fitness’ means 
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to ‘match’ the selective environment. The property of ‘being adapted to x’ is a 
quality of the organism that is independent of actual reproductive success, even 
if being adapted is the main factor for survival and reproduction. The unlucky 
twin might well have the property of being well adapted, even if her life ended 
the way it did. Adaptedness can be attributed independent of actual survival 
and reproduction. 
After the rise of population genetics, starting with J.B.S. Haldane, S. 
Wright and R. A. Fisher, fitness was defined as mere “success in producing 
offspring, irrespective of the causes of that success,” as Diana Paul (1992: 113) 
summarizes this change in meaning. The development of the concept of fitness 
ended with a mere quantitative notion of fitness: fitness as sheer reproductive 
output. This quantitative notion is still the conventional one. Nonetheless, it is 
well recognized that a proper concept of fitness must somehow lie in-between 
the qualitative and quantitative concept of fitness: On the one hand, fitness has 
something to do with physical properties. On the other hand, fitness evidently 
is connected to the explanation of evolutionary success, i.e., differential 
reproduction. Hence, fitness must be connected to both – adaptedness and 
reproductive output – and somehow lie in-between.
29
  
Although quantitative fitness is sometimes still defined as actual 
number of offspring, philosophical debates about the concept of fitness have 
reached a kind of mid-level consensus that comprises four aspects: (i) 
propensity interpretation of fitness; (ii) supervenience of fitness; (iii) optimality 
models as providing an independent criterion for fitness; (iv) drift as an 
alternative explanation to natural selection.
30
 These additions to the 
quantitative notion connect it with the physical properties that build the causal 
basis for quantitative fitness. To prevent misunderstanding and in order to stick 
to the nowadays conventional use, I will use from now on the term ‘fitness’ for 
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instance whether fitness is to be measured with respect to one generation or with respect to 
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dependency of the physical causes of fitness. A further issue is how to include the effects of 
fluctuating selection pressures and statistical variance in the measure of fitness. For discussion, 
see Beatty (1992), Sober (2001), Charlesworth (2002), Ariew & Lewontin (2004).  
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this quantitative notion and adaptedness for the qualitative notion of fitness in 
order to explain the four just mentioned aspects of the revised concept of 
quantitative fitness.  
(i). Propensity interpretation of fitness. According to the propensity 
interpretation of fitness, fitness is not actual survival and reproductive output. 
Fitness is instead the ability for survival and reproductive output. This thesis 
has been put forward by Mills and Beatty, who write:  
“[W]e suggest that fitness be regarded as a complex dispositional property of 
organisms. Roughly speaking, the fitness of an organism is its propensity to 
survive and reproduce in a particularly specified environment and population. 
[...] When we say that an entity has a propensity (disposition, tendency, 
capability) to behave in a particular way, we mean that certain physical 
properties of the entity determine, or are causally relevant to, the particular 
behavior whenever the entity is subjected to appropriate ‘triggering 
conditions’” (Mills & Beatty 1994 [1979]: 8f).  
The example they use to clarify this propensity notion of fitness is the 
solubility of salt. Solubility is physically based on the salt’s ionic crystalline 
structure. The triggering condition of solubility is the immersion into water. 
We can transfer this to fitness in the following way: Fitness is based on certain 
physical properties of the organism. The triggering conditions of fitness as a 
propensity consist of certain characteristics of the environment, including facts 
about the population the organism is part of (Mills & Beatty 1994 [1979]: 20).  
(ii). Supervenience of fitness. Although fitness is based on physical 
properties, it is not identical with these physical properties. On the contrary, it 
supervenes on them. This claim was introduced by Alexander Rosenberg 
(1978). Sober (2000) summarizes the assumed idea of supervenience, with 
reference to Kim (1978) in the following way: “One set of properties P 
supervenes on another set of properties Q precisely when the Q properties of an 
object determine what its P properties are – but not conversely. If P supervenes 
on Q, then there is a one-to-many mapping from P to Q” (Sober 2000: 75). For 
the fitness of organisms this means: If our two twins are identical in their 
physical properties and live in physically identical environments, then they 
must have the same fitness. The physical properties and the relation to the 
environment can be summarized as an organism’s Q properties. They 
determine its fitness. But if we have the same fitness of two organisms (the 
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organisms’ P properties), then it does not follow that these two organisms have 
the same physical properties (the organisms’ Q properties). Two types of 
organisms can have the same fitness (probability of survival and number of 
expected offspring), but for different reasons. If a giraffe has a propensity to 
have two offspring and a bacterium has the same propensity, this does not 
allow to conclude that there are similar causes in the mammals and the 
bacterium. They can exhibit different adaptations to survive in their respective 
selective environments, although they have the same fitness. The same 
quantitative fitness value can be realized totally differently in terms of 
adaptedness.
31
  
Going back to the tautology problem, the following is important: Even 
if (i) and (ii) mark central steps in the explication of the fitness concept, they 
do not yet provide a solution of the tautology problem, as John Beatty admits:  
“[T]he propensity interpretation does not resolve […] the supposed problem 
of the circularity of the principle of natural selection. To be sure, the claim 
that ‘the fittest are most likely to leave the most offspring’ is a tautology 
when ‘fittest’ is defined in terms of actual offspring contribution. But the 
claim is no more empirical when ‘fittest’ is defined as ‘best able to leave the 
most offspring’” (Beatty 1992: 118).  
The reason is that we can only claim to have evidence for the propensity, and 
not only for the actual survival and reproduction, if we have evidence for the 
propensity that is independent of actual survival and reproduction. Such an 
evidence, or the falsification of it, is provided by (iii) and (iv).  
(iii). Optimality models as providing an independent evidence for 
fitness. Stephen J. Gould replied to Tom Bethell’s (1976) reaffirmation of the 
tautology charge: In order to get out of the circularity there must be an 
“independent criterion for fitness,” so that we can “identify the fittest 
beforehand” (Gould 1998 [1976]: 94). Only then can we really explain 
evolution as a consequence of the identified fitness differences. What makes a 
given organism fitter? – Adaptedness. In a given environment, certain physical 
properties (morphological, physiological, and behavioral traits) are better 
adapted or superior than others. Gould writes: “These traits confer fitness by an 
engineer’s criterion of good design, not by the empirical fact of their survival 
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and spread [...] superior design in changed environments is an independent 
criterion of fitness”. According to Gould, fitness gets “expressed as differential 
survival, but it is not defined by it” (Gould 1998 [1976]: 95).  
In terms of fitness as supervening propensity, this means that only the 
physical basis of fitness – adaptedness – can provide a criterion for fitness or 
evidence for fitness that is independent of actual survival. (Note that Gould’s 
terminology is ambivalent: On the one hand he wants to define fitness in 
qualitative terms, as adaptedness. On the other hand, he merely requires 
adaptedness as an independent criterion for quantitative fitness. I will come 
back to these two options in a minute, after I have said a little bit more on 
optimality models as providing insights on adaptedness.)  
Adaptedness means that an organism exhibits traits that are an optimal 
solution for the task that arises for an organism given its relationship to an 
environment. Optimality models try to find out which design that is. To find 
out whether a given trait is an optimal design may be a hard task. In the case of 
the giraffe in an environment of high trees, it is easy to see that the long neck is 
optimal or at least advantageous. In other cases, adaptedness is less easy to 
recognize. For instance, Theodosius Dobzhansky investigated fitness 
differences in Drosophila. They were caused by chromosome inversions. He 
observed that the chromosome inversions led to differential replication, but the 
“phenotypic consequences of these inversions were difficult to identify, and so 
it often was quite unclear why one inversion was fitter than another” as Sober 
(2000: 70) reports. He concludes: “Traits do not always wear their adaptive 
significance on their sleeves” (ibid.: 70). In principle, there are two ways to 
find evidence for the fitness values, as Sober (2000: 68-70) stated: The 
physical basis of fitness, i.e. adaptedness, or the actual change in frequency, i.e. 
the consequences of fitness differences. Adaptedness is the independent 
evidence for fitness differences. Bernard Kettlewell (1973) used both lines of 
investigation when he made the famous case for a selectionist explanation of 
industrial melanism in the peppered moth in England. He observed that dark 
moths increased in frequency. But why? The selectionist hypothesis was: 
because they were fitter in the given environment of industrial pollution, which 
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darkened the trees on which the moths live. To find evidence for such a 
differential fitness, Kettlewell looked for lower mortality rates of the dark 
moths. But he also looked for the reason for the lower mortality rates of dark 
moths and could show that the higher fitness resulted from the fact that dark 
moths on darker trees were less visible to predators. The reason could well 
have been different. So he found the adaptive feature that accounts for the 
differential survival of the different kinds of moths. However, as the example 
of Dobzhansky showed, it is sometimes not so easy to find the respective 
causes of certain observed fitness differences. But it is not impossible either. 
So far we have encountered two slightly different solutions to the 
tautology problem. They are mixed together in Gould’s above-quoted position, 
since on the one hand he asks (a) for independent evidence of quantitative 
fitness, and on the other hand he wants to define (b) fitness “by the engineer’s 
criterion of good design.” Both requirements point into the same direction: An 
evolutionary explanation, based on the principle ‘survival of the fittest,’ must 
be linked to the physical basis of differential survival and reproduction. This is 
done in (a) via keeping the quantitative concept of fitness in its propensity 
interpretation and connecting it to the qualitative fitness, the physical basis of 
quantitative fitness. It is done in (b) via a total move towards adaptedness, the 
qualitative notion of fitness itself. The two options (a) and (b) are different 
solutions to the tautology problem. I see it as a matter of choice which solution 
one takes. It does not make any difference, at least not for the tautology 
problem. However, since contemporary biologists use the quantitative notion 
of fitness, I suggest to choose (a). In short, Darwinian explanations of change 
are in danger of being tautological, unless we can point to the physical basis of 
fitness differences.  
(iv). Drift as an alternative explanation to natural selection. Drift is an 
explanation of frequency change that is not connected to fitness differences. 
Although an alternative to natural selection, the inclusion of drift into the 
Darwinian paradigm provides testability of explanations that are based on the 
principle ‘survival of the fittest.’ Drift thereby complements (iii). It shows that 
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‘survival-of-the-fittest’-theses are empirical claims that can be tested and 
falsified and are therefore not tautological.  
As the twin thought-experiment shows, actual differential replication of 
genes (higher viability and fertility of organisms) is not always evidence for 
fitness differences. Differential replication can be due to causes that are not 
correlated with differences in replication potential. Processes of random 
genetic drift are instances of frequency changes that are not connected to 
fitness differences, since they are due to “accidents of sampling caused by 
random variation in rates of survival or reproduction”, as Futuyma (1998: 304) 
writes.  
The so-called founder effect can serve as an illustration. It is not only 
that an individual might be struck by lightning, as in the thought-experiment of 
the twins. A whole population might be struck by a chance event. Such an 
event might change the distribution of types so radically, so that a gene and a 
corresponding phenotypic effect, which had no chance of getting predominance 
before this random event, suddenly is predominant. Thus, if we want to know, 
for instance, why there are only giraffes with long necks on an island, it might 
as well be that this is not because they were better adapted to their environment 
in the past, but merely because the following happened: When this island was 
cut off another one through an earthquake, all the giraffes with long necks 
happened to be on this island and the others on the other one. The giraffes with 
long necks became the founders of a population with a totally new statistical 
distribution of certain traits. In such a case, the dominance of the trait, i.e., its 
changed frequency, does not arise because the individuals with the trait were in 
any way better adapted. The frequency changed for no reason that was 
connected to fitness differences. Drift can also arise through random sampling 
effects in mating, if population size is finite or other conditions that are the 
base of the Hardy-Weinberg-law are not fulfilled.
32
 Random drift counts today 
as an alternative to natural selection. However, the importance of drift is still 
                                                
32
 The Hardy-Weinberg-law says: if a population is infinite and randomly mating, if no genes 
are added from outside the population, if no mutation occurs, and if there are no fitness 
differences, then the frequencies of the genotypes and alleles stay constant. For a more detailed 
textbook description of the Hardy-Weinberg-law see Futuyma (1998: 235-239).  
Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity 
75 
debated. Kimura is the most well-known defender of random genetic drift, 
which is the cornerstone of his Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution (1983, 
1989).
33
  
Drift can explain changes in gene frequencies, even if there are no 
selective forces acting on the population. But it is beyond doubt that drift 
cannot explain the evolution of adaptedness, precisely because the frequency 
change has nothing to do with fitness, which is based on adaptedness. 
Consequently, if drift is responsible for a frequency change, the resulting 
evolution is neutral with respect to adaptive significance. As Kimura says, the 
neutral theory adds to Darwinism the “survival of the luckiest,” as an 
alternative to ‘survival of the fittest’ (Kimura 1992: 230). Therefore, the 
inclusion of drift into the Darwinian paradigm means that not all evolution is 
adaptive. A frequency change is not due to natural selection and therefore not 
adaptive, if “the influence of fitness upon offspring contribution is disturbed by 
any factors which separate successful from unsuccessful reproducers without 
regard to physical differences between them”, as Mills & Beatty (1994 [1979]: 
15) put it.  
It follows that fitness determines – and therefore explains – the fate of 
the population only if nothing interferes (e.g., a catastrophe like lightning), but 
not otherwise.
34
 This is analogous to the fact that the solubility of salt 
determines the solution of salt only if nothing interferes (e.g., that the salt is 
coated with plastic). If nothing interferes, the event of solution of salt in water 
can be explained by the solubility of salt, as the change of frequency can be 
explained by fitness (Mills & Beatty 1994 [1979]: 9). Therefore, in the same 
way as the solubility of salt can be tested, whether change in frequency occurs 
due to natural selection or not can in principle be tested as well. As long as 
evolutionary theory can specify which instances of frequency changes do count 
as drift and not as natural selection, the claim that evolution is due to the 
‘survival of the fittest’ is in principle testable and can be falsified, as also 
Popper (1978: 345-6) concluded from the inclusion of drift for evolutionary 
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theory. This was why he dropped his original claim that the principle of 
survival of the fittest is tautological.  
To recapitulate this last point: Variation, heritability and differential 
fitness lead to natural selection and hence to a frequency change of genes, if 
nothing else interferes. But sometimes exactly this happens. Not every 
frequency change can thus be explained by natural selection, in the Darwinian 
adaptationist sense. Genetic drift is a falsification of natural selection. The 
principle of ‘survival of the fittest’ is thus not tautological. However, it is then 
also not universally applicable.  
Conclusion 
Together, (iii), the existence of independent evidence for fitness differences 
(adaptedness), and (iv), drift as an alternative explanation of frequency 
changes, led to the consensus that the principle ‘survival of the fittest’ is not 
tautological. If we want to revise the two propositions cited at the beginning of 
this section,  
(1) The existing entities survived because they were those that were fittest.  
(2) Those who survive are those that are fittest. 
then a correct revised description of the explanation of the existence of certain 
entities, based on the principle ‘survival of the fittest,’ would thus be: 
(1’’) If no random drift processes interfered, the existing entities survived 
because they were those that had a higher propensity for survival and 
reproduction since they were better adapted to their respective environment.  
 
(2’’) Those who survive are those that have a higher propensity for survival 
and reproduction since they are better adapted to their respective 
environment, if drift does not interfere.  
2.5  THE UNITS OF SELECTION DEBATE 
The centrality of the individual and the attack from below 
In Darwin’s own theory of evolution individual organisms were central. As 
Stephen J. Gould writes, in Darwin’s theory, “the ‘struggle for existence’ is a 
matter among individuals” (Gould 1982: 85). Individuals try to pursue their 
self-interest through survival and reproduction or, to put it less intentionally: 
Those types of individuals, which have a higher fitness and can realize it, will 
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increase in frequency, if nothing else interferes. In such a case, their fitness 
explains the differential spread. From a systematic point of view, natural 
selection is then, first, a selection of individual organisms and, second, a 
selection for adaptive traits that serve their benefit – their benefit in terms of 
their adaptivity and consequently in terms of their survival and reproduction. 
First, selection is selection of individuals, since they are the entities that vary in 
fitness by exhibiting adaptive characteristics, that interact with the selective 
environment, and that are selected. Second, selection is selection for the 
adaptive traits that evolve through the differential survival and reproduction of 
organisms. Since these are traits that enhance the propensity for reproduction 
and survival of these organisms, organisms can be said to benefit from the 
evolutionary process. Natural selection selects the organisms because of these 
adaptive traits: The organisms are selected for these adaptive traits.  
Because of selection of individuals, for traits of individuals, and for 
their benefit, individual organisms have been regarded as the units of selection. 
Natural selection is individual selection. It is their adaptivity that explains their 
fitness, and it is their fitness (and therefore their ‘benefit’) that explains their 
spread. “[T]he reason that selection […] is effective is that what reproduces 
differentially are individuals with traits which are differentially adapted to the 
environment,” as Brandon & Burian (1984: xi) summarize the position that 
individuals are the units of selection.  
From the mid 20
th
 century this “central theorem,” as Dawkins (1982a: 
5) calls it, has been jeopardized from above (group selection) and below (gene 
selection). Researchers stated that groups can also be units of selection: There 
can be selection of groups and for their traits. Partly as reaction to this, others, 
most famously Richard Dawkins, stated that neither groups nor organisms can 
be units of selection. Genes are the only possible units of selection in the 
biological realm.
35
 This is the doctrine of gene selectionism, also called the 
gene-centric view of evolution. As Dawkins writes, gene selectionism means 
“that the fundamental unit of selection, and therefore of self-interest, is not the 
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species, nor the group, nor even, strictly, the individual. It is the gene, the unit 
of heredity” (Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 11). 
The statement refers to a general, philosophical argument for genes as 
the only possible units of selection. According to Dawkins, in all cases of 
biological evolution, genes are the units of selection. First, (1) genes survive, 
while organisms die: Only genes – as abstract entities – persist. Gene tokens 
make copies of themselves. They are replicators. Organisms do not make 
copies of themselves. Second, (2) genes are ‘selfish’: It is the ‘fitness’ of genes, 
i.e., their propensity for survival, that is favored in evolution, since they are the 
ultimate causal agents that determine phenotypic adaptations. Consequently, 
they explain the spread of these phenotypic adaptations. Ultimately, it is 
therefore always the fitness of the surviving gene that makes the spread of 
adaptations differential. In a nutshell, genes build organisms and have thus a 
fitness of their own, including the corresponding ‘self-interest’ in replication. 
In non-metaphorical terms – since genes do not have ‘interests’ in the literal 
sense – this means: Those genes that have a higher fitness, that lead to 
organisms that increase their survival, will be those that spread. This is the 
background of Dawkins’ talk of ‘selfish genes’ and ‘the good of genes.’ Within 
this doctrine, organisms are regarded as mere ‘vehicles’ or interactors – merely 
interacting with the environment as a coherent whole, and making through this 
the spread of genes differential. Before I explain Dawkins’s argument in more 
detail and in a more systematic way, I have to add a note about the ambiguity 
of the term ‘selfish gene,’ in order to prevent possible misunderstandings.  
The general philosophical argument just mentioned has to be 
distinguished from the more restricted issue about ‘selfish genes’ in the narrow, 
technical sense, often called ‘outlaw genes.’ Selfish genes in the narrow sense 
are genes that can spread in a population despite the fact that these genes do 
not lead to positive effects on the fitness of the organism incorporating these 
genes, or that do even lead to negative effects on the fitness of the organism. 
These outlaw genes violate the Mendelian fair lottery, in which each allele of a 
genome has a fair chance of 50 per cent to make it to the next generation. 
‘Selfish genes’ in the narrow sense circumvent this impartiality of heredity 
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through complex and diverse mechanisms. In a metaphorical language, they 
can be said to ‘compete’ with the other alleles for their representation in the 
next generation, while heredity is normally organized as a ‘cooperative’ 
endeavor of all the cells and genes of an organism. Normal genes have to 
‘cooperate’ and enhance the fitness of the organism. Outlaw genes work only 
for their own survival. Not all genes are selfish in this more narrow sense (Burt 
2002: 1020). Nonetheless outlaw genes are used as an argument for the general 
claim of gene selectionism, which assumes that all genes are selfish, in the 
wide sense, since they are the ultimate units of selection: (1) those units that 
survive across generations, and (2) the ‘selfish,’ ultimate causal agents that 
determine phenotypic adaptations.  
The philosophical debate about units of selection concentrates on the 
two thesis (1) and (2). I will do the same. Until today, no consensus has been 
reached in the debate. I will not try to solve the issue and will also put aside the 
group selection debate, since it is not relevant for this study on analogical 
reasoning from nature to culture. I will first of all show which conceptual 
issues are involved: What kinds of entities are central in evolutionary theory? 
What must a unit of selection do, i.e., what role does it play in the evolutionary 
process? This leads to the central concept of a replicator. After explaining the 
concept of a replicator, as it is used in Dawkins radical gene selectionism for 
(1) and (2), and after pointing to some critical aspects, I will briefly review the 
critique against (2), the causal issue about the ‘power’ and ‘self-interest’ of 
genes. What is at issue with respect to (2) is mainly whether one distorts the 
causal picture when one describes all processes that occur at the organismic 
level as phenotypic effect of replicators. If to do so distorts the causal picture, 
then genes merely ‘keep the book’ of evolutionary change.  
Relevance for analogical applications 
Before I continue, I want to indicate briefly why the debate about units of 
selection is relevant for this investigation. The issue about replicators as the 
only possible unit of selection is most relevant for the ontological analogy: 
Memeticists state that memes and genes are both replicators. A precise 
understanding of the replicator concept as developed in evolutionary biology is 
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therefore mandatory for any discussion of the transfer of the replicator concept 
to the cultural sphere. The issue about causation is most relevant for the 
explanatory units of selection analogy: Gene selectionism states that genes – 
and not organisms – are the ultimate beneficiaries of selection: ultimately, it is 
their fitness that is optimized through evolution; organisms are mere 
consequences of their replicative and organism-building power. Thus, they are 
explanatorily prior to organisms. In an analogous way, Dawkins, Dennett and 
others state that memes are the units of selection of culture: Memes and their 
differential survival and replication explain cultural evolution; the causal 
influence of human individuals is secondary.  
Replicators, vehicles and interactors 
The standard ontology of 20
th
 century evolutionary thinking assumes an 
organizational hierarchy of entities. At the most basic level, there are bits of 
DNA, lined up on chromosomes and identified with genes. Genes are parts of 
cells. Cells are lumped together to organs and these organs build organisms. 
Families, kinship groups, population and species, comprised of organisms, 
form the next level of the hierarchy. Local populations of different species 
form communities, which are parts of ecosystems, building the highest level of 
the hierarchy. From the lowest to the highest level, there is a part-whole 
relationship. At the center of evolutionary debates are genes, organisms and 
groups of organisms.  
At the beginning of the units of selection debate, there was just the 
question whether genes or organisms (or groups) are the unit of selection. 
Now, evolutionary theorists mainly distinguish in a formal way between two 
different causal roles genes or organisms can play in the evolutionary process: 
the role of a replicator and the role of a vehicle (or interactor).
36
 The concepts 
of ‘replicator,’ ‘vehicle,’ and ‘interactor’ were introduced by Dawkins (1976, 
1982a, b) and Hull (1980). According to Hull, a replicator is “an entity that 
passes on its structure directly in replication.” An interactor is “an entity that 
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debate: the replicator, the interactor (or vehicle), the beneficiary and the manifestor of 
adaptations. 
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directly interacts as a cohesive whole with its environment in such a way that 
replication is differential” (Hull 1980: 318). Dawkins uses similar definitions. 
A replicator is the unit of heredity that survives as an identifiable unit over long 
time spans. Selection, which works over many generations, must be based on 
such long-lasting units. But replication is not enough for evolution to occur. At 
each generation selection directly works on interactors, which make the 
replication of replicators differential. Genes are the paradigmatic replicators, 
whereas organisms are the paradigmatic interactors, although genes and groups 
can be interactors as well. On this basis, Hull (1980: 318) and also Dawkins 
(1982a: 82; 1982b: 162) argued that there is not one unit of selection but two. 
Each has its role to play in the evolutionary game. The question whether genes 
or organisms are the units of selection has thus to be divided into two 
questions: Who is the replicator and who is the interactor?
37
  
However this differentiation between two important causal roles, 
between two kinds of units of selection, did not end the debate. One of the 
reasons is that some gene selectionists, like Dawkins or Sterelny & Kitcher 
(1988), Waters 1991, Sterelny et al (1996) still claim that the causal power of 
interactors can be reduced to the causal power of replicators or (if formulated 
in more pluralistic terms) at least be represented at the level of replicators.
38
 In 
other words, even if we grant that the unit of heredity is the gene, that the unit 
of interaction is in most cases the organism, we leave out the following 
question: What is the unit that accounts for the traits that selection favors? 
Does evolution select for traits of organisms or for single genes themselves? If 
the traits of organisms can simply be reduced to or represented by genes, then 
the gene is necessarily the ultimate unit of selection. Before I can turn to this 
issue, the concept of replication has to become specified in a precise way.  
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 The conceptual distinction between replicators and interactors has led to a second 
distinction: Brandon (1982) introduced the distinction between units of selection (replicator 
question) and the levels of selection (interactor question). In general, it is now taken for 
granted that the interactor question is an empirical question. Selection normally acts on many 
levels (Keller 1999). Yet, many still disagree whether genes deserve a special status as the sole 
replicator of evolution.  
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 Hull is less radical with respect to what counts as replicator and opposes the reduction of the 
causal roles of interactors. See Hull (1980, 1988b) on his position. Therefore, I do not count 
him as a gene selectionist.  
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The replicator 
In The Selfish Gene (1976), Dawkins introduced his concept of a replicator 
with the following words:  
“At some point a particularly remarkable molecule was formed by accident. 
We will call it the Replicator […] it had the extraordinary property of being 
able to create copies of itself” (Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 15; Emph. in the orig.).  
A replicator is a copy-making entity. Genes are such replicators. Furthermore, 
a good replicator is characterized by three “kinds of stability”: “high 
longlevity/ fecundity/ copying-fidelity” (ibid.: 18). Since replicators produce 
copies of themselves, they are almost, or at least potentially almost, 
“immortal.” The “potential near-immortality” of a replicator, such as the gene, 
is not only the “defining property” of genes, but of replicators as such (ibid.: 
35).  
(i). Similarity requirement. In this definition of a replicator, we find the 
first general requirement an entity has to fulfill to count as a replicator. 
Something is only then a replicator, if there is a high similarity between the 
original and the copy. This is what I call the similarity requirement: A 
replicator is an entity that persists over time in form of similar copies. Implicit 
in this similarity requirement is a certain definition of genes. According to 
Dawkins, the gene-as-replicator is that string of DNA, out of a gene complex, 
that “survives through a large number of successive individual bodies” 
(Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 25). This gene concept is “not a rigid all-or-nothing 
definition, but a kind of fading-out definition” (ibid.: 32). The question, how 
big a portion of the genome a single gene is, cannot be answered in a general 
way. Dawkins writes: “The more likely a length of chromosome is to be split 
by crossing-over, or altered by mutations of various kinds, the less it qualifies 
to be called a gene in the sense in which I am using the term” (ibid.: 32). 
This gene concept is an evolutionary one. It differs from two kinds of 
functional gene concepts. The evolutionary gene, the gene-as-replicator is not 
identical with that sequence of DNA that codes for a single protein and is 
transcribed into a functional RNA, which would be the molecular gene 
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concept, since this segment of the genome can indeed be split up during 
reproduction. For the same reason, a gene is not necessarily identical with 
those bits of DNA, distributed over the whole genome, that can be said to be 
involved in ‘programming’ one phenotypic trait (functional or developmental 
gene concept).
39
 Dawkins gene concept is an evolutionary gene concept, 
pointing to the role DNA plays in an evolutionary perspective.  
Furthermore, the gene-as-replicator is a concrete, particulate, relatively 
stable, atom-like string of DNA-bits that persists over time. At the same time, 
however, the gene-as-replicator must be an abstract entity, a type, or a lineage 
of tokens, since no particular replicator-token (DNA-string), which, indeed, 
makes copies of itself, survives. What survives is the copy, the replica. But the 
replica will die as well. No gene-token, no replicator-token, survives, but the 
gene or replicator as a type does, or – if one does not want to involve types – 
the lineage of concrete DNA-bits survives.  
(ii). Lineage requirement. This directly leads to the second replicator 
requirement. Not any type-token-relationship that secures similar tokens 
(similarity requirement) counts as replication. A replicator involves a special 
ancestor-descendant relationship of the tokens. In replication, the tokens must 
form a lineage, as Dawkins adds in a note to the second edition of the Selfish 
Gene:  
“All printed copies of this book will be the same as one another. They will be 
replicas but not replicators. They will be replicas not because they have 
copied one another, but because all have copied the same printing plates. 
They do not form a lineage of copies, with some books being ancestral to 
others. A lineage of copies would exist if we xeroxed a page of a book, then 
xeroxed the xerox, then xeroxed the xerox of the xerox, and so on” (Dawkins 
1989 [1976]: 274). 
A lineage in the narrow sense is only present if the replicas “have copied one 
another,” i.e., if one ancestor has only one descendant and each descendant has 
exactly one ancestor. This is the case for gene-tokens. If, however, many 
copies are made from one original, as in Dawkins book example, we do not 
have a replicator, since one ancestor will have many copies. Likewise, if a 
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book is produced by copying many superimposed books, then the copy is a 
blend or average with many ancestors. In such a case, we would also not have 
replication in the narrow sense. In both cases there would be no lineage and 
hence no replicator in the narrow sense. Therefore, the second requirement an 
entity has to fulfill in order to count as a replicator is what I call the lineage 
requirement.
40
 As Dawkins says, whether the lineage requirement is fulfilled, 
is important for evolution: Only if such an ancestor/descendant relationship 
holds, does the series of copies have the “potential to evolve,” since only then 
can a “new blemish that showed up anywhere along the series […] be shared 
by descendants but not by ancestors” (Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 274). If all copies 
were made from one original, evolution would not be able to be cumulative.
41
  
(iii). Non-triggering requirement. There is a further way how two items 
can be similar without being replicated in the narrow sense, namely if the first 
item merely triggers the second item. I will call this third replicator 
requirement the non-triggering requirement. When a string of DNA is 
produced, this string has its structure not merely because the presence of the 
original DNA initiates the occurrence of a similar DNA-molecule, whose 
structure is determined by something else. The original DNA determines the 
structure of the copy. As Sperber has put it in informational terms, B is only 
then a copy of A, if the process that generates B obtains the “information that 
makes B similar to A from A” (Sperber 2000: 169). For this reason, contagious 
laughter is usually not considered as a process of copying or replication. My 
laughter merely triggers yours. It is similar, but it is similar because laughing 
(how it looks like, how it is done) is innate, not because you copy my laughter. 
You are not copying me; you are merely triggered by me to do the same as me.  
The latter two requirements show that it is not only similarity that is 
relevant for the concept of a replicator. The kind of mechanism that causes the 
similarity, “the causal relation linking the copy to the copied” is important as 
well (Godfrey-Smith 2000: 405; Emph. in the orig.). This comes even more to 
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 Sterelny (forthcoming a) makes the same point in requiring for a “true copying process” that 
the copy must be a copy of a particular original. If the copy is drawn from numerous sources, it 
is not true copying. 
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 See also Dawkins (1982a: 95).  
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the fore, if we look at the main reasons Dawkins cites for excluding other 
entities from being replicators, such as organisms or nests, although they can 
be said to reproduce. Looking at these reasons helps to make the similarity 
requirement more precise and will lead to further replicator requirements.  
(a). Organisms do not make copies. Dawkins wants to exclude any 
kinds of organisms (sexual and asexual) from being replicators. His first 
argument is the temporary existence of organisms: “[T]hey do not persist 
through making copies of themselves” (Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 34). The point is 
not that individual organisms die. As I mentioned above, individual DNA-
molecules die as well. The point is that they do not make copies of themselves. 
But this holds only for sexually reproducing organisms, since asexually 
reproducing organisms make copies of themselves. Furthermore, even sexually 
reproducing organisms produce similar organisms: ‘like begets like’ due to 
heritability. As mentioned in section 2.1, heritability means that parents and 
offspring are correlated in terms of similarity. It means that parent and 
offspring are more similar than other pairs of individuals, and that this is due to 
shared genes and not due to environmental influence. Since traits of organisms 
show heritability, Lewontin (1970) and others stated: Heritability is enough for 
evolution to occur.
42
 They admit that reproduction does not exhibit such a high 
‘copy-fidelity’ as the replication of genes, but they stress that copy-fidelity is a 
measure of degree. For them, there is no qualitative difference between genes, 
organisms, or other types of entities that reoccur generation after generation. 
As Lewontin writes:  
“The heritability is highest in units where no internal adjustment or 
reassortment is possible since such units will pass on to their descendent units 
an unchanged set of information. Thus, cell organelles, haploid organisms, 
and gametes are levels of selection with a higher heritability than diploid 
sexual genotypes, since the latter do not perfectly reproduce themselves, but 
undergo segregation and recombination in the course of their reproduction.” 
(Lewontin 1970: 8).  
The only thing that changes, if we have individuals as units of heredity, and 
therefore as units of selection, is the rapidity of selection. Although rapidity of 
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 For instance, Sober & Wilson (1994: 538), Godfrey-Smith (2000), Gould (2001: 214). See 
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selection depends upon the degree of heritability, a lower heritability does not 
make selection impossible. It only makes it slower. Thus, the objection is that 
one either has to count organisms as further replicators (widening the similarity 
requirement), or one admits that evolution is possible without replication in the 
narrow sense. In both cases, organisms would also have to count as units of 
selection: units that persist long enough to be the base for evolutionary 
changes. I will not take a stance on the issue. I merely wanted to point out that 
there is a problem whose solution – how much similarity is enough – is 
controversial. The solution itself is not important here.  
(b). Dawkins Weismannian reply. What is important, however, is that 
this problem is the reason why Dawkins cites a second main reason for the 
exclusion of organisms as replicators. According to Dawkins, the “fundamental 
reason” (Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 274) why organisms cannot be replicators is 
that acquired changes, phenotypic changes acquired during lifetime, are not 
handed down to the descendants of the organism.
43
 Thus, the argument is that 
since Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics is impossible, no 
organism – be it a sexually or asexually reproducing organism – can be a 
replicator. As outlined already in section 2.2, inheritance of acquired 
characteristics is one of the assumptions in Lamarck’s theory of evolution. 
Neo-Darwinism (or Weismannism) is strongly opposed to it: Only non-
acquired, genetic characteristics are assumed to be heritable. This is the so-
called “central dogma” of Neo-Darwinism (Crick 1958: 153). In contrast to 
this, inheritance of acquired characteristics was accepted almost universally at 
Darwin's time (Zirkle 1946). Even Darwin believed in the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics and tried to explain it with his hypothesis of ‘gemules’ 
produced and inherited through pangenesis (Darwin 1868). Before Weismann 
(1892) introduced the strict distinction between germ and soma,
44
 it was 
common belief that the hereditary material in the sex cells is produced from the 
material of the developed body. Given such a system, changes that the 
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 Later, Weismann’s germ-soma distinction has been replaced by the genotype-phenotype 
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organism acquired during lifetime could be inherited. Since the material that 
makes up the organism constantly changes, the hereditary material was also 
considered to be ‘soft’, i.e., pliable. Heredity was considered to be based on so-
called ‘soft inheritance’ (Mayr 1982: 959). Weismann, however, stated that 
heredity is ‘hard.’ He claimed that the germ plasm contains the hereditary 
material and that this germ plasm is a special substance that is not produced by 
somatic tissue. The hereditary material is present from the start, not made by or 
out of the material of the organism, and protected against any changes that 
occur in the somatic tissue. Biological inheritance is hard inheritance: The 
hereditary material is ‘hard,’ i.e., isolated, present from the start, persistent 
throughout the whole life-cycle, and stable against acquired changes that occur 
during the life of an individual.  
According to Dawkins, it is Weismannism that excludes organisms 
from being replicators. An entity can only be a replicator, if changes to the 
entity are inherited. Through pointing to hard inheritance, which implies the 
non-inheritance of acquired characteristics, Dawkins can exclude even asexual 
reproducing organisms from being replicators. The characteristics of the 
organisms are not copied. Only their genome is copied. As Sober & Wilson 
(1994: 538) answer, given this argument, gene selectionism relies on the 
universal truth of Weismannism. If we empirically find out that there are 
organisms for which the central dogma does not hold (organisms whose 
acquired changes are inherited), then we might well consider them as 
replicators. In such a case, heritability of whole organisms would be secured on 
the basis of soft inheritance, leading to the replication of these organisms. 
Now, the following question arises naturally: If we assume, for the sake of 
argument, that there can be asexually reproducing organisms that reproduce 
through soft Lamarckian inheritance, could we then count them as replicators? 
According to Dawkins, we still could not, since they do not self-replicate.  
(iv). Self-replication requirement. Dawkins explicitly requires self-
replication for true replication. He does this, for instance, to argue against nests 
as replicating entities (Dawkins 1982a: 99). Birds build nests and these nests 
reoccur at each generation of birds, but Dawkins assumes that nests do not 
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replicate. He reacts to a claim of Bateson (1978), opposing Dawkins gene 
selectionism that a bird (and its nests) is merely a ‘gene’s way of making 
another gene.’ According to Bateson (1978), who objects to giving genes so 
much causal priority, a gene could as well be regarded as a ‘nest’s way of 
making another nest.’ Dawkins answers:  
“There is a causal arrow going from gene to bird, but none in the reverse 
direction. A changed gene may perpetuate itself better than its unmutated 
allele. A changed nest will do no such thing unless, of course, the change is 
due to a changed gene, in which case it is the gene that is perpetuated, not the 
nest. A nest, like a bird, is a gene’s way of making another gene. […] The 
special status of genetic factors rather than non-genetic factors [in evolution, 
MK] is deserved for one reason only: genetic factors replicate themselves, 
blemishes and all, but non-genetic factors do not” (Dawkins 1982a: 98f; 
Emph. added).  
Nests do not count as replicators, since ancestor nests have not the required 
direct causal connection to descendant nests. As the lineage and the non-
triggering requirement, the self-replication requirement points towards a 
certain causal connection between original and copy. Nests get reproduced 
only as a consequence of the replication-machinery of something else. Before a 
nest can reoccur, the nest-building organism has to reproduce and this requires 
that genes replicate. Genes seem to self-replicate in the sense that one gene can 
lead directly to another one. That is why Dawkins considers them as self-
replicating. Birds and nests do not self-replicate in this sense.  
Yet, as critics, like Lewontin (1991: 48) or Griffiths & Gray (1994; 
1997) have pointed out, it is a very crude oversimplification to say that genes 
self-replicate. Genes replicate, but they do this by a complex machinery. The 
complex machinery is so important that it would be more precise to say that 
genes are replicated by this complex machinery in the same way as nests are 
replicated by the complex machinery of the habits of birds. Whether this counts 
as a critique depends on what one means by ‘self-replication.’ If Dawkins 
answers that the complex machinery is not an argument against what he means 
by self-replication,
45
 since any causal process that secures similarity between 
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 Dawkins implicitly does this through counting xeroxing sheets of paper as replication, which 
definitely relies on heavy copying machinery (Dawkins 1982a: 83). Dennett, defending 
Dawkins, answers explicitly in this way. Any causal chain connecting original and copy is 
enough for counting the entity as a replicator (Dennett forthcoming).  
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copy and original of a gene is enough for self-replication, then he ends up with 
a broad concept of replicators that has to count organisms, nests, and a number 
of other things (like thumbs) as replicators (Godfrey-Smith 2000). Yet, this 
would not only let the concept “collapse,” since it becomes too broad, as 
Godfrey-Smith (2000: 410) claims. It would also undermine the central claim 
of Dawkins gene selectionism, namely that organisms cannot be replicators. 
However, Dawkins offers a further way to single out genes as the sole 
replicators: Replicators are active.  
(v). Active replicator requirement. Dawkins introduced the concept of 
“active replicators” in the Extended Phenotype (1982a: 83). Genes now appear 
as a special sort of replicators, namely active germ-line replicators. Dawkins 
defines  
“a replicator as anything in the universe of which copies are made. Examples 
are a DNA molecule, and a sheet of paper that is xeroxed. Replicators may be 
classified in two ways. They may be ‘active’ or ‘passive’, and, cutting across 
this classification, they may be ‘germ-line’ or ‘dead-end’ replicators.” 
(Dawkins 1982a: 83).  
Dead-end replicators (active or passive) can only be copied for a finite number 
of times. DNA-bits of body cells count as dead-end replicators. A germ-line 
replicator (active or passive) “is potentially the ancestor of an indefinitely long 
line of descendant replicators” (ibid.: 83), such as bits of germ-line DNA. More 
important than the distinction between dead-end and germ-line replicators is 
Dawkins’ distinction between active and passive replicators.  
“An active replicator is any replicator whose nature has some influence over 
its probability of being copied. For example a DNA molecule, via protein 
synthesis, exerts phenotypic effects which influence whether it is copied […]. 
A passive replicator is a replicator whose nature has no influence over its 
probability of being copied. A xeroxed sheet of paper at first sight seems to 
be an example, but some might argue that its nature does influence whether it 
is copied, and therefore that it is active: humans are more likely to xerox 
some sheets of paper than others, because of what is written on them, and 
these copies, are, in their turn, relatively likely to be copied again” (Dawkins 
1982a: 83).  
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The xeroxed sheet of paper as a replicator shows that self-replication in the end 
is not central to Dawkins replicator concept, since a xeroxed sheet of paper 
clearly does not self-replicate in any sense.
46
  
However, what is most important at this point is the thesis that 
replicators are taken to have certain phenotypic effects. That genes are active 
germ-line replicators means for Dawkins that genes have causal priority over 
organisms and environmental or developmental factors, although the latter also 
influence the growth of organisms. To distinguish the influence of genes from 
the other factors, Dawkins often uses stronger language, in order to make the 
case for the gene-as-replicator as a primary causal agent in evolution. DNA is 
said to ‘program’ or ‘code’ for phenotypic effect, they are the primary 
‘controllers’ of developmental processes etc. Through ‘building’ organisms 
they control their own destiny. There could be given many references for this 
language and many withdrawals from it as well. The most famous phrases are 
on humans as “lumbering robots” and “survival machines” of selfish 
replicators (e.g. Dawkins (1989 [1976]: 19f). All of this often highly 
metaphorical language amounts to the following: Organisms are mere “units of 
phenotypic power of replicators“ (Dawkins 1982b: 167). Although Dawkins 
grants that selection acts on interactors, that they thereby are “functional units 
of great importance” (Dawkins 1982a: 112), he stresses that they are mere 
vehicles: “A vehicle is an entity in which replicators (genes or memes) travel 
about, an entity whose attributes are affected by the replicators propagation” 
(ibid.: 112). Groups and species can also be vehicles. Vehicles have differential 
success in survival, since they are selected during interaction with their 
environment. But this success is „differential success of vehicles in 
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 Sober & Wilson (1994: 538) do not distinguish between Dawkins’ self-replication 
requirement and his requirement that replicators must be active, when they criticize that a page 
fed into a copying machine is not self-replicating and therefore not “active.” That the page is 
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propagating the replicators that ride inside them“ (Dawkins 1982b: 166). Last 
but not least, the vehicles or phenotypic effects do not even have to be a part of 
the respective organism: A nest is a phenotypic effect of the genes coding for 
nest building behavior. It is not a part of the organism, but a part of the 
“extended phenotype.”
47
 To summarize, the fundamental reason why, 
according to gene selectionism, organisms, nests, thumbs etc. cannot be 
replicators lies in the idea that they are a mere consequence of a unit that has a 
replicating and phenotype-building ‘power.’  
Genes’ phenotypic effects and bookkeeping  
Although Dawkins repeatedly admits that genes always interact with each other 
and with environmental and developmental factors, he nonetheless claims that 
the phenotypic power of interactors can be reduced to the genes coding for that 
behaviour. The phenotypic power of interactors can be reduced to the 
“phenotypic power of replicators“ (Dawkins 1982b: 167). And he has to claim 
this, since only then can he say that a gene is selected for a certain phenotypic 
trait. Genes can only be units of selection, if they are selected for a specific 
phenotypic effect that reoccurs each generation of organisms. Hence genes can 
only be selected for this or that, if they are ‘genes for’ this or that. Units of 
selection must be functional units. Only through the reduction of phenotypic 
traits to the causal power of genes is it possible to say that, if an organism is 
selected for having an eye, this eye ultimately serves the benefit of those genes 
that cause this organism to have such an eye. “If we wish to speak of 
adaptations as being ‘for the good of’ something, that something is the active, 
germ-line replicator” (Dawkins 1982a: 113). They eye of the organism is just 
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 The concept of an extended phenotype is a further and, according to some, the most powerful 
argument that Dawkins offers against organisms as units of selection. See Dawkins (1982a), 
and summarized in Dawkins (1989 [1976]: ch. 13). He tries to show that an organism is not 
even necessary for evolution, as long as a replicator is accompanied by some interaction with 
the environment that makes replication differential. This can be through the replicator itself, 
being replicator and interactor at the same time, through a phenotypic effect in an organism 
containing the replicator, through an entity caused by the replicator in the environment, such as 
a nest, or through an effect of the replicator on a host organism, such as in the case of viruses. 
Since this argument is not so much relevant for this investigation and would have to be dealt in 
detail, I can only point to the relevant literature debating the issue, e.g.: Sterelny & Griffiths 
(1999), Jablonka (2004), Laland (2004), Dawkins (2004).  
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the vehicle making the survival of genes differential. Therefore, only the gene 
can be the unit of selection: it (1) survives long enough to benefit from 
evolution, and it is (2) the unit that ultimately causes those traits for which 
organisms are selected directly. Genes are the units whose fitness (in ultimately 
having properties that cause their survival to be differential, i.e., in being 
active) explains the spread of genes and the spread of adaptations, which are 
exhibited by the organisms having these genes. In other words, the causal 
function of vehicles, actually exhibiting adaptations and interacting with the 
environment, can be reduced to the gene as the ultimate unit that is causally 
responsible for this interaction, as Lloyd (forthcoming 2005) puts the issue.  
But, and this is the core of the issue, if units of selection are those units 
that are selected for, the question is whether selection really can discriminate 
for or against single genes, given that genes are defined as replicators, i.e. as 
strings of DNA that are potentially long-living, not broken up by cross-over 
etc. This question is at the center of the debates that address the causal issues 
involved in the units of selection debate. Until today, no consensus has been 
reached. I can only review the core arguments. The main argument of critics is 
that attributing to single replicators a fitness and phenotypic consequences of 
their own is distorting the causal process. Genes are only ‘bookkeeping’ what 
happens on the organismic level.  
Today, it is uncontroversial to define evolution as a change in gene 
frequencies in a population. As countable units, genes keep the book of 
evolutionary change. If this is the case, than single genes do have a fitness 
value of their own that can be “treated algebraically,” as the arithmetic mean 
effect of the respective alleles in a population. Nonetheless, this does not 
qualify them as the causally responsible units of selection, as critics claim.
48
 As 
Gould summarizes the opposition to gene centrism: Gene centrism rests on a 
“confusion of bookkeeping with causality” (Gould 2001: 208). The problem is 
that genes would need attributable context-independent effects on phenotypes: 
effects for which they are selected, effects that are their effects, and not the 
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effect of a larger junk of DNA, in the limit the whole genome. That Dawkins’ 
replicators do not have such a context-independent effect is suggested by the 
fact that phenotypes are caused by a complex network of gene interaction, 
which differs in each organismic context, since the gene meets different genes 
in different organisms.
49
 The bits of DNA that are singled out by Dawkins’ 
evolutionary concept of genes as replicators might not have such a context-
independent effect. Dawkins and others have countered this critique with the 
argument that we can treat other genes as a background condition, as a genetic 
environment influencing the fitness of a single gene.
50
 Genes are difference-
makers with a context-independent effect, if we regard other factors as 
constant, i.e., if we stick to ‘ceteris paribus.’ Whether this suffices to show that 
the context-independent phenotypic effects of genes and the respective 
averaged fitness of individual genes are more than mere mathematical 
“artifacts,” as Sober & Lewontin (1982) object, cannot be answered here. The 
details of the arguments involve assumptions about causation, emergence, 
ceteris paribus clauses, and the like, which would lead too far away from the 
goal of this investigation. Important here is not the answer to the units of 
selection debate. Important is rather that it does not suffice to claim that 
replicators exist and that evolution can be represented through counting gene 
frequencies. You can track evolution through regarding genes as the ultimate 
units of heredity, which preserve their structure with a high copy-fidelity. But 
in order to regard them as units of selection, as the entities, which selection 
discriminates for or against, you need further assumptions about the causal 
picture that are contentious.  
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 Note that this is different from Mayr’s (1963, 1975) and Brandon’s (1982, 1999) argument 
that the causal influence of phenotypic characteristics ‘screens off’ the causal impact of their 
genotypic basis. According to them, the organism is a more direct cause of selection and is thus 
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same time. 
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Conclusion 
The units of selection debate is about the roles certain entities play in 
Darwinian evolution. I introduced the replicator concept, which formalizes the 
role genes play in evolution, and which was meant to show that genes are the 
units that are selected for by evolution. According to Dawkins, a replicator in 
the narrow sense has to meet five requirements: (i) the similarity requirement, 
(ii) the lineage requirement, (iii) the non-triggering requirement, (iv) the self-
replication requirement, and (v) the active-difference-maker requirement. The 
latter concept is connected to the claim that genes have a fitness of their own, 
and a context-independent phenotypic effect. A replicator in a broad sense only 
has to fulfill the similarity requirement. According to this concept, almost 
anything that reoccurs in form of copies would count as a replicator. The 
narrow concept of replicators is therefore necessary to single out genes as the 
one and only replicators of biological evolution. In chapter 3, I will put into 
question whether memes are replicators in the narrow sense. In chapter 5, I will 
show that attributing memes a fitness of their own cannot serve as a basis for 
considering them as the ‘selfish’ units of cultural selection. The reason is 
similar to why genes as explanatory prior units of selection are controversial: 
To attributing them a fitness of their own might be mere bookkeeping.  
2.6  SUMMARY 
We saw that a Darwinian explanation of change has the following structure: It 
explains systems that exhibit variation, fitness differences, and heredity by 
referring to a sorting process, which is in the case of biological evolution 
mainly natural selection. But drift is an alternative sorting process compatible 
with a Darwinian paradigm. Variation arises through a process that is 
decoupled from selection, leading to undirected variation. Selection is 
imposing direction on this variation ex post facto and can only work in an 
opportunistic manner, leading to local adaptation, according to immediate pay-
off, and doing this in the manner of a ‘tinkerer.’ Fitness is a propensity for 
survival and reproduction. If the concept of fitness is not connected to the 
causal basis of this propensity, i.e., to traits of the respective entity that make 
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up his adaptedness, then the principle of ‘survival of the fittest’ is tautological, 
explaining survival via survival. Different entities that can be distinguished in 
biological evolution can play different roles in this evolutionary process. 
Organisms are the paradigmatic interactors, and genes are the paradigmatic 
replicators. The controversial issue is whether the causal role of interactors can 
be reduced to the causal role of replicators.  
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3  ONTOLOGICAL ANALOGY: GENES AND 
MEMES  
3.1  UNITS OF CULTURE 
The gene-meme-analogy  
The ontological analogy between biological evolution and culture compares 
genes and ideational units of culture, such as ideas, beliefs, rules for behavior, 
or values. In the 19
th
 century, it was organisms (or organs) and artifacts that 
had been compared by natural theology or evolutionists. Paley, for instance, 
draws an analogy between the eye and the telescope because of the perceived 
design (complexity and functionality) in both of these entities. Although the 
analogy between organisms, organs, and artifacts was at issue in the debates 
about the argument from design and is still at issue in current debates about 
function ascriptions,
1
 it is of no importance in the two approaches that are at 
issue here: the Darwinian approach to creativity and memetics.  
As the evolution of species is defined as change in gene frequencies and 
counted through genes, since genes are as replicators the ‘bookkeeping’ basic 
units of heredity in biology, it is assumed that culture involves similar basic 
building blocks: units of cultural heredity that can be tracked and counted, that 
can therefore be used to ‘keep the book’ of cultural change, and that are 
replicators. Dawkins (1976) called these building blocks memes: ideational 
units, such as ideas, beliefs, rules for behavior, values, concepts and the like. 
The ontological analogy at issue here is an analogy between genes and memes.  
This ontological analogy is based on three assumptions: First, it rests on 
the assumption (1) that there are such ideational units of cultural heredity. 
Second, it rests on the assumption that (2) we can count these units. I will call 
this second assumption traceability condition of memes. Third, it rests on the 
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assumption that (3) both are replicators. This third assumption will be called 
replicator condition.
2
  
The anthropological concept of culture  
The first assumption, (1), that there are basic ideational building blocks of 
culture, simply mirrors the contemporary anthropological concept of culture. 
Since memeticists and most critics do not care much about the history of the 
concept of culture, as it has developed in humanities and social sciences, 
especially anthropology, they miss this point.
3
  
Etymologically the term ‘culture’ comes from the Latin term colere. It 
means the tending of natural growth or ‘husbandry’. Cicero, who used the term 
cultura animi for the tending of the soul, made the first application beyond the 
sphere of agriculture. This concept of culture, referring to the enhancement or 
perfection of the soul, is still found in the French ‘Enlightment’ concept of 
culture as civilization – the universal progress of humanity. In contrast to this, 
a more ‘Romantic’ and nationalistic concept of Kultur was developed in 
Germany: Culture means national identity. That each nation had its culture 
means that “[e]ach Volk had its own Geist, and its specific destiny,” as Adam 
Kuper (2002: 88) puts it. Herder is one of the most well-known philosophers in 
this tradition. In parallel to these two concepts, there had always been a third, 
more elitist or ‘classic’ concept of culture: only art, philosophy and the like 
were culture. Culture is ‘high culture.’ These three concepts were prevalent in 
all the humanities.  
In the 19
th
 century then, a distinct scientific concept of culture 
developed during the formation of anthropology as a scientific discipline. 
Edward B. Tylor was the pioneer of this development. The two volumes of 
Primitive Culture (1871) are considered as the founding texts of modern 
anthropology as a scientific discipline. The first volume, entitled Origins of 
Culture, begins with Tylor’s now classic anthropological definition of culture:  
                                                
2
 The fourth assumption – a part of memetics but not a part of the ontological analogy – is that 
memes and not minds explain why we think what we think. It will be addressed in chapter 5. 
3
 For exceptions see Plotkin (2002) and the critique of memetics of Kuper (2000) and Bloch 
(2000).  
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“Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex 
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of a society“ (Tylor 
1958 [1871]: 1).  
This definition is important for two reasons: (i) First, the definition implicitly 
establishes an opposition between biological inheritance and social learning. 
Culture is ‘acquired by man as a member of a society’ and thus not innate. 
Hence, the concept that culture is a separate system of inheritance, based on 
social learning, which I introduced already in chapter 1, goes at least as far 
back as to the 19
th
 century. This is the first of two important aspects of the 
contemporary scientific concept of culture that will be essential for the 
evaluation of the ontological analogy. The second aspect, which will be 
relevant for that goal, is: (ii) Tylor enumerates diverse units of culture that are 
organized into an integrating ‘complex whole,’ abstracted from the 
conglomerate of these units.  
In 1952, the anthropologists Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn 
(1952) tried to summarize the developments from Tylor until then. They listed 
164 definitions and several statements about culture. Based on this review, they 
suggested a summarizing formula as a kind of consensus for the 
anthropological concept of culture at their time:  
“[C]ulture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior 
acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement 
of human groups, including their embodiments in artefacts; the essential core 
of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas 
and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be 
considered as products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of 
further action” (Kroeber & Kluckhohn 1963 [1952]: 357). 
Let me reconstruct this formula with respect to the above mentioned two 
aspects: (i) As consisting of ‘products of action’ that are at the same time 
‘conditioning elements of further action,’ as ‘acquired and transmitted by 
symbols,’ being thereby the ‘distinctive achievement of human groups,’ culture 
is created by man, transmitted through social learning, and thereby maintained 
in history through traditions. (ii) As consisting of ‘patterns of and for 
behavior,’ as transmitted by ‘symbols,’ culture has its ‘essential core’ in ‘ideas 
and especially their attached values,’ which are merely ‘embodied’ in artifacts. 
These two aspects have already been present in Tylor’s definition. But Tylor 
Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity 
99 
did not put so much stress on ideational units. Even if the concept of culture 
still is subject to controversial debates, not much has changed since Kroeber & 
Kluckhohn, at least not with respect to the two aspects at question here.
4
 I will 
now turn to a more detailed description of these two aspects.  
(i). Culture as created by humans and transmitted through social 
learning. The contemporary scientific concept of culture assumes that humans 
either create cultural units or learn them from others. The way a traditional pot 
is made in Poland in the 20
th
 century is not specified in the genes of Polish 
people. Somebody invented the pattern of making the pots and others have 
learned these patterns. Culture is thus based on individual learning, creativity 
in a more narrow sense, and social learning. (The distinction between 
individual learning and creativity will be explained in chapter 4.) Traditions, 
which conserve culture over time, are thus maintained via non-genetic transfer 
from individual to individual. Culture is something ‘added to’ our biological 
design or equipment: We create things that are not innately specified and hand 
them down to others through means that are not part of biological inheritance.  
This is, as you might recall, also the aspect that distinguishes the 
analogical applications of Darwinism from the literal extensions mentioned in 
chapter 1. Evolutionary psychology uses a wide notion of culture: Cosmides & 
Tooby, for instance, define culture as “any mental, behavioral, or material 
commonalities shared across individuals […] regardless of why these 
commonalities exist” (Cosmides & Tooby 1992: 117). Culture is behavior. 
According to them, culture is merely ‘evoked’ through experience in the world 
and basically innate. As indicated in chapter 1, the problem with this wide 
notion of culture is that it ignores that behavior is caused by different factors 
that can hardly be isolated in practice but have to be distinguished in theory: 
genes and other biological factors, environment, social structure, and culture – 
as consisting of socially transmitted ideational units, such as ideas, values etc. 
To say that every behavior is culture and that culture in this sense (i.e., 
behavior) can be reduced to genes and mere triggering factors is a sleight of 
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hand that reduces culture by defining it away. It is ignoring the “critical 
generative dimension” of culture, as Weingart et al (1997: 301) write, which 
can only come into focus, if we define culture as a second system of 
inheritance of ideational units.  
This directly leads us to the second aspect, namely the units of culture. 
Before I turn to that, I want to point to the implied relation between cultural 
items and humans: On the basis of a concept of culture that does not ignore the 
generative dimension of culture, humans are creators of culture, they select 
cultural items and they are the culture bearers. 
(ii). Culture as based on ideational units. Culture is related to entities 
that fall in three ontological categories: ideational units, social units, and 
observable units. Ideational units include mainly mental states that include a 
cognitive content (i.e., beliefs, ideas, values, etc.; skills, habits, behavioral 
rules, and the like). But not all mental states can be cultural units, since these 
contain, by definition, sharable cognitive contents: Color sensations and 
emotional states, for instance, cannot be shared and are therefore excluded 
from the cultural realm. Nonetheless, we might share (i.e., transmit to others) 
our knowledge about colors. Social units comprise mainly social institutions, 
like laws or universities, and social roles, like being a minister. The observable 
units are behavioral patterns (such as rituals or actions), and artifacts (such as 
books, the university building, or other created objects like pots).  
The contemporary concept of culture gives ideational units a 
predominant role. This ideational concept of culture, used already by Kroeber 
& Kluckhohn (1952) was furthered when Talcott Parsons distinguished 
between the social and the cultural. Parsons (1951) tried to develop an 
interdisciplinary, but unified theory of social action. For this reason, he tried to 
establish a new division of labor for the social sciences: Culture and society are 
interdependent but separate systems (Kroeber & Parsons 1958). Thus, social 
institutions are not a part of culture in this ideational sense. Social institutions 
belong to the social system that – besides other things – structures the space in 
which cultural items in the narrow sense (i.e., ideational units) are shared and 
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‘travel’ from person to person – through being learned, i.e., diffused.
5
 Parsons’ 
program has gained dominance through such important students of him like 
Clifford Geertz and David Schneider, major figures in the anthropology of the 
second half of the 20
th
 century.
6
 For Geertz and Schneider, culture is a 
‘symbolic system.’ Culture is for them analogous to a shared text that has to be 
interpreted with the same methods as any literary text. Their theories were the 
base for the breakthrough of the so-called ‘ideational theories of culture.’ 
Keesing (1974) distinguishes their theories from two other main schools that 
developed along an ideational concept of culture: Ward Goodenough defined 
culture as a ‘cognitive system,’ as a mental competence that is analogous to a 
Chomskian language faculty through which humans acquire knowledge that 
must be known in order to be part of a society. Claude Levi-Strauss and his 
followers considered culture to be a ‘structural system.’ It consists of symbolic 
structures, such as myths. Through deciphering these symbolic structures, they 
believed to find universal principles of the human mind that generate these 
symbolic structures. I cannot go into the details of the differences between 
these approaches. What is important here is that all three schools more or less 
assume that the basic building blocks of culture are ideational units, more or 
less ‘ideas.’ This ideational concept of culture considers ideational units as 
generative and as more basic than behavior and artifacts: Behavior and artifacts 
are a mere consequence of ideational units. Thus, the basic building blocks and 
units of heredity of culture are the ideational units.  
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Some certainly would object the distinction between the social and the cultural and would 
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6
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This shows that the first assumption of the Darwinian ontological 
analogy, which was that (1) there are basic ideational units of cultural heredity, 
mirrors the two central aspects of the contemporary scientific concept of 
culture, as developed in anthropology: (i) that culture is created by humans and 
transmitted through social learning; (ii) that culture is based on ideational units.  
Identification and replication 
This said, it is important to realize that the contrary holds for the second 
assumption of the gene-meme-analogy. Anthropologists usually doubt that (2), 
the traceability condition of the gene-meme-analogy, holds. We cannot easily 
identify and count these basic building blocks of culture. As ideational units 
they can only be inferred and are subject to interpretation. And this is the basis 
of a common critique against the gene-meme-analogy. I will discuss this 
critique in my analysis of a set of identification problems in section 3.3. Last 
but not least, the ideational concept of culture does also not entail the third 
assumption: that social learning, the transmission of these ideational units from 
person to person, is analogous to replication, as defined by Dawkins. This 
issue, comprising a couple of replication problems, will be dealt with in section 
3.4. 
Before I can address these issues, it is essential to draw a precise picture 
of what memes are, in order to understand the position of the memeticists and 
the critics alike. The most frustrating feature of memetics, however, is that 
even memeticists have different concepts of memes.  
3.2  WHAT AND WHERE MEMES ARE 
Memes made more precise 
Since the 1970s, when Dawkins first introduced the idea of memes as 
replicators, the precise nature of these memes has been a controversial issue. 
What is a meme? Can we find memes only in brains, or are memes also ‘in’ 
behavior and artifacts? Is there an analogue to DNA and one to phenotypes? As 
Susan Blackmore, well-known defender of memetics, writes: “[T]he 
terminology of memetics is in a mess and needs sorting out” (Blackmore 1999: 
Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity 
103 
63). Since these questions have caused and still cause confusion, I have to go 
into some conceptual detail, which are often enough ignored in the hot ‘meme 
wars’ between defenders and critics. I will concentrate on the main approaches 
of Dawkins, Hull, Dennett and Blackmore, who settled on an ideational 
concept of memes. Nonetheless, there are still differences between them: 
mainly with respect to what the analogue to DNA is, and with respect to what 
the analogue to phenotypic expressions of genes is. There are other memeticists 
that do not define memes as ideational units. To make the ideational concept 
more precise, I will thus introduce the alternative of a neuronal concept of 
memes, presented by Aunger (2002). A further alternative, namely to define 
memes as behavioral units, will be presented at the end of section 3.3: This 
alternative can partly be interpreted as a reaction to the identification problems. 
Memes become identified with something else in order to restore the analogy 
between genes and memes, i.e., in order to find something in culture that is 
easily identifiable and mirrors gene replication more closely than the 
transmission of ideational units. As I will claim, the price you pay for this is a 
certain trivialization.  
Dawkins’ ideational memes 
Dawkins (1976) started memetics with a rather imprecise definition. According 
to him, the meme is a “new kind of replicator,” a “unit of cultural transmission, 
or a unit of imitation” (Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 192). After saying this, all what 
he adds as a clarification at this point is the following:  
“Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes, fashions, ways 
of making pots or of building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in 
the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes 
propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a 
process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation. If a scientist 
hears, or reads about, a good idea, he passes it on to his colleagues and 
students. He mentions it in his articles and his lectures. If the idea catches on, 
it can be said to propagate itself, spreading from brain to brain” (Dawkins 
1989 [1976] :192; Emph. added). 
This means that, first, the entities sanctified as new replicators belong to 
various ontological categories: ideas and skills on the one hand, externally 
observable behavior and artifacts on the other hand. Second, imitation in the 
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broad sense is self-propagation and analogous to the process of replication. I 
will say more on the latter in section 3.4.  
After explaining why memes are selfish, Dawkins states that we can, 
third, divide a meme-complex (e.g., a whole symphony or a theory), into single 
memes, as we can divide a gene-complex into single genes. He then makes 
clear that, fourth, we actually have to distinguish between the meme as an 
essence of something (i.e., the “idea-meme”) and its interpretations in the 
minds of diverse individuals. Darwinism is his example. He writes:  
“[W]hen we say that all biologists nowadays believe in Darwin’s theory, we 
do not mean that every biologist has, graven in his brain, an identical copy of 
the exact words of Charles Darwin himself. Each individual has his own way 
of interpreting Darwin’s ideas. […] Yet […] there is something, some 
essence of Darwinism, which is present in the head of every individual who 
understands the theory. If this were not so, then almost any statement about 
two people agreeing with each other would be meaningless. An ‘idea-meme’ 
might be defined as an entity that is capable of being transmitted from one 
brain to another. The meme of Darwin’s theory is therefore that essential 
basis of the idea which is held in common by all brains that understand the 
theory. The differences in the ways that people represent the theory are then, 
by definition, not part of the meme.” (ibid.: 195-6; Emph. in orig.)  
With this statement Dawkins want to secure that there is one and the same 
meme in different heads at all. It is important to realize that this ‘essentialism’ 
is similar to the essentialism that is hidden in the modern concept of hard 
inheritance.
 
As explained in section 2.5, this concept assumes that genes are the 
heritable units, which are hidden inside of bodies and ‘hard’ – strictly separate 
from the somatic tissue, present from the start, continuously existing, and 
protected against acquired changes. Acquired changes are those that arise from 
the influence of the external environment during development, which builds a 
context that varies from organism to organism. Acquired changes are not part 
of the genes, do not become integrated into the genetic heritage, and are thus 
not heritable. Acquired changes are mere temporary, arbitrary, or even 
‘imperfect’ realizations of the gene. These phenotypic realizations change 
according to the context, but the gene stays the same – except, of course, when 
mutations occur.  
If memes are analogous to genes, and if there is something (i.e., the 
interpretation of the meme) that changes from context to context, whereas the 
meme stays the same, then memes have a context-dependent phenotypic 
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‘expression.’ Now, the following interpretational problem arises: Do they also 
have a material realization in a ‘meme-DNA’, which is invariant across 
contexts? If there is no such context-independent material realization of the 
essential Darwinism-meme, than this means that memes do not have a DNA, as 
genes have a DNA that stays the same in different organisms, despite different 
phenotypic realizations. Thus is the meme a purely abstract entity without a 
clear material identification? Dawkins statements in 1976 allow no definite 
answer to this question about a DNA-analogue. Nonetheless, what is clear is 
that Dawkins regards memes as abstract, essential entities: memes have an 
essence that is shared despite concrete differences in the minds of individuals.  
Dawkins was more precise in his The Extended Phenotype (Dawkins 
1982a: 109-112). He writes:  
“I have previously supported the case for a completely non-genetic kind of 
replicator, which flourishes only in the environment provided by complex, 
communicating brains. I called it the ‘meme’ […] I was insufficiently clear 
about the distinction between the meme itself, as replicator, on the one hand, 
and its ‘phenotypic effects’ or ‘meme products’ on the other. A meme should 
be regarded as a unit of information residing in a brain […]. It has a definite 
structure, realized in whatever physical medium the brain uses for storing 
information. […] This is to distinguish it from its phenotypic effects, which 
are its consequences in the outside world […]. The phenotypic effects of a 
meme may be in the form of words, music, visual images, styles of clothes, 
facial or hand gestures, skills such as opening milk bottles in tits, or panning 
wheat in Japanese macaques. They are the outward and visible (audible, etc.) 
manifestations of the memes within the brain” (Dawkins 1982a: 109; Emph. 
added).  
Only ideational units are regarded as memes. Variations in physical 
realizations are not part of these memes; they are phenotypes. The analogues to 
bits of DNA are brain-patterns. That there are different internal phenotypic 
expressions, interpretations, of these memes in the minds of individuals, and 
not only different external realizations, is not addressed anymore.  
In his Foreword to Blackmore, Dawkins (1999) again slightly changes 
his concept of memes. On the one hand, there are memes, which have a non-
memetic phenotype, understood as imperfect external realizations of an idea or 
‘instruction.’ On the other hand, there are also memes where the “phenotype in 
every generation is also the genotype” (Dawkins 1999: xi). The example he 
uses for the first kind of memes are “instructions” (ibid.: xi) for making a 
Chinese paper junk, an origami model of a flat-bottomed Chinese sailing-ship. 
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The example of the second kind of memes is an artifact, a drawing of a Chinese 
paper junk. The transmission processes of these two types of memes are 
different, especially with respect to the copy-fidelity of the transmission. The 
transmission of the first kind of memes is truly Weismannian (i.e. hard 
inheritance), while the transmission of the second is ‘Lamarckian.’ Lamarckian 
in this context means that the imperfect ‘phenotypic’ realizations are copied as 
well. Hence, imperfections accumulate and lead to a total different drawing 
after a couple of transmissions. I will come back to this distinction between 
two kinds of memes and two kinds of transmission in section 3.4, where I will 
say more about copy-fidelity of memes. Important at this point is that the 
constant back and forth, between defining memes as ideational units and 
defining them as including observable artifacts and behaviors as well, does 
indeed create some of the confusion about what memes are.  
Hull’s ideational memes 
David Hull was the first author who took Dawkins suggestion about cultural 
units as replicators seriously. Already in The Naked meme (Hull 1982) and in 
later papers (Hull 2000, 2001), he suggested that memes – the sought-for “units 
of sociocultural evolution” that can play the role of replicators – “can exist in 
brains, books, computers, and a wide variety of physical vehicles of 
knowledge” (Hull 1982: 276). Note that the term ‘vehicle’ here, does not have 
the special meaning it has in Dawkins’ gene selectionism (introduced in section 
2.5). Hull is very clear about this, at least in later papers, where he writes: 
“Using vehicle to refer both to interactors [to which Dawkins vehicles belong, 
MK] and to the physical basis of replication begs for misunderstanding, and 
misunderstanding comes along easily enough on its own. One need not beg for 
it” (Hull 2001: 33). ‘Vehicle’ in the above quotation just stands for any 
physical “substrate” of memes, the latter being “ideas” (Hull 1982: 310) or 
“information” incorporated in these substrates (Hull 2000: 58).
7
 Hull thus 
                                                
7
 The concept of information is now often used, replacing ‘representations’ or ‘mental content’ 
or ‘ideas,’ even though its meaning is usually not clarified. As Hull (2000: 58-61) states, the 
concept of information that should stand for contents that are in minds, books, etc. is still a 
dubious one. It cannot be the information thermodynamics deals with. It cannot be the 
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differs from Dawkins in that he does not regard brain-patterns as primary 
material substrate of memes. While DNA is usually considered to be the one 
and only material substrate of genes, memes have diverse physical substrates.
8
  
Hull (1982: 310) also distinguishes these physical substrates from the 
phenotypic expressions of memes.
9
 Symbolic systems (written or spoken 
language, musical scores or geometric representations) should not be counted 
as phenotypic, as Dawkins does, since the relationship between memes and 
these physical substrates is more similar to the relationship between genes and 
DNA, than to the relationship between genes and phenotypic characteristics. 
The reason he offers is that the relationship between symbolic systems and 
mental content is “structure-retaining,” just as the relationship between genes 
and DNA. The relation between a word and the respective concept, for 
instance, counts as structure-retaining. Words would therefore count as mere 
physical substrates of memes, as DNA is a mere physical structure-retaining 
substrate of genes.
10
 Memes are coded in diverse physical substrates, while 
genes are coded only in DNA. Furthermore, genes and memes are not only 
coded in a physical substrate, they code for phenotypic characteristics. As 
Dawkins, Hull takes memes to ‘code for’ behavior and products of behavior. 
But only those instances and products of behavior that can count as a non-
structure retaining behavioral “application” or “implementation” of memes are 
phenotypic expressions of memes. The relation between the idea of peaceful 
behavior and peaceful behavior itself would thus not count as structure-
retaining. Peaceful behavior would merely be a phenotypic expression of the 
idea, as an eye is a phenotypic expression of genes. The same holds for the 
                                                                                                                            
information mathematical information theory (Shannon & Weaver 1949) talks about. It must 
be a semantic concept of information that still waits for its discovery. See Wilkins (1998) for a 
first step in the direction of a precise concept of semantic information in memes. 
8
 See also Hull (1982: 310, 2000: 58).  
9
 See also Hull (2000: 58-61, 2001: 33).  
10
 Whether spoken words, for instance, still have the same structure as the respective ideas is an 
important philosophical question, which cannot be addressed here. I will simply take it for 
granted that there is a difference between, let’s say, the phenotypic expressions of such an idea 
like peaceful behavior, and the mere physical realizations of this concept in the written word 
‘peaceful behavior.’ The word for the concept is more similar to the concept itself than its 
expression in behavior. However, see Heyes & Plotkin (1989), who criticize Hull for assuming 
a Fodorian language of thought, i.e., that all mental contents are propositional.  
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relation between scientific theorems and their application (Hull 1982: 310), and 
for the relation between a recipe and a cake. The former is the meme, coded in 
any kind of physical substrate, for instance letters on paper, while the latter is 
analogous to a phenotypic expression of genes in a respective organism.  
The distinction between structure-retaining and non-structure-retaining 
physical substrates is similar to Dawkins’ (1999) distinction between memes 
with a clear genotype-phenotype distinction (instructions to make a Chinese 
paper junk) and those memes without a clear genotype-phenotype distinction 
(the drawing of the Chinese paper junk). Hull’s conception, however, has the 
advantage not to end up with two kinds of memes. According to his 
conception, there would be one meme (the idea of a Chinese paper junk) that 
can be realized either in structure-retaining symbolically coded behavior 
(instructions), or in resulting artifacts (the drawing of a Chinese paper junk or 
the Chinese paper junk itself), which do not necessarily retain the structure of 
the meme.  
Dennett’s ideational memes 
Dennett moves away even further from Dawkins. He is not very clear on what 
he regards as the analogues to ‘phenotypic effects of memes’ or whether he 
really wants to transfer the dichotomy between genotypes and phenotypes at 
all. In Consciousness Explained (1991),
11
 Dennett defined the meme, the “new 
replicator,” as  
“roughly, ideas. Not the ‘simple ideas’ of Locke and Hume (the idea of red, 
or the idea of round or hot or cold), but the sort of complex ideas that form 
themselves into distinct memorable units – such as the ideas of wheel, 
wearing clothes, vendetta, right triangle, alphabet, calendar, the Odyssey, 
calculus, chess, perspective drawing, evolution by natural selection, 
Impressionism, ‘Greensleeves,’ deconstructionism” (Dennett 1991: 201).  
As genes are “invisible,”  
“carried by gene vehicles (organisms) in which they tend to produce 
characteristic effects (‘phenotypic’ effects) by which their fates are, in the 
long run, determined” (ibid.: 203),  
memes are also  
                                                
11
 With respect to the quotations used here, the section on memes in Dennett (1991) is almost 
identical with Dennett (1990), where he first introduced his version of memes.  
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“invisible, and are carried by meme vehicles – pictures, books, sayings (in 
particular languages, oral or written, on paper or magnetically encoded, etc.). 
Tools and buildings and other inventions are also meme vehicles. A wagon 
with spoked wheels carries not only grain or freight from place to place; it 
carries the brilliant idea of a wagon with spoked wheels from mind to mind. 
A meme’s existence depends on a physical embodiment in some medium” 
(ibid.: 204; Emph. added).  
Dennett talks of behavior (e.g., oral language) and artifacts (e.g., the wheel) as 
“meme vehicles,” explicitly in analogy to phenotypic effects or “phenotypic 
expressions” due to genes (ibid.: 206). At the same time he talks of these things 
as “physical embodiment,” as genes have their embodiment in DNA. 
Evidently, he does not draw a difference between physical substrate and 
phenotypic expressions, as Dawkins (at least in 1982) and Hull did, although 
there clearly is one in most cases of biological entities. This ambiguousness is 
literally reproduced in Dennett’s famous Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995: 
342-352).
12
  
However, as he writes, in order to “consider more carefully what 
Dawkins’ memes are or might be” (Dennett 1995: 342), he tried to add 
“important improvements” (ibid.: 343) in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. He more 
clearly specified his ideational concept of memes. Memes are now 
“information – in a media-neutral, language-neutral sense. Thus the meme is 
primarily a semantic classification, not a syntactic classification that might be 
directly observable in ‘brain language’ or natural language. In the case of 
genes, we are blessed by a gratifyingly strong alignment of semantic and 
syntactic identity: there is a single genetic language, in which meaning is 
(roughly) preserved across all species. Still, it is important to distinguish 
semantic types from syntactic types” (ibid.: 353f; Emph. in the orig.).  
Two aspects of his account are important for this study:  
(i). Memes consist of information that have multiple physical substrates, 
in Dennett terms, “mediums,” or “physical vehicles,” (ibid.: 348) or 
“phenotypes (the ‘body design’ of memes)” (ibid.: 355; cf. 349). As we should 
not “identify genes with their vehicles in DNA” (ibid.: 353), we should not 
identify memes with their vehicles, such as brain-patterns. According to 
Dennett, memes show best “the separation between information and vehicle,” 
for instance in brain-patterns, since “it is very unlikely – but not quite 
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 The section “Invasion of the body-snatchers” (Dennett 1995: 342-352) contains large 
portions literally reprinted from Dennett (1991).  
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impossible – that there is a uniform ‘brain language’ in which information is 
stored in different human brains” (ibid.: 353). Furthermore, memes can have 
multiple ‘vehicles’: books, wheels, or any other physical entity.  
(ii). Memes are semantic. Memes are connected to something they ‘are 
about,’ as genes are connected to their “phenotypic effects – what they are 
‘about’ (such as making hemoglobin, or eyes)” (ibid.: 354). Thus, in addition to 
having various physical substrates, each meme is about something. The 
‘wheel’-meme (the idea of a wheel) can be ‘coded in’ brain-patterns, words, 
artifacts, or behavior such as making a wheel. They are ‘coded in’ these entities 
as genes are ‘coded in’ DNA. The meme is, however, about one thing only, 
namely the wheel, the artifact, in which it is coded or realized at the same time. 
The meme of ‘peaceful behavior’ can be coded in brain-patterns, in words, in 
artifacts like a peace treaty, or in peaceful behavior. And it has a meaning, 
which is not easy to find out. A ‘moon’-meme can equally appear in diverse 
physical substrates, but it clearly is about the moon. There are memes that are 
about artifacts, about behavior (e.g. clothing), about entities, about matters of 
fact, about institutions …. all the kind of things our intentionality can focus on. 
Although it can be doubted that it makes sense to speak of ‘genes being 
about phenotypic effects,’ as ideas are about something, I would like to focus 
on a different issue.
13
 What is now the cultural analogue to DNA and what the 
cultural analogue to ‘phenotypic effects’? According to Dennett, all kinds of 
things are cultural analogues to DNA: from brain-patterns, to symbolic 
artifacts, to behavior and non-symbolic artifacts. With respect to the cultural 
analogue to phenotypic effects it is unclear what Dennett wants to say. Is it the 
thing memes are about or the diverse physical substrates? Dennett is highly 
confusing in his usage of the concept of ‘phenotypic effects.’ On the one hand, 
Dennett says that memes ‘are about’ something, as genes ‘are about’ 
phenotypic characteristics. On the other hand, memes have ‘phenotypic 
                                                
13
 To talk of genes ‘coding for’ or ‘being about’ phenotypic characteristics rests on the concept 
of genetic information. This concept is highly controversial. There have been many articles on 
this issue in the last couple of years. See Maynard-Smith (2000) and the replies to this article as 
entrance to the debate. See also Griffiths (2001) for further discussion.  
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effects,’ i.e., ‘vehicles’ (e.g. words, brain-patterns, books, artifacts), although 
the memes are not necessarily about these phenotypic vehicles.  
From an analytic standpoint, what is so confusing in Dennett’s version 
of the gene-meme-analogy is that he ignores an important difference between 
genes and memes: genes are (if at all) not only ‘about their phenotypic effect,’ 
they causally play a role in building these ‘phenotypic effect of genes.’ This is 
not the case for all the things ‘memes’ can be about. The ‘moon’-meme is not 
causally involved in bringing about the moon, as the ‘eye’-gene is causally 
involved in bringing about an eye. (If at all, it would be just the other way 
round: If at all, the moon is causally involved in bringing about the moon-
meme, which would be analogous to an eye bringing about its gene). One 
should not forget that ‘coding for’ in biology is not a mere ‘semantic relation’ 
between genes and their phenotypic expression – if it is one at all; it is – first 
and foremost – a causal relation between the two. If Dennett is taken seriously, 
genes do cause their phenotypic effects, since they code for them, while 
memes, first, ‘cause’ and are represented in physical realizations of the meme 
(i.e., the DNA analogue), and, second, can mean (i.e., ‘code for’) something 
else. In other words, if a gene produces a phenotypic characteristic (an eye), the 
gene is certainly involved in producing this ‘phenotypic effect’ and we might 
say that the gene ‘codes for’ or ‘is about’ the eye. If I, however, produce 
outward behavior (expressing the moon-meme by saying the word ‘moon’), the 
meme is certainly causally involved in producing these ‘phenotypic effects.’ In 
this sense the meme ‘codes for’ this behavior (me saying the word ‘moon’). 
However, and this is very important, the meme is not ‘about’ that behavior (me 
saying the word ‘moon’). It is about the moon, which, in turn, exists without 
any causal influence of the meme. This difference between genes and memes is 
totally ignored by Dennett.  
To recapitulate, instead of being clear about what he means by 
‘phenotypic effects’ of memes, Dennett uses the concept of phenotypic effects 
of genes (or memes) in (i), his claim that memes consist of information that 
have multiple physical substrates, with respect to the causal relation between 
genes (or memes) and the respective phenotypic effects, as did Dawkins and 
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Hull. In (ii), his claim that memes are semantic, he uses the concept of 
phenotypes in a different way, namely with respect to the supposed analogous 
‘semantic’ relation between genes (or memes) and their phenotypic effect. 
Dawkins and Hull only used the causal relation between genes and phenotypes 
for the gene-meme-analogy: In Dawkins’ case, ‘genes causally influencing the 
occurrence of phenotypes’ equals ‘memes causally influencing the occurrence 
of behavior and artifacts.’ In Hull’s case, ‘genes causally influencing the 
occurrence of non-structure retaining phenotypes’ equals ‘memes causally 
influencing the occurrence of non-structure retaining behavior and artifacts.’ 
Whether all this analogical reasoning from nature to culture makes sense at all 
has not yet been at issue in this descriptive section; however, to be clear about 
and to decide how to use the concept of ‘phenotype’ in the analogical 
reasoning from nature to culture is a prerequisite for any serious consideration 
of the ontological analogy.  
If one cannot decide for what the concept of ‘phenotypic effects’ should 
be used, it is better to reject that the concept can be applied to culture properly. 
This is what Blackmore (1999: 62, 64-66; 2002: 715f) decides for, wrongly 
stating, however, that Hull and Dennett have the same position as she does. 
Nonetheless, I interpret Dennett to have at least intended the same as 
Blackmore, namely that the concept of phenotype is best not used at all for the 
gene-meme-analogy. If Dennett is taken in this way, his concept of memes 
includes that: (i) There are multiple substrates of memes, multiple DNA-
analogues, since memes can be found in brain-patterns as well as books, 
behavior etc; (ii) memes are semantic units; (iii) there is no clear analogue to a 
phenotype that stands in the same relation to memes as biological phenotypes 
stand to genes, having a semantic relation that is at the same time also a causal 
relation between genes and their phenotypic effects, a causal relation of the sort 
specified above.  
Blackmore’s ideational memes 
Susan Blackmore is ambiguous as well. In her book The Meme Machine 
(1999), she defines memes as “instructions for carrying out behavior, stored in 
brains (or other objects) and passed on by imitation” (Blackmore 1999: 17). 
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Although explicitly denying that there is a clear distinction between genotypic 
and phenotypic aspects of memes (Blackmore 1999: 62, 64-66; 2002: 715f), 
she nonetheless uses the supposed semantic relation between genes and their 
phenotypic expression implicitly, for instance in the following statement: “It is 
tempting to consider memes as simply ‘ideas’, but more properly memes are a 
form of information. (Genes, too, are information: instructions, written in 
DNA, for building proteins)” (Blackmore 2000: 65). What ‘information’ is and 
in which sense genes are information about something is – as usual – not 
explained at all. A further employment of the concept of phenotypic effects can 
be found in the following: Blackmore criticizes Dennett for using the term 
‘vehicle’ for artifacts such as a wheel. She wants to use the term ‘vehicle’ as 
restricted to a relation between genes and their phenotypes not highlighted so 
far: Genes are carried around by their vehicles. According to Blackmore, 
memes are not carried around by such artifacts as a wheel (Blackmore 1999: 
65). This conflicts with Dennett’s claim that the wheel is a ‘meme vehicle.’ 
According to Blackmore, the ‘wheel’ is a product of the wheel-meme, but does 
not carry the meme. The background of this is that she distinguishes between 
‘instructions’ and their ‘products.’ I regard this as similar to Hull’s distinction 
between structure-retaining physical substrates and non-structure-retaining 
phenotypes of memes. Products of memes, such as a wheel, do not retain the 
structure of the instruction, and they thus do not carry the meme.  
I have analyzed the vagueness and various differences in the concept of 
memes used by the main defenders of the idea of memes as replicators. Neither 
Blackmore, who, at least, tries to illustrate the differences in the concepts of 
memes employed by the various memeticists (Blackmore 1999: 63-66), nor 
Dawkins, Hull, Dennett, or other memeticists, recognize that some of the 
differences are due to different assumed relations between genes and their 
phenotypes: causal, ‘semantic,’ or ‘carrying around,’ When one uses analogies 
one should be precise in which sense one uses them, otherwise analogies only 
lead to confusion. 
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Aunger’s neural memes 
Aunger (2002) regards memes as brain-patterns and is thus closest to Dawkins 
meme concept.
14
 However, he differs from Dawkins and the others in 
regarding the replicator – genes and memes – not as abstract entity (the type) 
that is merely realized in different physical substrates, but as lineage of 
material tokens. Recall what I have said in section 2.5 on replicators as types 
and as tokens. A singular gene token (i.e., a singular string of DNA) does not 
persist over cycles of replication. As I understand Dawkins, what persists 
according to him is an abstract entity – the type. But what persists can 
alternatively also be understood to be the lineage of tokens. If the replicator 
concept is understood in the latter sense, then Aunger is correct in saying the 
following: “Most definitions of memes are abstract, couched in terms of 
information or the mental representation that results from imitation. But 
replicators exist as specific substrates, as physical complexes” (Aunger 2002: 
193; Emph. added). They are not only ‘carried’ or realized in physical 
substrates – they are these specific substrates. He is, however, not quite 
correct, since, if understood as material entities, replicators only exist as a 
lineage of physical substrates, as Hull has insisted (Hull 2001: 33).  
The neuronal concept of memes points thus towards an issue that has 
not been in focus so far. How can we understand the ontological status of these 
abstract types? Blackmore (1999: 29) points to this as well, when she criticizes 
Popper for his concept of cultural units residing in a ‘world 3’ (Popper 1972). 
Popper is treated as a kind of forerunner of memetics, but criticized since he 
thought of abstract ideas in a ‘world 3’ that is distinct from both the mental and 
the material world. The problem is, she says, that it is unclear how these 
abstract entities can cause anything. Her answer to how memetics can get out 
of such a problem is clearly deficient. She merely says that “[I]n memetic 
terms, all that happens – whether in science or art – is selective imitation” 
(Blackmore 1999: 29), while it is unclear whether she is on Dawkins’ or 
Aunger’s side with respect to these issues and what Dawkins position would 
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 For a similar account see Delius (1991).  
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amount to in terms of a supposed ‘world 2,’ ‘world 3,’ or similar Platonic 
realms. Dennett (1995: 356-361) has a definite answer: Memes as semantic 
units are actually “intentional objects” that can be ascribed as being part of the 
natural world from an intentional stance (Dennett 1987). As such intentional 
objects they are real. What the ontological status of memes as abstract entities 
is will not be addressed further. I merely wanted to point out what memeticists 
themselves assume. I will neither defend nor criticize any answer to the 
question of the ontological status of these abstract entities. It would lead us too 
far away from the Darwinian analogies. My critique of the assumption that 
there are such abstracts units, presented at the end of section 3.3, will go in a 
different direction.  
Conclusion and further outlook 
I chose Dawkins, Hull, Dennett, Blackmore and Aunger because they represent 
typical solutions that can also be found in other authors. To review all of them, 
in the detailed way needed to prevent confusion, would consume too much 
space. Before I end this section with a note on the relationship between persons 
and memes, I would like to summarize what we have found so far.  
There is a purely neuronal concept of memes, regarding memes as 
tokens of brain-patterns that replicate and get thereby inherited from brain to 
brain (Aunger). There is an ideational concept of memes, identifying memes 
with abstract types of mental content, often called ‘information,’ as genes are 
often regarded as abstract types of information coded in DNA-tokens 
(Dawkins, Dennett, Hull, Blackmore). However, within this group only 
Dawkins regards memes as having a single specific physical substrate, 
analogous to genes having a single physical substrate in DNA. This substrate is 
the brain. Everything else is equivalent to phenotypic effects of memes, 
somehow ‘caused’ by these memes. Dawkins thereby employs an analogy 
between the causal relation between genes and their phenotypes as basis for his 
concept of memes. According to Hull, Dennett and Blackmore, physical 
meme-tokens exist in brains, books, spoken language, and the like. Hull clearly 
distinguishes these physical meme-tokens from their non-structure retaining 
phenotypic consequences, which are nonetheless caused by memes (also 
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employing thereby the causal relation between genes and their phenotypes as 
basis for this terminological decision). Dennett regards all kinds of things as 
physical substrates (‘vehicles’) of memes, which are consequences of these 
memes and carrying these around, employing thereby implicitly a kind of 
causal relation between memes and their phenotypes, and a further carrying-
relation as basis for his description of memes and their existence in the material 
world. However, he mainly uses a semantic relation between genes and their 
phenotypic effects, to distinguish between memes themselves and what they 
are about. Blackmore also treats all kinds of material entities as physical 
meme-tokens, but does not want to use the concept of ‘phenotypes.’  
In addition to the neural and ideational meme concept, there are 
revisionists, defining memes as outward behavior or in terms of the 
consequences of behavior (artifacts). As mentioned already, with this 
behavioristic meme concept,
15
 they react to the problem that ideational memes 
cannot be identified easily (identification problems). Although they can react to 
the identification problems, as I will argue after I have discussed these 
problems in section 3.3, what is left over from the gene-meme-analogy is 
almost trivial.  
Before I proceed to the identification problems, I want to add a note on 
how memeticists construct the relation between memes and human individuals. 
What I have said in this descriptive section relates to old philosophical and 
anthropological questions. What is the ontological status of ideas, mental 
content etc.? Are they essences or not? How do they relate to brain-patterns 
and behavior? I have clarified what memeticists say on these issues: what 
memes are, in which relation memes stand to brain-patterns, behavior and 
different products of behavior. However, in addition to these relations, memes 
also have a relation to the persons having these memes in their minds. What is 
the assumed relation between memes and people? This last question creates a 
link to the explanatory units of selection analogy, since Dawkins, Dennett and 
Blackmore assume that a human minds are mere ‘vehicles’ or ‘hosts’ of 
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memes: built by memes and carrying memes around with them. A human 
person is only a consequence of memes and thus derivative for explaining the 
change in frequency of memes. This is employing the causal and the carrying-
relation between genes and phenotypes at the same time, but now with respect 
to whole persons. Anthropologists used to express a similar point in saying that 
humans are ‘culture bearers.’ Yet, one can question whether this is the only 
role humans play in culture. As mentioned in section 3.1, the anthropological 
concept assumes that a person is also the creator and selector of the cultural 
items a person bears around with him. I will address the relationship between 
memes and minds in chapter 5. The issue is negligible for the ontological 
analogy between genes and memes, since the ontological analogy is 
independent of the explanatory units of selection analogy in the following 
sense: Even if the units of selection analogy fails and minds are not reducible 
to their role of ‘carrying around’ memes, memes may still be replicators in the 
narrow sense. In this chapter, I will explain that whether they are replicators 
depends on the other relations discussed in this section: the relation between 
memes and brain-patterns, memes and behavior, memes and artifacts.  
That memes are replicators has indeed been criticized heavily. In the 
latest reply to critics, Dawkins mentions three “favourite objections” to the 
gene-meme-analogy: (i) “the vexed question of how large a unit deserves the 
name ‘meme’;” that (ii) “nobody really knows what a meme physically is;” that 
(iii) “memes have insufficient copy fidelity,” and therefore do not qualify as 
replicators (Dawkins 1999: xiv).
16
 Although (i) and (ii) involve a more 
complicated problem of identification, and although (iii) involves more then 
the question of copy-fidelity, these objections mirror the essential problems the 
ontological analogy faces: (i) and (ii) belong to what I have above called 
identification problems; (iii) belongs to what I call the replication problems.  
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3.3  IDENTIFICATION PROBLEMS 
Traceability condition and identification 
If memes should be cultural units of heredity that can be counted in order to 
track cultural change, then they should be easy to identify. This has been 
doubted on the base of a couple of objections. The debate about meme’s 
identification is messy, since different problems of identification are involved. 
Memes are doubted to exist, because we do not know what they are made of, or 
because they can only be abstracted from other entities. It is objected that we 
cannot single out discrete, particulate memes as we can single out and identify 
discrete, particulate single genes. The fronts of the debate are harsh: 
Memeticists often accuse critics of not knowing enough about the concept of 
genes, genetics ,and its history;
17
 and critics in turn accuse memeticists for not 
knowing enough about culture.
18
 Both do this without clearly distinguishing 
between different problems of identification.
19
 I will present a systematic 
overview and single out three distinct problems of identification: the boundary 
problem, the holism problem, and the material identification problem. The 
boundary problem is about finding the length of single memes: i.e. about how 
to partition the whole meme-complex into single memes. The holism problem 
is about finding a context-independent effect/meaning of single memes. The 
material identification problem is about identifying memes in material 
substrates. I will say less on the first two problems, since others have treated 
these in a convincing way. This is different for the material identification 
problem. I will analyze this third problem in detail. By specifying in which 
sense there are disanalogies between genes and memes, and in which sense 
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 See for instance Hull (2000), Blute (2005).  
18
 See for instance Kuper (2000), Bloch (2000).  
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 Blackmore (1999: 53ff), for instance, confuses the problem that genes can be defined in 
various ways (as evolutionary units being replicators, as molecular units coding for one protein 
and as functional units, as ‘genes for’ a phenotypic trait) and the alleged analogous problem for 
memes, with the problem of finding the boundaries of the gene or meme as replicator, a 
problem that appears only with respect to the evolutionary gene concept. The question how 
large a gene-as-replicator is different from the question what a gene is in conceptual terms: the 
replicator, the cistron, or a functional unit.  
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there are not, I offer a new way through an insufficiently structured debate 
about the gene-meme-analogy.  
Boundary problem 
A first kind of objection, which has been addressed by memeticists from the 
start, states that we cannot define the boundaries of single memes, whereas we 
can easily do this with single genes. After introducing memes, Dennett writes:  
“Intuitively these [memes, MK] are more or less identifiable cultural units, 
but we can say something more precise about how we draw the boundaries – 
about why D-F#-A isn’t a unit, and the theme from the slow movement of 
Beethoven’s Seventh Symphony is: the units are the smallest elements that 
replicate themselves with reliability and fecundity” (Dennett 1991: 201). 
If the meme is defined as a replicator, it is identified as the gene-as-replicator 
by a relative measure: as the smallest replicable unit of a complex that can 
survive transmission undivided quite long. For the example of a symphony, the 
singular meme would have to be “sufficiently distinctive and memorable to be 
abstracted from the context of the whole symphony” (Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 
195). What a sufficiently distinctive and memorable unit of a symphony is 
depends on the respective symphony and is sometimes surely not easy to 
answer. The splitting up of a whole into parts is even harder if we look at other 
cultural items, for instance, a theory. Using Darwinism as an example, 
Dawkins says that the boundary problem can in principle be solved in the 
following way:  
“If Darwin’s theory can be subdivided into components, such that some 
people believe component A but not component B, while others believe B but 
not A, then A and B should be regarded as separate memes. If almost 
everybody who believes in A also believes in B – if the memes are closely 
‘linked’ to use the genetic term – then it is convenient to lump them together 
as one meme” (Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 196).  
Believing A and not B is treated as analogous to segregation in biological 
inheritance: Segregation means that a certain segment of the chromosome of 
one parent is inherited independent of the inheritance of another segment.  
It is indeed not easy to find the boundaries of a single meme, i.e., to 
identify a single meme out of a complex of memes. However, as just indicated, 
the same problem holds for genes. As shown in section 2.5, if a gene-token is 
not defined as that string of DNA that codes for one protein (molecular gene 
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concept), but as that string of DNA that is very likely to survive long enough 
through not being divided in reproduction (evolutionary gene concept), then 
genes have the same boundary problem. It is not easy to say which string of 
DNA out of the genome is the evolutionary gene (i.e., the replicator). The 
boundaries can only be defined statistically or ex post facto, after the survival 
of a string of DNA over a significant time-span.  
Therefore, although the boundary problem exists, it cannot serve as an 
argument against the analogy between genes and memes as replicators. As Hull 
writes the “definition of evolutionary genes is just as difficult to apply as is its 
memetic correlate. In general, critics of memetics assume standards so high for 
scientific knowledge that few, if any, areas of science can possible meet them” 
(Hull 2000: 48). If the rough-and-ready definition of replicators is accepted for 
genes, which faces equal boundary problems, than it should be good enough 
for memes.
20
  
Holism problem 
Another objection against the gene-meme-analogy is that memes cannot be 
regarded as particulate isolates, as independent entities so to speak, since 
memes have their meaning only in the context of other memes (Bloch 2000, 
Kuper 2000). As I also illustrated in section 2.5, the same holism problem 
exists for genes. Whether genes have a context-independent phenotypic effect 
depends on how one looks at the relation between genes themselves, between 
genes and phenotypes, and between genes and the environment. Be it as it may, 
the context-independent effects of genes are not easily found out. Sober (1992) 
addressed this issue with respect to the critique that memetics and other 
Darwinian approaches to cultural change ‘atomize cultural characteristics.’ He 
concludes that the same problem occurs for biological evolution of distinct 
traits based on distinct genes:  
“Having two children rather than five, or being a kamikaze pilot, are 
characteristics that are abstracted from a rich and interconnected network of 
traits. The worry is that by singling out these traits for treatment, we are 
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losing sight of the context that gives them cultural meaning. It is worth 
mentioned that precisely the same question has been raised about various 
models in genetic evolution itself. If you wish to understand the population 
frequency of sickle cell anaemia, for example, you cannot ignore the fact that 
the trait is correlated with resistance to malaria. In both cultural and genetic 
evolution it is a mistake to think that each trait evolved independently of all 
the others. Of course, the lesson to be drawn from this is not that one should 
not atomize characteristics, but rather that the atoms one identifies should be 
understood in terms of their relationship to other atoms” (Sober 1992: 31).  
In this sense, the gene as a functional unit is definitely context-dependent, as is 
a meme. Bloch (2000) criticizes memeticists for wrongly assuming that memes 
are “discrete,” “distinguishable,” having a “defined existence.” At one place, 
he writes:  
“At first, some [memes, MK] seem convincing as discrete units: catchy tunes, 
folk tales, the taboo on shaving among Sikhs, Pythagoras’ theorem, etc. 
However, on closer observation, even these more obvious ‘units’ lose their 
boundaries. Is it the whole tune or only a part of it which is the meme? The 
Sikh taboo is meaningless unless it is seen as part of Sikh religion and 
identity. Pythagoras’ theorem is a part of geometry and could be divided into 
smaller units such as the concept of triangle, angle, equivalence, etc.” (Bloch 
2000: 194; Emph. added).  
He definitely mixes up the boundary problem with the holism problem. The 
Sikh taboo is definitely a unit that can exist and can be isolated from the whole, 
even if its meaning is dependent on the whole. The same situation holds for 
genes. A certain part of a chromosome that can be singled out as a replicator, 
as an evolutionary gene, does have its effect on the phenotype (i.e., its 
‘meaning’ as Dennett would call it), only in context of all the other genes of the 
respective organisms. Identifiable units might well be dependent in their effects 
(or meaning) and still be identifiable as single units. Bloch (2000: 197ff) has a 
point, when claiming that each meme that enters a culture (or a single mind) is 
made consistent with the other memes in this culture (or mind) and that its 
meaning changes through this integration and is therefore context-dependent. 
But he ignores that there is nonetheless something that is made consistent. 
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between the claim that there are no 
memes as distinguishable units (i.e., that their boundaries are often unclear) 
and the claim that their meaning is context-dependent. One should also 
distinguish these two problems from a further one, which I call the material 
identification problem. Nonetheless, although different, the latter will lead us 
back to the former.  
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Material identification problem 
Although both, genes as well as memes, face a boundary problem and a holism 
problem, there is indeed a difference between genes and memes with respect to 
their identification. It is usually ignored that the evolutionary gene concept 
presupposes that genes are indeed identifiable, namely as bits of DNA, even 
though it is – at the same time – admitted that genes face a boundary and 
holism problem. The evolutionary gene, the gene-as-replicator, is defined as a 
type of similar strings of DNA tokens, or as a lineage of DNA tokens that are 
not likely to be divided during reproduction.
21
 Through looking at DNA, we 
identify a replicator and say that these bits of DNA over there are the same as 
the bits of DNA over here, proving thereby that there is similarity between the 
two bits and proving thereby that they are tokens of the same type. The same 
holds for the gene as a functional unit – those bits of the genome that are 
involved in the expression of a single protein or phenotypic characteristic. In a 
nutshell, genes do have a definite material substrate that allows to identify 
them and to count them. And that is, first and foremost, why they are at all 
considered to be the ‘bookkeepers’ of biological evolution. We can identify 
them because genes are materially realized exclusively in DNA, and are always 
‘coded’ in DNA in the same way. If the genes are different, then the DNA is 
different; if the genes are the same, the DNA will be the same. This is a one-to-
one relationship between the abstract, informational gene and its material 
realization. There is one material substrate with one way to ‘code’ the genes in 
this material substrate.  
Memes, however, are doubted to have such a universal material 
substrate that allows to identify and to count them in the same way. Note that 
we not only need a DNA-analogue; we need a DNA-analogue that allows to 
identify memes. This has been contentious and is what I call the material 
identification problem. In contrast to genes, memes seem to be subject to this 
problem.  
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(i). Memes and identification through brain-patterns. As Dawkins 
writes, “[m]emes have not yet found their Watson and Crick; they even lack 
their Mendel” (Dawkins 1999: xii). If we regard brain-patterns as the exclusive 
material substrate of memes, it stands to question whether we can infer the 
same memes from looking at two brain-patterns in two humans. Although this 
is part of the philosophical mind-body problem, an issue that definitely has no 
rough-and-ready answer, nobody involved in debates about memetics believes 
that we can find for a given idea the same brain-pattern in different heads of 
people. Imagine two people and imagine that we can convincingly show that 
they believe in exactly the same meme, namely the proposition that the apple in 
front of their faces is red and not blue. Now, could we ever find out that they 
believe in the same proposition by looking at their brain-patterns? Not likely. 
The first person’s belief might be stored or ‘coded’ in a totally different brain-
pattern than the second person’s belief. Hence, we clearly cannot identify 
memes through their alleged material substrate in brains. One and the same 
meme, adopted or held by different people, can be correlated with diverse 
brain-patterns in these people’s heads; and, vice versa, one and the same brain 
pattern of different people’s minds can be correlated with diverse memes. This 
many-many-relationship between brain-patterns and memes is usually 
admitted by critics as well as defenders.
22
 It is beyond doubt that we cannot 
observe memes through looking at brain-patterns. Scholars involved in debates 
about memetics do not differ on the fact that mental contents do not map on to 
a definite, universal brain pattern in all kinds of individuals. But, and this is 
important, they differ on what follows from this for the gene-meme-analogy.  
(ii). Memes identified through other obersvables. Dawkins, for instance, 
answers that, although there is a disanalogy with respect to a definite one-to-
one-mapping of memes in brain-patterns, which makes identification of memes 
in brain-patterns impossible, memes can nonetheless be identified and counted 
through their phenotypic effects, or – as other memeticists would say – through 
other material substrates, such as written words. After admitting that memes 
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(1998), Wilkins (1999).  
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cannot be identified and counted through brain-patterns, Dawkins writes: “As 
with genes, we track memes through populations by their phenotypes” 
(Dawkins 1999: xii). The problem is that the relation between genes (or 
memes) and their respective phenotypic expression is also characterized by a 
many-many relationship.  
Let me explain this first with respect to genes: In the past it might have 
been considered by some researchers as a good way to track genes by tracking 
phenotypic characteristics, however, today it is not considered anymore as a 
reliable way to track genes, partly because of the holism problem (introduced 
in section 2.5 and mentioned above). Furthermore, not only the holism of gene 
interaction poses a problem. In principle, one particular phenotypic 
characteristic can be correlated with diverse genes, and one gene can be 
correlated with diverse phenotypic characteristic. One phenotypic characteristic 
can be correlated with diverse genes, since, for instance, an eye might be 
caused by that string of DNA in one species and by a different string of DNA 
in another species. Even within a species, it is principally possible that two 
different genes cause the same phenotypic effect. This is because the 
expression of genes is not only influenced by the presence of other genes and 
the interaction with these. The expression is also influenced by environmental 
factors: A gene has a norm of reaction, a spectrum of phenotypic effects that 
vary with the context of their environment. In one case, the phenotypic trait 
might be causally influenced by certain bits of DNA having a reaction norm 
that comprises this phenotypic effect, given a certain environmental 
interaction. In another case, it can well be caused by different bits of DNA 
having a different reaction norm, but one that also comprises the respective 
phenotypic effect, given a certain environmental interaction. The reaction 
norms can in principle overlap. Therefore, different genes can in principle 
cause the same phenotypic effect. In turn, given the same gene, different 
phenotypic traits can result, precisely because genes do not code for a specific 
trait but have reaction norms, a range of phenotypic effects. Which phenotypic 
effect results in the end is dependent on the environment in which a gene is 
expressed. In short, the inference from phenotypic traits to certain genes has to 
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be made very carefully. It is an empirical question whether a certain 
phenotypic characteristic is always (within and between species) causally 
influenced by the same gene.  
However, and this is very important, in principle we can nonetheless 
find out whether one phenotypic characteristic is correlated with the same 
gene, across individuals and across species. We simply need to double-count: 
phenotypic characteristic and the DNA and look at the causal processes 
producing the phenotypic characteristic. To find out which gene or genes cause 
a certain phenotypic effect, given that we can identify genes as molecular 
structures independently of their phenotypic effect, is still difficult, mainly 
because of the holism problem. However, to find out which genes cause a 
certain phenotypic effect without direct access to genes is terribly hard. 
And there’s the rub: double-counting is precisely what we cannot do in 
the case of memes. I will offer two kinds of examples of memes that show that 
there is a many-many-relationship between memes and their alleged 
‘phenotypic’ effect. I will then claim that because of the lack of access to 
something analogous to DNA, the identification problem cannot be solved in 
the case of memes, whereas, as just stated, it can in principle be solved in the 
case of genes. First, as Boyd & Richerson (2000: 155) write: “For any 
phenotypic performance there are potentially an infinite number of rules that 
would generate that performance.” In this case, rules would be the memes and 
a certain behavior the ‘phenotypic performance,’ produced by these memes. 
Their convincing example is taken from the generativist model of phonological 
change. Pronunciation is governed by complex rules. If pronunciation changes 
in adults, they simply add a rule at the end of a chain of existing rules, 
adjusting their behavior through this procedure. If children, however, learn a 
pronunciation they simply “induce the simplest set of grammatical rules that 
will account for the performances they hear” (ibid.: 156). Let us look at their 
example. “In some dialects of English, people pronounce words that begin with 
wh using what linguists call an ‘unvoiced’ sound while they pronounce words 
beginning with w using a voiced sound. […] Now suppose that people who 
speak such a dialect come into contact with other people who only use the 
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voiced w sound” (ibid.: 156). If the people now totally adopt the pronunciation 
of the other group, then we end up with the following situation: After adults 
learned to get rid of the unvoiced sounds, children will never hear it and will 
induce from observation the simplest set of rules, namely one that does not 
distinguish between the pronunciation of words with ‘wh’ (as in whether) and 
those with ‘w’ (as in ‘weather’). Adults still maintain rules for the difference 
and, in addition, a rule for pronouncing the former nonetheless like the latter. 
Although “there is no difference in the phenotypic performance among parents 
and children, children do not acquire the same mental representation as their 
parents” (ibid.: 156). In this example, a given ‘phenotypic trait’ is then due to 
different ‘memes.’  
If we look at a second kind of memes, memes that are not cognitive 
instructions for a behavioral pattern (such as the pronunciation of a word), the 
same problem occurs. The meaning of the word ‘moon,’ the ‘phenotype’ of the 
alleged moon-meme, may vary from person to person. Weingart et al (1997: 
301-312) called this the meaning problem. How do we find out about the 
‘meaning’ of memes? Memes are not physically observable, neither as 
ideational units, nor as brain-patterns. We therefore track them through 
behavior and artifacts. However, there is not always a stable one-to-one 
mapping between behavior and meaning of memes. Memetics thus faces “the 
fundamental problem in the social sciences of relating attitudes to behavior” 
(Weingart et al 1997: 309).  
If this problem exists, than it is not only the case that we cannot identify 
memes and their meaning through brain-patterns. It is also the case that we 
cannot identify them easily through behavior or artifacts, which are either 
‘physical substrates’ or material ‘phenotypic expressions’ of the meme. We 
have to infer the memes from the observables of culture and this involves 
interpretation. The problem is that the inference from similar behavior to 
similar memes is precarious. Examples where such an inference from similar 
behavior or artifacts to similar meaning is dubious are abundant. As Bloch 
stresses, even if Italians imported the behavior of making and eating pasta from 
the Chinese, it does not necessarily mean the same for them. What ‘pasta’ 
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means for Italians includes, for instance, the reasons for the maintenance of the 
behavior of making and eating pasta, as he claims. And these reasons include 
facts about other “beliefs, symbolism, economy, agriculture and perhaps family 
organization” (Bloch 2000: 198). The Italian concept of ‘pasta’ is different 
from the Chinese one, although both make and eat pasta. The same differences 
in meaning has been shown for basic shared social norms even within a culture, 
for instance for the meaning of the Ten Commandments in contemporary 
America (Atran 2001).  
Note that it is not enough to cite other examples where the inference is 
quite safe. Such examples certainly exist and we use them in our everyday 
inferences. Take the above-mentioned example of two persons asserting that 
they see a red apple in front of them. We believe that if the two persons do or 
say similar things, then they must also believe in similar things. We do this 
because we further assume that they speak the same language and have the 
same background beliefs. Thus, when I say ‘red’ and you say it as well, it is 
rather safe to conclude that we mean approximately the same, given that we 
share enough other memes, for instance, the same belief in the natural causes 
of colors and so on. Checking enough other beliefs can test this. However, the 
meaning problem reminds us that we have to be careful with inferences from 
similar behavior to similar memes. We have to be as careful as biologists, 
when they infer a ‘gene for’ from observable facts of phenotypes without direct 
access to the genes themselves. 
Now, the meaning problem sounds quite similar to the holism problem 
mentioned above: A meme has its meaning only in context of other memes that 
influence what I mean when I say ‘moon.’ Indeed the meaning problem is the 
holism problem. However, the reason why the meaning problem is a problem 
for memetics is not the holistic aspect of meaning as such, which holds for 
genes as well. Although I think that the just mentioned authors are correct in 
claiming that there is a many-many-relationship between memes and the 
respective behavior or artifacts, they ignore the following complication: The 
important point is not that one behavioral characteristic (for instance, me using 
the word ‘moon’ and somebody else doing the same) can be due to different 
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memes, since the analogous problem exists for genes, as shown above. The 
important point is that it is so hard to find out whether a specific behavior is 
due to a different meme or due to the same meme, whereas we can in principle 
find it out for genes, since we have, besides looking at the phenotypic 
characteristic, a second access through directly looking at DNA. The problem 
is that we do not have an access to memes that is independent of their 
phenotypic behavioral effects – an access comparable to the access we have to 
genes due to our access to DNA.
23
 Only the material identification problem 
shows why the holism/ meaning problem is a problem for the gene-meme-
analogy.  
Nonetheless, memeticists could choose a last strategy: They can argue, 
that in the past we did also not have such an access to DNA. Memetics is still 
in its infancy that should be judged according to this infancy-status. Dennett 
(1995: 344) suggests, as Dawkins did, that we can identify genes via their 
“uniformity of the phenotypic effects,” and that this was the method used to 
identify them before we discovered DNA. From this he concludes that there is 
neither an identification problem for genes nor for memes. As I said with 
respect to the similar claim of Dawkins, the latter simply ignores all the 
complexities of the causal effects of genes and the analogous problem for 
memes. As Weingart et al write, the situation with memes  
“is strikingly similar to the early and ill-fated strategy of certain camps of 
genetics who, driven by enthusiastic speculation, identified all kinds of 
common sense attributes of people, especially racial ones, as ‘traits’ whose 
genetic determination was postulated by them and then searched for in vain 
by way of inference from genealogies. The crucial task of establishing 
‘heritability’ is already a highly complex endeavor on the level of human 
organisms, and even more so on the level of cognitive entities. Evolutionists 
and anthropologists have to beware so as not to make the same mistakes as 
the eugenicists” (Weingart et al 1997: 313). 
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There definitely was an identification problem for genes, but DNA now 
provides a rather good way out of it. The claim that genetics had the same 
problem before the discovery of DNA (and the implicit claim that memetics 
will solve it one day as genetics did), does not help. If it is correct, as Dennett 
concedes, that there is no one-to-one mapping between memes and brain 
pattern, we will never have an independent access to memes. In addition, 
before the discovery of DNA, a one-to-one mapping between genes and 
phenotypes was at least assumed as a viable hypothesis for genetics. Not even 
this is the case for the analogous hypothesis in memetics. One wonders where 
the confidence of memeticists about the future of their new science comes 
from. 
To conclude: The wonderful thing about genes is that there is a one-to-
one mapping between physical substrate and abstract gene, as described above. 
In addition we have a direct access to that physical substrate, independent of 
the phenotypic effect of genes. We can double-count genes and phenotypes. 
This allows a clear identification of genes. For memes the case is different. 
There is no one-to-one mapping between memes and their phenotypic 
expression. We do not have an access to memes that is independent of the 
phenotypic expression of these memes. We cannot double-count memes and 
their phenotypic expression. Indeed, we cannot count them at all, we can only 
infer memes from the observable behavior and artifacts and interpret these 
observables as representations of memes. Therefore, compared to genes, we do 
not have the same possibility of a clear identification. This is a disanalogy 
between genes and memes: Memes have a material identification problem, 
while genes do not. I turn now to a detailed description why this disanalogy is 
important for the evaluation of the ontological analogy.  
Consequences for the ontological analogy 
First of all, as Dennett (1995: 353f) says, memetics will certainly not be a 
science in the sense as genetics is, since this would require that neuronal mind-
reading is possible, as DNA-reading is possible.  
(i). The traceability condition and memetics as a science. If this is the 
case, as admitted by almost everybody in the debates about memes, then 
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memetics will not be a science comparable to natural sciences such as biology. 
However, ignored by Dennett and others, memetics will not really be a science 
for a further reason that follows from the first: memetics relies on unobservable 
ideational units, which can only be inferred, which involves interpretation of 
what a certain behavior (speaking out ‘moon,’ for instance) means for the 
person engaged in the behavior. Therefore, my first main conclusion is that 
memes fail to fulfill the traceability condition, which is evidently fulfilled by 
genes. The ontological analogy is wrong with respect to this central aspect of 
the analogy. 
This has further consequences for the status of memetics in midst other 
sciences. Since the attribution of unobservable memes does involve 
interpretation, and since this is usually considered to be the watershed between 
hard natural and ‘soft’ social sciences or humanities, memetics will have to 
take its place in midst of the humanities and social sciences. Despite being an 
application of evolutionary theory, memetics is not a new naturalistic frame 
that can give the latter disciplines some new ‘scientific’ tools of thinking. On 
the other hand, this simply means that memeticists are in good company with 
‘soft’ scientists, who also try to deal with the meaning problem since a long 
time. The problem of identification is not only a problem for memetics. It is the 
standard problem of social sciences and humanities. Therefore, it would be 
unfair to judge memetics harder than any other theory of culture, which 
inevitably faces the same problem. The theoretical postulates about ideational 
units of heredity are at the same level as the assumptions of other schools of 
thought in the social sciences, such as anthropology. They assume the same 
ideational concept of culture and end up with the same problems. My critique 
is not that the gene-meme-analogy uses these assumptions and has these 
problems. My critique is that memetics is heuristically trivial, not adding 
anything new and ending up with the same meaning problem as any social 
science relying on an ideational ontology. In addition, the meaning problem 
and the material identification problem affects the memeticists more severely 
than other scholars who also assume ideational units. While social scientists 
usually know about the meaning problem and try to find methods to secure that 
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the inferences from a certain behavior to a specific mental state are legitimate, 
memetics seem to lack any recognition of the complexities that are involved in 
such inferences.  
(ii). The similarity requirement for replicators. Although memeticists 
may already be not amused already, I want to make an additional point – a 
point that leads to a more far-reaching critique of memetics. Can the material 
identification problem serve as critique that affects memetics in particular but 
not other theories that try to understand culture? I have claimed that genetics 
differs from memetics in having the chance to double-check DNA and 
phenotypes. We cannot do that in memetics.  
This is an essential difference between genes and memes that harms the 
ontological analogy between genes and memes in terms of descriptive 
adequacy and explanatory force in a way not mentioned so far: Because of the 
meaning problem and the material identification problem, it also becomes 
questionable whether memes fulfill the replicator condition. If the traceability 
condition is not fulfilled, than memes may fail to meet the first replicator 
requirement (introduced in section 2.5), namely the similarity requirement, 
which secures the longevity of replicators. For the neuronal meme it is safe to 
say that it is not replicated, since each meme is very likely to be coded in a 
different brain pattern. If memes are these brain-patterns, they do not 
replicate.
24
 For the ideational meme the same can hold, since a certain 
behavior, exhibited by two different individuals, is not necessarily 
accompanied by the same mental content. Therefore, the learning of a certain 
behavior might well not be a replication of memes, since memes might not 
have been copied. The question whether a given meme is a replicator or not 
depends thus on each individual case. And the answer to this question is hard 
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to find out. It depends on whether the mental content is also copied, when a 
behavioral pattern or an artifact is copied. It therefore depends on a one-to-one 
mapping between memes and their phenotypic expressions that holds across 
individuals. Genes, on the contrary, are replicators, even if there is no such 
one-to-one mapping between them and their phenotypic effect. That one 
biological phenotype can in principle be due to different genes, does not imply 
that – if a given phenotype does reproduce by biological inheritance – its genes 
can fail to replicate. That a certain behavior can be due to different memes, 
however, implies that the meme can fail to survive when the respective 
phenotype of the meme (behavior or artifact) is transmitted from person to 
person.  
That is why the material identification problem refers to a very 
important disanalogy: Memes can fail to meet the similarity requirement 
because of the complex relationship between ideational units and their 
consequences in behavior and artifacts. This is my second main conclusion 
with respect to the identification problems. The claim that memes are 
replicators is in danger of being false for all cases where memes cannot safely 
be inferred from similar behavior, since in such cases the similarity 
requirement is in danger of not being fulfilled. Whether the claim about memes 
as replicators is false for a specific meme is an empirical question that is 
difficult to answer. In addition, since memetics cannot offer memes as 
identifiable units that would make answering the question easier, the 
ontological gene-meme-analogy is heuristically trivial.  
Something-is-preserved-arguments 
I will now turn to two tricky defense arguments against my critique about the 
traceability and replicator condition. I call them ‘something-is-preserved-
arguments.’ Against my last objection, memeticists can counter that something 
evidently is preserved in social learning and this something shows – if 
preserved – necessarily similarity across persons. Although the meaning 
problem seems to be plausible, there evidently is something shared between 
cultures and in cultures, even in cases where the meaning of a meme varies 
across contexts. As Mark Jeffreys writes: “Clearly, information is preserved 
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across minds, even across cultures and centuries […] something is preserved” 
(Jeffreys 2000: 233; Emph. in the orig.). Now, the essential question is what 
this “something” is. The behavior that can be correlated with different memes 
certainly is transmitted and maybe changed later on. Take again the pasta 
example. Italians imported from Chinese the habit to make and eat pasta. If 
Bloch (2000) is right, then the cultural meaning attached to pasta-eating was 
not transmitted thereby. In order to reject the meaning problem, memeticists 
merely need to say that the meaning, which is attached to pasta-eating by some 
and not others, is not part of the meme. There are two ways to do that. The first 
option comes from scholars that suggest to define the meme as a behavioral 
instead of an ideational unit. The second comes from within the ideational 
concept of memes.  
(i). Observable units as preserved. The meaning problem has lead some 
memeticists to define memes not as ideational unit but as observable units, i.e. 
as behavior or artifacts.
25
 These units can be identified and counted; and one 
can decide whether they are shared between peoples or not. But the problem 
with this solution is that we would then end up with memes that are not the 
basic building block of culture. Just like evolutionary psychology we would 
end up with a concept of culture that ignores the generative building blocks of 
culture. As argued for in section 3.1, these are ideational units. Gatherer 
(1998), for instance, opts for the meme as a behavioral unit. In addition, he 
says that only behavioral units are cultural, while cognitive units are not. He 
thereby creates a dualism between mind and culture, totally separating culture 
from mind. This would be a step backwards – to a concept of culture that 
ignores that behavior and artifacts are mere consequences of ideational units. 
Although we might then have something that is observable, that can be 
counted, and whose similarity can therefore be judged much more easily, we 
end up with counting things that might not represent culture in its full 
generative sense. In a nutshell, we might thereby get countable replicators, but 
lose our target, namely culture. As Weingart et al (1997) have put it, to treat 
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behavioral patterns as the basic units of culture, would be “a mistake roughly 
tantamount to treating genes as traits and ignoring pleiotropy, dominance, and 
other developmental complexities of the geno-phenotype connection“ 
(Weingart et al 1997: 301). Hence, defining memes in a behavioral way will 
not help to get rid of the meaning problem.  
Therefore, my third main conclusion with respect to the identification 
problem is: By defining memes as behavioral units, the claim that memes are 
replicators would become true, but would nonetheless loose a lot of descriptive 
adequacy, since it would leave out an essential part of culture. Through this, 
the ontological analogy between genes and memes would also loose its 
explanatory force, since an explanation of culture necessarily requires to take 
the generative dimension of culture into account. In addition, the analogy 
would then fall short of the level at which an explanation is thought for culture 
by others, who take the ideational dimension of culture into account. Through a 
‘behaviorist’ something-is-preserved argument, we would restore the analogy, 
but only by paying the price of triviality.  
(ii). Ideational essences as preserved. However, defenders of the 
ideational concept of memes can react with a different ‘something-is-
preserved-argument’: They can state that there must be something that is 
cognitively shared. Dennett, for instance, writes that we can identify the meme 
as a semantic property through looking at what is common between different 
physical vehicles. We can identify the meme that lies beyond an English, 
German or French translation of ‘West Side Story.’ We can identify it as “the 
story, not the text” (Dennett 1995: 356). Although it is correct that we often 
can abstract a common core of different observable units of culture, he still 
misses the point of the meaning problem, since what the story ‘means’ to this 
or that person can still be different at the cognitive level. My inner 
understanding of ‘West Side Story’ is certainly different from yours. Dawkins 
made a similar step, but directly referring to the cognitive level, when he 
referred to an essence of Darwinism, the Darwinism-meme, that is shared 
between scientists, even if these scientists all have different interpretations of 
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Darwinism in their mind.
26
 We infer these different cognitive variants (i.e., 
variants in different people’s minds) from what these people do, write and say. 
We then abstract a common core. The problem is that to discover this essence 
is a task that is even more complicated than just to infer the different variants 
from the observable differences in behavior. It can even be doubted and has 
been doubted that there is such an essence of theories and similar entities. As I 
already mentioned at the end of section 3.2, I cannot answer here whether there 
are such abstract ‘essences’ of cultural units and what their ontological status 
would be.  
What I wanted to object to the gene-meme-analogy with respect to the 
described identification problem and the ideational something-is-preserved 
argument is more restricted. If memeticists merely retreat to ‘essential’ memes, 
then the ontological analogy is heuristically trivial: In such a case, the analogy 
would not add anything to the common assumptions about culture, and would 
not contribute to the solutions of the problems arising from these assumptions. 
Memeticists state that there must be something ideational that has to be 
abstracted from the behavior and artifacts that make up the observables of 
culture. This ‘something’ is assumed to be shared and maintained between 
people despite different interpretations of a text, despite different cultural 
meanings of a certain cultural habit. They thus state that there are basic 
building blocks of culture. As described already, this simply mirrors the 
contemporary ideational concept of culture. The ontological status of this 
‘something,’ however, is not made clear through superimposing the gene-
meme-analogy. The analogy does thus not have a heuristic value in this sense. 
On the contrary, the postulate of memes ends up with the same problems any 
theory of culture has to face and cannot offer any new insights. Philosophy of 
language, psychology, and anthropology have developed diverse theories that 
try to solve the problem. Memeticists are often ignorant of these theories. But 
even if they were not ignorant of them, they would still merely reinvent the 
wheel. As Bloch (2000: 191) writes, what memeticists do when they announce 
that they have found the basic building blocks of culture and call them memes, 
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can be interpreted as similar to a sociologist announcing in the year 2000 that 
he has discovered that there are genes. This is my fourth concluding claim 
against the merits of the ontological analogy.  
Conclusion 
My arguments against the gene-meme-analogy with respect to the 
identification problems can be summarized in the following way: Although the 
meaning problem is a common problem of all theories dealing with culture, it 
shows two central disanalogies: that (i) the traceability condition is definitely 
not fulfilled because we cannot double-count memes and their phenotypic 
expression; that (ii) the similarity requirement for replicators may not be 
fulfilled in some cases of memes, whereas it is evidently fulfilled in the case of 
genes. If we then try to circumvent this by moving back to a behavioral 
concept of memes, then (iii) the analogy can be restored but only for the price 
of trivialization, since a behavioral concept of memes ignores the generative 
ideational dimension of culture. These are the first three of my concluding 
claims about memes and their identification. My fourth concluding claim for 
this section is: (iv) Even if the generative dimension is included, memetics 
mirrors the standard assumption of the existence of basic ideational units of 
culture and has not managed to add anything but confusion to the solution of 
the traditional identification problem that arises from the meaning/holism 
problem.  
3.4  REPLICATION PROBLEMS  
Replicator condition 
So far, we have seen that the ontological analogy rests on three assumptions: 
(1) that memes are basic ideational units of culture; (2) that they can be 
tracked; (3) that they are replicators. The material identification problem has 
not only shown that (1) is trivial, and that (2) is false, but also that (3) is in 
danger of not being fulfilled. The latter is connected to the following further 
objection against the ontological gene-meme-analogy: memes lack a copy-
fidelity that is high enough for being replicators. I will call this the copy-fidelity 
Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity 
137 
problem. It is related to the meaning problem, but it addresses not only an 
epistemological problem, about how to find out whether a meme is shared, 
given that people exhibit the same behavior. It gives a reason why the meaning 
problem exists at all: Memes change during the process of social learning. In 
addition, since the corresponding phenotypic expression of memes might 
change as well, as a consequence, the copy-fidelity problem also addresses 
cases where the outward behavior and artifacts are different after transmission, 
since they change in line with the alleged memes.  
However, just like the meaning problem, the copy-fidelity problem has 
been answered by memeticists by referring to memes as ideational units with 
‘hard’ essences. Although we met this argument already in the last section, I 
will nonetheless summarize what memeticists have said with respect to copy-
fidelity. Their answer shows that memeticists end up assuming inferences to 
memes – inferences that are made by the learning individuals themselves, and 
not only by the researches looking at social transmission. These inferences 
have been considered as providing a basis for two further arguments against 
memes as replicators: One argument doubts that memes fulfill the lineage 
requirement (lineage problem); another argument doubts that memes fulfill the 
non-triggering requirement (triggering problem). Since replicators in the 
narrow sense do not only have to fulfill the similarity requirement but also the 
lineage and non-triggering requirement this provides a serious problem for the 
analogy between genes and memes as replicators. Both arguments claim that in 
most cases of social learning – even in cases where there is reliable 
transmission of behavior – the process of transmission of the underlying 
supposed memes is not analogous to replication: Memes are not replicated, 
they are inferred by the learning individual from multiple encounters with 
similar ideas. In a nutshell, the critique is that, even if we assume that memes 
have sufficient copy-fidelity, in order to spread across a group of individuals, 
they do this not via replication in the narrow sense.  
Copy-fidelity problem 
The copy-fidelity problem points towards the reasons why there is a 
meaning/holism problem at all. Most memes are conside
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similarity requirement, since they are changed when they enter the mind of a 
new ‘host.’ They are made ‘consistent’ with what is already there or changed 
for other reasons. This change can affect the ‘phenotype’ of memes (i.e., the 
consequences in behavior), but does not have to. The important thing is that 
from this changeability of memes, a disanalogy is derived: Memes are too soft, 
too pliable to change to serve as analogous to genes, which are not soft, but 
hard – hard enough to count as replicators and thus able to survive long enough 
in identical copies to serve as units of a multiple-step selection process. As 
Dennett has put it with respect to biological evolution: “Raise the mutation rate 
just a bit too high and evolution goes haywire; natural selection can no longer 
work to guarantee fitness over the long run” (Dennett 1995: 354).  
Before I show how the issue has been discussed by memeticists, I have 
to add two notes of caution. First, from the point of view of general selection 
theory, it is unclear how much mutability or softness is still compatible with a 
multiple selection process. Although Dennett is correct with respect to 
biological evolution, in general a high mutation rate is compatible with the 
possibility of a selection process. The immune system is a perfect selection 
system with a very high mutation rate, as Hull & Wilkins (2005: 6) and Henry 
Plotkin (2000a: 77) make clear. It depends on the strength of selection in the 
respective system how much mutability is compatible with multiple-step 
selection. To say that a mutation rate is too high for a respective system 
requires an empirical proof of this claim, as Blackmore (1999: 58) answers. We 
have met the same problem with respect to Dawkins dismissal of organisms 
because they lack sufficient copy-fidelity: it is notoriously unclear how much is 
enough. Second, it is often unclear whether the changeability of memes is due 
to a process that is analogous to mutation, or to other processes. Apart from 
attributing a ‘high mutation rate,’ the softness of memes has also been regarded 
as due to ‘blending’ or ‘Lamarckian inheritance.’ Let me explain this by 
illustrating how Dawkins reacts to the copy-fidelity problem.  
Dawkins addressed the issue about the copy-fidelity of memes already 
in The Selfish Gene (1976). He wrote:  
“At first sight it looks as if memes are not high-fidelity replicators at all. 
Every time a scientist hears an idea and passes it on to somebody else, he is 
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likely to change it somewhat. I have made no secret of my debt in this book 
to the ideas of R.L. Trivers. Yet I have not repeated them in his own words. I 
have twisted them round for my own purposes, changing the emphasis, 
blending them with ideas of my own and of other people. This looks quite 
unlike the particulate, all-or-none quality of gene transmission. It looks as 
though meme transmission is subject to continuous mutation, and also to 
blending.” (Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 195)  
Nonetheless, according to him, the disanalogy is an illusion. As genotypic 
properties ‘blend’ at the level of phenotypic properties, interacting to build 
these phenotypic effects, ideas blend only at their phenotypic level. The 
Darwinism meme blends with other things at its ‘phenotypic level’. The 
differences in interpretation of different versions of Darwinism, maintained by 
different people, are not part of the essential ‘Darwinism meme’ (Dawkins 
1989 [1976]: 195f). The differences are interpreted as occurring only at the 
level of the phenotype of memes, whatever that is, where one meme blends 
with others and where the meme gets muddled with all the phenotypic noise of 
interpretation and additional aspects. At the same time, the essence of the 
meme resides unchanged somewhere in the mind, as genes are understood to 
stay unchanged in the nucleus of cells since Weismann postulated the non-
inheritance of acquired characteristics.  
In 1982, Dawkins changed his opinion and accepted the changeability 
of memes as indeed providing a disanalogy. Besides pointing to other 
differences between genes and memes, he admitted: 
“There are, of course, significant differences between meme-based and gene-
based selection processes […]. The copying process is probably much less 
precise than in the case of genes: there may be a certain ‘mutational’ element 
in every copying event […]. Memes may partially blend with each other in a 
way that genes do not. […] The equivalent of Weismannism is less rigid for 
memes than for genes: there may be ‘Lamarckian’ causal arrows leading 
from phenotype to replicator, as well as the other way around. These 
differences may prove sufficient to render the analogy with genetic natural 
selection worthless or even positively misleading.” (Dawkins 1982a: 112) 
I will come back to this ‘recantation’ of Dawkins, since he nonetheless sees 
some value in the analogy, not for culture theory, but for gene selectionism 
itself. At this point only the following is important: Mutation, blending and 
Lamarckian causal arrows are forces that would change hereditary material. 
They can clearly be distinguished for biological evolution. Mutation happens to 
particulate genes and happens relatively rarely. Blending and Lamarckian 
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causal arrows could so far be excluded to exist in biological evolution. 
Blending would mean that during reproduction the hereditary material mixes 
and that the outcome is a kind of average between the two ‘genes’: big wings 
of one parent and small wings of the other result in mediate size wings. Mendel 
has proven that this is wrong. Hereditary factors do not blend. Lamarckian 
causal arrows refer to the inheritance of acquired characteristics, through which 
the progeny inherits the changes that a phenotype acquires over its lifespan. 
Weisman first established the claim that this is impossible, a claim that has 
been confirmed since then and found its most concise formulation in the 
‘central dogma’ of molecular biology, as briefly described in section 2.5. The 
common core of blending and Lamarckian inheritance is that both would 
render ‘hard inheritance’ impossible. Although a high mutation rate has to be 
distinguished from the latter two, it can also lead to a hereditary material that 
might be too soft to serve as a material basis for a selection process. Dawkins 
(1982a) does not explain in which sense change through mutation, blending, or 
Lamarckian causal arrows can be distinguished in the case of memes. Be it as it 
may, the difference will be important at a later point of this section.  
 Although Dawkins regards high mutation rate, blending and 
Lamarckian causal arrows as providing a disanalogy between memes and genes 
in 1982, he changed his mind later on. In 1999, replying directly to the 
objection that memes are not stable enough to be proper units of heredity and 
selection, Dawkins then distinguishes between his two kinds of memes, which 
I introduced already in section 3.1. He introduces them in order to partly 
restore the analogy. If a child learns how to fold a Chinese paper junk because 
a teacher instructs the child how to do it, then the meme (i.e., the instruction) 
has a non-memetic phenotype, namely the paper junk, an imperfect realizations 
of the ‘idea’ or ‘instruction.’ Blackmore (1999: 59-62) called this transmission 
process “copy-the-instructions.” This is, according to Dawkins, analogous to 
replication. If the teacher, however, does not transmit instructions but merely 
shows the child a drawing of a paper junk, which is the meme in this case, and 
asks it to copy it, then the meme – the drawing – is genotype and phenotype at 
the same time. In such a case, Blackmore calls the process “copy-the-product,” 
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as opposed to copy-the-instructions. The transmission processes are 
consequently different, most importantly with respect to copy-fidelity: The first 
kinds of memes are, according to Dawkins, based on Weismannian or Neo-
Darwinian inheritance and show a high copy-fidelity, whereas the latter do not 
and are inherited in a Lamarckian manner. ‘Lamarckian’ in this context means 
that the imperfect phenotypic realizations are copied. Hence, in the case of 
copy-the-product, imperfections accumulate and lead to a total different 
drawing after a couple of transmissions from teacher to child to another child 
and so on. According to Dawkins, in the case of learning the instructions, what 
is copied and is therefore the sought-for meme is an “idealized task” (Dawkins 
1999: xii) and it is replicated since it shows a high copy-fidelity. As Dawkins 
writes, “Plato would enjoy it: what passes down the line is an ideal essence of 
junk, of which each actual junk is an imperfect approximation” (ibid.: xii). The 
child that should learn the task does thus not slavishly copy the product of the 
behavior of the teacher, which always shows arbitrary details that might not 
have been intended. The child tries to infer the intentions beyond the verbally 
given instruction and the exemplar produced by the teacher. The learning 
individual will, for instance, try to fold all four corners of the paper into the 
exact center of a perfect square, even if the teacher folded it not exactly at the 
center. That is why the transmission of the “inferred Weismannian instruction” 
(ibid.: xii) has much more copy-fidelity than the second meme-transmission in 
the example, namely the transmission of the drawing.
27
 We thus get memes (or 
more precisely behaviors and artifacts) with a high-copy-fidelity, and others 
with a less high-copy-fidelity.  
Genes are assumed by almost everybody in evolutionary debates to 
exhibit a very high-copy-fidelity. Now, we cannot infer a general disanalogy 
between genes and memes as such: Genes mutate as well and it is unclear how 
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much copy-fidelity is enough for a selection process to occur. The copy fidelity 
problem thus does not lead to a strong argument that shows that memes are in 
principle different from genes. Furthermore, as stated in the last section 3.3, we 
often do not even know exactly how much similarity the memes have, since we 
do not have direct access to them.  
My critique against the gene-meme-analogy is rather that the copy-
fidelity-problem shows that both – copy-the-instructions as well as copy-the-
product – involve an inference to a Weismannian instruction. This is ignored 
not only by Dawkins and Blackmore but also in all the meme debates. Copy-
the-product is more akin to changes only because it makes the inference to the 
intentions of the person showing something much harder, although not 
impossible. To make the same Chinese paper junk, if you only have the junk of 
somebody else as a model, is much harder compared to a case where you have 
in addition somebody explaining to you what you have to do. That is why we 
need teachers to teach our children so that they learn as quickly and efficiently 
as possible what we want them to learn. That is why reverse-engineering in 
technology is hard and why we have copy-right laws that help to keep the 
recipes (i.e., the instructions) for making Coca-Cola and other goods secret so 
that copying is made harder. Nonetheless, it is important to realize that both 
processes, copy-the-instructions as well as copy-the-product, involve inferring 
a “Weismannian instruction.” Even in copy-the-product, the learning individual 
has to reconstruct the instruction from the observable verbal and non-verbal 
behavior of its teacher. If the inference is safe, the copying process of the same 
behavior can exhibit a high copy-fidelity. In all cases, and this is important, 
copy-fidelity depends on the reliability of these inferences and not on the kind 
of meme or transmission per se.  
In addition, that all cases of transmitting memes involve inferences, 
shows that all cases of meme transmission involve reconstruction of memes: If 
we transmit a meme, the meme is not transmitted directly. On the contrary, it is 
reconstructed. This means that meme transmission is always more similar to 
what Dawkins has called ‘Lamarckian inheritance,’ and what I would like to 
call the epi-memetic inheritance of memes: What is directly transmitted in 
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copy-the-product as well as copy-the-instructions are not memes (i.e., 
Dawkins’ ideal essences) but behavior or artifacts. This is what the child 
observes and takes from the teacher. If there are ideal essences at all, they 
become reconstructed, in copy-the-instructions as well as in copy-the-product, 
by the learning individual through inference from the respective observables. If 
at all, memes are inherited through an epi-memetic channel, by a process of 
inferential reconstruction.
28
 This is evidently not the way genes are transmitted 
from person to person. Genes are not reconstructed from transmitted 
phenotypic characteristics. And that they are not reconstructed is central for 
Dawkins replicator concept, since otherwise he could not exclude organisms 
from being replicators by pointing to non-Lamarckian inheritance, as shown in 
section 2.5. Therefore, the epi-memetic inheritance of memes provides a 
central disanalogy between genes and memes.  
Nonetheless, my main critique lies somewhere else: The process of 
inferential reconstruction, occurring in copy-the-instructions and copy-the-
product, is the basis for the lineage and triggering problem, which address 
whether the way we learn these instructions, or any kind of memes, is 
analogous to gene replication in the narrow sense.  
Before I proceed to that issue, I want to make a concluding point with 
respect to the issue about copy-fidelity. As we saw already in the last section, 
the similarity requirement for memes is claimed to be fulfilled by simply 
defining memes as that ‘something’ that reoccurs reliably across people, so that 
what the learner has in mind, after he learned something, can be considered as 
similar to what the teacher had in mind. Since learning evidently does take 
place, it is assumed that there are ideational units – memes – with a high copy-
fidelity that stay the same despite differences in their ‘phenotypes.’ As 
mentioned before, whether such essential ideal units really exist in the minds of 
people is not indubitable. One could also say that the way memeticists answer 
the issue about copy-fidelity is selling a definition as a hypothesis: They secure 
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fidelity and similarity through stripping off all differences that might result 
from the transmission processes between persons as non-memetic, as external 
to memes, as mere arbitrary details of the abstracted ‘idealized task.’ As Allen 
Orr has replied to Dawkins defense strategy:  
“For one thing, the low fidelity of memes is a simple observation: we all 
know that ideas change as they pass through many minds. This brute fact is 
unchanged by clever argumentation about how memes could be replicated 
with high fidelity; the fact is they often aren't. To put it differently, Dawkins's 
attempted fix is at best relevant to a subset of memes” (Orr 2004: 28; Emph. 
in the orig.).  
Thus, as I said with respect to the material identification problem: There might 
well be memes that do not fulfill the similarity requirement. Whether they do is 
hard to find out.  
A second reply offered by Orr leads to the next issue on whether the 
process of inferring the intentions of the teacher is replication, even if the 
meme shows high fidelity. Orr proceeds:  
“Finally, Dawkins’s fix only seems to work because he’s smuggled in a 
battery of mental processes like inference, intuition, and idealization: the 
child figures out the ‘inferred instruction,’ intuits what the ‘instructor 
intended,’ and correctly identifies certain ‘idealized tasks.’ The problem is 
that it’s all this inference, intuition, and idealization that does the heavy 
lifting in Dawkins’s scenario, not memes. It’s hardly surprising that if every 
child infers the same implied task, all children will pass on instructions for 
the same task. But this leaves wholly unexplained why and how each child 
infers the same thing—and this is the source of high-fidelity copying in 
Dawkins’s scenario. While I wouldn’t claim that this objection is fatal, it at 
the least suggests that, if you want to understand the mind, you’re probably 
better off trying to understand inference, intuition, and idealization than 
memes” (Orr 2004: 28; Emph. in the orig.). 
I have already illustrated in the last section in which sense this shows that the 
gene-meme-analogy is heuristically trivial, since to refer to ‘idealization’ in the 
process of learning does not add anything to what social scientists and 
philosophers have worked with so far, namely the idea that common ideational 
units lie behind common behavior. Furthermore, others have indeed claimed 
that the invocation of inferential reconstruction is fatal for the analogy: It 
shows that the causal process of social learning is not analogous to replication 
in the narrow sense, as defined by Dawkins (see section 2.5).  
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Meme replication as a process 
If we take for granted, for the sake of argument, that there are cases where 
‘something’ ideational is shared between persons, then this something fulfills 
the similarity requirement for replicators. The similarity requirement was, 
however, only one of the requirements a replicator has to meet. Similarity is 
not enough; replication as a process implies further requirements. There must 
be a certain causal connection between the original and the copy. As explained 
in section 2.5, something can be a copy without being produced by a process of 
replication in the narrow sense. In addition to similarity, the narrow concept of 
replication included the lineage requirement, the non-triggering requirement, 
the self-replication requirement and the active-difference maker requirement. 
With respect to the ontological analogy, critics mainly addressed the lineage 
and the non-triggering requirement. Since the status of the self-replication 
requirement is already unclear for genes, it is usually not debated at all. A 
word, as a sheet of paper in a copying machine, clearly cannot self-replicate, it 
always needs minds in order to be copied. The active-difference maker 
requirement is not essential for the ontological analogy, since it is that 
requirement that would make minds – as phenotype of memes – to mere 
consequences of memes. This issue will therefore be addressed in chapter 5. 
Relevant for this chapter is not whether memes are active replicators but 
whether memes are replicators at all, i.e., whether social learning is analogous 
to replication in the narrow sense. Therefore, the essential question is: If we 
take for granted that there is something ideational shared through social 
learning, how is it transmitted – through replication or not?  
In order to answer this question one has to look more closely at the 
actual mechanisms of social learning, i.e., at the details of the cognitive 
processes that make social learning possible, processes which evidently involve 
‘inference, intuition, and idealization.’ A review of what social learning is will 
then lead us to the critique that in most of these processes of social learning the 
lineage requirement (lineage problem) and the non-triggering requirement 
(triggering problem) are not fulfilled.  
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Social learning  
There are two levels of analysis that help specify different kinds of social 
learning. The first level of analysis is a populational one, the second a 
psychological one. At a populational level, Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981) 
distinguished between three types of social transmission: vertical, horizontal, 
and oblique transmission.  
“Vertical transmission is used to denote transmission from parent to offspring 
and horizontal transmission denotes transmission between any two (usually 
unrelated) individuals. […] We will, however, use the term horizontal as 
restricted to members (related or not) of the same generation, and in addition 
we introduce the word oblique to describe transmission from a member of a 
given generation to a member of the next (or later) generation who is not his 
or her child or direct descendant.” (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman 1981: 54; 
Emph. in the orig.) 
Different concrete “modes” of transmission, such as parental teaching, sib-sib-
interactions, peer learning, teaching, enculturation through social hierarchy, 
political indoctrination, mass communication, can be ordered according to 
these three major kinds of transmission. The distinctions are analytical 
distinctions, since in practice all the modes “interact and produce transmission 
matrices of great complexity” (ibid.: 59).  
Cavalli-Sforza (2000: 179-187) later refined this typology. He now 
distinguishes between vertical transmission and three different forms of 
horizontal transmission. Vertical transmission occurs between parents and their 
biological or adopted children. Horizontal transmission now includes all 
pathways between biologically and socially unrelated individuals, i.e., 
individuals whose contact and relationship is not as enduring and stable as 
between parents and children. It can be split up into three types that are 
distinguished with respect to the number of sender or receiver in the 
transmission of a cultural item, or ‘trait’ as Cavalli-Sforza prefers to say. If the 
sender belongs to an older generation, transmission is still called oblique. The 
first type is a one-to-one communication pattern, as in peer-to-peer 
communication. The second type, ‘magistral’ transmission, involves a one-to-
many communication pattern, as in mass media, or as in cases where an 
authority enforces a cultural item on a population by decree or other political or 
social pressures. The third type, which Cavalli-Sforza has called ‘concerted,’ 
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involves a many-to-one communication, where a group of people exerts social 
pressure on new members.  
What is important for our discussion here is that magistral and 
concerted transmissions depart significantly from the replication of genes, 
since the copies of a cultural item and their original do not form lineages. The 
transmission is comparable to making many copies of a book from one original 
or superimposing many versions of an original in order to produce one copy, a 
kind of blend of the different versions. As shown in section 2.5, such processes 
are excluded by Dawkins from being true replication processes, since the 
lineage requirement is not fulfilled, which is important for the possibility of 
cumulative evolution. Already this shows that memes cannot be replicators in 
the narrow sense, given that some social learning evidently relies on magistral 
and concerted transmission. Memes that are transmitted in this manner are thus 
not replicators in the narrow sense. But note that even vertical transmission 
might fail to fulfill the lineage requirement. This becomes evident, when we 
look at the psychological level of learning.  
At a psychological level, cultural transmission can be due to diverse 
cognitive types of learning. There are many psychological classifications of 
kinds of learning. Avital & Jablonka (2000: 90ff) for instance have counted 
thirty different terms to distinguish between different forms of social learning, 
whereas many overlap.
29
 The types of social learning differ with respect to the 
cognitive demands and with respect to what exactly is learned. Social learning 
in general does only require that “the presence of one relatively experienced 
individual increases the chances that a naïve individual will learn a new 
behaviour,” as Avital & Jablonka (2000: 90) have put it. This distinguishes 
social learning from pure individual learning. However, it is common to 
distinguish between social learning that is merely learning through others on 
the one hand and learning from others on the other hand. Learning through 
others means that the novice learns through observation not the behavior itself, 
but only something about the environment. This kind of learning has also been 
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 See Heyes (1994) attempt to bring some order in the terminology about social learning. See 
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called ‘stimulus enhancement,’ or ‘local enhancement.’
30
 The individual still 
learns on its own, it ‘reinvents the wheel’ but it is enhanced through being 
exposed to the relevant stimuli. Learning not only through, but also directly 
from others involves learning something about the behavior of the experienced 
individual. This has often been called ‘imitation in the broad sense.’
31
 As 
Avital & Jablonka put it, “[w]ith socially influenced learning, an animal learns 
what to do as a result of its association with others; with imitation it learns both 
what to do and how to do it” (Avital & Jablonka 2000: 93).  
There is considerable debate over how much animal learning is due to 
imitation in this broad sense, and not due to mere enhancement learning. A 
famous example is the spreading of the habit of opening of milk bottles by the 
Great tits in Britain. It has been shown that the method was not imitated by 
these birds, but learned by trial-and-error by each individual tit. It has been 
shown that some tits learn the behavior, even if they do not watch the behavior 
but merely the outcome of the behavior – the opened milk bottles.
32
  
Learning from others (imitation in the wide sense) comprises simple 
observational learning as well as kinds of learning that are more complex, 
since they are based on understanding of symbols and attributions of 
intentionality. Pure observational learning has also been called “imitation in the 
narrow sense.”
33
 Humans imitate when they slavishly copy bodily movements. 
Imitation in the narrow sense is only a minor force in culture, since, for 
complicate tasks, humans have developed more efficient ways of learning. 
Tomasello (1999) insisted on such a type of social learning. According to him 
it is peculiar to humans. He calls it cultural learning. Cultural learning involves 
role-taking and sharing intentions. Cultural learning is not possible without 
joint attention that is not exhibited by children before the so-called nine-month-
revolution. It is also not exhibited by animals. According to Tomasello, 
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 For instance, by Maynard-Smith & Szathmary (1999), or Boyd & Richerson (2000). 
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 See, for instance, Avital & Jablonka (2000: 92), Blackmore (1999: 43), or Dawkins (1989 
[1976]: 206). 
32
 See Sherry & Galef (1984); see also Tomasello (1999) for review of the debate and further 
examples.  
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 Plotkin (2000a: 75f), Laland & Brown (2002: 210). Calling observational learning imitation 
goes back until Thorndike (1898), as Plotkin mentions.  
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cumulative cultural evolution does not only require imitation in the wide sense, 
but also understanding the intentionality of actions (goals of actions, functions 
of artifacts). The child learns not only what to do (as in enhancement learning 
through others) and how to do (as in learning from others) but also why it 
should do it. According to Tomasello, without the latter the cognitive 
separation of goal and means is not possible. Yet this separation is necessary 
for an intentional variation of the already developed means in order to 
intentionally improve on these means for a certain goal, or in order to improve 
on the goal itself. Furthermore, without cultural learning language acquisition 
or the acquisition of any symbolic culture would be impossible. The 
arbitrariness of symbols makes it necessary that one understands the 
communicative intention in the use of symbols. Only on the base of cultural 
learning, humans are able to learn symbolically. Symbolic learning is very 
effective, since the respective learning situations can be represented 
symbolically. Even if the behavior is not performed, the novice can learn it 
through explaining what, how and why he has to do this or that. This is the 
psychological basis of the difference between Dawkins’ copy-the-instruction 
learning and copy-the-product learning. Since only humans are engaged in 
cultural learning and massively use symbol systems, cultural learning has been 
taken by Tomasello to explain why only humans managed to build up such 
impressive cultural systems like religion, art, technology, science etc.
34
  
To recapitulate, at the psychological level we can systematically 
distinguish between three cognitive types of learning: enhancement learning 
(learning merely through others); observational learning in the narrow sense 
(learning through and from others by simply repeating behavior); insightful 
cultural learning processes (learning through and from others, involving 
attribution of intentions, use of symbols and inferences with respect to the 
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 In addition to Tomasello (1999), see Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, who also rest human 
uniqueness on this capacity and add that therefore culture can be retained over time and over 
space without direct contact of individuals: “[W]hat may be unique to man is the capacity to 
transmit knowledge to other individuals remote in space and time by means of such devices as 
writing, mainly, transference of abstract instructions and explanations in ways that do not 
require face-to-face observation and direct imitation” (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman 1981: 4). 
 
Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity 
150 
meaning and function of symbols or actions). In order to keep things clear, I 
will use these three terms –enhancement learning, observational learning, and 
cultural learning – to distinguish between these three types of learning. The 
reason for this terminological decision and the detailed review of types of 
learning is that the use of the term imitation has caused much confusion: it is 
sometimes used for all kinds of social learning, sometimes for learning from 
others – observational or cultural – and sometimes only for observational 
learning.  
Before I proceed to the lineage and triggering problem, I have to add a 
note on the explanatory force of postulating these different kinds of learning. 
All these three psychological types of learning might well comprise different 
cognitive mechanisms that could be specified further. Learning a motor pattern 
or learning how to dance, even if both might well be instances of observational 
learning, could involve different mechanisms. Furthermore language 
acquisition, learning to use mathematical symbols, learning to understand and 
work with social constructions such as ‘money,’ or learning to understand 
Newton’s laws on the basis of other basic competences and already acquired 
knowledge will also differ and involve different cognitive mechanisms, as 
Plotkin (2000a) stresses, although they all belong to the category of cultural 
learning. For our purposes, however, it suffices to distinguish between these 
three cognitive types of learning. Explanation of social learning clearly has 
reached this level in psychology of learning. If we want to explain how a single 
tit learned to open milk bottles, we say that it learned it by enhancement 
learning, or imitation. Given the distinctions about social learning, we can now 
ask whether social learning is analogous to replication. 
Lineage problem 
I claimed above that in cases of magistral and concerted transmission, the 
lineage requirement is not fulfilled. However, at the psychological level, 
magistral and concerted transmissions do not so much differ from one-to-one 
transmission. Even if we assume that we exclusively learn something from one 
person alone, we might not learn it instantaneously. We might well learn it 
through multiple encounters with an outward realization of that ‘something’ 
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that we should learn. Even if one ends up with a cultural item that is very 
similar to what others maintain, e.g., a certain pronunciation of ‘whether,’ one 
did certainly not acquire this ‘copy’ through a process of copying one’s ‘copy’ 
from a single template-original – whether one learned it from one person alone 
or from many people. In such cases, the ‘meme’ has not been transmitted 
through replication in the narrow sense. Thus, in all cases of learning that rely 
on multiple encounters with tokens of a type that is said to be copied, the 
process is not a true replication, since the lineage requirement is not fulfilled in 
these cases. 
As Dawkins himself has recognized for genes, if the lineage 
requirement is not fulfilled, then cumulative change becomes impossible, since 
a change that has been introduced newly in one copy is then not passed on in 
subsequent copies. And this is what happens in cases of multiple encounters, 
since the newly introduced variant is averaged out. If a child acquires the 
pronunciation of ‘whether’ through multiple encounters, critiques of the gene-
meme-analogy claimed, the child will ‘blend’ or ‘average’ over all the 
information it receives from others.
35
 Through this blending it is secured that 
the child ends up with the average of the population. Heredity, and therefore 
social learning and similarity at least in a wide sense, are therefore secured. Yet 
at the same time a newly introduced change, for instance in pronunciation, 
occurring in one individual in the population, has almost no chance to spread, 
since it is averaged out: i.e., it does not survive the averaging-process because 
of blending. As said, that is the reason why the lineage requirement was so 
important for the replicator concept and also for the concept of Darwinian 
evolution as such: Changes occurring at one point must be heritable; they are 
not heritable if blending is operative. Mendel showed, although not yet at a 
molecular level, that heredity does not involve blending. It is particulate. 
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 Boyd & Richerson (2000), Henrich, Boyd & Richerson (forthcoming), Godfrey-Smith 
(2000: 419), Sterelny (forthcoming a). Boyd & Richerson (2000), Henrich, Boyd & Richerson 
(forthcoming) and Gil-White (forthcoming) try to explain this blending process at a cognitive 
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Therefore, the lineage requirement is, first, a central aspect of Darwinian 
evolution and, second, it is one of the essential requirements for replicators.  
 From this it follows that if memes are often blended in the sense that 
they do not fulfill the lineage requirement, memes are in many cases not 
transmitted through replication.
36
 For these cases there is an important 
disanalogy between genes and memes. Without being able to offer empirical 
evidence here, I guess that many cultural units are transmitted through a diffuse 
blending process of multiple encounter with multiple templates. In culture, 
heredity is usually secured differently than in nature. Therefore my main 
conclusion with respect to the lineage problem is: In cases of social learning 
that involve multiple encounters, memes are not replicators. The analogy is 
false for these cases of social learning, since the lineage requirement is not 
fulfilled.  
Yet, for clarity, I have to add how change is possible nonetheless on the 
basis of blending inheritance. Is it really true that only particulate inheritance 
can secure cumulative evolution? Boyd & Richerson and other critics of 
memetics, who want nonetheless to maintain that culture evolves in a 
Darwinian variational manner, claim that in the absence of replication, 
blending heredity can lead to the accumulation of changes, as required for 
Darwinian evolution. Replication is not needed for a Darwinian account of 
culture.
37
 According to them, what changes is the statistical mean of a certain 
cultural item. The mean (of phenotypic realizations of alleged ideational units) 
can be tracked by researchers, and the mean can be said to change and spread 
differentially in a culture. I do not want to go into the details of their defense 
here, since the only thing important for this study is not how cumulative 
change is possible at all, even if memes do not replicate as genes do. The 
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 Note that referring to blending is different from claiming that a meme pool is subject to 
constant crossing and joining of branches or lineages of species, while “biological evolution is 
a system of constant divergence without subsequent joining of branches”, as Gould (1991: 65) 
objected against memetics. Genes may replicate and hence fulfill the lineage requirement, even 
if some genes in a population come from a different species, a phenomenon that does in fact 
sometimes happen in biological evolution, as Hull (1982) argued.  
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important thing is that the latter question occurs only because blending shows 
that memes are usually not replicators in the sense defined by Dawkins.  
Triggering problem 
As outlined in the subsection on the copy-fidelity problem, memes do not only 
blend, they are also inferred and reconstructed. Our example was learning to 
make a Chinese paper junk. According to Sperber (1996, 2000) and Atran 
(2001) the invocation of inference provides a further argument against the 
claim that memes are replicators, since the invocation of inferences shows that 
memes fail to fulfill the non-triggering requirement. Recall that the non-
triggering requirement says that replication requires that ‘information’ is 
transferred and not only triggered. If it is only triggered, the information was 
there already. The example from section 2.5 was laughter. If laughter spreads 
in a group of people, it is not replicated in the narrow sense; it is triggered. 
Sperber explains the difference between replication and triggering with a 
thought-experiment:  
“First case: ten sound-recorders with the same repertoire of melodies in each 
have been fixed so that they are activated by the sound of the last five bars of 
any melody in their repertoire, and then play this very melody. They are 
placed in such a manner and at such a distance of one another that the first 
one activates the second, the second the third, etc. The first recorder plays 
melodies in random order at appropriate time intervals. Second case: ten 
sound-recorders have been fixed and placed so that the second-recorder 
records sound from the first, and then replays it, the third recorder records 
sound from the second and then replays it, and so on. Only the first recorder 
has a ready repertoire of melodies, and it plays them in random order at 
appropriate time intervals” (Sperber 2000: 169).  
According to him, in the first case, “only triggering takes place and no copying 
at all” (ibid.: 169). Since replication requires what Sperber here calls ‘copying’, 
no replication has taken place. Applied to the question whether social learning 
is an instance of replication, analogous to gene replication, the answer for 
Sperber is ‘No,’ since according to him triggering is always involved in 
learning.  
If we learn something and do this through inferring certain intentions, 
as in Dawkins example of a child learning by instruction from a teacher how to 
fold a Chinese paper junk, then some of the information that the child uses to 
perform the task is actually not learned at that very moment. Part of the 
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information necessary to understand the teacher has been learned long before. 
For instance, the instruction to fold the paper exactly at the middle of the paper 
to a square relies on general knowledge about squares, folding etc. This general 
knowledge is triggered in the learning situation, and the task itself is inferred 
by the child from what it knows already, and from what it sees and hears at that 
very moment. According to Sperber, the pre-existing knowledge can be 
acquired or innate; yet, according to him, it usually is innate, specified in 
cognitive modules.  
Note, that Sperber does not (and cannot) claim that literally nothing is 
transmitted in such cases.
38
 It is not an either-or-question. It is a question of 
more-and-less. The influence of pre-existing knowledge might for instance be 
less important in observational learning, but it certainly is very important in 
cultural learning, such as in learning the grammar of language or learning how 
to use symbols for sounds in music. How much triggering is involved in an 
instance of learning is thus dependent on each individual case. Therefore, 
although I agree with Sperber on his general point that triggering is not 
replication, it is hard to decide what to do with mixed cases, i.e., cases that do 
involve some copying, but also triggering. Sperber merely states that  
“[f]or memetics to be a reasonable research program, it should be the case 
that copying, and differential success in causing the multiplication of copies, 
overwhelmingly plays the major role in shaping all or at least most of the 
contents of culture. Evolved domain-specific psychological dispositions, if 
there are any, should be at most a relatively minor factor that could be 
considered part of background conditions” (Sperber 2000: 172; Emph. 
added).  
Two points are important here:  
First, how much is “overwhelmingly”? This is indeed unclear. 
Therefore, I suggest not to appeal to any relative measure in order to evaluate 
the claim about memes as replicators. Genes clearly do not involve any 
triggering, even if they cannot self-replicate. The form of DNA copied from a 
previous DNA-token definitely stems from the latter, which is a template, and 
not from proteins or any other entities involved in the complex molecular 
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replication machinery. Therefore, the triggering problem seems to show a 
second central disanalogy between genes and memes with respect to the causal 
process that connects a serious of similar tokens of a type, be it a meme or a 
gene. The disanalogy would be that, contrary to genes, memes almost always 
include some triggering.  
In order to show how memeticists can react to this charge, let me add a 
second note. Not only innate pre-existing psychological knowledge is triggered 
and not replicated. If Sperber’s argument (i.e., that triggering proves that the 
transfer of knowledge is not an instance of replication) is correct, then the 
argument holds for any pre-existing knowledge (i.e., for any knowledge that is 
pre-existing in the mind of the novice at the very moment where the novice 
learns a specific cultural item). As shown in chapter 1, not everything in 
culture is innate. There evidently are things that are definitely learned. I 
therefore disagree with Sperber on the following point: that evidence for innate 
knowledge provides an argument against memetics. If only triggering of innate 
knowledge were involved in a learning situation, the situation would in fact be 
no instance of culture as contemporarily defined. The contemporary definition 
of social learning, which I presented in section 3.1, entails that the content that 
makes up culture is socially transmitted and not genetically. Therefore, for 
those cases that clearly do involve social learning, Sperber’s form of the 
triggering argument does not provide a critique against memetics, who only 
deal with instances of social learning. The triggering argument can only be 
defended for cases that clearly are cases of social learning. Now, the question 
is whether those instances of acquiring knowledge that definitely include social 
learning (i.e., cultural items) are learned by replication or whether they are 
learned by triggering of previously learned knowledge.  
That is the snag of the whole issue. From the latter it follows that the 
triggering problem that can be objected to memetics applies to cases where the 
pre-existing knowledge that makes learning possible has been acquired earlier 
in life. However, since even in such cases the issue is not an either-or issue, 
memeticists could answer to the triggering problem in the following way: 
There is always something that is transmitted at that point in time, even if pre-
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existing knowledge helped to transmit it. In other words, a memeticist simply 
needs to answer that what he regards as the meme is that ‘something’ that has 
been transmitted in that moment of learning, i.e. that something that a novice 
was able to add to his repertoire, given the background of pre-existing 
knowledge that made this addition to his repertoire possible. Plotkin (2000a) 
does exactly that. There are memes that are acquired early in life. Some of 
them are ‘deep-level memes,’ like the concept (or schema, frame, script, as 
others prefer to say) of a restaurant. A person can learn that Italian restaurants 
regularly serve pizza, only if a person first acquired the ‘deep-level’ restaurant-
meme, to take a simple example. Nonetheless, the proposition ‘Italian 
restaurants regularly serve pizza’ has been learned at that moment and not only 
triggered through pre-existing knowledge. In other words, the information that 
has been learned at that moment, has been ‘bootstrapped,’ but not triggered, as 
Gil-White (forthcoming) objects in a similar way to Sperber’s triggering-
argument against memetics. This holds even if the learning involves inferences 
to what a speaker means when he says ‘restaurant,’ ‘Italian,’ etc. 
However, memeticists are responsible for not being precise in 
specifying what a meme is. As illustrated in this chapter, often they merely 
repeat that there must be ‘something’ that is similar or transmitted, for instance 
in learning by instruction of how to make a Chinese paper junk. As Dawkins 
has said, the meme is the instruction to make the paper junk. But this leaves 
undecided whether this meme includes or excludes the knowledge that has 
been learned before – knowledge that is needed for the child, in order to infer 
from the observed verbal and non-verbal behavior what his teacher intends the 
child to do. If a child learns to make the Chinese paper junk, then a lot of the 
things, which are required for the child to make it, has not been transmitted and 
therefore has not replicated.  
In practice, it might be hard, if not impossible, to find out which part of 
a newly acquired skill has been transmitted and which has been acquired 
before. However, the distinction is important, in order to get a foothold on the 
triggering problem. For that ‘something’ that is indeed transmitted at the 
moment of learning, the non-triggering requirement is fulfilled. Only that 
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‘something’ that is learned can be the content of the newly learned ‘meme’ in 
the mind of the novice.  
Therefore, if it is made precise what the actual meme is in an instance 
of learning, and if previously acquired aspects are excluded from the respective 
meme, then there is no difference between genetic replication and social 
learning with respect to triggering. This is my concluding claim on the 
triggering problem. In principle, the analogy can thus be restored. Yet the 
triggering problem shows again: It all depends on what is specified as the 
meme. If the skill of folding a Chinese junk is the meme, then the meme has 
not been replicated, as long as, for instance, the general skill of folding papers 
has been acquired before. If we, on the contrary, identify the meme as being 
the meme of folding this particular Chinese paper junk, then this particular 
meme has been replicated – given that the other replicator conditions are 
fulfilled as well. Therefore, whether the non-triggering requirement is fulfilled, 
and the analogy justified, on that ground, is dependent on how we define the 
respective meme. Memeticists usually do not care about this issue and maybe 
cannot, since it is practically almost impossible to dissect the learning situation 
in such a way. My conclusion on the triggering problem includes therefore the 
following critique: First, as with the similarity requirement, it is hard to decide 
empirically whether a meme fulfills the non-triggering requirement; second, 
the claim that ‘something’ is learned in each learning situation, the only claim 
that can be derived from calling memes replicators, is no news for anybody, 
except for radical nativists. In this sense the analogy is heuristically trivial, 
even if it can be made precise in a way that circumvents the triggering 
problem.  
Widening the concept of replication 
I will now turn to a last resort some memeticists have taken in order to answer 
the different replication problems all together. Their answer is that replication 
in the narrow sense is not required. Similarity is enough. The concept of 
replication is thus widened so that any kind of cultural transmission counts as 
replication, reaching thereby an immunization against the critique that memes 
do not replicate in the narrow sense, as genes do. This defense strategy, 
Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity 
158 
however, leads to a trivialization of the claim that memes are replicators. As 
with the behaviorist something-is-preserved argument (discussed in section 
3.3), the analogy thus becomes true but trivial, if we take for granted, for the 
sake of argument, that usually some ideational units are transmitted through 
social learning of similar behavior.  
Dennett (forthcoming) states that the “invocation of intelligent, 
semantically-sensitive, intention-attributing agents in the purported replication 
process” does not as such provide a claim that the process is not an instance of 
replication, even if genetic replication is “mindless” and “mechanic,” whereas 
social learning is not. Although this is correct, I think that the invocation of 
semantically-sensitive, intention-attributing agents nonetheless provides a 
problem for the claim that memes are replicators. According to Dennett, this is 
not the case: “Darwin (and Fisher, and Williams, and others) saw the need for a 
sufficiently ‘strong principle of inheritance’ to keep evolution going, but 
nothing has been said about how that fidelity is to be maintained, 
mechanically” (Dennett (forthcoming), Emph. added).
39
 This might have been 
the case for Darwin and Fisher, but it is a crude oversimplification of the 
concept of replication, made precise by Dawkins on the basis of Williams’ 
gene selectionism. Dennett’s statement ignores all the issues of the 
contemporary units of selection debate. Heredity is not replication (as I 
illustrated in section 2.5 and above). Replication has much stronger 
requirements than heredity, requiring higher copy-fidelity, lineage building, 
non-triggering, self-replication, and a causal influence of the replicator on its 
own replication. Memes are often not replicated, since they often do not build 
lineages; and if they are not defined carefully, they do not fulfill the non-
triggering requirement.  
Oversimplification is the deeper, hidden problem that many memeticists 
face, if forced to the details of how the transmission of memes happens. 
Although they claim that memes do replicate, they tend to claim at the same 
time that the details are not important. They widen the concept of replication or 
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are unclear about what is demanded for replication. Again, according to 
Dennett, “[y]ou can finesse your ignorance of the gory mechanical details of 
how the information got from A to B, at least temporarily, and just concentrate 
on the implications of the fact that some information did get there – and some 
other information didn’t” (Dennett 1995: 359; Emph. added). According to 
him, merely the similarity across people is important. Thus, for him there 
seems to be no difference between the following two specifications, which he 
uses simultaneously. At one point, for instance, he mentions that others have 
invented alternatives to the term ‘meme’ for the ‘new replicator’ and writes:  
“But since the word meme has secured a foothold in the English language, 
appearing in the most recent edition of the Oxford English Dictionary with 
the definition ‘an element of culture that may be considered to be passed on 
by non-genetic means’, we may conveniently settle on it as the general term 
for any culturally based replicator – if there are” (Dennett 2002: E-85; Emph. 
added).  
Not every unit that is cultural, and therefore by definition not transmitted by 
genetic means, qualifies as a replicator in the narrow sense. Dennett and other 
memeticists constantly ignore this.  
Dawkins also cited the English Oxford Dictionary for defining ‘meme’ 
as “[a]n element of a culture that may be considered to be passed on by non-
genetic means, esp. imitation” (Dawkins 1999: viii). In a shortened reprint of 
this passage (Dawkins 2003), he changes this to “a self-replicating element of 
culture, passed on by imitation.” One often does indeed not know what the 
exact claim behind the gene-meme-analogy is: that culture is based on social 
learning in the general sense, i.e., transmission through non-genetic means; or 
that culture is based on imitation, in the narrow sense of observational learning 
or in the wide sense that is tantamount to social learning in the general sense; 
or that imitation in one of these senses is analogous to replication.  
The same confusion arises from statements of Blackmore. According to 
her, cultural inheritance (i.e., social learning) is based on imitation and 
imitation is analogous to replication. Blackmore (1999: 47-52) explicitly 
excludes ‘local enhancement’ as an instance of imitation and replication. She 
does this with the same argument Sperber has used to exclude cases of learning 
from being instances of replication in the narrow sense, namely with the 
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argument that triggering is included. According to Blackmore, ‘local 
enhancement’ relies heavily on triggering and is therefore not replication. If a 
novice learns merely through others but not from others, since he is merely 
exposed with a greater frequency to the stimuli that make individual learning 
more likely, the new behavior or cultural idea itself has not been replicated. It 
has been triggered, in this case by the environment. However, observational 
learning (i.e., imitation in the narrow sense) and other more complex processes 
of learning (i.e., what Blackmore calls imitation ‘in the broad sense’) are 
considered by her as analogous to replication, despite the triggering problem 
for most cases of cultural learning:  
“Imitation is a kind of replication, or copying, and that is what makes the 
meme a replicator and gives it its replicator power. You could even say that 
‘a meme is whatever it is that is passed on by imitation’ – if it didn’t sound so 
awkward. We may (and will) argue about just what counts as imitation but 
for now I shall use the word ‘in the broad sense’, as Dawkins did. When I say 
‘imitation’ I mean to include passing on information by using language, 
reading, and instruction, as well as other complex skills and behaviors. 
Imitation includes any kind of copying of ideas and behaviors from one 
person to another” (Blackmore 1999: 43; Emph. added).  
What she offers later on does not add much clarity.
40
 What is important is, first, 
that, although she excludes enhancement learning from being replication 
because of triggering, all other forms of social learning are taken to fulfill the 
non-triggering requirement. Second, she has nothing new to say on the 
“mechanisms underlying imitation” (ibid.: 51). She repeats the standard kinds 
of social learning, which I introduced above. According to her, the fact that 
memeticists make their claims without knowing “the mechanisms for copying 
and storing memes” does not matter. She offers two arguments for this 
position: First, Darwin started without having any reliable knowledge of how 
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 See Blackmore (1999: 46- 52): On the one hand, she admits that similarity between two 
tokens of a cultural unit is necessary but not sufficient for replication. She writes that to show 
that imitation is more than this, “we need to define imitation” (ibid.: 46). Using on the one 
hand, the narrow concept of imitation (observational learning), taken from Thorndike, she 
changes back and fourth to the wide concept of imitation. She then distinguishes between: (i) 
“contagion,” which is innately triggered behavior, such as laughing; (ii) “social learning,” such 
as enhancement learning; (iii) “true imitation,” i.e. learning from others (ibid.: 47-52). Since 
not every learning from others is observational learning, it seems that, on the one hand, all 
cases of social learning are true imitation; but on the other hand it seems that everything that 
fulfills the non-triggering requirement is considered as ‘true imitation,’ but this is not the case 
for all cases of learning from others.  
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heredity is secured, so can memetics. Second, “memes depend on being 
transmitted from one person to another and, by definition, this is done by 
imitation” (ibid.: 58). The first merely reaffirms that so far memetics has not 
reached the level of a science and it ignores the material identification problem. 
The second indicates that her concept of imitation is indeed a very broad one.
41
 
In such a case, memes are indeed – by definition – replicators: things that are 
transmitted from person to person through non-genetic means. If imitation in 
the broad sense (social learning in general) is replication for the sole reason 
that it fulfills the similarity requirement, then this contradicts her exclusion of 
enhancement learning as imitation and replication. Enhancement learning has 
been excluded because it does not fulfill the non-triggering requirement, 
despite it fulfills the similarity requirement. It is therefore totally unclear 
whether she requires more than similarity for a replicator or not. To require 
more than similarity for enhancement learning but not for higher forms of 
cultural learning is certainly no solution to the question whether social learning 
is replication or not.  
Changing back and forth between a narrow and a wide concept of 
replication leads to confusion. In addition, widening leads to trivial statements 
about social learning. It leads to trivialization for the following reasons: (i) It 
conflicts with the narrow concept of replication, used to justify gene 
selectionism; (ii) it simply mirrors the anthropological concept of culture; (iii) 
last but not least, claiming that memes are replicators in the wide sense does 
not add anything to what social psychology has found out about social 
learning.  
(i). Conflict with the narrow concept of replication used to justify gene 
selectionism. If memeticists answer to the objection that memes are not 
replicators in the narrow sense with a wide concept of replication, then any 
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 If, however, Blackmore would build her gene-meme-analogy on a narrow concept of 
imitation (observational learning), she would simplify culture by excluding all those kinds of 
social learning that are evidently different from simple observational learning. These kinds of 
social learning account for the more important parts of culture, e.g., social constructions like 
‘democracy,’ ‘money.’ norms like the ‘Golden Rule’ or the Christian Ten Commandments, or 
mental scripts such as the concept of a ‘restaurant’ etc. See (Plotkin 2000a: 76, 2000b) on this 
line of argument. 
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kind of cultural transmission – by definition – counts as replication. This wide 
concept of replication, however, evidently conflicts with the claim that in the 
case of biological evolution only genes are replicators. If the loose standard 
that then holds for cultural evolution should apply to biological evolution, the 
difference between heredity and replication could not be justified (as I 
explained in section 2.5 and above in reaction to such a widening of the 
concept of replication in Dennett). Dawkins, when he withdraw from a strong 
analogy in 1982, wrote:  
“There are, of course, significant differences between meme-based and gene-
based selection processes […]. These differences may prove sufficient to 
render the analogy with genetic natural selection worthless or even positively 
misleading. My own feeling is that its main value may lie not so much in 
helping us to understand human culture as in sharpening our perception of 
genetic natural selection” (Dawkins 1982a: 112; Emph. added).  
If it is correct that memes are not replicators in the narrow sense, since they 
mutate too much, do not fulfill the lineage requirement, and – depending on 
individuation of memes – might not fulfill the triggering requirement, then 
memes cannot even be used to sharpen our perception of genetic replication, 
since memes are replicators only in a wide sense. If the wide concept of 
replication were used to illuminate the special role of genes, then the concept 
of replicators would become trivialized even for genes.  
(ii). Memes as replicators in the wide sense simply mirrors the 
anthropological concept of culture. With a wide concept of replication, we are 
far away from illuminating the explanation of culture. Widening the concept of 
replication leads to a heuristically trivial reassertion of the anthropological 
concept of culture. Defending the claim that similarity for ideational units 
holds does not comprise special claims that would distinguish memetics from 
other approaches to social transmission. All of these approaches assume the 
basic anthropological concept of culture, i.e., they all assume that their objects 
of study are those generative ideational units of culture that show similarity 
across people, and that are transmitted through non-genetic means. The defense 
that memes are replicators in the wide sense states nothing more than that they 
are transmitted through non-genetic means. The less you require, the more 
trivial the analogy becomes. The gene-meme-analogy reinvents the wheel, 
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since memeticists neither developed the concept of culture with this analogy, 
nor did they contribute any new hypothesis about culture, nor did they provide 
any new solution to the identification and meaning problem. Everything that 
they say and that is correct can be found in any theory that tries to explain 
culture in the narrow sense. The gene-meme-analogy is thus heuristically 
trivial in this sense.  
(iii). Claiming that memes are replicators does not add anything to 
what social psychology has found out about social learning. Finally, the gene-
meme-analogy does not add anything to the explanation of how social learning 
works. Calling what we assumed all the time (that culture is based on the 
transmission of similar ideational units) ‘replication’ does not add anything to 
the explanation how this transmission works. Dennett and Blackmore state that 
we do not need this level of analysis for the analogy. We do indeed not need 
precise psychological accounts of how the information is transmitted in order 
to state the analogy. But whether the replicator requirements are fulfilled, 
whether the analogy is correct or not can only be found out by looking at the 
details of the psychological processes involved. Blackmore argues in one place 
for Dawkins gene selectionism, the view that only genes can be units of 
selection. She implicitly suggests that group selectionists were wrong since 
they “talked about evolution occurring for the ‘good of the species’ without 
worrying about the exact mechanisms involved” (Blackmore 1999: 4), whereas 
she takes our knowledge of DNA as replicating to show that these group 
selectionists are wrong. If this standard is used for biology, why not use it for 
culture – as a standard for judging the analogy?  
A clear exposition of the different types of social learning, which have 
been distinguished by social psychology, although they are not yet an 
explanation at the level of true mechanisms, does allow to show that not all 
kinds of social learning are by definition instances of replication in the narrow 
sense. For many instances of social learning the lineage requirement is not 
fulfilled, even if we assume that these memes fulfill a quite loose standard of 
similarity. That this is the case is already visible at the populational level and 
could be backed up by looking at the cognitive process at the psychological 
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level. The gene-meme-analogy needs to address these processes and the basic 
‘mechanisms’ beneath these processes, as Plotkin (2000a) criticizes. Plotkin 
also wants to use the word ‘meme’ for an explanation of culture, but his 
account of memes takes all the points mentioned in this chapter into account, 
and he requires that memetics explain the mechanisms of transmission in order 
to have explanatory value. I disagree with Plotkin in claiming that – in order to 
proceed to this level – we do not need the gene-meme-analogy. The analogy is 
superficial at these levels of description and explanation. Social psychology 
works on these issues since decades and they do not need the meme analogy: 
First, they do not need the gene-meme-analogy to find out whether an instance 
of social learning is due to enhancement learning, observational learning, or 
cultural learning, the three basic forms I distinguished above; second, they do 
not need it to further explain how these processes work. At the level at which 
social learning is described and explained by describing and analyzing different 
processes of social learning, and at the level at which these processes might be 
explained further, the gene-meme-analogy is trivial, not offering anything that 
could count as explanation of how social transmission works.  
Conclusion 
Considering all of the above, the gene-meme-analogy is wrong with respect to 
the narrow concept of replication, and the gene-meme-analogy is trivial with 
respect to the wide concept of replication: merely mirroring the definition of 
culture and not adding any new hypothesis to what we know already – an 
analogy with no fruitful role.  
3.5  SUMMARY 
There is heritability in culture, although the process how this is secured is 
different from the way heritability is secured in biological evolution by genes. 
Looking at the concept of culture, at the concept of memes, at social learning, 
and at the concept of replication in a precise way has proven to be decisive. 
The first basic assumption of the gene-meme-analogy, (1) that there are basic 
ideational units of culture, is heuristically trivial; the second assumption, (2) 
that they can be tracked, is wrong; the third assumption, (3) that they are 
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replicators, is either wrong or trivial. The ontological analogy, claiming that 
culture is built and transmitted through basic building blocks that are 
observable replicators, in the same sense as genes are, is thus either wrong or 
trivial. It is trivial in its broad Darwinian guise, claiming that there is 
something transmitted, and wrong in its gene selectionism version, claiming 
that memes are countable replicators.  
The only positive role the ontological gene-meme-analogy could play is 
to serve as a link between diverse disciplines (mainly philosophy, psychology, 
anthropology, and evolutionary biology), and to bring these disciplines 
together – to study mankind in its totality, as Hull (for instance in 2000) has 
claimed. Memetics can therefore be a philosophical perspective on culture that 
is valuable in this heuristic sense only – a Wittgensteinian ladder that can be 
thrown away as soon as we come to the details, i.e., after the different 
disciplines managed to talk to each other.  
I have to add a last note on the relation between the ontological analogy 
and other applications of the Darwinian paradigm. I will illustrate the relation 
between the ontological gene-meme-analogy and the other two basic analogies 
at issue in this study in the respective chapters. However, as mentioned in 
chapter 1, there are numerous other applications that differ in many details 
from these analogies. It is not possible to evaluate them, their relation to, and 
dependency on the ontological analogy with the same necessary precision. I 
shall be content with a brief example. Although the ontological analogy has its 
defects in the sense shown in this chapter, it might nonetheless be a fruitful 
hypothesis to test whether cultures are – analogous to biological species – 
subject to fast evolutionary change if there are small groups, as Hull (1988a) 
claimed for science.
42
 Such claims do not need the close analogy between 
genes and memes as replicators, as defined by Dawkins. What is important for 
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 See Hull (2000: 62ff) on more examples, or Blute (2005) for this typical manoeuvre. Laland 
& Brown (2002: 234-237) also cite a couple of empirical ways for detecting “natural selection 
of cultural variation”. Memetics could for instance find out whether the phenomenon of 
convergent evolution occurs in unrelated cultures, i.e., whether they arrive at the same 
solutions independently, if confronted with similar problems. However, even if memetics 
would turn towards such empirical research, that research does not need a close analogy 
between genes and memes as replicators. 
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my critique of the gene-meme-analogy is that they therefore can also not be 
used to prevent the ontological analogy from the critique presented in this 
chapter.  
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4  ORIGINATION ANALOGY: DARWINIAN 
NOVELTY IN CULTURE 
4.1  THE ORIGINATION AND PATTERN OF CHANGE IN 
CULTURE 
The origination analogy 
Culture evidently changes in time. The question whether it changes in a 
Darwinian manner or not, can be approached in two different ways: First, is 
culture a variational system, with selection as a necessary part of the change? 
Second, does variation arise in an undirected way? That is, are the factors 
involved in the generation of novelty (i.e., in the process bringing about 
variation) and those involved in selection decoupled as in biological evolution 
or coupled, exhibiting a Lamarckian correlation? And is the correlation partial 
or even total, as in a Lamarckian instructive mechanism that guarantees that 
adaptive novelty arises? As explained in section 2.3, even if a system is a 
variational system, it can nonetheless include coupling, which is excluded in 
Neo-Darwinism. Thus, the two questions have to be addressed separately. 
There is a third question that, in principle, should also be addressed, when the 
analogy between origination of novelty in culture and in nature is at issue: In 
which sense does selection of cultural items differ from ‘blind’ (i.e., 
hindsighted and opportunistic) natural selection? I will address the issue about 
the hindsightedness of selection as part of my analysis of undirectedness of 
variation. In addition, I will address opportunism at the end of this section.  
I will start with a detailed description about how the origin of novelty in 
culture can be approached, independent of Darwinian thinking. I will then 
shortly address the graduality of cultural change, the variational nature of 
culture, and intentional selection. That culture is often gradual, that it is 
basically a variational system, based on intentional selection, which differs 
from natural selection, are uncontroversial issues. Furthermore, the gradual and 
variational pattern of cultural change is usually not cited as justification of the 
Darwinian approach to creativity; and intentional selection is not cited as a 
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critique of this approach. These aspects are not central for the origination 
analogy. That is why I will only shortly address these issues, as part of this 
opening section. 
Most of this chapter is dedicated to a detailed analysis of the following 
issue: In which sense can creativity be said to be based on ‘blind variation,’ i.e. 
based on truly undirected variation as defined in section 2.3. This issue is at the 
center of the Darwinian approach to creativity and has caused considerable 
controversial debates over the last 45 years. The arguments have gone back and 
forth without much progress. I will lead through this zig-zagging in the 
following way: First, I will distinguish between three interpretations of the 
claim that creativity is based on ‘blind variation’ (section 4.2). Depending on 
what kind of blindness is meant, the evaluation of the analogy differs. I will 
then present the standard critique that culture and creativity do not rest on blind 
variation, but on guided variation. I will systematize and develop the critics’ 
core argument, in order to show what exactly provides a problem for the 
origination analogy (section 4.3). After this I will introduce, analyze, and 
assess three kinds of compatibility arguments – arguments that state that the 
critique – although correct – does not destroy the analogy, since guided 
variation is compatible with drawing the analogy between origination in 
creativity and biological evolution (section 4.4 – 4.5). By distinguishing 
between three meanings of ‘blind variation,’ and by discussing these 
compatibility arguments, I will provide a new and well-balanced critique of the 
origination analogy that takes the points of critics as well as those of defenders 
of the analogy into account. However, my conclusions are not in favor of the 
origination analogy, since I will show that the three compatibility arguments 
either fail or end up in almost trivial claims.  
Before I introduce how the origination of novelty in culture can be 
understood irrespective of Darwinian analogical reasoning from nature to 
culture, I want to add a note on the independence of the origination analogy 
from the ontological analogy. Culture relies on a certain degree of heritability 
of ideational entities. As illustrated in chapter 3, this heritability can exist, even 
if the process of transmission of these ideational entities is not analogous to 
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replication. The close ontological analogy, that memes and genes are both 
replicators in the narrow sense, is neither necessary for claiming that culture is 
a variational system, nor necessary for claiming that creativity is based on 
undirected variation: First, the fact that there are memes does not entail that 
culture is a variational system. A Lamarckian transformational system could 
also rely on basic countable and replicating building blocks that are maintained 
over time. Second, it follows from what I have said in chapter 2, that 
Lewontin’s three principles and the principle of undirectedness of variation can 
hold for culture, even if the units of selection are not replicators in the narrow 
sense.  
Origin of novelty in culture and creativity 
The anthropological concept of culture (introduced in section 3.1) entails the 
conception that culture is created by individuals, maintained across individuals 
through social learning and intentional selection of newly introduced or 
socially learned cultural units. At issue in this chapter is how individuals create 
culture, i.e., how novelty is introduced into culture by individuals.  
To create culture in its wide sense means to bring about something that 
is new as a token. Making a traditional kind of pot is creating culture, even if it 
is just a new token of a type of behavior (and artifact) that is already well-
established in a certain culture. This kind of creating is a conditio humana and 
an ubiquitous activity. That is why I will call such activity creativity in an 
anthropological sense. Whenever we are creative in this sense, we bring about 
what I would like to call anthropological novelty: something is new in an 
anthropological sense, if it cannot come into existence without our creating 
activity. Even if a craftsman creates a traditional kind of pot over and over 
again, he is – in a wide, i.e., in an anthropological sense – creative in doing so. 
He adds something to the world that can only come about through this socially 
transmitted activity.  
However, since creativity in this sense does not produce historical 
novelty, for instance through creating a new kind of pot, it is not the kind of 
creativity essential for an understanding of cultural change. What is essential 
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for cultural change is what I call psychological creativity. It is the kind of 
creativity that is at the basis of each historical novelty.  
A cultural unit can be historically new in two senses, relatively and 
objectively: It can be new for a group of people that are bound together 
diachronically and synchronically as a tradition (relative historical novelty), or 
even new in an absolute sense, i.e., new in the sense of first appearance in the 
whole universe (absolute historical novelty). The essential thing for this study 
is that every historical novelty must also be a psychological novelty, i.e., new 
for the person introducing the historical novelty. Something that is new in a 
historical sense (i.e., something that has never been brought about by any 
person before, in a certain culture or absolutely) must be new for the creative 
individual as well, since otherwise there would have been at least one person 
(i.e., the creative person) for whom the alleged historical novelty was not new. 
The novelty would in fact not be historically new, if it was not psychologically 
new. A historical novelty must thus always be a psychological novelty. The 
converse, however, does not have to be true, since something can be novel for 
a certain person but old in a historical sense. Nonetheless it follows that an 
explanation of historical novelty is tantamount to the explanation of 
psychological creativity: If we want to explain historical novelty, we always 
have to explain the occurrence of psychological novelty.  
But in doing so, we have to exclude cases where the psychological 
novelty derives from a historical ‘original,’ since not everything that is 
psychological new, is conventionally called creative in a more narrow sense. If 
we copy something, we are not creative. Yet the reason is not the existence of a 
historical predecessor, the reason is that psychological creativity excludes the 
‘copying’ from such a historical predecessor. The exclusion of such a kind of 
‘copying’ is thus a part of the contemporary concept of psychological 
creativity.  
The contemporary folk-psychological and scientific concept of 
psychological creativity, distinguishes creativity (i) from individual learning 
(social learning and learning-by-experience) and (ii) from routine, 
‘mechanical’ production. These two demarcations are implicit in contemporary 
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psychological definitions of creativity. The creativity psychologists Robert J. 
Sternberg and Todd I. Lubart give the following definition:  
“Creativity is the ability to produce work that is both novel (i. e., original, 
unexpected) and appropriate (i. e., useful, adaptive concerning task 
constraints)” (Sternberg & Lubart 1999: 3).
1
  
‘Original’ hints at (i) and ‘unexpected’ at (ii). Since these two demarcations are 
essential for evaluating the analogy between creativity and biological 
evolution, I will have to go into some detail about them.  
(i). Psychological creativity and learning. If a psychologically novel 
idea is merely acquired through the causal influence of something that can 
legitimately be considered as an ‘original,’ then the idea is psychologically 
new, even though it did not come about through creativity in the narrow sense. 
Creativity in the narrow sense demands what I call psychological originality: a 
partial independence from the causal influences of any kind of ‘original,’ be it 
an influence of an ‘original’ through social learning, or through individual 
learning-by-experience of the external world.  
Our intuition says the following: Although the potter who makes the 
traditional kinds of pots may be creative in the anthropological sense, he is not 
truly creative. But why? The answer normally is: If the potter did not come up 
with the idea on his own, considering the kinds of pot he makes, but learned to 
make them from others, he is not really creative. Again, it is not the existence 
of an original but the copying from an original that delineates social learning 
from creativity. If this intuition is correct, then the concept of psychological 
creativity entails that not every psychological novel idea is brought about 
creatively, since what I learn from others is – despite being a copy – 
psychologically new for the learning individual.  
What I have said so far also holds for individual learning in the sense of 
individual learning-by-experience of the external world. In opposition to social 
learning, individual learning-by-experience is learning something about the 
external world because one has a direct experience of what one learns, whereas 
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or Kronfeldner (2005).  
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the probability of the experience is not increased by the presence of individuals 
who have learned the respective thing already. The cognitive processes 
underlying learning-by-experience also lead to novelty in mind. Yet, individual 
learning-by-experience is conventionally also considered as opposed to 
creativity. As Plotkin writes: „Originality and creativity are, after all, defined 
by the independence of their products form direct experience” (Plotkin 1994: 
64). Such a concept of creativity also lies behind Noam Chomsky’s stress of 
the creative aspect of language use (Chomsky 1966: 3-31). According to 
Chomsky, language is produced “unbounded in scope and stimulus-free” and is 
in this sense creative (Chomsky 1966: 5). Stimulus-freedom is, however, most 
important for considering language production as creative, as Chomsky adds, 
since “[a] tape recorder or a person whose knowledge of a language extends 
only to the ability to take dictation has an unbounded output that is not 
stimulus-free in the intended sense” (Chomsky 1966: 77). ‘Stimulus-freedom’ 
means that the language production is “undetermined by any fixed association 
of utterances to external stimuli or physiological states” (Chomsky 1966: 5).
2
 If 
we produce the entities that we produce with our mind only by experience and 
association of the experiences, then the part of the external world that becomes 
represented through individual learning-by-experience can also be regarded – 
with some poetic license –as a kind of ‘original’ that becomes ‘copied.’ I think 
that is the reason why learning-by-experience is usually regarded as uncreative.  
However, two points of clarification are necessary here: First, in this 
context the term ‘copying’ has to be taken in a wide sense, not in the sense of 
replication dealt with in chapters 2 and 3. If an outside world produces any 
representation of the external world at all in our minds, the similarity between 
the ‘copy’ and the ‘original’ is not the kind of similarity that holds for social 
learning or even for gene replication. The images, concepts, and knowledge our 
mind extracts from the external world (i.e., the ‘copies’) do not belong to the 
same ontological category as that external world of which a ‘copy’ is made 
from. This is also the reason why one clearly has to distinguish between 
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since Descartes.  
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learning-by-experience and social learning, since in the case of the latter the 
transmission leads to the same kinds of entities: I ‘copy’ – through inferential 
reconstruction – the concept of peaceful behavior prevalent in our culture. 
Second, if I say that creativity is usually opposed to learning (learning from 
others or learning-by-experience of the external world), it should be clear that 
this statement depends on how one wants to use the term ‘learning’. If it can be 
shown that individual animal learning (animal innovation) is stimulus-free to 
some extent (i.e., not merely induced by an instructive, direct molding 
influence of the respective environment or due to social learning), then it is a 
terminological question whether we still want to talk about learning, caused by 
some special process, or whether we conclude that the respective animals do 
not learn but are in fact creative.
3
 It doesn’t matter how we choose the terms. 
What does matter is that we see the difference between novelty through 
psychological originality and novelty through external ‘determination’ or 
‘information transmission’ from something or someone. The reason for my 
choice of terminology is simple. It suits better our everyday usage of the terms: 
Although we say that I learn from experience of the external world or from 
someone, we do not say that I create from such an experience or from 
someone. 
The following is an example that can illuminate what the opposition 
between learning and creativity amounts to. Friedrich August von Kekulé’s 
discovery that the benzene molecule forms a ring is usually taken as a 
paradigm example of creativity. The discovery was revolutionary. It made a 
whole new field of inquiry possible, namely the chemistry of aromatic 
compounds. The chemical composition of the benzene molecule was known. 
But its structure was unexplainable by the standards of chemical theory at that 
time, standards of a theory that were developed independently by Kekulé and 
Couper. This theory assumed that all hydrocarbon compounds are simple 
strings (Findlay 1968: 34-41). The problem was that the valences of benzene 
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 See Reader & Laland (2003: 16ff) for a list of the processes involved in animal innovation. 
Creativity is considered to be but one of these processes involved in animal learning. If we 
define learning very widely, creativity is one way of learning. If instead we define learning 
very narrowly, creativity and learning become excluding categories.  
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did not fit into this model. Now, Kekulé’s more or less direct experience of 
benzene molecules did not suffice to find the solution for this problem. He 
could not learn the structure of the benzene molecule in the sense we learn 
other things by direct experience, for instance that sugar is sweet. Given his 
knowledge, he could not ‘read off’ the structure from the chemical features of 
benzene molecules. Although the benzene molecules exerted some influence 
on his mind, leading thus to learning-by-experience of the benzene molecule, 
this impact did not suffice to discover the structure of benzene. There must 
have been something else that complemented his empirical knowledge about 
benzene when he arrived at his new idea.  
It is important not to misunderstand the opposition between creativity 
and learning. The opposition is only a gradual one. That learning was not 
sufficient for the invention of Kekulé’s idea does not mean that he had not 
learned a lot about chemistry that had an influence on his mind when he 
thought about the structure. His knowledge as a chemist does not exclude that 
he is creative, in the same way as training in pottery does not exclude that a 
trained potter can be creative. On the contrary, Kekulé’s previously acquired 
knowledge was necessary for the idea, necessary in order to come up with the 
idea and necessary to judge it as appropriate. That creativity is opposed to 
learning means that there must be some independence from the causal 
influences of an ‘original’ on its own re-presentation. It only means that 
Kekulé could not learn the structure of the benzene molecule. It only means 
that a potter did not learn the kind of pot he makes. The novelty in mind must 
transcend the learned and be independent in this sense only. 
This can also be illustrated by the example of a student learning the 
structure of the benzene molecule at school. Through experiments the student 
has a direct experience of the object. Through teachers he gets a lot of 
additional information about chemical compounds etc. But as long as the 
teacher does not present the solution straight ahead to the student, the student 
has to be creative to some degree. The teacher defines the problems and gives 
the student everything that is needed – and this is surely much more than 
Kekulé himself had. Although the teacher can thus trigger the correct answer in 
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the student, the student is creative to some degree, as long as the student finds 
the solution on his own. Since the student surely started with more ‘given’ 
knowledge and could use the guiding hints of the teacher, the student is 
nonetheless much less creative then Kekulé. Psychological originality is not an 
all or nothing. As I said, Kekulé did not discover the structure of the benzene 
molecule out of nothing. Kekulé also built his idea on experience and on 
already established knowledge that he learned from others, or that he invented 
himself beforehand.  
To recapitulate this point on creativity and learning, psychological 
creativity, creativity in a narrow sense, demands psychological originality. It 
thus stands in a gradual opposition to learning – learning from others and from 
individual experience.  
(ii). Psychological creativity and routine production. Psychological 
creativity also stands in a gradual opposition to routine production. It demands 
psychological spontaneity: the partial independence from the influence of 
already acquired knowledge of the creative person and thus from the 
intentional plans of the creative person resting on that knowledge. Even if 
Picasso’s paintings were not ‘copied’ from others, it could still be that Picasso 
knew exactly what’s going to happen in his mind when he was painting a 
certain picture. Imagine that he knew exactly what he is doing at that moment, 
in the same sense as a potter who creates over and over again the same pot. But 
would we then consider him as being creative in the moment when he paints 
this particular picture? Picasso himself is often quoted for having said: “Je ne 
cherche pas, je trouve,” indicating that, in the case of creativity in the narrow 
sense, originality is complemented by a certain passivity of the creative person. 
This passivity is the effect of psychological spontaneity – the partial 
independence of the cognitive processes involved in creativity from the 
intentional control and plans of the individual, which are based on already 
acquired or created knowledge.  
That being creative in a narrow sense – by definition – presupposes 
spontaneity has been stressed since Plato stated in the Meno (80d-86e) the so-
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called Meno problem:
4
 You cannot search for or intend to bring about what you 
do not know. If you, however, can search for something, then you know it 
already, it is thus not really new to you. Thus, if you don’t know what you are 
looking for, you cannot look for it, even if you can look for a solution to the 
problem at hand, and even if you know to some extent the criteria that have to 
be fulfilled by the solution.  
On this basis, the characteristic passivity involved in creativity, of 
which Picasso spoke, can be interpreted as a peculiar simultaneity: You only 
know that you looked for it at the very moment of insight. As Carl R. Hausman 
stresses this with respect to the activity of creative artists:  
“The artist begins a creative process without a preconceived plan or concept 
of the exact complex of qualities in the object which he will create. If he were 
to start with such a plan, then creation already would be complete in his 
mind. But the creator does begin with a certain talent and set of established 
habits of work. At first, he senses that certain elements are required in the 
future product, but he does not yet know these are. And as he creates, he 
somehow discovers what he wants to create. He formulates his plan at the 
same time that he comes to see what that plan is – at the same time that he 
sees what is required to complete the process he started” (Hausman 1984: 
10f). 
Hausman writes that if the artist were to start with a plan, “then creation 
already would be complete in his mind.” The creation would not be creative, 
since the creation would have been entailed in the plan, it would have been 
already given. This is the reason why we do not call a potter creative who 
repeatedly makes the same kind of pot. When making the kind of pot that he 
made already several times, the actual making is entailed in his plan, even if 
only as a plan or as a possibility.  
All this amounts to the following: In open-ended problems, where no 
already known procedure helps you all the way down to the final product, 
where these procedures give only rough guidelines, the person has to rely on 
spontaneous, i.e., unplanned occurrence of the solution. The opposition 
between creativity and routine production excludes an intentional planful or 
‘mechanical’ production of the solution for a problem. ‘Planful’ in this context 
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 The problem is not only a problem for creativity, it is a problem for epistemology and 
reappears in philosophy as the problem of induction, how general knowledge can arise de-novo 
out of experience with a few particulars. See Gamble (1983) or Nickles (2003) on this issue. 
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means foresight and control: When acting planful, I know what I will do or 
want to do in order to reach my goal before I do it. Creativity presupposes the 
absence of such a control; it presupposes psychological spontaneity. But, as 
with psychological originality, the opposition can only be a gradual one, for the 
same reason outlined above for psychological originality. Creativity in the 
narrow sense thus requires a partial independence from already achieved 
knowledge of the creator. This independence excludes a methodic or routine 
plan of search. Creativity is not totally independent of these routines but 
transcends it at the same time.  
This gradual opposition between creativity and routine production is not 
only a conceptual assumption of philosophers, it is a phenomenological datum 
of psychological research on creativity. Many famous protocols of creativity, 
taken from the hall of fame of history, show that creativity involves this kind of 
spontaneity. It is a phenomenological datum that shows up in at least three 
kinds of phenomena: insight, trial-and-error, and serendipity.  
The history of science and art is full of great stories about sudden 
Eurekas – the moment of inspiration, the moment of sudden insight. Kekulé’s 
discovery is an often-cited example. Insight appears, however, not only in great 
stories about creative genius but also in everyday creativity observed and 
analyzed in the psychologist’s laboratories (Sternberg & Davidson 1995). In a 
famous paper, Poincaré (1982 [1908]) describes his mathematical inventions as 
based on such flashes of illumination. But he did not reduce creativity to this 
very moment. He described four stages, which are widely accepted by 
psychology of creativity as descriptively adequate. The whole process of 
creative cognition is assumed to consist of multiple overlapping and iterated 
stages: a preparation stage, an incubation stage, an inspiration stage, and an 
elaboration and evaluation stage.
5
 The core of the overall process is the 
incubation and inspiration part. It is taken to account for the spontaneity of the 
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 Wallas (1926: 79-107) and Hadamard (1954 [1945]) adopted this four-stage-model and made 
it prominent. See also Csikszentmihalyi (1996: 79-106) and Boden (2004: 25-39) for suitable 
revision in the light of new data. Note that this stage model does not include a hard distinction 
between the so-called ‘context of discovery’ and the ‘context of justification’: evaluative 
aspects can be present to a different strength at the four stages.  
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overall process. The individual cannot intend and cannot control what happens 
in the incubation and inspiration part. From an intuitive point of view, insight 
is opposed to will: We can raise our arm by will, but we cannot come up with a 
solution for a difficult problem by the power of our will. We have to rely on 
that the ideas come to us.  
Apart from insight, there are two other phenomena that can exclude the 
control of the creative individual over the creative process: Trial-and-error and 
serendipity.
6
 Both involve an unexpected moment of finding the final solution, 
a passivity on the side of the creative person. There is a lot of trial-and-error in 
science, art, or other cultural spheres. Ignaz Semmelweis’ discovery of the 
reason for the epidemics of childbed fever in a Vienna Hospital counts as an 
instance of the first. Alexander Fleming’s discovery of penicillin is one of the 
famous cases of serendipity.
7
 The difference between trial-and-error and 
serendipity is that in trial-and-error you are looking for a solution to a certain 
problem, even if the wish itself doesn’t give birth to the solution. You have to 
try and the trials very often fail. In true serendipitous creation or discovery you 
aren’t even looking for a solution. “Pseudo-serendipity” (Roberts 1989) is 
somehow between trial-and-error in the narrow sense and true serendipity. 
Whereas you intentionally produce trials in trial-and-error processes, you do 
not produce a ‘trial’ in pseudo-serendipity: You collide with a solution while 
looking for it. In true serendipity you are not even looking for it. The central 
mark of serendipity is that the solution was found by acknowledging or taking 
into account a coincidental event in the outside world. But what characterizes 
all three phenomena – serendipity, trial-and-error, as well as insight – is the 
following: it is the impossibility of generating the discovery or solution to a 
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 The concept of serendipity goes back to Horace Walpole, a British writer, who wrote in 1754 
a letter to Horace Mann, describing a tale with the title “The Three Princes of Serendip”. 
Serendip was the old name for Sri Lanka. The princes make discoveries ‘by accident and 
sagacity, of things which they were not in quest of’ (Lewis 1960: 407-411). The term 
serendipity found its way to standard English language through the work of Walter B. Cannon 
(1940), a physiologist, and the work of sociologist Robert K. Merton (1967 [1949]: 103-108). 
See on the history and current usage of the term Diaz de Chumaceiro 1999. See also Merton & 
Barber (2004) on the history of the term and the concept from the point of view of historical 
semantics and sociology of science. (The book was written already in the 50s but not published 
until 2003).  
7
 See Boden (2004: 233f) on Fleming.  
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given problem in a ‘mechanic’ or intentional way. That you want a solution 
does not help, if you do not know how to find it. Serendipity is well 
documented.
8
 It is as much a phenomenological datum of creativity as is 
insight. Trial-and-error is often the way scientists or even artists proceed when 
they explore the frontiers of their domain.  
In practice, the distinction between insight, trial-and-error and 
serendipity is not clear-cut. A trial-and-error process can lead to a serendipitous 
discovery: It is possible that you look for a solution to a certain problem, you 
intentionally try one, and you thereby find a solution to another problem. Yet, 
as I will show in section 4.3, the distinction is important with respect to the 
question whether novelty occurs in an undirected way. Furthermore, insight 
can be but does not have to be the source of serendipity. Insight is 
characterized by an inner complex cognitive event as a part of a long creative 
process with one or all the four stages mentioned above, maybe iterated several 
times. True serendipity does not involve such a creative process, it is mainly 
characterized by a relevant new event in the outside world. Some might even 
want to exclude serendipity as an instance of creativity, since there is nothing 
creative in finding something. Others would answer that the finding usually 
also involves an insight that is creative. Archimedes, the father of the famous 
‘Eureka!’, discovered how to find out whether a crown was really made of 
gold. He knew that if he were able to measure the volume of the crown, he 
could say whether the crown was pure gold. But he did not know how to 
measure the volume of such an irregular solid object. When he stepped into the 
bathtub in the public bath of Syracuse, he realized how this could be done: The 
volume of his irregular solid body equals the amount of water that overflowed 
when he stepped into it. He was so surprised so that he ran out of the bath, 
naked, through the town, shouting ‘Eureka! Eureka!’. Archimedes’ discovery 
counts for Roberts (1989) as an instance of pseudo-serendipity, since he looked 
for the solution but did – when he found the solution – not consciously produce 
a trial-situation in order to test it. Yet at the same time Archimedes’ discovery 
is one of the paradigm examples of insight. Fleming discovered the Penicillin 
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by true serendipity, yet his discovery is sometimes considered as an instance of 
creativity and sometimes not. One solution for this interpretational problem 
could lie in the following: Insight appears as not necessarily relying on external 
events, while serendipity does. But on the other hand, insight can rely on 
external events that are incorporated by the creative person during incubation 
as clues for a solution. I do not want to give a final answer on this 
categorization problem.  
The important points are the following: First, only those cases of trial-
and-error that involve psychological spontaneity (and therefore insight) can be 
counted as creative. Trial-and-error can well be purely mechanical when the 
trials are produced mechanically and would thus be excluded from being 
creative in the narrow sense. Second, cases of serendipity might well do 
without insight and can therefore be doubted to be paradigm cases of creativity. 
Third, serendipity differs from trial-and-error in that the person was not 
engaged with a certain task for which it sought a solution.  
To recapitulate: I have illustrated in which sense creativity in the 
narrow sense excludes routine production. Creativity requires thus a partial 
independence from an intentional plan of the creative individual, a partial 
independence from already acquired knowledge. We also saw that creativity 
presupposes a partial independence from the causal influence of an original – 
from a mental original in other people or from an external original in the 
outside world. The contemporary folk-psychological and scientific concept of 
creativity requires psychological originality and psychological spontaneity.  
On the basis of this, it stands to question whether this includes 
important consequences for a psychological explanation of creativity. If Kekulé 
had just used a standard rule that says that, in the case of such a problem, try 
the structure of a ring, his idea would not have been creative, since the whole 
idea would have been just an application of a routine method. If someone had 
told Kekulé that the structure of the benzene molecule is a ring, this external 
influence would have made the process in Kekulé’s mind uncreative, since he 
would have ‘copied’ the idea. If his discovery simply were the outcome of his 
strictly empirical knowledge of the benzene molecule, the process would not be 
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creative, since he would have just passively re-presented the structure. From 
this it can be concluded that creativity cannot fully be explained by reference to 
learning and previously acquired knowledge alone. That is what makes an 
explanation of creativity special. Whether the Darwinian approach to creativity 
can offer a new and correct explanation of how we come up with new ideas 
will be addressed in the subsequent sections. At this point, it is important to 
realize that the contemporary narrow concept of creativity excludes a certain 
explanation of creativity.
9
 However, it alone does not give an explanation yet: 
it simply specifies what the phenomenon to explain is.  
Creativity in its narrow sense is one source of novelty in culture. 
Individual learning-by-experience – as defined above – is another major 
source. Errors in social learning can count as a further but minor source of 
novelty in culture. I will concentrate on creativity since it is the phenomenon 
that has been addressed by Darwinian approaches to creativity, and since it is 
the phenomenon that is – for conceptual reasons – most likely to fit a 
Darwinian frame.
10
  
Standing on the shoulders of giants  
To attribute the occurrence of novelty to creativity does not necessarily mean 
that culture changes in big sudden leaps, made by great geniuses. Creativity is 
normally part of a gradual change, whereas each creative individual stands on 
the ‘shoulders of giants.’ A creator of a cultural item usually relies on many 
previously created ideas, knowledge, or patterns of behavior, although he 
transcends them at the same time. That is why the opposition between 
creativity and learning or routine production is only partial. Gradual change 
therefore means that the origination of an existing cultural item, like the design 
of a modern watch, cannot be explained by a single creative act. It has to be 
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 Some philosophers have gone even further: They deny that creativity can be explained at all, 
interpreting thereby creativity as demanding freedom or independence of the creative person 
from any causal influences. See Kronfeldner (2005) on this issue.  
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 Learning-by-experience in general and operant conditioning in particular have also been 
regarded as Darwinian. See for this version of Darwinian analogical reasoning from nature to 
culture: Skinner (1953), Jerne (1967), Blute (1979), Plotkin (1994) and Hull et al (2001), to 
name but a few.  
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explained by a gradual, cumulative process of multiple cycles of origination 
and diffusion.  
Now, to explain the origination of an artifact with the help of an 
analogy from biological origination of novelty to cultural novelty can simply 
mean that cultural change is explained as a gradual change. If the thesis that 
cultural change is Darwinian were interpreted as merely saying that culture 
changes gradually, then the thesis about the Darwinian nature of culture would 
be almost trivial in two respects: First, as I illustrated in chapter 2, gradualism 
is not the distinctive feature of Darwinism. Gradualism as such is compatible 
with the idea of creation as well as with Lamarckian evolution. Gradualism is 
not the essential characteristic of the process of change that makes Darwinism 
so peculiar – compared with creationism and Lamarckism. Furthermore, 
graduality is not even necessary for a Darwinian picture. If mutations leaded 
not only to small but big changes in phenotypes, the pattern of change could 
still be a variational one, and could still contain undirectedness of variation, 
and hindsighted, opportunistic natural selection. Second, gradualism does not 
lead to any special thesis about creativity. The gradual nature of cultural 
change is no contentious issue anymore. Albeit there are still people who 
believe that certain grand human accomplishments are created solely by one 
individual, by one big genius, it is commonly accepted that every creative 
individual stands on the ‘shoulder of giants.’ Basalla (1988), for instance, could 
show with impressive evidence that technology usually changes gradually 
through the accumulation of the multiple creative activities of individuals.
11
 It 
is then an empirical question how many steps were involved in the origination 
of, for instance, the watch, and how big the single steps were. The answers will 
vary from case to case. Furthermore, even within one creative individual, 
creativity is usually not an instantaneous act. Creativity takes time. Thus, to say 
that culture changes in a Darwinian manner because it changes through small, 
cumulative steps just reformulates an empirical fact and names it ‘Darwinian,’ 
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 Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland (2004) refer to further empirical evidence, for instance already in 
Pitt-Rivers (1875) on stone tools and spears, in Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981) on lithic 
technology, and Wilder (1968) on the gradual emergence of the basic mathematical decimal 
system.  
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although a gradual change might as well be described and explained by one of 
the other two paradigms – creation or transformational evolution – as well.  
Last but not least, even if a cultural item originated in a gradual way, it 
still holds that the individual steps are at the center of any explanation of the 
change. Gradual change makes the goal of explaining cultural change more 
complicated, since it divides the origination of a cultural product into many 
cycles of more or less small steps. At each step, novelty is introduced. 
Therefore, if we want to explain the origin of a cultural item, we have to look 
at each particular step. Each step contains either an error in social learning, 
individual learning, or the creative act of one person, standing at the same time 
on the ‘shoulders of giants.’ Consequently, the origination analogy has to be 
justified as a hypothesis about the nature of each step of the cumulative 
gradual change.  
What has to be shown with respect to the steps is not that the steps are 
small, but that the nature of the steps leads to a Darwinian pattern of change 
that exhibits some undirected generation of novelty, the hindsighted selection 
that follows from this, and the kind of shortsightedness that is typical of natural 
selection – aspects that are essential and distinctive for a Darwinian pattern of 
change.  
Culture as a variational system 
In contrast to graduality, a variational pattern of change is an essential and 
distinctive characteristic of Darwinism. Does culture change in a variational or 
in a transformational manner? That culture is indeed variational is not 
contentious, and often implicitly taken for granted by Darwinians as well as 
non-Darwinians. In addition, the claim that culture is variational has not been 
cited as a central aspect for the Darwinian approach to creativity. That is why I 
will not say much about it. I will take the variational nature of culture for 
granted, but let me nonetheless explain what it comes down to and refer to 
some evidence.  
The concept that culture is variational rests on the assumption that a 
change in culture as a system is brought about through a change of the 
distribution of cultural items. First, there is variation: There are, for example, 
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people in German culture who drive cars and there are some that do not. They 
ride bicycles. Second, a kind of sorting process – usually intentional selection 
by conscious or unconscious choice of individuals – is a necessary part of the 
explanation of a change in distribution of these habits. A transformational 
picture would have to deny that there is real evolutionarily significant variation 
in cultures.
 12
 But this is evidently false, as just indicated with the example of 
cars and bicycles. That such diversity usually exists is also taken as an 
empirical fact, for instance, in anthropology, with respect to many aspects of 
pre-modern societies (Barth 2002, Vayda 1994) or with respect to 
technological change in modern societies (Basalla 1988).
13
  
A transformational pattern is also unlikely because of the following: As 
illustrated above, the origin of variation lies in the learning and creative 
activity of individuals. Individuals react differently to the influence of the 
natural and social environment. Although social transmission, in form of 
concerted or magistral transmission, and individual learning-by-experience of a 
common natural and social world can prevent variation to some degree, as 
shown in chapter 3, there is no overall unity of response, as assumed in 
Lamarck’s concept of a typological and adaptive reaction of individuals to the 
respective environment. Variation comes about because not every person has 
exactly the same experiences, even if they are situated in the same selective 
environment. In addition, if there is some stimulus-freedom in the sense 
specified above, the associations we make between different experiences and 
                                                
12
 The only evolutionary paradigm that includes a transformational pattern would be the 
paradigm of classical evolutionism in anthropology, mentioned in chapter 1. This tradition has 
been developed parallel to, but independently from Darwin’s theory of evolution. It assumes 
that all cultures develop along a determined transformational axis of progress, i.e., civilization. 
Cultures develop along this axis since they are all essentially similar. For cultural relativists 
like Franz Boas (1911), there was no such commonality between cultures. Hence, according to 
him, there is no common destiny and no order of ‘primitive’ or ‘higher developed.’ This debate 
will not be of interest here. It takes whole cultures as the unit of analysis and addresses the 
overall path of culture. Relevant in this study, however, is the micro-evolutionary process of 
change that happens within cultures. On classical evolutionism and the concept of culture as 
transformational in this sense see Carneiro (2003), Sanderson (1990), Rindos (1985), and 
Fracchia & Lewontin (1999). 
13
 See also Borofsky (1987), on the inhabitants of the Polynesian atoll of Pukapuka, and the 
dual-inheritance-theorists Durham (1991, 2002), Boyd & Richerson (1985, 2005), and Cavalli-
Sforza & Feldman (1981). See also Rogers’ (1995) diffusion studies, which also model 
empirical research on diffusion of innovations along variational lines.  
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conclusions we draw from them might well be diverse, even if they were build 
on exactly the same basic experiences. If these differences add up in a person, 
differences in the population result and lead to a variational pattern in culture. 
These individual differences exist. Culture can therefore be understood as 
exhibiting variation. Furthermore, the differences add up through multiple 
cycles of variation and selection, just as in biological evolution, leading 
thereby to a cumulative variational process of change.  
Nonetheless, the variational nature of culture is often overlooked or not 
taken to be the object of study. The reason is that variation is related to a 
methodological problem in anthropology. In field observations, variation is 
often too easily lost by abstraction. A stereotype is falsely taken as the 'object 
of observation' (Barth 2002: 28). But this methodological problem should not 
be confused with what the anthropologist Vayda (1994: 324ff) calls 
“essentialist bias” and Durham the “essentialist trap”:  
“[C]reating the impression that each ‘ethnolinguistic group,’ for example, has 
its own distinctive, characteristic ‘culture.’ Such a move would be a step 
backwards, contributing to the false illusion that there is one uniform culture 
common to all people who, for instance, speak a given language or who 
occupy a particular geographic or political area” (Durham 2002: 194).  
Although culture is often misguidedly understood as a homogenous, shared 
whole, culture is in fact more like an interbreeding population, consisting of 
many different cultural items that exhibit different frequencies in the culture-
bearing individuals of a society. As the anthropologist Tim Ingold (1994: 330) 
writes, “[w]hat we do not find are neatly bounded and mutually exclusive 
bodies of thought and custom, perfectly shared by all who subscribe to them, 
and in which their lives and works are fully encapsulated.” Hence, that culture 
is variational is evident in the fact that not every part of culture is shared by 
everybody who is a member of that culture. A person might be a member of a 
culture, although he does not share all the items that appear in this population 
of ideas. That culture is shared means that there is a close idea-transmitting 
interbreeding interaction between people, whereas the boundaries are only  
“relative barriers to social transmission for the specific cultural information 
under study: natural barriers (rivers, lakes, mountains, etc.), language 
barriers, social barriers (as may come with various forms of inequality, such 
as class or caste), and the like. […] A large and heterogeneous society can 
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thus be subdivided into pertinent 'reference groups' within which individuals 
have similar sociocultural constraints and opportunities” (Durham 2002: 195)  
That culture is shared does thus not mean that everyone thinks and does exactly 
the same. There certainly has to exist a homogenously shared basis. Without 
such a common ground, there would be no understanding and no transmission, 
hence no ‘reference group,’ as Durham calls it, and no culture as an 
interbreeding field of ideas. Homogeneity is ensured through enculturation, as 
well as imposition and conformity pressures. Homogeneity is essential for 
culture, but it is not total.  
In short, culture is variational; it changes through a sorting process. 
However, even if culture is variational, cultural change can still be different 
with respect to the way novelty arises in individuals. As explained in section 
2.3, a variational pattern can still be based on guided variation, due to 
coupling. Furthermore, the sorting process does not have to be natural 
selection. 
Intentional selection 
The cumulative variational process of cultural change depends not only on the 
occurrence of novelty. For cultural change to occur novelty must be selected 
by the creative person, must be presented to the public, and must be accepted 
by some others. Selection of cultural items happens thus first in the learning or 
creative person, and then in other individuals who merely adopt the item and 
thereby determine the subsequent diffusion of the item. Through iteration of 
this dual process of originating steps and sorting, cumulative cultural change 
can occur.  
The selective processes involved in such a cumulative evolution are 
evidently governed by plans and knowledge of the selecting individuals. 
Humans select by artificial, intentional selection as presented in section 2.3. 
The selection of cultural items by humans differs from natural selection in that 
it does not necessarily rely on the same kind of opportunism as natural 
selection: (i) Humans are able to have higher long-term goals and can thus 
globally maximize their decisions. They can make their decisions according to 
a greater outlook, according to a kind of master plan for a certain long-term 
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project. (ii) Humans can thus also take into account positive effects that will 
only occur in the future – effects that have no positive effect at the moment of 
decision. They do this by predicting these future effects, something nature 
cannot do. They select by predicting outcomes, whereas nature selects by 
momentary actual outcomes; (iii) Humans are not necessarily bound to 
tinkering, when they create novelty. They can abstract from a given context 
and go back in the history of a development. They can do this, since, contrary 
to nature, they have a memory that enables them at the same time to build on 
already achieved cultural items and to ignore them. Furthermore, they can also 
take parts of certain complex cultural items and can ignore the rest, something 
nature cannot do either.  
In chapter 5 I will say more about intentional selection as a cause of 
diffusion. Here we are only concerned with the selective activity of the creative 
person who brings about cultural novelty. The just mentioned differences 
between intentional and natural selection are usually uncontroversial. They are 
implicitly taken for granted by critics as well as defenders of Darwinian 
approaches to creativity, but not cited for or against the analogy. That 
intentional selection is as opportunistic as natural selection has never been part 
of the origination analogy at issue here and is thus not central for an evaluation 
of the analogy.  
The following, however, is central and is highly controversial: As I will 
show in the next section 4.3, defenders of a Darwinian approach to creativity 
have claimed that the selective part of human creativity (i.e., the act of 
adopting your own ideas) rests on hindsighted selection, since creativity can, as 
natural evolution, produce novelty only by blind variation. There is no real 
foresight in human creativity with respect to the appropriateness of the 
products of our minds, even if we try to predict the appropriateness, and even if 
we respect expected long-term payoffs.  
The latter claim – that creativity is based on blind variation – has been 
strongly criticized. As the deity introduces novelty in a directed way through 
wisdom, plan, and purpose, critics claim that human creativity is equally based 
on wisdom, plan and purpose, even if humans are not as perfect as an alleged 
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creator deity. Whether creativity is blind or not is the most frequently 
reoccurring and hotly debated issue with respect to Darwinian thinking and the 
origination of novelty in culture. For this reason the issue about blind variation, 
to which I now turn, also stands at the center of my analysis.  
4.2  BLIND VARIATION IN CREATIVITY  
Creativity as blind-variation-selective-retention 
The debate about creativity as based on blind variation is at the center of the 
Darwinian approach to creativity. It had its starting and reference point in 
Donald T. Campbell’s famous article Blind Variation and Selective Retention 
in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Process (Campbell 1987 [1960]). 
In this as well as in further articles, Campbell tried to defend that creativity is a 
“blind-variation-selective-retention process.” If we apply Darwinian thinking 
to creativity, ‘variation’ stands for the process of generating novelty. 
Generating novelty can mean either the modification of existing, or the creation 
of new cultural items. ‘Selective retention’ stands for intentional selection of 
the generated items. The problematic part of the formula ‘blind-variation-
selective-retention’ is the term ‘blind.’ I have explained the concept of blind 
variation for biological evolution in chapter 2. It means undirectedness, 
decoupling of the factors that cause novelty from the factors that select novelty.  
The application of this concept of ‘blind variation’ to creativity has 
caused some confusion, partly because the meaning of blind variation for 
biological evolution has not been made clear either. As Hull complains, “[t]he 
characterization of the variation that functions in selection processes has been 
one of the most contentious topics in the literature – and the most frustrating. It 
seems that no adjective exists in the English language that accurately reflects 
the sort of variation that occurs in selection processes. Is this variation blind, 
chance, random, nonprescient, nondirected, nonteleological, unforesighted, 
what?” (Hull et al 2001: 513). Further candidate terms that are used now and 
then are ‘unjustified,’ ‘wasteful,’ or ‘unconscious.’ Campbell (1987 [1974a]: 
56f; 1974b: 147-152) himself deplored the confusion. But Campbell is partly 
responsible, since he was not really clear about what blind variation means, as I 
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already illustrated in section 2.3. To approach the issue what blind variation 
means for creativity, let me start with the central claim of Campbell’s 
Darwinian approach to creativity.   
Often quoted, Campbell stated:  
“[I]n going beyond what is already known, one cannot but go blindly. If one 
can go wisely, this indicates already achieved wisdom of some general sort” 
(Campbell 1987 [1974a]: 57).
14
  
According to Campbell, although no blindness is involved in most cases of 
intellectual achievements, if we go “beyond what is already known,” i.e., if we 
produce novelty, it must be generated blindly. At the frontier of art, science or 
what so ever, creativity is necessary and creativity is necessarily Darwinian. 
According to Campbell, that creativity is based on blind variation is thus an 
“analytical truth” (Campbell 1974b: 142).  
We saw in section 4.1 that creativity in the narrow sense is 
characterized by psychological spontaneity. Psychological spontaneity consists 
of a partial independence of the cognitive process from the intentional control 
and plan of the individual who exerts his control through constructing a plan on 
the base of already acquired or created knowledge. This independence is 
required for creativity because of the gradual opposition between creativity and 
routine production. Furthermore, as shown above, such a partial independence 
entails the absence of foreknowledge of whether the trials that we emit are 
worthwhile. That is the reason why Campbell says that his claim is analytic.
15
 
If one merely reproduces in a routine production procedure what one knows 
already, as the potter, who makes the same pot over and over again, then one is 
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 Defenders of the Darwinian approach to creativity continuously repeated this ‘analytical’ 
claim, without much elaboration, especially when they get under attack about ‘blindness’. See 
for instance the critical defense of Perkins (1998: 181), the strong and detailed defense of 
Cziko (1995: 289, 295; 1998: 194) or Simonton (2003: 316). Simonton rests content with 
merely paraphrasing Campbell’s claim: “Something more must be added to take the creative 
mind beyond the limitations and constraints of that expertise, to generate truly original ideas 
that go beyond what has worked before.”  
15
 In a strict sense, it is no analytical truth, although the claim rests on the narrow concept of 
creativity. If we do not conceptually rule out that there is a possible world where muses or a 
omnipotent, all-knowing supernatural deity is reliably inspiring the creative person, then 
novelty can be brought about in a directed way by the inspiring source. See Gamble (1983: 
359) for a similar point, but one that ignores psychological originality as an essential 
component of creativity in the narrow sense.   
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not creative and one has pretty good foreknowledge that the trials are 
appropriate, because one has seen the consequences of the ‘trial’ several times 
already. Indeed, what one does is not even a trial anymore; it is a mere 
reapplication of a recipe of which one knows that it is not a ‘maladaptive’ one. 
If one has such kind of foreknowledge, one is not creative. As Hausman (1984: 
10) wrote, if an artist were to start with a “plan, then creation already would be 
complete in his mind,” and he would not be creative. The alleged creation 
would be entailed in the plan, something already given. This is the reason why 
we exclude the craftsman from being creative. In making the kind of pots, 
which he made already several times, the actual making was entailed in his 
plan, although only as a plan or as a possibility.  
This would be comparable to the perfect activity of a deity who creates, 
like a craftsman – by wisdom, plan and foreknowledge. Since the deity is 
perfect he knows everything in advance. Thus, in the sense of psychological 
creativity, defined as it is today, this deity cannot be creative in the strict sense. 
He is a mere uncreative craftsman. However, since humans do not have perfect 
foreknowledge, they have to rely on psychological spontaneity. Campbell thus 
seems to merely reaffirm that creativity involves psychological spontaneity, a 
partial independence from previously acquired knowledge.  
What has, however, caused some of the above-mentioned confusion 
about blindness, is that Campbell sometimes illustrates his claim with respect 
to ‘foresight’ and ‘prescience,’ and sometimes with respect to ‘wisdom,’ 
‘existing knowledge,’ and ‘intelligent choice.’ Compare the following 
variations on the argument: In his famous article from 1960, Blind variation 
and selective retention in creative thought as in other knowledge process, he 
writes:  
“Real gains must have been the products of explorations going beyond the 
limits of foresight or prescience, and in this sense blind” (Campbell 1987 
[1960]: 92; Emph. added).  
“[I]nsofar as thought achieves innovation, the internal emitting of thought 
trials one by one is blind, lacking prescience or foresight” (ibid.: 96; Emph. 
added).  
In Unjustified Variation (1974b) he writes:  
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“The natural selection epistemology here offered has one special analytic 
feature: if one is expanding knowledge beyond what one knows, one has no 
choice but to explore without benefit of wisdom (gropingly, blindly, stupidly, 
haphazardly). This is an analytical truth central to all descriptive 
epistemologies of the natural selection variety” (Campbell 1974b: 142; 
Emph. added).  
“[I]ncreasing knowledge or adaptation of necessity involves exploring the 
unknown, going beyond existing knowledge and adaptive recipes. This of 
necessity involves unknowing, non-preadapted fumbling in the dark” (ibid.: 
147; Emph. added).  
That there is no foresight or prescience just says that we do not know whether 
the trials we emit are worthwhile or not. They are trials, guesswork, and 
psychological spontaneity is involved. But does exploring the unknown mean 
that we bring about the trials “without benefit of wisdom,” that we are 
“fumbling in the dark,” that we do not have plans and methods that help us find 
our way through the country of the unknown that lies beyond the frontier of 
already acquired knowledge? This is the essential question that will guide my 
subsequent analysis. It will lead me to a multi-layered critique of Campbell’s 
central claim.  
What I want to show is that although psychological spontaneity can be 
interpreted as a certain form of blindness, this does not mean that we bring 
about ideas ‘without benefit of wisdom’ and in this sense blindly. To show this, 
I will distinguish between three different forms of blind variation in creativity. 
The first, blind variation as random variation, is clearly not the way novelty 
occurs in creativity; the second, blind variation as unjustified variation, is a 
kind of blindness that I think Campbell meant with his claim – and one that he 
should have meant, if the analogy between creativity and biological evolution 
should be correct; the third kind of blindness, blindness as undirectedness, is, 
however, what he should have meant, if the claim should lead to a close 
analogy between creativity and biological evolution. By clearly distinguishing 
between these three interpretations of the concept of blind variation in 
creativity, I hope to bring some order in the confusion about blind variation in 
creativity.  
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Blind variation as randomness  
Campbell wrote, for instance, that blindness of variation means:  
“[T]hat the occurrence of trials individually be uncorrelated with the solution, 
in that specific correct trials are no more likely to occur at any one point in a 
series of trials than another, nor than specific incorrect trials” (Campbell 
1987 [1960]: 93). 
In most cases we do not produce ideas in such a random way. There is no 
equiprobability of trials. If a chemist is engaged with a problem about 
chemistry, it is very unlikely that he comes up with some totally absurd idea 
that is totally unrelated to chemistry. A good idea is more likely. This holds at 
least as long as he is mentally sane. To take another example: We do not write 
a creative novel in the way the proverbial monkey from chapter 2 does. In the 
case of the monkey, each trial of the target ‘ME THINKS IT IS LIKE A 
WEASEL’ is equally likely. The monkey indeed produces randomly, “without 
benefit of wisdom (gropingly, blindly, stupidly, haphazardly,” as Campbell 
(1974b: 142) would say. The monkey randomly produces trial after trial and 
reaches his goal by ‘brute force.’ It is usually beyond dispute that we are not 
producing our ideas blindly in this sense. The question whether we produce a 
new idea randomly in this sense might not even be applicable as Popper once 
said, even though he was a defender of Campbell: In cases of creativity, or in 
any other complex choice situation, the range of possible options is not given 
in advance and “since we do not know the elements of this range we cannot 
attribute probabilities to them, which we should have to do in order to speak of 
randomness in any clear sense” (Popper 1974a: 35).  
Although the apparent non-randomness of creative ideas is often used 
as an argument against the Darwinian approach to creativity,
16
 it would be 
unfair to criticize the approach because of that. This kind of blindness is not 
even required for organic evolution, as I illustrated in section 2.3. Although the 
‘ME THINKS IT IS A WEASEL’-typing monkey would be a perfect example 
of truly random variation, this randomness can only count as an ideal 
reconstruction of Darwinian evolution. This ideal is not even fulfilled by real 
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 See for instance Sternberg (1998: 163-165), Perkins (1999: 348), or Schooler & Dougal 
(1999: 351).  
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organic evolution. In actual organic evolution there is no equiprobability of 
variation. The probability of mutation and combination is determined by many 
factors; there are different mutation pressures; and the range of variation is 
developmentally constrained by the history of the species. What is, however, 
fulfilled by organic evolution is that the probability of adaptive trials is not 
increased because of its adaptivity: Novelty is undirected (i.e., decoupled, 
adaptively unbiased).  
Campbell is, however, in part responsible for being criticized because 
of the non-randomness of creative ideas, since he indeed said that 
equiprobability is what blindness means. However, in the same paper from 
which the above quotation is from, he said that “equiprobability is not needed, 
and is definitely lacking in the mutations which lay the variation base for 
organic evolution” (Campbell 1987 [1960]: 92).
17
 Dean K. Simonton (1999a: 
27) wrote the following, in order to clarify what he and Campbell mean by 
“essentially blind”:  
“By this qualifier Campbell did not insist that the variations be absolutely 
random, although they may be. He held only that the mind eventually reaches 
the point where it has no a priori basis for knowing which ideational 
variations will prove most effective. Neither prior experiences nor current 
environmental circumstances will provide sufficient clues about how to 
restrict the range of choices, nor does there exist any rationale for assigning 
useful priorities to the various alternatives.” (Simonton 1999a: 27; Emph. 
added)  
This says that the origination of novelty, leading to new variants, does not have 
to be random in order to count as blind. However, the meaning of blind 
variation is still ambiguous. Again, is it the same to say, first, that we do not 
have an “a priori basis for knowing which ideational variations will prove most 
effective,” and, second, that actual trials are unrestricted by previously 
acquired knowledge, that the actually trials are reached ‘without the benefit of 
wisdom,’ as Campbell said? I will show that there is a clear difference between 
the first and the second.  
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 See also Campbell (1987 [1974a]: 56; 1974b: 148) or Blute (1979: 44-45) defending 
Campbell.  
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Blind variation as unjustified variation  
Campbell
18
 claimed, as did Popper,
19
 that science rests on unwarranted 
hypothesis formation and that it proceeds in this sense ‘blindly.’ As Popper 
puts it, “in the quest for new knowledge,” we are in “the proverbial situation of 
a blind man who searches in a dark room for a black hat which – perhaps – is 
not there” (Popper 1974b: 1061). That is why Campbell said in 1974 that ‘blind 
variation’ first of all means “unjustified variation” (Campbell 1974b). This 
meaning was entailed already in 1960, where he wrote that blindness means 
that  
“variations are produced without prior knowledge of which ones, if any, will 
furnish a selectworthy encounter" (Campbell 1987 [1960]: 92).  
For Popper and Campbell science crucially depends on hypotheses that are 
unjustified trials, or “conjectures” as Popper prefers to say. They are selected 
after they are proposed. Knowledge acquisition is a process of unjustified 
variation, followed by selection: It is assumed that the generated hypotheses 
have no warranty of being correct by their origin. They have to get their 
legitimation by something else.
 
Popper thought that the trials of science get 
their legitimation not by their origin, but by surviving the method of rigorous 
falsification. For him, falsification was analogous to natural selection – a 
process of error elimination. The fact that beliefs are unjustified prior to 
selection is the reason why Campbell called his and Popper’s program 
‘evolutionary epistemology.’ How, and if at all, beliefs can get their 
justification, if not by their genesis, is an epistemological question that is 
irrelevant for this study.
20
  
Here it is only relevant that Popper’s and Campbell’s approach contain 
the claim that the origin of theoretical knowledge is creative (i.e., involves 
psychological originality and psychological spontaneity). According to Popper, 
man is creative and creativity is opposed to what he has called 
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 See Campbell (1987 [1960], 1987 [1974b], 1974b). 
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 See Popper (1972, 1974b, 1984). 
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 See Nickles (2003) for an extensive survey on the impact of the claim about unjustified 
variation on ‘generativism’ in epistemology. Generativism claims that hypotheses receive their 
justification from their origin in a process of directed imprinting by the environment.  
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“observationism,” “bucket theory of the mind” (Popper 1984) or 
“inductivism,” which he judges to be parallel to “Lamarckism” (Popper 1974b: 
1061). Recall from chapter 2, Lamarck explained local adaptation by pointing 
to the molding influence of the environment. Through this influence organisms 
were thought to directly adapt to their environment. As Lamarck conceived 
evolution, selection was not necessary for evolution, since each organism was 
thought to interact with its environment directly and to reach ‘harmony’ by this 
direct interaction. For Darwin, on the contrary, adaptive and non-adaptive 
features of organisms arise in a population. After repeated selection of the good 
ones, this indirect trial-and-error-process leads to adaptations. Popper transfers 
this contrast between Lamarckian and Darwinian evolution to science: 
Hypothesis formation cannot be reduced to gathering “‘direct knowledge’ of 
anything immediately ‘given’;” we are not “passive recipients of information 
impressed upon us from outside” (Popper 1974b: 1061). Instead, we create 
ideas and select them afterwards. Therefore, he concludes: “[W]e must 
abandon any approach which starts from sense data and the given, and replace 
it by the assumption that all human knowledge is fallible and conjectural. It is a 
product of the method of trial and error” (ibid: 1061).
21
 In a nutshell, Popper 
states that psychological originality is essential for all knowledge acquisition 
processes and that they are creative in this sense.  
Whether creativity should be defined as requiring psychological 
originality is one question. I claimed that to define it in this way is intuitive and 
mirrors the usage in psychology and philosophy. Whether all knowledge 
acquisition is creative in this sense is, however, a different question, which I 
will not answer here. I will thus not discuss whether and in which sense all 
knowledge in science is Darwinian in this sense (i.e., unjustified by its origin). 
I will only explain what this has to do with ‘blind variation’ and evaluate the 
claim that creativity is, because of this, analogous to natural selection. I will (i) 
show that if creativity in this sense exists, then it is indeed analogous to a 
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 Popper is not the first who stated this contrast. It goes back to William James (1979 [1880]) 
who accused Herbert Spencer of being a psychological Lamarckist.  
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Darwinian pattern of change, but I will also claim that (ii) this is a relatively 
trivial claim.  
(i). Creativity as a Darwinian selection process. First, irrespective 
whether creativity occurs in science or elsewhere, ideas do fail and creativity 
thus involves selection. In contrast to Popper, Campbell laid more stress on 
psychological spontaneity. At the frontier of science, art or any other cultural 
domain, we cannot but go blindly, i.e., try ideas without foresight of which one 
will prove worthwhile. Ideas can fail, and since we often do not know in 
advance whether they will fail, creativity is necessarily selective and in this 
sense Darwinian. Whatever the origin, we indeed come up with ideas that are 
not appropriate for our diverse goals, be it in science, or in art, or in any other 
cultural domain. This is a bare fact we know from history. Consequently, in 
order to maintain only the ‘adaptive’ ones, we have to weed out the 
‘maladaptive’ ones. “Il faut cultiver notre jardin,” says Candide at the end of 
Voltaire’s ironic persiflage on beliefs in the best of all possible worlds, 
guaranteed by God’s wisdom and benevolence. Hence, as a matter of fact, 
there are sometimes ideas in our mind that are unjustified or ‘maladaptive’ by 
their origin for the purpose of, for instance, acquiring knowledge. They can 
arise and do arise over and over again. We do make mistakes. In this sense, it 
can be concluded that the origination of novelty in culture is parallel to the 
origination of novelty in organic evolution: It often demands for a hindsighted 
selection process. If the world, or something else, guaranteed the appropriate 
novelty to occur, we would not have to care about rigorous selection of the 
arising ideas. We would just have to produce them.  
Thus the presence of false trials and hindsighted selection is in a way 
sufficient to exclude two kinds of accounts of creativity: First, it excludes that 
all novelties are produced in the sense of an automatically acting Lamarckian 
mechanism of directed generation of novelty. Second, it also excludes that we 
bring about new ideas like a perfect creator, who has foresight about the 
adaptedness of what he brings about. Such a foresight would make selection as 
superfluous as a Lamarckian mechanism of adaptation or any guarantee of 
appropriate ideas for a certain goal. But such a kind of ‘sightedness’ can safely 
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be excluded for humans. If we had perfect knowledge and prescience, we 
would never produce false trials. We do produce false trials because of our lack 
of real foresight. The generation of novelty in creativity is in this sense blind. It 
is a selection process as Darwinian evolution is a selection process.  
But note that the claim that creativity is a selection process should not 
be confused with the claim that creativity is a variational process, where certain 
ideas of a ‘population of ideas’ change their frequency in the mind of an 
individual. Nature always works in the manner of parallel processing, working 
with many organisms as trials, which are all at the same time subject to 
selection. Human minds are usually not engaged in such a kind of parallel 
processing, where massive diverse variants are simultaneously tested and 
where, as a consequence, the best variants increase in frequency. We do not 
breed ideas in our minds that then increase their frequency. In other words, 
ideas do not get ‘babies.’ This is an important difference to other Darwinian 
systems, like the immune system or the genetic algorithms of evolutionary 
computing. Both heavily rely on massive parallel processing and differential 
breeding. Certainly, in problem solving, we can compare different ideas that 
seem to be candidate solutions for one and the same given task. In this sense 
creativity can surely be variational. But sometimes we do not create this variety 
synchronically but only diachronically. Creativity is – as Nickles (2003: 63) 
says – an instance of “serial evolution,” if it is Darwinian at all. We have an 
idea and try it out. If it fails, we often have to look for an alternative that is not 
at hand. Hence, we try another yet unwarranted idea. This procedure is 
evidently a selection process, although not a variational process at the 
individual level. The variational pattern arises only at the cultural level, where 
a new idea, if submitted to the public, can spread differentially in the public 
domain.  
(ii). To consider creativity as a selection process is relatively trivial. 
My second claim about blind variation as unjustified variation is the following: 
The claim that creativity is a selection process is a relatively trivial claim that 
has to be distinguished from the stronger claim that this creative generation of 
novelty in mind is ‘blind’ in a more challenging sense: First, the existence of 
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false ideas is no news. That ideas can fail and that we do not have a 
foreknowledge of which one of our ideas will fail, is not an insight that 
becomes only visible from an analogy between creativity and natural selection. 
We know it from history. Hence, we do not need Darwinian analogical 
reasoning from nature to culture to know it. If the origination analogy is merely 
based on claiming that creativity involves selection, then it is in this sense 
heuristically trivial. It does not say anything new.  
Second, such a claim is trivial in another sense. The concept of 
unjustified variation simply mirrors the definition of creativity as resting on 
psychological originality and spontaneity. Please recall that Campbell said that 
it is an analytical truth that in creativity, exploring the yet unknown, we can 
only proceed blindly, since we have to go beyond the knowledge we have 
reached so far. As explained above, this is the same as defining creativity in a 
narrow sense, as requiring psychological spontaneity. To see that creativity 
requires psychological spontaneity, we – again – do not need Darwinism. 
Furthermore, even if it is correct that humans are creative when they produce 
novelty without perfect foreknowledge, and that they are in this sense creating 
ideas blindly, we have still not learned anything about how novelty then occurs 
in our minds by pointing to the analogy between creativity and the evolution of 
organisms. The analogy cannot explain how we manage to be creative in the 
absence of foresight. The claim that novelty in mind is unjustified can only 
negatively exclude a crude externalist or creationist explanation of novelty in 
mind, since the former would contradict psychological originality and the latter 
psychological spontaneity. As I said in section 4.1, creativity in the narrow 
sense cannot fully be explained by reference to social learning, experience, and 
previously acquired knowledge alone. Since the Darwinian approach to 
creativity mirrors this concept, it can exclude a certain explanation of 
creativity, but it thus has not yet offered an explanation. If it does not offer 
itself such an explanation, the analogy has almost no explanatory force and is 
in the explanatory sense trivial, merely assuming what others assume for the 
concept of creativity. I will, however, show in section 4.5 how Simonton 
nonetheless tries to give such an explanation in Darwinian terms.  
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Last but not least, the claim that there are unjustified ideas is relatively 
trivial, because it is weaker than the claim that creativity is blind in a more 
fundamental sense, namely based on undirected variation, in the sense 
biological evolution is claimed to be undirected. Neo-Darwinism states that 
biological evolution is an instance of decoupled variational evolution. It does 
not only state that evolution is an instance of variational evolution, where 
selection is necessary for evolution to take place. It states that variation arises 
in an undirected way. Thus the concept of blind variation as ‘unjustified 
variation’ has to be distinguished from the stronger claim that creativity is 
based on truly undirected variation, in the sense of a decoupled setting of 
variation and selection, as explained in section 2.3. Only the latter would lead 
to a strong or close analogy between creativity and evolution.  
Blind variation as undirected variation 
As just mentioned, blind variation in biological evolution means the absence of 
a statistical bias towards adaptivity. In blind, undirected variation, the factors 
bringing about novelty have to be decoupled from the selecting factors. 
Transferred to creativity this means: Creative hypothesis formation is 
analogous to biological evolution only if it is based on decoupled change in the 
mind of an individual. It is only analogous to biological evolution, if the 
occurrence of new ideas is not influenced by factors that determine the 
selection of these new ideas. Again, variants do not have to be produced at 
random in the statistical sense. This is not required for biological evolution 
either. 
Whether Campbell has meant this kind of blindness is not easy to say. It 
is suggested that sometimes he did mean this kind of blindness, for instance, 
when he says that “if one is expanding knowledge beyond what one knows, 
one has no choice but to explore without benefit of wisdom (gropingly, blindly, 
stupidly, haphazardly)” (Campbell 1974b: 142; Emph. added). This sounds like 
demanding decoupled, undirected variation. However, demanding that “[r]eal 
gains must have been the products of explorations going beyond the limits of 
foresight or prescience, and in this sense blind” is more analogous to merely 
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demanding unjustified variation (Campbell 1987 [1960]: 92). In 1974, 
Campbell wrote:  
“While most descriptions of discovery and creative processes recognize the 
need for variation, the present author’s dogmatic insistence on the blindness 
of such variation seems generally unacceptable” (Campbell 1987 [1974a]: 
57).  
Simonton, defending Campbell, admits the same: “[a]lthough it is obvious that 
the creator must engage in selective retention, the notion that the creator also 
must generate ‘blind’ variations appears less so. This latter idea seems to run 
counter to the common assumption that creativity is a manifestation of 
intelligent behavior” (Simonton 2001a: 555). These latter two statements 
suggest that Campbell meant more than ‘unjustified variation’ when talking 
about blind variation.  
Be it as it may, blind variation in the strong sense of undirected, 
decoupled evolution is at least what critics thought that he means, and, as I 
would like to add, what he should have meant, if creativity should be 
considered in close analogy to biological evolution. Undirected variation is, 
after all, what blind variation means for biological evolution and what critics 
have objected, while unjustified variation is usually taken for granted.  
4.3  THE CRITIQUE OF GUIDED VARIATION  
Guided variation at a populational level 
Critics claimed that our orientation towards certain problems makes variation 
in cultural novelty directed, be it creative novelty in the narrow sense or not. In 
culture, we have guided variation, not undirected variation. Since this basic 
objection exists in different variants, I will present two variants of it, in order to 
clarify what exactly provides a problem for Campbell’s alleged claim that 
creativity is based on truly undirected variation.  
Boyd & Richerson (1985: 81-98), for instance, state that culture is not 
dominated by blind, “random” variation. According to them, only 
misremembering or error-prone reconstruction in social transmission leads to 
random “cultural mutation.” The dominant source of change, however, consists 
not in copying-errors, but in different kinds of problem-solving, individual 
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learning processes, creative as well as non-creative ones. These are 
summarized as directed, “guided variation” (Boyd & Richerson 1985: 82). The 
processes underlying guided variation are not random, since humans “have 
objectives or guiding criteria, that allow them to rank possible outcomes of 
their behavior” (Boyd & Richerson 1985: 94). They assume that after an 
individual has solved a problem the output is “usually favorable” (ibid.: 82), 
precisely because of a decision process in the problem-solving individual that 
is guided by the guiding criteria. If such individually selected variants are then  
“culturally transmitted, the result is a force that increases the frequency from 
one generation to the next of the same variants whose frequency is increased 
within a generation by learning” (ibid.: 82).  
This “force” is described further in the following way:  
“We call this the force of ‘guided variation.’ Early evolutionary theory placed 
great weight on this force, often attributed somewhat erroneously to 
Lamarck. Darwin […] stressed its importance under the rubric of ‘the 
inherited effects of use and disuse.’ Although students of genetics have all 
but ruled out ‘Lamarckian’ effects in that system of inheritance, it is likely 
that they are important in the case of culture” (ibid.: 82).  
This can be reconstructed in the following sense: The ‘usually favorable’ 
cultural item, created and selected by one person, is fed into a cultural pool and 
is thus already biased towards ‘adaptivity’ when it enters this pool. This 
already directed novelty, guided by a process occurring in the creative 
individual, is then inherited by social transmission. The result is a ‘force’ that 
makes cumulative ‘adaptive’ change possible: the ‘inheritance of acquired 
characteristics’, i.e., the inheritance of new, ‘usually favorable’ cultural items 
that have been introduced by this or that individual. What is learned in one 
generation of individuals of a society is transmitted to and maintained by the 
next generation, if adopted by the individuals of that generation. In this way, 
this force “increases the frequency from one generation to the next of the same 
variants whose frequency is increased within a generation by learning.” 
However, the inheritance of newly created cultural items is not guided or 
Lamarckian because of the inheritance of these novelties, as Boyd & Richerson 
seem to suggest. It is guided, because of the pre-selection in the mind of the 
person who introduced the new item into the population. It is guided because at 
the moment when the innovation is fed into the cultural process, the novelty is 
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directed already. In Lamarck’s theory of evolution, what is fed into the 
transmission process is directed through instructive processes acting on 
phenotypic characteristics; it is directed before these characteristics are 
transmitted to the next generation. In Darwinian evolution, mutations are not 
directed at the moment when they are fed into the biological transmission 
process. Guided variation thus indeed provides a disanalogy between cultural 
change and biological evolution.  
But guided variation in Boyd & Richerson’s sense only means that the 
guiding criteria in the minds of people lead to a directedness at the 
populational level of culture, because of a guided selection at a cognitive level. 
It does not mean, and this is very important, that already the occurrence of new 
ideas is directed or guided in the sense Lamarck assumed for physiological 
characteristics. It can thus not be used to object Campbell’s claim that 
creativity is based on undirected occurrence of novelty at the cognitive level – 
novelties that are then selected according to ‘guiding criteria.’ Guided variation 
in Boyd & Richerson’s sense cannot be used against Campbell, since the 
argument does not show that the occurrence of the variants at the cognitive 
level is made more likely by the presence of a selective environment. This is, 
however, what is required for directed variation as defined for biological 
evolution (see section 2.3). Boyd & Richerson’s argument merely shows that a 
selective process at the cognitive level leads to pre-selected ideas that enter the 
cultural selection process as pre-selected ones. Thus, defenders of a Darwinian 
account of creativity could answer that the selection process at the cognitive 
level is nonetheless a Darwinian process based on undirected occurrence of 
novelties – a process that only leads to ‘guided variation’ at the end of the 
cognitive selection process.  
Guided variation at the cognitive level 
Michael Ruse writes that “cultural evolution must be necessarily different from 
biological evolution because the raw units of culture are introduced with a 
purpose in a way quite different from the random appearance through mutation 
of genes” (Ruse 1998b: 405). In 197 already, Ruse made the same point with 
the example of Semmelweis, who discovered that the epidemics of childbed 
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fever in a Vienna Hospital could be stopped by rigorous hygienic measures of 
hand washing. Semmelweis’ discovery looks like a serendipitous finding, but, 
as Ruse points out,  
“it cannot be said that the knowledge occurred ‘randomly’ – Semmelweis 
spent several years thinking and working hard, proposing and testing 
different hypothesis before he hit on the right one. Thus it would seem that 
this example strongly supports my claim that not all cultural elements – in 
particular, not all adaptive cultural elements – occur at random. Indeed, I 
suspect that most new cultural elements appear because they are needed” 
(Ruse 1974: 432).  
Let me assume, for the sake of argument, that Ruse meant with randomness the 
undirectedness assumed for biological evolution, a form of what Boden called 
r-randomness (see section 2.3). Now, the long time of Semmelweis’ 
engagement with his problem does not make the discovery less directed or 
more directed. The essential point is that Ruse claims that ‘most new cultural 
elements appear because they are needed.’ This is why Ruse mentions 
Fleming’s discovery of penicillin as an example of random occurrence (ibid.: 
432), in contrast to Semmelweis’ discovery. The difference between 
Semmelweis and Fleming is that Fleming’s discovery can count as truly 
serendipitous, while Semmelweis’ discovery is an instance of trial-and-error: of 
the two, only the latter looked for a solution for the respective problem. 
Fleming did not look for penicillin.  
Paul Thagard goes in the same direction, addressing the issue with 
respect to problem solving in a more general sense. He interprets Campbell as 
using a “false dichotomy” between ‘blind’ and ‘prescience,’ and goes on to say 
that “[t]ruly blind variation never occurs.” In problem solving,  
“[t]here is no prescience […], since nothing guarantees that the structures 
activated [in problem solving, MK] will lead to a solution to the current or 
future problems. But variation is clearly not blind either, since formation of 
concepts and rules that may be useful in solving a problem is more likely to 
occur during the attempt to solve that problem” (Thagard 1988: 104).  
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Thagard’s claim is not only that useful ideas are more likely. The claim is that 
useful ideas are more likely ‘during the attempt to solve that problem.’ They 
are thus more likely to occur because we look for them.
22
  
In section 2.3, I explained that directed mutations are defined in an 
analogous way: Mutations are directed if they occur more likely because they 
would be useful in a given environmental context. Ruse and Thagard differ 
from Boyd & Richerson in addressing the issue at the cognitive level, claiming 
that creative problem solving is directed, since there is an adaptive bias 
involved: Our orientation towards certain problems makes the occurrence of 
appropriate solutions more likely.  
However, both arguments still leave open how the need or orientation 
towards a certain problem can bias the occurrence of trials towards adaptivity. 
They do not show from where the bias comes from. In the following I want to 
make explicit in which sense orientation towards a problem leads to directed 
variation due to coupling, due to a ‘Lamarckian correlation’ between 
producing and selecting factors. It is this kind of directedness that is excluded 
by the Neo-Darwinian concept of undirected variation. 
Guided variation due to coupling 
When we are looking for a solution to a problem, then we project previously 
acquired knowledge onto the problem. Fleming’s knowledge could not make 
the occurrence of penicillin more likely, since it was not ‘projected onto,’ not 
directed at that specific problem. If someone serendipitously finds a solution 
for a problem, like Fleming the penicillin, the probability that he will find it is 
thus not influenced by previously acquired knowledge, even though the 
recognition of the discovery as a solution is certainly influenced by previously 
acquired knowledge. The finding, i.e., the being aware of something as a 
candidate for solution, is a necessary condition for judging it as a solution. But 
the finding itself is a coincidence where the producing factors and the selecting 
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unjustified variation. 
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factors are decoupled, in the way required for undirectedness in biological 
evolution. The invention of penicillin is not made more likely by the selecting 
factors. The invention is thus as undirected as biological evolution. True cases 
of serendipity are indeed parallel to what happens in organic evolution. 
Knowledge and intentions only have an influence on the selection of the 
occurrence of novelty, not on the occurrence itself.  
In the case of trial-and-error-processes, however, such as in the case of 
Semmelweis, intentions also have an influence on the occurrence of novelty. 
First of all, the orientation towards a certain problem restricts the problem-
space in which novelty should arise. Moreover, it might also influence the 
probability that the appropriate changes occur, since it influences which trials 
occur in the first place. Take Kekulé’s discovery of the benzene molecule, 
which I discussed in section 4.1, as an example for creative trial-and-error that 
involves insight. Kekulé’s general knowledge about chemistry and his 
knowledge that benzene has certain chemical features played a decisive role in 
the production of the idea that benzene builds a ring. The knowledge that is 
activated through the need for a solution structures the search-space and 
triggers certain ideas and not others. The knowledge prevented him from 
coming up with a totally bizarre hypothesis. It bootstrapped some ideas and not 
others and increased thus the likelihood that a solution occurs in his mind that 
he would select as appropriate. After producing the idea, he evaluated the idea. 
He evaluated it in the face of the same cluster of knowledge that influenced the 
production of the idea – namely, knowledge about chemistry and chemical 
features. The important thing to realize is that in such a case the producing 
factors were not decoupled from the selecting factors. Part of the producing 
factors were – at the same time – selective factors. Kekulé did not produce his 
idea in a truly undirected manner, since already acquired knowledge biased the 
occurrence of trials.  
This is how the orientation towards a certain problem can lead to 
directed ‘guided variation’: Certain trials are more likely to occur because the 
factors that are responsible for the generation of the novelty are coupled with 
those factors that determine the selection. The influence of already acquired 
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knowledge thus leads to a disanalogy between creative problem solving and 
biological evolution. Creative problem solving is an instance of a coupled 
selection process, while biological evolution is not.
23
 
Nonetheless, the influence of already acquired knowledge is only 
“plastic,” as Larry Briskman (1981: 147), defender of the Darwinian account of 
creativity, proposes. If the influence were too rigid, the occurrence of new 
ideas would be impossible. If previously acquired knowledge totally 
determined what we think, in being the only factor influencing the occurrence 
of new ideas, then no change of thinking would be possible. That is why the 
independence implied in psychological spontaneity (i.e., the independence 
from knowledge, methods, and the like) can only be a partial one. Generally 
speaking, creativity can only occur if the coupling in creativity is not 100 per 
cent. If it were 100 per cent, creativity would be impossible. Due to factors that 
are not part of previously acquired knowledge, creativity can occur. In the case 
of creativity, variation and selection are coupled, but only to a certain degree. 
The likelihood of a specific variant is increased since the individual, with his 
previously acquired knowledge, his skills and characteristics, makes up the 
actual ‘selective environment.’ This selective environment also includes some 
of the factors that produce novelty. Therefore, there is no decoupling between 
the factors that produce novelty and those that select novelty. Variation is thus 
biased towards adaptivity; it is directed. Organic evolution exhibits no 
coupling. Although creative trial-and-error problem solving involves no 
complete coupling, the partial coupling shows an important disanalogy with 
respect to the origination of novelty. 
Let me recapitulate: The reason for the adaptive bias in cases where we 
look for a solution to a certain task, cases of trial-and-error, is a form of 
coupling. Thus although trial-and-error as well as serendipitous discovery may 
well be instances of Darwinian selection with unjustified variation, there is an 
important difference between the two: Only serendipity is Darwinian in a more 
fundamental sense. Only in serendipity can we have truly undirected novelty, 
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since coupling is very unlikely to occur. Cases of serendipity are important in 
the history of science, technology, and certainly also in art – it would be whig-
history to ignore them. However, they are not really the paradigm cases of 
creativity, as I mentioned in section 4.1. Hence, if we want to explain 
creativity, we also have to address standard non-serendipitous cases, such as 
Kekulé’s case.  
Conclusion 
Boyd & Richerson can only show that a disanalogy exists at the level of 
cultural diffusion, since novelty is already pre-selected when it enters the 
cultural pool. On the basis of a critique such as Ruse’s or Thagard’s, it can be 
concluded that in cases of trial-and-error, which often involve insight, novelty 
is constrained by our previously acquired knowledge. These cases are 
nonetheless creative, as the example of Kekulé illustrates. I have tried to show 
that the adaptive bias making variation in creativity directed is due to coupling 
between the producing and selecting factors. This contradicts one of the 
versions of the analytic argument quoted at the beginning of section 4.2. 
Campbell said that blindness means that, in the case of creativity, we proceed 
to novelty “without benefit of wisdom” (Campbell 1974b: 142). In creative 
problem solving, we go beyond previously acquired knowledge, but we are not 
doing this without benefit of wisdom. The fact that we indeed use our 
previously acquired wisdom in problem solving shows an important disanalogy 
between creativity and biological evolution, since the latter involves 
decoupling between variation and selection, while the former does not. 
Nonetheless, I consider serendipitous discoveries as cases that involve 
decoupling, as biological evolution. But since I do not regard them as the 
paradigm cases of creativity, guided variation provides a challenge for the 
origination analogy, if this analogy is understood as requiring really undirected 
origin of novelty in creative problem solving processes.   
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4.4  SELECTIONIST AND BIAS COMPATIBILITY  
Reaction to guided variation 
Darwinians replied to the critique of guided variation that the apparent 
guidedness in creative problem solving does not show that the analogy between 
origination of novelty in creativity and in biological evolution is wrong. 
Indeed, it is not only important to ask whether there is an adaptive bias or not. 
A well-balanced evaluation of the analogy has to address whether such a bias 
really destroys the analogy or not.  
Campbell actually acknowledged the influence of previously acquired 
knowledge. Yet he differs on the consequences of this influence for his claim 
that variation occurs in a blind manner. According to him, the above-described 
influence of previously acquired knowledge has an analogue in biological 
evolution: The increased likelihood of useful trials is reinterpreted as a 
standard effect of cumulativity. If mutations arise in an undirected manner, 
then there is no ‘Lamarckian’ or ‘adaptive correlation,’ as Campbell prefers to 
say, between selecting and producing factors. In such a case, there is no 
coupling that makes useful variants more likely to occur because of their 
usefulness. After conceding this, he writes:  
“But even were (and where) some degree of adaptive correlation to be found 
between a new environmental setting and the mutations which are 
concomitant with it, or, more likely between a new puzzle situation for an 
animal and the responses it emits, this neither violates the model nor provides 
an explanation of an eventual improvement of fit. For this adaptive bias in 
variations is itself an evidence of fit needing explaining. And the only 
available explanation (other than preordained harmony) is through some 
past variation and selective retention process” (Campbell 1974b: 151; Emph. 
added).  
The argument that a Lamarckian correlation does not ‘violate the model’ can 
be interpreted in two ways, which I will call selectionist compatibility 
argument and bias compatibility argument.  
Selectionist compatibility argument 
That guided variation does not violate the model can be interpreted as saying 
that it still holds that all problem solving processes involve selection. They all 
rely on unjustified variation, since the novelty that comes about in human 
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creative minds is neither warranted to be useful by its origin nor warranted by 
foresight. There is no ‘preordained harmony’ neither by an adaptivity-
guaranteeing molding force of the environment nor by foresight. Be it as it 
may, this would merely be restating the weaker claim that creativity involves 
selection of trials, of which we do not know in advance whether they are 
worthwhile. Answering in this way would show that the critique of guided 
variation is compatible with a weak analogy between creativity and biological 
evolution. This is what I would like to call the selectionist compatibility 
argument. Further above, I explained in which sense I regard the weak analogy 
between creativity and biological evolution, i.e., the claim that origin of 
novelty by creativity is a selectional process, as trivial: The selectional nature 
of creativity is correct but no news; it mirrors the narrow definition of 
creativity; and it does not lead to a restoring of a more close analogy between 
creativity and biological evolution, namely that both rest on undirected 
variation due to decoupling of variation and selection. It can thus not be used to 
restore a strong analogy; it cannot be used to counter the critique of guided 
variation.  
Bias compatibility argument 
However, Campbell can also be interpreted as providing another compatibility 
argument. He can be interpreted as mainly saying that the kind of bias that 
follows from the influence of previously acquired knowledge is the same kind 
of bias we have in organic evolution, namely a bias that is the effect of 
previous selection.
24
 This argument, which I call bias compatibility argument, 
can be separated into two claims: (i) the claim that there is a nested hierarchy 
of vicarious selection processes, and (ii) the claim that the effect of previously 
acquired knowledge is similar to the effect of cumulativity in organic 
evolution.  
(i). Campbell’s hierarchy of vicarious selection. Campbell believed that 
there is a continuous “nested hierarchy of selective-retention processes” 
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have repeated this defense strategy. See, for instance, Cziko (1995: 289f) or Nickles (2003: 60-
64).  
Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity 
210 
(Campbell 1987 [1974a]: 54-62). Life began with biological evolution, a 
selection process leading to organisms that exhibit innate characteristics and 
some flexibility. Because of the flexibility, these organisms do not have to wait 
anymore until biological evolution comes up with further favorable mutations 
for new behavioral variants when they encounter an environmental problem. 
Flexible organisms can adapt during their life to their environment. They do 
this through diverse ontogenetic learning mechanisms. According to Campbell, 
these mechanisms are vicarious for biological evolution. They are themselves 
instances of blind-variation-selective-retention-processes and only replace 
biological evolution. In addition, these mechanisms can be ordered into a 
hierarchy of ontogenetic vicarious selection processes. This ontogenetic 
cascade begins with locomotion as a process of behavioral problem solving. 
The organisms try a way, hit, for instance, an obstacle, and try another one. In 
some organisms, locomotion has then been replaced by sensory systems, like 
echo location or vision. Organisms with such a sensory system do not have to 
hit a wall physically in order to ‘learn’ that this is not the right way to go. They 
can sense it before hitting it. These sensory systems also operate by an internal 
blind-variation-selective-retention process. The difference to locomotion is that 
the trials are internalized sensory trials. Sensory exploration in turn is replaced 
by imagination and ‘thought trials,’ as Campbell says. In sum, thought trials 
replace sensory exploration, while the latter has replaced overt locomotion. 
Although all these kinds of trials can lead to a direct selective interaction with 
the real environment, the selective interaction with the environment can 
become internalized as well: The thought trials then interact with an internal 
representation of the environment; they are thus not only generated internally 
but also selected internally. This is what Campbell called “mnemonically 
supported thought”:  
“At this level the environment being searched is vicariously represented in 
memory or by ‘knowledge’, rather than visually, the blindly emitted vicarious 
thought trials being selected by a vicarious criterion substituting for an 
external state of affairs. The net result is the ‘intelligent’, ‘creative’, and 
‘foresightful’ product of thought, our admiration of which makes us 
extremely reluctant to subsume it under the blind-variation-and-selective-
retention model” (Campbell 1987 [1974a]: 62).  
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Daniel Dennett states a similar nested hierarchy in his “Tower of Generate-
and-Test” (Dennett 1995: 373-381). His hierarchy mainly consists of four types 
of creatures: “Darwinian creatures,” which are “ ‘hard-wired’ phenotypes,” 
leading to “selection of one favored phenotype;” “Skinnerian creatures,” who 
blindly try different overt responses, leading to overt selection of these overt 
responses; “Popperian creatures,” which have “an inner selective environment 
that previews candidate acts” and selects them internally, i.e., before the 
favorite trial is tested in a real interaction with the outward environment; 
“Gregorian creatures,” who additionally import “mind-tools from the (cultural) 
environment,” like language or other symbolic systems, tools like photography 
or other devices that extend our knowledge-gaining abilities.  
The important point about such a nested hierarchy of selective 
processes is, according to Campbell, that the nesting leads to the guided, i.e., 
adaptively biased variation: The products of previous selection stages restrict, 
i.e., guide further selection. The nested hierarchy thus forms the foundation for 
the second thesis (ii): Guided variation is compatible with the claim that 
novelty arises in close analogy to biological evolution, since guided variation 
can be reconstructed as a normal effect of cumulativity. 
(ii). Guided variation as effect of cumulativity. The kind of cumulativity 
that is exhibited in biological evolution indeed leads to a biased pattern of 
variation. It does so because of the effect of developmental constraints, which I 
introduced in section 2.3. As I stated there, this effect has to be distinguished 
from ‘coupled’ evolution. This means that Campbell can restore the close 
analogy between creativity and biological evolution, only if the kind of 
coupling that has been stressed by critics can be reconstructed as analogous to 
developmental constraints. That this is possible was defended in detail by Stein 
& Lipton (1989), who described previously acquired knowledge as a kind of 
pre-adaptation. For Stein & Lipton, “in both cases [biological evolution and 
knowledge acquisition, MK], we must face the anomaly of apparently guided 
variation” (Stein & Lipton 1989: 54). Biological evolution is thus considered to 
be not “truly blind” either (ibid.: 43). Stein & Lipton are followed by others, 
for instance by Simonton (1999a: 62), who admits that there are only “degrees 
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of blindness” – in biological evolution as well as in creativity. The degree of 
blindness is dependent on how much the variation is restricted by constraints 
that are the effect of previous trials.
25
  
The phenomenon of pre-adaptation in biological evolution, which I will 
explain in a minute, finds its cultural analogue in what they call heuristics. 
Heuristics are defined as “anything that restricts variation” (Stein & Lipton 
1989: 40). They cite a hypothetical example of a chemist trying to understand 
the behavior of a chemical compound. The chemist will not make random 
conjectures, but use heuristics drawn from the explanations of similar 
compounds. These heuristics restrict the construction of Campbellian ‘thought 
trials.’ Now, their important move is to state that heuristics are in fact the ‘pre-
adaptations’ of creativity, and that the pre-adaptations in biology and creativity 
explain the bias in the respective production of novelty. A pre-adaptation is 
best explained by an example. In the case of the evolution of a complex organ 
there must be cumulative selection, since it is almost impossible that a single 
mutation can lead to its evolution, as shown in section 2.3 with respect to the 
example of the Shakespeare-typing monkey. Stable intermediate structures that 
have an adaptive advantage on their own are thus essential for cumulative 
evolution of complex devices. Stein & Lipton refer to the half-wing structure 
of the ancestors of birds as such a stable intermediate pre-adaptation for the 
evolution of wings. As they suggest, the “half-wing may have been used for 
trapping insects,” and was selected, even though the half-wing did not yet 
allow to fly (Stein & Lipton 1989: 37). Accordingly, heuristics are pre-
adaptations since “[l]ike the half-wing of biological preadaptation, the 
epistemic preadaptation had to be good for things other than its current 
adaptive use (or, at least, not harmful)” (ibid.: 39).  
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But all this is only half way to the analogy between pre-adaptations and 
heuristics, since heuristics and pre-adaptations are brought in to show that both 
explain the statistical bias towards adaptive novelty in biological evolution and 
creativity. Both must be shown to constrain subsequent generations of novelty. 
According to Stein & Lipton, heuristics restrict the future generation of novelty 
in the same “way a pre-organ structure restricts the sort of final organ an 
organism will have” (ibid.: 47). They also point out that heuristics, as epistemic 
preadaptations, and biological pre-adaptations can be viewed in  
“two, quite compatible, ways: either as restrictions on future variations or as 
programs for the generation of new variants. […] In biological evolution, the 
appearance of the half-wing makes possible the appearance of some 
structures, most notably a wing. At the same time, the appearance of the half-
wing prevents certain other structures from appearing – for example, an arm 
in place of the half-wing. In epistemic evolution, if a person adopts a certain 
heuristic, then various future conjectures are made possible, but others are 
made impossible or overwhelmingly unlikely. One possible disanalogy 
between biological and epistemic variation that seems to have appeared can 
be turned into another analogous feature between the two” (ibid.: 47f).  
This is their main argument to resolve the “anomaly of apparently guided 
variation” (ibid.: 54). The difference between directed, i.e., guided variation in 
creativity and undirected variation in biology is an illusion. As said above, the 
essential claim is that guided variation can be explained as a perfectly 
Darwinian effect of previous variation-selection cycles. 
In order to understand the core of this argument it is important to see 
that in biological evolution pre-adaptations only have a constraining effect 
because they represent developmental constraints. That an already existing 
half-wing prevents the appearance of an arm in place of a wing is due to 
developmental constraints. Developmental constraints do not restrict mutation; 
they only restrict which mutations will be supported developmentally and 
which mutations have a positive effect on the well-being, survival and 
reproduction of the organism. The existence of a pre-wing does not bias 
mutation. But if a pre-wing is already prevalent, a mutation for development of 
an arm might not lead to anything, since the developmental machinery for 
expressing this mutation might not be present. Furthermore, developmental 
constraints have this constraining effect, even if they are not connected to pre-
adaptations that had a different positive effect before they became selected for 
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something else. In short, Stein & Lipton’s core argument rests on the 
following: Guided variation can be explained as the effect of developmental 
constraints.  
Differences between developmental constraints and coupling 
I will now explain why I think they are wrong. Their argument rests on a 
simple error: They mix up a bias in variation that is caused by coupling with a 
bias that is caused by developmental constraints. Developmental constraints 
differ from coupling in two respects. First, as just and in section 2.3 explained, 
developmental constraints do not influence which mutations and 
recombinations arise in the first place; they only restrict which mutations or 
recombinations will have a positive effect on the organism, given the other 
traits of the organism. The existence of a pre-wing does not bias mutation. 
Coupling, on the contrary, would influence the occurrence of novelty from the 
onset. It would make adaptive mutations more likely to occur because they 
would be adaptive in the respective selective environment. Second, and much 
more important for our purpose here, developmental constraints are an effect of 
past selective environments. Coupling, however, would be a direct effect of the 
respective current selective environment. Only coupling leads to directed 
variation, as defined in section 2.3, even if developmental constraints lead to 
restricted variation.  
To ignore these differences is confusing a bias with its cause. A bias 
can have many reasons. Developmental constraints is one such cause; coupling, 
leading to directed variation, is a different one. Furthermore, as I illustrated in 
section 2.3, although some Darwinians seem to oppose developmental 
constraints, they are in fact compatible with the Darwinian paradigm. As long 
as the bias in variation, the restriction of the range of variation and the 
consequent change in the probability of variation, is not caused by coupling, 
most Darwinians do not have any problems with such a bias. In contrast to 
developmental constraints, coupling is considered as incompatible with the 
Neo-Darwinian concept of Darwinian evolution and believed to be absent in 
biological evolution.  
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If we now go back to the question whether guided variation is a 
problem for the analogy between creativity and biological evolution, then the 
following holds. The bias compatibility argument says that – despite guided 
variation – creativity is closely analogous to biological evolution, since in both 
cases there is a bias in variation that can be explained as a normal effect of 
previous cycles of variation and selection. My claim is that, on the one hand, 
this is true and, on the other hand, it is not.  
Is creativity an instance of coupling, as critics of the origination analogy 
claim? Or is it an instance of restrictions on variations that exert their 
influences due to the cumulative nature of evolution, such as developmental 
constraints, as defenders claim? Now, the problem is that creativity is both at 
the same time, since, in the case of creativity, the effects of past selections 
make up the current selective environment. Cognitive variation is directed 
since variants that are useful are more likely to occur because they are thought 
to be useful. This adaptive bias is caused by coupling, since it is the same kind 
of knowledge that influences the production of trial solutions as well as the 
selection of those trial solutions. At the same time, creativity is based on ‘pre-
adaptations,’ since the knowledge that governs the selection and production of 
trials is the effect of previous selection stages, restricting future developments. 
There is thus a cultural analogue to developmental constraints: previously 
acquired knowledge, partly represented in the form of cognitive heuristics and 
certain standards of a domain (e.g., epistemic qualities like testability in 
science, aesthetic qualities in arts).
26
  
Important for the question at issue here is that the knowledge (selective 
environment) that causes coupling between variation and selection is that very 
knowledge that is the effect of previous cognitive selection. This is not 
necessarily the case for biological evolution. The tree in the selective 
environment of a giraffe is not an effect of previous selections of giraffes, even 
if some phenotypic features of the giraffe itself can be regarded as a kind of 
inner selective environment for the undirected mutations. In contrast to the 
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tree, our previously acquired knowledge, which influences the selection and the 
production of thought trials, is at the same time the effect of previous selections 
of the body of belief (analogous to the giraffe) whose evolution is at issue. 
Because of this simultaneity of effects of previous selection and current 
selective environment in the case of creativity, developmental constraints and 
coupling are harder to distinguish in the case of creativity, although they are 
easy to distinguish for biological evolution. 
Since creativity contains developmental constraints and coupling at the 
same time, critics and defenders are both correct: Creativity is an instance of 
coupling, and the coupling is an effect of cumulativity that is analogous to 
developmental constraints. The bias compatibility argument, however, still 
faces a problem. Stein & Lipton’s bias compatibility argument is that coupling 
is no argument against the analogy, since the bias in creativity can be explained 
by cumulativity. Therefore, they state, “we do not need the coupling of 
variation and selection” (Stein & Lipton 1989: 53) to explain guided variation. 
On the one hand, this is correct, since in the case of creativity, coupling is 
explained by previously acquired knowledge. On the other hand, creativity 
evidently exhibits coupling, while biological evolution does not. Guided 
variation is an effect of cumulativity and of coupling at the same time. 
Conclusion 
My concluding claim with respect to the bias compatibility argument is the 
following: We might not need coupling to explain the presence of knowledge 
that does bias cognitive variation. But we need coupling in order to explain 
how the knowledge that is the effect of previous selection causes the bias in 
variation. The bias is caused by coupling, a phenomenon that is still believed 
not to be present in biological evolution. For this reason, pointing to a cultural 
analogue of developmental constraints cannot restore a close analogy between 
creativity and biological evolution. 
Stein & Lipton cannot see this, since they do not see the difference 
between developmental constraints and coupling. The bias compatibility 
argument fails because of this central error. It mistakenly explains a factual 
instance of coupling as a mere analogue to the effects of cumulativity in 
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biological evolution. In creativity, previous selection leads to coupling that 
causes variation to be directed. In biological evolution, previous selection does 
not lead to coupling. In other words, while biological evolution exhibits the 
effects of cumulativity and developmental constraints, it does not exhibit the 
effects of coupling. Biological evolution is an instance of decoupled 
cumulative evolution, often affected by developmental constraints. Creativity is 
a special case of coupled cumulative evolution. Hence, the point of the critics 
of the Darwinian account of creativity – that creativity is coupled while 
biological evolution is not – can be defended. Since the decoupled structure of 
Darwinian change is an essential character of Darwinism, I regard this as an 
important disanalogy.  
Although the bias compatibility argument does fail, the selectionist 
compatibility argument does not. But it does not restore a close analogy either, 
since, as I claimed, it refers to a much weaker claim, only implying that 
creative problem solving is a selection process, i.e., involving unjustified but 
not truly undirected variation. The Darwinian analogy holds only for blindness 
as ‘having no guarantee of success.’ This said, I now turn to a last 
compatibility argument that has been offered to restore the strong analogy 
between undirected variation in creativity and in biological evolution.  
4.5  HIDDEN CHAOS COMPATIBILITY  
Creativity as unconscious blind variation 
The hidden chaos compatibility argument refers to a ‘hidden chaos’ beneath 
the apparent guidedness of creative problem solving. The argument is implicit 
already in Campbell (1960, 1987 [1974a], 1974b) and has most prominently 
been defended by the creativity psychologist Dean K. Simonton in his “chance-
configuration theory” (Simonton 1988, 1995).
27
 The argument refers to a pre- 
or unconscious mechanism at the cognitive level that is itself truly blind, 
although being part of an overall process of guided variation at the conscious 
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compatibility. I will not analyze their formulation of the argument and instead concentrate on 
the stronger and more detailed version of Simonton.  
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level. The move is similar to the one I mentioned as reaction to Boyd & 
Richerson’s argument about guided variation at the populational level. The 
point is not that blind variation is opposed to guided variation due to expertise 
and wisdom. The point is that expertise works with a cognitive process that is 
blind at the cognitive pre- or unconscious level. With this move, blindness is 
restored by making it hidden or unconscious. Hence, implicit in such a defense 
against the critique of guided variation is a new connotation of blind variation 
that we have not considered so far, namely blind variation as pre- or 
unconscious variation.  
Furthermore, Simonton appears to defend the Darwinian approach to 
creativity not only as an approach that excludes explanations that ignore the 
originality and spontaneity of creativity. He appears to defend an approach that 
offers an explanation of the cognitive processes involved in creativity, since he 
points to an alleged Darwinian mechanism at the cognitive level.  
Poincaré’s explanation of creativity 
Campbell (1987 [1960]: 99f) and Simonton
28
 both refer to the mathematician 
Poincaré as a major forbearer of such a Darwinian explanation of creativity. I 
have already introduced Poincaré’s four-stage model in section 4.1. But 
Poincaré did not only offer a description of the phenomenological datum of 
psychological spontaneity; he also offered an explanation for this 
phenomenological structure. He describes what happens in the mind between 
the incubation and inspiration stage in the following way. First, Poincaré 
reports his own introspective experience of how it is to be creative:  
„One evening, contrary to my custom, I drank black coffee and could not 
sleep. Ideas rose in crowds; I felt them collide until pairs interlocked, so to 
speak, making a stable combination” (Poincaré 1982 [1908]: 387) 
Based on this and similar introspective reports, he speculated about the 
cognitive mechanism in order to interpret what he experienced. According to 
Poincaré, creativity relies on intuition: having an idea with a feeling of 
certainty that the idea is appropriate, without knowing that it is. This is similar 
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to Campbell’s claim that creativity relies on guesswork. More importantly, 
intuition is for Poincaré the outcome of an unconscious mechanism in the 
“subliminal self,” as he says (Poincaré 1982 [1908]: 392). In the moment of 
insight, this subliminal self ‘presents,’ so to speak, to the conscious mind 
certain promising ideas, i.e., good guesses. However, for Poincaré it is not the 
case that the subliminal self has foresight itself or “delicate intuition” that 
would enable this unconscious part of the mind to produce only the good trials 
(Poincaré 1982 [1908]: 391). According to him, the subliminal self “blindly” 
produces various ideas. Only some of these ideas become conscious:  
“Among the great numbers of combinations blindly formed by the subliminal 
self, almost all are without interest and without utility; but just for that reason 
they are also without effect upon the esthetic sensibility. Consciousness will 
never know them; only certain ones are harmonious, and, consequently, at 
once useful and beautiful” (ibid.: 392).  
Thus, which of the blindly formed ideas become conscious is not a matter of 
chance. Only those that “affect most profoundly our emotional sensibility” 
have this “privilege” (ibid.: 391). And “it is this special esthetic sensibility 
which plays the role of the delicate sieve” (ibid.: 392). The esthetic sensibility 
reacts to harmony of ideas, an esthetic quality that first guides the unconscious 
selection process, and then also the subsequent conscious selection process, 
which the individual imposes upon those ideas that arrive on the conscious 
screen. According to Poincaré, the esthetic sensibility is an important 
competence of a good mathematician. This leaves open whether the property of 
harmony is an objective or a subjective property of ideas.  
Be it as it may, what is important for this study is that Poincaré believed 
that the mind unconsciously produces a kind of waste: Ideas that never have an 
impact on consciousness. This can be interpreted as showing a kind of ‘chaos’ 
that is hidden, but nonetheless part of the apparent guided generation of 
novelty. In one passage he speculates about whether the subliminal self truly 
produces ideas at random. He writes:  
“The conscious self is narrowly limited, and as for the subliminal self we 
know not its limitations, and this is why we are not too reluctant in supposing 
that it has been able in a short time to make more different combinations than 
the whole life of a conscious being could encompass. Yet these limitations 
exist. Is it likely that it is able to form all the possible combinations, whose 
number would frighten the imagination? Nevertheless that would seem 
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necessary, because if it produces only a small part of these combinations, and 
if it makes them at random, there would be small chance that the good, the 
one we should choose, would be found among them” (Poincaré 1982 [1908]: 
393f; Emph. in the orig.)  
Given that the subliminal self produces trials at random, we face a serious 
problem. If the mind worked in the manner of the proverbial monkey, it would 
need much more time than it seems to need in order to randomly hit at the good 
ideas. To resolve the question how the subliminal self can nonetheless produce 
new and appropriate ideas, Poincaré opts for the same kind of guidance that is 
the basis for the critique of guided variation: Previous knowledge and 
engagement with a specific problem bias the overall process and make thus 
useful combinations more likely. The way this happens according to Poincaré 
is the following: 
“Permit me a rough comparison. Figure the future elements of our 
combinations as something like the hooked atoms of Epicurus. During the 
complete repose of the mind, these atoms are motionless, they are, so to 
speak, hooked to the wall; so this complete rest may be indefinitely 
prolonged without the atoms meeting, and consequently without any 
combination between them. On the other hand, during a period of apparent 
rest and unconscious work, certain of them are detached from the wall and 
put in motion. They flash in every direction through the space (I was about to 
say the room) where they are enclosed, as would, for example, a swarm of 
gnats or, if you prefer a more learned comparison, like the molecules of gas 
in the kinematic theory of gases. Then their mutual impacts may produce new 
combinations. What is the role of the preliminary conscious work? It is 
evidently to mobilize certain of these atoms, to unhook them from the wall 
and put them in swing. […] after this shaking up imposed upon them by our 
will, these atoms do not return to their primitive rest. They freely continue 
their dance. Now, our will did not choose them at random; it pursued a 
perfectly determined aim. The mobilized atoms are therefore not any atoms 
whatsoever; they are those from which we might reasonably expect the 
desired solution” (Poincaré 1982 [1908]: 394)  
Previously acquired knowledge helps the mind to ‘unhook’ certain promising 
idea-atoms. Nonetheless, the unhooked ideas are presented as colliding by 
chance: they ‘flash in every direction through the space,’ ‘like the molecules of 
gas in the kinematic theory of gases,’ they ‘freely continue their dance.’ 
Simonton’s chance configuration  
Simonton (1988, 1995), who heavily relies on Poincaré, termed his Poincaréan-
Campbellian theory “chance-configuration theory.” According to Simonton,  
“creativity begins with the chance permutation of mental elements. The latter 
include ideas, concepts, recollections, emotions, sensations, or any other 
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basic component of mental functioning. Most of these permutations are too 
unstable to enjoy anything more than an extremely ephemeral existence in 
the fancy. Nonetheless, from time to time, a specific combination of elements 
coalesces to form a cohesive whole, or conceptual Gestalt. This so-called 
chance configuration represents the insight that transfers to more deliberate 
and elaborate processing at later stages in the creative process” (Simonton 
1995: 467).  
This model has been explained to some detail in Simonton (1988: 1-23). The 
creative mind pre- or unconsciously forms permutations. These “chance 
permutations vary appreciably in stability” (Simonton 1988: 8). Highly stable 
permutations are termed ‘configurations.’ The stability is not an output of a 
conscious selection process but the input for further conscious information 
processing. Furthermore, for Simonton, stability seems to be a consequence of 
objective properties of ideas (ibid.: 13). I will not discuss the latter issue. 
Instead, I want to concentrate on the implied blindness of creativity and on 
whether the process postulated by Simonton is in fact the way humans produce 
novelty or not.  
According to Simonton, chance does not mean equiprobability. He 
acknowledges the influence of prior knowledge on creative problem solving in 
about the same way as Poincaré did. He adds that even within the ‘unhooked’ 
mental atoms, combinations are not random in the sense of equiprobability. 
Whether the kind of randomness that is then implied is undirected variation is, 
however, not made clear. The only thing that he definitely requires is that 
myriad determinants influence the subconscious cognitive process and that a 
“large number of potential permutations exist, all with comparably low but 
nonzero probability” (ibid.: 7). I take this to imply in any case that there is 
blind variation in the sense that there exist unconscious trials that are a kind of 
‘waste,’ since they never come to consciousness. And let me take for granted, 
for the sake of argument, that the kind of randomness is analogous to 
undirected variation, since Simonton evidently wants to defend Campbell’s 
claim that creativity is analogous to a Darwinian kind of origination of novelty, 
despite the critique of guided variation.  
At the basis of this, I take Simonton’s chance-configuration theory to 
include at least two claims: (1) Creativity contains a hidden chaos, i.e., 
undirected, unconscious, false trials; (2) these trials are produced by a special 
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cognitive process, the unconscious chance-configuration process, which 
accounts for creativity. The second claim has so far not appeared in this study 
and is less important for it; but the claim is not independent of the first claim, 
as a short examination of the evidence for the two claims will show.  
Evidence for a hidden chaos as an explanation of creativity 
Is chance configuration the hidden mechanism by which creativity operates in 
the human mind? Poincaré himself admitted that his account of creativity is 
only a speculation. Campbell (1987 [1960]: 108f) conceded that his model of 
creativity as blind variation is not yet an explanatory psychological theory, 
since such a theory would require to specify and cite evidence for the exact 
cognitive mechanism of creativity. He treated Poincaré’s speculations as a 
possible hypothesis about such a cognitive mechanism that would be 
compatible with his theory. This was in the 1960s. Psychology of creativity has 
come a long way since the 60s, and it is Simonton who claims that in the light 
of current developments of psychology of creativity, Poincaré’s model turns 
out to be the correct cognitive explanation of creativity. The dispute between 
Simonton and other contemporary creativity theorists is, however, whether 
conclusive evidence exists for such a cognitive explanation.  
(i). Hidden chaos. As mentioned in section 4.1, most creativity 
psychologists accept Poincaré’s stage model. Within this model, the special 
process of unconscious chance-configuration would be the explanation for the 
incubation and subsequent inspiration stage. Incubation is the label for the 
phenomenon that insight often occurs during or after rests – during or after the 
time when people turn away from their engagement with a specific problem 
that demands a creative solution. Apart from (a) Simonton’s “subconscious 
random-recombination hypotheses,” there are three other common hypotheses 
about what actually happens during incubation, which are debated in standard 
psychology of creativity: (b). The “conscious-work hypothesis” states that the 
cognitive processes are not really pre- or unconscious processes; the thought 
processes merely occur so rapidly so that they are hard to report by the creative 
person. (c). The “fatigue-dissipation hypothesis” states that during incubation 
people merely recover and are not engaged with the problem. (d). The 
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“selective-forgetting hypothesis” states that during a break people forget their 
false and inhibiting strategies and can thus more easily find a new way. 
Although it is a major problem to construct reliable and realistic experiments to 
test the different hypotheses, the evidence that was gathered by experimental 
psychology is not in favor of Poincaré’s subconscious-random-recombination 
hypothesis (Seifert et al 1995).  
(ii) Special process view: In addition, most theorists in creativity 
research have given up searching for a special process underlying incubation 
and insight. They point towards ordinary cognitive processes. According to the 
ordinary process view, creativity can be demystified as ordinary cognition that 
merely operates at its highest efficiency.
29
 The ordinary processes that are 
assumed to make up creativity are for instance: perception and visual imagery 
in general; processes such as “Janusian thinking” (i.e., conceiving two or more 
opposite antithetical ideas or images simultaneously) or “Homospatial 
thinking” (i.e., superimposing different ideas or images);
30
 diverse cognitive 
heuristics, like distorting, repeating, omitting and mixing parts of concepts; in 
particular, associational linkage, conceptual combination, analogical 
reasoning, abstraction, use of metaphors, conceptual expansion (i.e., the 
extension of the boundaries of concepts); in addition, memory retrieval in 
general and spreading activation (i.e. one remembered idea activates related 
memories and does this across many related memories); defocused attention as 
a cause for spreading activation.  
In a nutshell, the ordinary process view claims that to explain creativity 
one does not require a special process of chance-configuration, or any 
particular special mental operation, which only creative people can perform. 
The diverse mechanisms that are very likely involved in creativity, which 
interact in complex ways, often cannot be reported or reconstructed by the 
creative agents themselves, if they are asked how they came up with their 
ideas, since these mechanism operate quite fast and some thoughts are rather 
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fleeting. Nonetheless, they are not necessarily pre- or unconscious, even if they 
are not consciously monitored and reported. They also do not necessarily 
operate in a blind or random fashion. Jonathan Schooler & Sonya Dougal 
(1999: 352) for instance note that spreading activation is “by no means random 
in nature. Rather, the direction and extent of the spread of activation critically 
depends on (a) the specific items that were initially activated and (b) the 
underlying structure of an individual’s knowledge representation.”
31
  
Furthermore, these processes can incorporate various clues from 
perception and self-generated (i.e., stimulus-free) perceptual imagination. 
These extraneous clues and imaginations, which can indeed be r-random with 
respect to the goals and knowledge of the individual and thus comparable to 
those events involved in truly serendipitous discovery, are then incorporated 
and associated with the other material that is used to tackle the problem or 
project at hand. This ordinary-cognition model of creativity thus builds on the 
traditional view that chance favors only the prepared mind: Serendipitous clues 
play a role even in non-serendipitous creative trial-and-error problem solving, 
but they can only play this role because of a complex and sophisticated 
network of cognitive mechanisms, which have little resemblance to the 
internal, random dance of Poincaré’s idea-atoms. Seifert et al (1995) coined a 
name for the incorporation of serendipitous clues. They call it “opportunistic 
assimilation”: opportunistic, i.e., serendipitous information is processed by 
normal cognitive mechanisms, leading to an assimilation of this information.
32
  
Every creativity theorist accepts that creativity involves trials that are 
not warranted by their origin alone. Although they thus accept that creativity 
involves psychological spontaneity, they nonetheless deny that there is a 
special cognitive mechanism that is inherently Darwinian and that accounts for 
creativity. The consensus that emerged in recent years from creativity research 
is thus not only a change from a special-mechanism account to an account in 
terms of a single ordinary mechanism. The shift was one from a single 
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mechanism account to an account that refers to many cognitive mechanisms 
that work together in complex and diverse ways, making up the myriads of 
idiosyncratic cases of creativity that are so hard to bring under a general model, 
precisely because of the sheer complexity of interaction of these mechanisms. 
The accounts of different creativity theorists certainly differ, but they all cite 
evidence that is not in favor of a special process of chance-configuration.  
To give a full survey and explanation of these diverse approaches and 
the evidences they cite for their ordinary process view would much exceed the 
space available here. I shall rest content therefore with the following 
concluding claim with respect to the hidden chaos compatibility argument: As 
long as there is no definite empirical evidence for an unconscious production of 
a ‘hidden chaos,’ the claim that creativity relies on a process that is undirected, 
despite the apparent guidedness, cannot be defended. I will now present what 
Simonton himself has offered as definite evidence for his Darwinian approach 
to creativity and illustrate why this evidence also provides no basis for the 
hidden chaos compatibility argument. 
Simonton’s defense 
It is essential to realize that in later papers Simonton implicitly withdraws from 
the claim that the cognitive mechanism that accounts for creativity is chance-
configuration. Over the years, he seems to have moved back to a weaker 
position that does not defend a special cognitive mechanism that is treated as 
truly undirected and thus closely analogous to Darwinian evolution. Sometimes 
Simonton states that creativity is explained by a chance-configuration-
mechanism (Simonton 1988, 1995: 467f). But sometimes he merely states that 
creativity is dominated by a general process of blind-variation-selective-
retention. The chance-configuration-mechanism is then but one of many 
mechanisms accounting for this general process (Simonton 1999a, 1999b, 
2003). This weaker version of his theory is in fact the weak claim I discussed 
in section 4.2: the claim that creativity is guesswork, i.e., lacking foresight. 
Thus Simonton says, for instance, that the stress of ‘blindness’ of generation of 
novelty in creativity denotes  
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“the lack of foresight in the production of variations – the inability to 
generate purposively the most adaptive variations. […] The term blindness 
also has the advantage of not committing the theory to any particular 
variation mechanism” (Simonton 1999b: 310).  
With this move, Simonton seems to settle for the ordinary process view of 
creativity. Nonetheless, he cites Poincaré in both cases. This is one of the 
reasons why it is sometimes hard to find out which claim he wants to defend.  
The problem to which I want to point to is that although moving back to 
a weaker claim, he upholds that the Darwinian model explains creativity, i.e. 
that it is stronger than the claim that creativity involves guesswork. In section 
4.2, I already pointed out that the thesis that creativity is guesswork does not 
have much explanatory force, since it merely re-describes the phenomenon of 
psychological creativity, as it is usually defined. Although this concept 
excludes certain explanations of creativity, it does not give a positive 
explanation itself.  
I will now back up this critique of the Darwinian account of creativity 
by looking at the evidence Simonton himself cites for the Darwinian account. 
As it is often unclear which claim he wants to defend, it is unclear whether the 
evidence should be considered as evidence for the strong claim about an 
unconscious chance-configuration process, or whether it should be considered 
as evidence for the weak claim that creativity is guesswork. 
In the Precise (Simonton 1999b: 312f) of his book Origins of Genius 
(Simonton 1999a), an article that has been commentated extensively by other 
creativity psychologists, Simonton (1999b) refers to the evidence for his 
Darwinian approach to creativity. The evidence he cites comes from three 
methodological domains: (i) evidence from the historiometric, (ii) evidence 
from the psychometric, and (iii) evidence from the experimental domain. By 
reviewing the debate about this evidence, I will show that even the evidence 
cited by Simonton himself does not provide direct evidence for (1) and (2), the 
claim that there is a special process of chance configuration that accounts for 
creativity.  
(a). Evidence from the historiometric domain. I will start with the most 
indirect evidence, the historiometric evidence, which tends, as Simonton says, 
“to fall in line with what we would expect from a Darwinian model” (Simonton 
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1999b: 315). Over the years, Simonton gathered a lot of data about professional 
career development. This research provides evidence for what Simonton has 
called the “equal-odds rule” (Simonton 1997). The equal-odds rule says, for 
instance, that the expected probability of career success remains constant 
within one career, regardless of quantity of output, and regardless of the 
creator’s age and increase in accumulated knowledge. In other words, the 
proportion of hits, e.g. in terms of frequently cited publications, in relation to 
total attempts stays the same across time. It stays the same regardless of the 
age and increase in accumulated knowledge. A scholar might produce more 
works later in his life, but in relation to his total output he does not produce 
more good works; he also produces more waste. This is indeed an interesting 
finding.  
However, the important question is in which sense this provides 
evidence for the claim that beneath guided variation lies a cognitive 
mechanism of blind, unconscious variation in the Darwinian sense. Simonton 
writes that careers of “creative output […] have several features that are most 
compatible with a Darwinian view of creativity. Probably the most remarkable 
feature is the consistent relation between quantity and quality” (Simonton 
1999b: 316). As illustrated above, the equal-odds rule says that the relation 
between quantity and quality stays the same over time. This means that, within 
careers, the principle of the equal-odds shows that within a career more expert 
knowledge, acquired over the years of engagement with a domain, does not 
make it statistically more likely that a person produces a work that can count as 
‘success,’ according to a certain standard. According to Simonton, this shows 
that the guided variation cited by critics is an illusion, since the individual has 
no chance to increase the likelihood of ‘hits’ by using already acquired 
knowledge. He writes: “The fascinating aspect of this principle is that it is what 
we would predict from the Darwinian viewpoint. If the variation process is 
truly blind, then good and bad ideas should appear more or less randomly 
across careers” (Simonton 199b: 316).  
First, this interpretation of the data contradicts his repeated insistence 
that creativity normally is not ‘truly blind,’ but exhibits only ‘degrees of 
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blindness,’ whereas the degree depends on the amount of knowledge 
accumulated over time.
33
 Second, the data can also be interpreted as evidence 
for the weaker Darwinian analogy, namely that creativity involves guesswork, 
i.e., that the creative author of scientific or artistic output has no guarantee that 
he produces a ‘hit,’ according to this or that standard. Third, the historiometric 
method cannot provide direct evidence for a cognitive mechanism, since it 
measures only the socially ‘successful’ creative ideas. It measures how often 
we succeed according to a quantitative standard, for instance, according to the 
amount of citations. But the historiometric method does not provide direct 
evidence that allows to draw conclusions about how we come up with the 
‘succeeding’ and the ‘non-succeeding’ ideas. In particular, it does not give 
evidence for an unconscious chance-configuration mechanism. From this 
perspective, the historiometric evidence does not allow any inference to any 
specific cognitive process. In direct reaction to Simonton, Michael D. 
Mumford refers to the same problem, in order to show the inadequacy of the 
historiometric evidence:  
“[C]reative thought is not a simple, uniform process. Instead, multiple 
processes, strategies, and mental operations may be involved, applied by 
different people, in different ways, at different points in a creative effort. 
When such complex causation exists, and we aggregate data over a variety of 
problems and settings, we can expect the resulting data to fit a random 
model. This point is of some importance because it suggests that caution 
should be exercised whenever aggregate historic data are being used to draw 
inferences about cognitive operations. More centrally, however, this point 
implies that inferences about the nature of creative thought, such as universal 
blind generation, must be made with reference to specific cognitive processes 
being examined under controlled conditions” (Mumford 1999: 344). 
Because of these limitations, historiometric evidence cannot provide 
supporting evidence for the strong thesis of a chance-configuration 
mechanism.
34
  
 (b). Evidence from the psychometric domain. With respect to 
psychometric studies, Simonton cites the Remote Associates Test from Sarnoff 
Mednick (1962). It tests whether individuals are able to make rather remote 
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associations. He also cites Joy P. Guilford (1967)’s Alternate Use Test of 
divergent thinking, which tests how many different ideas of using a common 
object a person can come up with. According to Simonton, both tests “operate 
according to an implicitly variation-selection model of the creative process” 
(Simonton 1999b: 314). Indeed, these creativity tests measure the ability to 
produce novel, unusual ideas. They are compatible with the weak Darwinian 
thesis of creativity as guesswork, and are compatible even with the stronger 
postulate of an unconscious chance configuration process. Yet they are 
compatible with other cognitive processes as well. The tests thus do not 
provide evidence for a specific cognitive mechanism. They measure creativity 
according to a certain definition of creativity, which entails that novel ideas are 
produced. These tests ‘operate according to’ a certain concept of creativity and 
not according to a distinctive Darwinian account of creativity. They are 
compatible with almost any creativity theory resting on the narrow 
psychological concept of creativity. They are designed according to this 
concept.  
The same holds for the findings about characteristics of creative 
personalities. And Simonton admits this, in writing that these findings are  
“quite compatible with what we would expect to be necessary from a 
Darwinian view of creativity […] That is creative personalities tend to 
possess those characteristics that would most favour the production of ideas 
both numerous and diverse” (Simonton 1999b: 315).  
Although he cites this compatibility, he wants to defend a distinctive 
Darwinian explanation of creativity. In a commentary on a similar statement, 
the creativity psychologist Sternberg objects: “Really, is there any theory of 
creativity that would take issue with this statement? Almost any plausible 
theory could account for these and similar claims” (Sternberg 1999b: 358). 
Simonton just reformulates what creativity is: the production of interesting, 
novel ideas. As Sternberg states, the evidence does not “directly support the 
Darwinian theory of creativity. […] At best one can say that there are findings 
that are not wholly inconsistent with the evolutionary theory, but even this 
claim would be pushing things. And many other theories are at least as 
consistent with the findings presented” (Sternberg 1999b: 358). All the 
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cognitive processes mentioned above, referred to by defenders of the ordinary 
process view, are consistent with the psychometric evidence cited by 
Simonton. Thus psychometric evidence does also not provide support for the 
claim that there is a hidden chaos, a chance-configuration mechanism, behind 
the apparent guidedness in creative problem solving.  
 (c). Evidence from the experimental domain. The last kind of evidence 
Simonton cites is experimental evidence from laboratory studies and computer 
simulations. They most directly bear on questions about cognitive processes. 
For instance, he cites that creativity seems to rely heavily on ‘opportunistic 
assimilation.’ It is important to realize that the latter was a process to which 
critics of a Poincaré-style chance-configuration process pointed to as well 
(Seifert et al 1995). And Seifert et al (1995) explicitly formulated their 
opportunistic-assimilation-hypothesis as an alternative to a chance-
configuration process. The process of opportunistic assimilation is indeed a 
mechanism that allows the mind to incorporate and assimilate coincidental 
experiences and imaginations. But this mechanism is totally different from a 
chance-configuration-mechanism and “just because creativity can be fostered 
by random cues does not necessarily implicate randomness in the 
psychological process of creativity,” as Schooler & Dougal (1999: 352-353) 
pointed out, with reference to the approach of Seifert et al (1995) and in reply 
to Simonton (1999b).  
Simonton also presents the so-called Geneplore model of creative 
cognition, formulated by Finke, Ward and Smith (1992), as supporting the 
Darwinian thesis, although he concedes that this model is “not explicitly 
formulated in Darwinian terms” (Simonton 1999b: 312). The problem is the 
same as with the other evidence cited by Simonton. The Geneplore model is 
consistent with the weak version of Simonton’s Darwinian model, i.e., 
consistent with the claim that creativity involves unjustified variation and 
selection. But the Geneplore model does not rely on the claim that the 
generation of novel ideas, so to speak, is ‘blind’ or dependent on a special 
process of unconscious chance-configuration. It only relies on the claim that 
creativity generates ideas that still have to be explored, elaborated, and tested 
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in order to find out whether they are worthwhile. That is why the model is 
called Geneplore – generate and explore. Finke, Smith and Ward explicitly 
state that describing creativity as involving variation and exploration, which 
incorporates selection, is a mere “general framework,” a “heuristic model” that 
does not yet explain creativity (Ward et al 1999: 191). In addition, they 
explicitly rely on the ordinary process view. Random generation through 
external coincidental clues or other mechanisms is judged by them to play 
some role, but, as described above, the influence of coincidental clues itself 
relies on diverse mechanisms that are rather structured and not ‘blind’ in any 
significant sense (Ward et al 1999: 209). 
The same holds for computer models of creativity as evidence for a 
Darwinian analysis. Simonton cites genetic algorithms as “blatantly 
Darwinian” models of human creativity (Simonton 1999b: 313).
35
 Genetic 
algorithms are analogous to Dawkins’ computer monkey that randomly types 
the sentence from Shakespeare. Indeed, genetic algorithms can be regarded as 
perfectly Darwinian systems, relying not only on undirected, but on truly 
random generation of trials. But according to Boden, for instance, a defender of 
a connectionist model of computer and creativity, our mind does not work like 
genetic algorithms. Our flexibility in thinking is based on generative structures 
that put constraints on the generation of ideas even at the pre- or unconscious 
level (Boden 1999: 366-369). Our mind is not a structure-less Poincaré-like 
box in which nothing prevents the ideas’ “random dancing from falling onto 
madness” (Boden 2004: 34). According to Boden, the presence of previously 
acquired knowledge does not only cause certain ideas to be part of the 
combinatorial mental ‘dance.’ It structures the Poincaréan ‘space’ of dancing 
idea-atoms, so that certain ideas are more likely to combine with others. If 
Boden is right, then genetic algorithms do not model our creativity. Now, 
Simonton admits that Boden’s connectionist (and also classical AI-models) are 
not as Darwinian as genetic algorithms. Nonetheless, he considers them as 
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Darwinian enough, since they all incorporate at least a ‘random’ number 
generator (Simonton 1999b: 313).  
But all this taken together leads to a strange situation: If computer 
models differ with respect to the kind of cognitive mechanism for which they 
should be a model, as genetic algorithms differ from connectionist networks, 
how can they then count as supporting the same thesis about cognitive 
mechanisms modeled by these computer programs? The diverse computer 
models cannot provide evidence for a chance-configuration mechanism, only 
genetic algorithms as a viable model of our creativity could, if at all. Only 
genetic algorithms could serve as a computer model of truly undirected 
variation at the cognitive level, and could thus be cited in justification of the 
hidden chaos claim. Simonton’s claim that diverse currently existing computer 
models of creativity are evidence for his model shows that in the end 
‘blindness’ means less than what is present in genetic algorithms. It only means 
that when we generate new ideas, we incorporate input that is r-random into a 
process that is strongly guided by expertise. The output we thereby generate is 
not guaranteed to be a solution for the problem at hand, but the output is not 
produced in an undirected way either. Simonton ends up with the weak version 
of the origination analogy applied to creativity: Creativity involves variation 
and subsequent selection, but not undirected variation. 
Compatibility with diverse cognitive mechanisms 
This weak version is not only trivial for the reasons offered in section 4.2. It is 
trivial, since it is compatible with almost all kinds of cognitive mechanisms. 
What Simonton’s defense amounts to is that the empirical findings are 
compatible with the suggestion of a chance-configuration-mechanism. The 
problem is that although some of the evidence might indeed be compatible, it is 
compatible with other theoretical models as well, precisely because the 
evidence is not a direct evidence for a truly undirected chance-configuration 
mechanism. The Darwinian analogy therefore does not by itself explain 
creativity, since it has no evidence for the cognitive mechanism it suggests as 
explanation for creativity.  
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As quoted above, Simonton himself has talked about mere 
‘compatibility’ of the evidence he refers to with his Darwinian model. A 
further example should make clear where this leads to. In an earlier paper, his 
chance-configuration theory is presented as most inclusive and therefore 
valuable. It is compatible with Freudian primary process thinking that is guided 
by the inner logic of the Freudian ‘Id.’ At the same time, computational models 
of creativity are presented as not being compatible with such Freudian 
theorizing (Simonton 1995: 488). However, the Darwinian theory is 
compatible with both of the opposing views. As I said, the problem is that such 
a Darwinian theory of creativity is compatible with almost all kinds of 
cognitive processes. But if we really want to understand and explain creativity, 
we have to look at the cognitive processes and whether they justify the 
Darwinian analogy despite the apparent guidedness. Psychology of creativity, 
as I illustrated, has started to do exactly this. Therefore, at the level of basic 
cognitive processes, such as those cited above as part of the ordinary process 
view, the Darwinian approach to creativity cannot provide an alternative 
explanation.  
Conclusion 
If Simonton is understood as offering an explanatory claim about a special 
cognitive mechanism, then the Darwinian approach to creativity still has to 
bring in the evidence for this claim. With respect to the critique of guided 
variation it can thus be concluded that the hidden chaos argument cannot 
provide a way out of the critique of guided variation, as long as there is no 
direct evidence for a chance-configuration process. Thus, as long as there is no 
such evidence, the close analogy between undirected variation in creativity and 
biological evolution cannot be justified.  
If Simonton is taken as not claiming the existence of a chance-
configuration mechanism, then the Darwinian approach to creativity is trivial 
in explanatory terms: If the Darwinian account of creativity only refers to a 
general process of creating candidate ideas that may turn out to be false, then 
the claims that are derived from such a weak origination analogy are 
compatible with most findings in creativity theory, since the analogy is not 
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offered at the level where explanations are suggested today, a level where, for 
sure, divergences in psychology of creativity arise. As long as the analogy does 
not specify a cognitive mechanism that is in itself Darwinian, like the chance-
configuration-mechanism, the origination analogy does not provide an 
explanation of creativity, since the level at which psychology of creativity 
looks for an explanation is the level of basic cognitive processes. In addition 
such a weak analogy is also descriptively trivial, since it merely assumes the 
same concepts and facts other approaches to creativity assume as well, namely 
the contemporary folk-psychological and scientific concept of creativity, 
requiring psychological originality and spontaneity. As long as there is no 
direct evidence for a hidden chaos, the Darwinian account of creativity can 
only provide a general framework that is almost universally taken for granted 
by the psychology of creativity. 
4.6  SUMMARY 
Culture is a variational system, often changing in a gradual way, and creativity 
provides a major source of novelty in culture. However, the novelty in culture 
is not introduced in an undirected way. It is already pre-selected by the creative 
individual when it enters the cultural pool. Creativity itself is based on blind 
variation in the sense that there is no guarantee that the ideas that are produced 
are appropriate. Creativity is in this sense Darwinian. It is, however, not 
Darwinian in a strong sense, since it is based on a process that involves a 
guided origination of novelty that is analogous to a partial Lamarckian 
coupling of producing and selecting factors. This is an important disanalogy. In 
the case of creativity, variation is not undirected in the Darwinian sense.  
The bias compatibility argument fails since it ignores the differences 
between coupling and developmental constraints. In addition, the disanalogy 
cannot be rescued by pointing to a ‘hidden’ Darwinian chaos, beneath the 
guided generation of novelty. The hidden chaos compatibility argument fails, 
as long as there is no direct evidence for such chaos. That the evidence does 
not seem to be in favor of such a hidden chaos has been defended by showing 
alternative approaches to creativity and by reviewing the evidence Simonton 
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himself has cited for a hidden chance-configuration mechanism. The only way 
to restore the analogy is the selectionist compatibility argument, i.e., to insist 
that creativity involves guesswork, variation and subsequent selection. But this 
was never in doubt and is trivial, since it does not provide by itself an 
explanation of creativity, even though it excludes explanations that ignore 
originality and spontaneity.  
To say that creativity is Darwinian beyond the almost trivial sense that 
it involves guesswork is extending the analogical game too far. Campbell saw 
this when he stated:  
“At the level here developed, one might better speak of an ‘orientation to’, or 
a ‘perspective on’ creative thought processes, rather than a ‘theory of’” 
(Campbell 1987 [1960]: 108).  
According to him, this constitutes a weakness of the model” (Campbell 1987 
[1960]: 110). To quote a special mechanism, as Simonton did, for which there 
is no direct evidence has not helped to get rid of this weakness and I doubt that 
it ever will. Yet, to mix up the different levels of the Darwinian analogy from 
nature to culture is even worse. There are three levels of analysis where 
creativity has to be taken into account if cultural change is at issue: creativity 
as the source of variational change in culture at the populational level; 
creativity as a cognitive selective process itself; creativity as being based on 
undirected variation. These levels have so far not been distinguished in the 
detail developed here, neither by critics nor by defenders. Yet to distinguish 
these levels is required for a well-balanced evaluation of the origination 
analogy, and shows that the central error of the Darwinian approach to 
creativity lies in overextending the analogy: Although we can say that 
creativity leads to a variational pattern, that creativity is a selection process, it 
is not the case that creativity is based on undirected variation.  
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5  EXPLANATORY UNITS OF SELECTION 
ANALOGY: SELECTION OF MEMES 
5.1  MEMES AS THE SELFISH UNITS OF CULTURAL 
SELECTION 
Diffusion from a traditional point of view 
Evolutionary theory not only aspires to describe a pattern of change as a 
variational change, i.e., as a sorting process leading to a frequency change of 
cultural units. Evolutionary theory wants to explain the frequency change. 
Explaining the change involves two kinds of questions: How does an item 
originate and why does it spread and persist in a population. Whether the 
origination of cultural novelty is analogous to Darwinian evolution has been 
addressed in chapter 4. This chapter will be concerned with why certain 
cultural items (memes) spread and persist in a population and not others. At 
issue is the process of diffusion of cultural units. Memeticists point towards 
memes not only because they want to draw an ontological analogy as described 
in chapter 3. In analogy to gene selectionism, memeticists have claimed that 
the units that account for cultural selection are memes, the ‘selfish replicators,’ 
the ultimate beneficiaries and causal ‘agents’ of culture. Those memes which 
are ‘selfish,’ i.e., which have a high fitness of their own, will spread and others 
will not. This is what I call the explanatory units of selection analogy.  
The traditional conception of culture entails that cultural items spread 
and persist because individuals select them. Humans determine which memes 
spread and persist – by adopting them or not. Selecting memes by adopting 
them is understood as intentional selection, ‘sighted’ and not ‘blind’, even if 
human selection does not rely on foresight of whether the selected items prove 
worthwhile. We do not have this kind of perfect knowledge. That is one of the 
reasons why our rationality in making selective decisions is restricted. Despite 
limited knowledge and the absence of foresight, we nonetheless guide the 
diffusion of cultural items in choosing cultural items according to certain 
beliefs, preferences, expected utility, and intentions. This is what philosophers 
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call the belief-value model of decision processes, which is assumed by almost 
all social sciences and builds the foundation of folk-psychological explanations 
of human action. This model presupposes what Dennett has called the 
“intentional stance,” i.e., attributing beliefs and desires to humans (Dennett 
1987).  
In an empirical way, diffusion has been studied, for instance, in 
anthropology, by dual-inheritance-theorists, and in economics. I will take the 
tradition of diffusion studies in economics as an example, in order to show 
what this traditional conception of intentional selection processes amounts to. 
Over the last decades, Rogers (1995), with his paradigmatic research on 
diffusion, collected a lot of evidence for understanding diffusion: Diffusion of 
innovation could be shown to be dependent on characteristics of the respective 
newly introduced cultural item, but dependent only as these characteristics are 
perceived by individuals. Each individual interprets cultural items differently. 
The interpretations depend on many factors: the information available to the 
person, previously acquired beliefs and preferences, social status of the 
individual, or communication structure (i.e., who communicates with whom, 
use of mass media, etc.). Although the basic psychological model, assumed for 
the individual decision processes involved in adopting new cultural items, is 
the standard belief-value model, this traditional concept of culture does not 
assume that the people are perfectly rational in an objective sense.  
Although I cannot go into the details of rational choice models, let me 
summarize some standard assumptions about rational choice. Rational choice 
can be described as referring to a means-end-rationality.
1
 Individuals are 
assumed to rank options for actions according to subjective preference 
orderings. In economics it is further assumed that one can quantify these 
preference orderings as utility orderings by assigning numbers to the options. 
Higher numbers stand for more preferred options. According to this formalized 
model, developed by John von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern, and Leonard 
Savage, rational choice is assumed to maximize expected utility. That a 
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decision-maker only maximizes expected utility means that it is not assumed 
that the decision maker has perfect knowledge. Many decisions are taken under 
risk, i.e., the decisions rely on more or less probable outcomes of choices. In 
addition, we often have to rely on subjective probability judgments about the 
respective probability distribution. This has been called decision under 
uncertainty.
2
 Our beliefs, which are the basis for our calculation of the 
likelihood of a specific outcome, and the calculated expected utility of these 
outcomes might thus well be wrong. That we make errors because of this has 
already been an issue in the last chapter 4. In making such errors, we are thus 
not perfectly rational in an objective sense. But we nonetheless can be called 
rational in a subjective sense – rational at the basis of our limited knowledge. 
We made the best out of what we had available. Contrary to this subjectivist 
concept of rationality, philosophers sometimes assume that the beliefs and 
preferences that form the basis of our decisions have themselves to be rational, 
e.g., that the preferences confirm ethical standards, or that the beliefs are true 
or at least justified.
3
 But most research in social science does not assume such 
normative standards for rational choice. However, there is another normative 
requirement that is indeed imposed on subjective rational choices. Even if our 
decisions are based on limited knowledge, the traditional concept of rationality 
demands that we are at least consistent in what we believe and desire, that we 
really maximize our utility, and that we satisfy certain axioms of expected 
utility theory.
4
 If we conformed to these procedural standards, we would be 
perfectly rational, but in a subjective sense. Psychology, however, has gathered 
a lot of evidence that we are not even rational in this sense. Simon (1959), for 
instance, has claimed that we are not maximizing utility, we are merely 
‘satisficing,’ since there are not only constraints on gathering information (e.g., 
limited access, high costs of obtaining information, and limited time), but also 
constraints on reasoning ability (e.g., limited memory, intellectual disabilities, 
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 See, for instance, Katz & Rosen (1998) as a purely economical treatment of rational choice as 
maximizing expected utility.  
3
 See, for instance, Kutschera (1999) or Searle (2001). For a general overview see Hampton 
(1998) on practical rationality, and Adler (1998) on the rationality of belief.  
4
 See Hampton (1998) for a brief description of the axioms of expected utility theory.  
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and too difficult, costly, or time-consuming calculations). According to Simon, 
our rationality is bounded in diverse ways. Furthermore, theorists have claimed 
that expected utility theory is empirically wrong, since we violate some of the 
axioms that are assumed in the expected utility theory for rational calculations.
5
 
As a reaction, the normative standards of consistency, of maximizing utility, 
and of expected utility theory are sometimes interpreted as a mere idealization 
of what we humans actually do and can do.
6
 It is not important here whether 
we conclude in light of the just mentioned findings that humans are often just 
irrational or whether we reformulate the concept of rationality, since we still 
want to understand ourselves as rational.
7
 What is important here is that the 
contemporary concept of human decision-making takes into account that we do 
not have perfect knowledge, that we make errors in our decisions and that our 
cognitive abilities are rather restricted, i.e., that we are often not able to make 
perfect and complicated calculations when we have to make a decision.  
Let me go back to diffusion studies: The empirical research on diffusion 
has also observed again and again that objectively useful innovations fail to 
spread. For instance, boiling water failed to spread in villages in Peru. Rogers 
(1995) claims that the reasons for this (objectively) irrational resistance 
comprise the following ones: First, the people perceived the innovation as 
incompatible with local knowledge. Second, the so-called ‘change agent’ (i.e., 
the person introducing a cultural item into a population) was perceived as too 
different in social status and life style. Third, a prestige bias prevented 
adoption, i.e., the opinion leader in the respective population was opposed to 
the innovation. It is not important here what the actual reason for this behavior 
was. The important point is that these cases do not contradict the contemporary 
concept of a subjective rationality, since the case only shows that, at the basis 
of the preferences and beliefs of the villagers of Peru, boiling water was just 
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not perceived as a good choice. The traditional belief-value model does not 
have to rely on strong standards of perfect objective rationality.  
The explanatory units of selection analogy 
Meme theory wants to present an alternative to the just described traditional 
model: For meme theory, cultural items spread and persist, because the cultural 
items themselves have a context-independent survival value, a fitness of their 
own that is maximized, a fitness that plays an important explanatory role in 
answering why certain ideas spread. Memes are the selfish units of cultural 
selection, as genes are the selfish units of natural selection. In a section on the 
“the philosophical importance of memes,” Dennett claims that the gene-meme-
analogy is important, since memes are the units that explain why a certain unit 
spreads in a human population, even if memes are not replicators in the narrow 
sense, i.e., even if we cannot identify memes as easily as genes, and even if we 
do not know exactly how memes spread.  
I ask you to recall from chapter 2 that Dawkins not only claimed that 
genes are replicators, he also suggested that they are the ultimate units of 
selection, since they are active replicators, difference-makers with a context-
independent effect and a fitness of their own, building ‘vehicles’ that interact 
on their behalf with the environment. Genes are thus the ultimate ‘agents’ that 
get the ‘credit’ for adaptations – in terms of survival – and that are selected for 
these adaptations. For gene selectionism, fitness of genes is the only fitness that 
is maximized in all cases of evolution: The fitness of genes and their benefit in 
terms of survival does not only account for ‘outlaw’ genes (see section 2.5), 
but also for cases in which organisms could equally be regarded as units of 
selection, namely as reproducing interactors that benefit from their adaptations. 
Gene selectionism claims to account for these cases as well, since the causal 
power of these interactors can be reduced to the causal power of genes. For this 
reason, gene selectionism considers organisms in general as mere 
consequences of the ‘selfish,’ replicative, and organism-building power of the 
replicators.  
In analogy to gene selectionism, memeticists have claimed that memes 
are the selfish units of selection that explain cultural change. Humans, carrying 
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around these memes, are a mere consequence of their ‘selfish,’ replicative, and 
mind-building power. Gene selectionism is mirrored by meme selectionism. 
According to Dennett, the “crucial point” (Dennett 1995: 364) is the following 
claim:  
“[A] cultural trait may have evolved in the way it has simply because it is 
advantageous to itself” (Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 200; Emph. in the orig.).  
Dennett considers this claim as providing a “striking new perspective” 
(Dennett 1995: 353). It “challenges one of the central axioms of the 
humanities,” namely the traditional view that we do what we do and think what 
we think because we believe that it is good for us (ibid.: 362). According to 
memetics, we do what is good for memes, what is good for their ‘fitness.’ 
Below I will explain the claims that are included in the explanatory units of 
selection analogy in a more systematic way.  
Before that I want to say a little bit more how it relates to the preceding 
chapters. This explanatory units of selection analogy is independent of the 
origination analogy, and partly dependent on the ontological analogy. It can be 
true or false irrespective of whether cultural selection is based on undirected 
variation. But, it should be clear from chapter 3, that memes cannot have a 
fitness of their own, if they do not form a lineage. If the lineage requirement 
for replicators is not fulfilled, no memes (be it as type or lineage of token) 
survives. What survives is a blend or an average of many similar memes, but 
not a single meme. This argument would suffice to render the units of selection 
analogy pointless, at least for all cases of social learning that include averaging. 
However, the point that I will develop in this chapter, a point against the 
explanatory units of selection analogy, is stronger: Even if some memes form 
lineages, it can be doubted that these memes are active difference-makers that 
have any explanatory priority over their human carriers, as genes are claimed 
to have explanatory priority over their human carriers.  
Although the explanatory units of selection analogy is dependent on the 
ontological analogy, it is not dependent on the truth or falsity of gene 
selectionism. Even if gene selectionism is correct, meme selectionism could 
still be false. As I said in section 2.5, I do not want to judge whether gene 
selectionism is correct. What I will do instead is the following: I have 
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explained in section 2.5 that the controversial core of the units of selection 
debate lies in issues about causality: whether single genes-as-replicators are 
mere bookkeepers or have a special causal power – a fitness of their own that 
represents a causal influence that singles them out as replicators for a certain 
phenotypic consequence, i.e., a causal influence that allows to reduce the 
causal role of the organism in evolutionary processes as a mere effect of the 
causal power of single genes. This is the Achilles heel of gene selectionism. 
Genes can be the ultimate units of selection of biological evolution only if it 
can be shown that genes are not mere bookkeepers. The analogous claim about 
memes as the selfish units of cultural selection will be shown to have the same 
Achilles heel: Memeticists have to show that attributing to memes a fitness of 
their own is more than bookkeeping. They have to show that memes have a 
causal priority over other entities, in the case of memes, over human 
individuals.  
‘Selfish memes’ from a systematic point of view 
The explanatory units of selection analogy comprises two central claims: (1) 
The survival of the fittest meme explains cultural diffusion; (2) memes and not 
humans, with their beliefs and their preferences, determine and therefore 
explain diffusion. The latter claim entails that meme selectionism provides an 
alternative to the traditional explanation of diffusion introduced above. Apart 
from (1), this second claim is based on three arguments: (i) there is no 
connection between meme fitness and the utility of memes for us; (ii) 
irrationality can only be explained by ‘selfish memes;’ (iii) minds are built by 
memes. Let me explain these claims and arguments.  
(1). The survival of the fittest meme explains diffusion. For memeticists, 
the survival of the fittest meme explains the pattern of diffusion we find in a 
culture. For Dennett, one of the main defenders of memes as an explanatory 
concept, a  
“[m]eme X spreads among the people because X was a good replicator” 
(Dennett 1991: 205).  
I have already quoted Richard Dawkins, who became famous for introducing 
not only the ‘selfish gene,’ but also the ‘selfish meme,’ for writing:  
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„What we have not previously considered is that a cultural trait may have 
evolved in the way it has simply because it is advantageous to itself“ 
(Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 200; Emph. in the orig.).  
Under the paragraph “Whose advantage,” of her book The Meme machine, 
Susan Blackmore states:  
“The whole point of memetics is to treat the meme as a replicator in its own 
right, operating entirely for the benefit of its own selfish replication” 
(Blackmore 1999: 30).  
At the end of her book she writes:  
“This is the power and beauty of memetics: it allows us to see how human 
lives, language, and creativity all come about through the same kind of 
replicator power as did design in the biological world. The replicators are 
different, but the process is the same. We once thought that biological design 
needed a creator, but we now know that natural selection can do all the 
designing on its own. Similarly, we once thought that human design required 
a conscious designer inside us, but we now know that memetic selection can 
do it on its own. […] If we take memetics seriously there is no room for 
anyone or anything to jump into the evolutionary process and stop it, direct it, 
or do anything to it. There is just the evolutionary process of genes and 
memes playing itself endlessly out – and no one watching.” (Blackmore 
1999: 242). 
According to Dennett, Blackmore, and Dawkins, who are the three main 
theorists
8
 in memetics, and according to other so-called memeticists, cultural 
evolution is about the struggle for existence of replicating memes. They do not 
only state that there are replicators or that humans are ‘blind watchmakers,’ 
just as natural selection; they state that there is ‘no one watching.’ All we need 
in order to explain culture is the fitness of the selfish memes. Memes are not 
only bookkeeping the change; they are the primary causal factor that we have 
to take into account in order to explain cultural change. As Sterelny has 
summarized memetics, “the crucial element of a meme-based theory is that the 
fitness of the memes themselves plays a crucial explanatory role” (Sterelny, 
forthcoming a).  
In summary, meme selectionism tries to explain the retention and 
spread of ideas with ‘the good of memes,’ the differential fitness of memes 
                                                
8
 I say theorists, since only Dennett and Blackmore can really count as defenders. We saw 
already at the end of chapter 3 that Dawkins restricted the force of the analogy after the first 
publication of The Selfish Gene because of the differences in ontology and transmission of 
memes and genes. Nonetheless, Dawkins was important in stressing the explanatory units of 
selection analogy by claiming that there are ‘viruses of the mind’ that invade us. These viruses 
survive despite their disadvantage for us (Dawkins 1993).  
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instead of the causal power and interests of individuals. This is accomplished 
by invoking a property of ideas: their fitness as an explanatory concept. 
Therefore the units of selection analogy is: As the survival of genes, and only 
their survival, can explain all cases of biological evolution, only memes and 
their survival can explain all cases of cultural evolution. The ontological 
analogy is extended into an explanatory analogy. As genes – being the units of 
selection, the ultimate ‘beneficiaries’ of biological evolution – explain 
biological evolution, memes – being the units of selection and beneficiaries of 
cultural change – explain cultural evolution.  
(2). Memetics as an alternative to the traditional explanation. Part of 
this position is an opposition that is similar to the opposition between genes 
and organisms in the units of selection debate. Properties of memes and not the 
properties of individuals explain why a unit of culture spreads. Individuals are 
mere vehicles, hosts or resources for memes, driven by memes. They are 
secondary for the goal of explanation. As an organism appears from the gene’s 
eye perspective as just a gene’s way of a making another gene, from the 
‘meme’s eye perspective,’ “[a] scholar is just a library’s way of making 
another library” (Dennett 1991: 202). This position has been justified by the 
following three claims that have to be distinguished carefully:  
(i). There is no connection between the fitness of memes and utility of 
memes for our goals. According to Dennett,  
“The first rule of memes, as it is for genes, is that replication is not 
necessarily for the good of anything; replicators flourish that are good at …. 
replicating! – for whatever reason. […] The important point is that there is no 
necessary connection between a meme’s replicative power, its ‘fitness’ from 
its point of view, and its contribution to our fitness (by whatever standard we 
judge that)” (Dennett 1991: 203; Emph. added).  
Note that Dennett says ‘by whatever standard we judge that.’ It is not only that 
memeticists want to show that we believe things that do not contribute to our 
biological fitness. For Dennett, and less rigorously for Dawkins, there are 
memes that do not even contribute to other goals that we might have: truth, 
aesthetic values, moral values, other more mundane general goals such as 
influence or money, or particular goals such as the desire to relax. Attributing 
such goals to individuals is what Dennett calls the “traditional model,” since it 
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“uses the intentional stance as its explanatory framework” (Dennett 2001a: 
307). As illustrated above, if we take an intentional stance towards people, we 
describe them as having ideas, beliefs, and values that determine their 
decisions about what to believe, what to desire, what to do in order to fulfill the 
basic desires, and so on. Meme selectionism is thought to replace this 
traditional model, by explaining culture through reference to the fitness of 
memes. As explained above, this is parallel to the claim that genes are not only 
bookkeepers of biological evolution but have a fitness of their own that allows 
to single them out as the active units of selection that alone benefit, in the long 
run and in all cases, from the adaptive phenotypic consequences these memes 
cause in their ‘vehicles.’  
This is what I call the general independence claim. It can be understood 
as one argument for claiming that minds cannot explain cultural change, since 
the fitness of memes does not dependent on what individuals regard as their 
benefit, whatever that may be. But memeticists offer two further arguments for 
their second main claim that meme selectionism replaces the traditional 
perspective.  
(ii). Irrationality can only be explained by ‘selfish memes’ in the 
narrow sense. One further argument is that the meme’s eye perspective is more 
inclusive than the traditional intentional stance perspective. The traditional 
model of explaining diffusion is presented as failing to explain all cases of 
diffusion of cultural items (Dennett 2001a: 309). Dennett sometimes 
acknowledges that the traditional explanation can explain many cultural 
phenomena, but not all. There are cases – mainly cases of irrationality – where 
the pattern of diffusion of memes cannot be explained by referring to beliefs 
and intentions of individuals. It can only be explained by the fitness of memes.  
Here is an example: Why do most of us use Microsoft and not Unix or 
Linux to run our personal computers? A hypothetical traditional explanation 
could be the following: Most of us have chosen Microsoft, because it was 
better advertised, easier to use, easier available, etc. Whatever the precise 
answer is, the answer would always include that we judged Microsoft to be 
better for certain goals, given the information at hand. After a while a further 
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factor might have played a role, namely compatibility with the systems the 
majority uses. If people use not Microsoft system, file sharing might turn out to 
be difficult. Now, many computer programmers would agree on the fact that 
Linux is a better system. Be it as it may, Microsoft won the battle. It is costly 
and objectively irrational to use the system, if there is a cheaper and better one. 
But even if it were objectively the case that Linux is better, we can explain the 
fact of the widespread use of Microsoft systems through the fact that humans 
are not always perfectly rational and that given the situation the person is in – 
given their knowledge and their skills to work with computers, given what 
other people use – the choice for Microsoft can be considered as subjectively 
rational, given the constraints on the decision situation. – Do we need ‘selfish 
memes’ to explain such a case of irrationality? Meme selectionism states that 
we do: Even if we can explain cases of rational behavior by the traditional 
model, in order to explain irrationality, we need meme talk. Microsoft system 
spreads because its properties enhance or ‘serve’ the survival of the Microsoft-
system-meme.  
Note that this claim has to be distinguished from the general claims (1) 
and (2), which entail that the fitness of memes is always the ultimate causal 
source of their spread, independent of what we regard as useful spread. The 
claim about irrationality is used as a justification of (2), although it is more 
restricted than (2), since it does not provide a new alternative for all cases of 
diffusion. It only presents the fitness of selfish memes as an alternative for 
cases of irrationality. Recall from section 2.5, that one has to distinguish 
between ‘selfish genes’ in the narrow sense, cases where genes spread despite 
neutral or negative consequences for organisms, and ‘selfish genes’ in the 
broad sense, where genes are declared to be the ultimate source and 
‘beneficiaries’ of all cases of evolutionary change. As with gene selectionism, 
if the general philosophical claim about genes as the ultimate units of selection 
in all cases of biological evolution is different from the more limited claim 
about ‘selfish’ outlaw genes, we also have to distinguish between the limited 
claim that memes have to be taken into account, since they can explain cases of 
irrationality, and the general claim that memes have a fitness of their own 
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independent of our preferences in all cases of diffusion. That is why I call the 
claim about irrationality the limited independence claim.  
(iii). Minds are memes. In addition, memeticists have offered a third 
argument in order to justify the second basic claim that memes provide an 
alternative to the traditional model: Meme selectionism does not only claim 
that memes have a fitness of their own that causes their spread independent of 
the preferences of human carriers; it claims that these carriers are nothing else 
than a conglomerate of memes. Persons are built by memes; they merely are 
the effects of memes. Dawkins, Dennett, and Blackmore describe human minds 
mainly as being either meme vehicles, as organisms are for genes, or as hosts 
for memes, as organisms are for viruses.
9
 Human minds are built by them. 
Humans are thus understood as mere ‘survival machines’ or ‘replicating 
machinery,’ and considered as secondary for explaining diffusion of memes. 
This is employing the ‘carrying’-geno-phenotype relation, which I introduced 
briefly in section 3.2. Anthropologists used to express the same in saying that 
humans are ‘culture bearers.’ Yet, it will prove decisive that humans are not 
just a bundle of memes, and that carrying memes is not the only role humans 
play in the diffusion of culture.  
Let me add a note on the philosophical importance of the explanatory 
units of selection analogy, before I make clear in which sense I will approach 
this analogy. It is the second basic claim, namely that memetics challenges 
‘one of the central axioms of the humanities,’ that makes the explanatory units 
of selection analogy so radical and philosophically important. At first sight, the 
units of selection analogy leads to a kind of Gestalt shift, like a radical move in 
our perception of culture: Before, there were individuals with a prominent role 
as creators and choosers of culture. They carry with them all kinds of cultural 
items, now called memes. Now, there are memes, living, surviving, being 
spread by ‘individuals’ that are driven by these memes to do so. Susan 
Blackmore for instance writes about the “power behind the idea of memes”:  
                                                
9
 The virus metaphor was part of the meme idea from the start (Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 192). 
See Dawkins (1993), exclusively on memes as viruses.  
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“To start to think memetically we have to make a giant flip in our minds just 
as biologists had to do when taking on the idea of the selfish gene. Instead of 
thinking of our ideas as our own creations, and as working for us, we have to 
think of them as autonomous selfish memes, working only to get themselves 
copied” (Blackmore 1999: 7-8). 
This is the central philosophical point of the explanatory units of selection 
analogy. Dennett himself does not shrink back from emphasizing the seeming 
importance of the question whether this analogy is correct.  
“I don’t know about you, but I’m not initially attracted by the idea of my 
brain as a sort of dung heap in which the larvae of other people’s ideas renew 
themselves, before sending out copies of themselves in an informational 
Diaspora. It does seem to rob my mind of its importance as both author and 
critic. Who’s in charge, according to this vision – we or our memes?” 
(Dennett 1991: 202). 
Tautologies, dilemmas, a straw man, and minds as memes  
Dennett does a lot to persuade the reader that memes are in charge and not 
minds, and that this is an important new insight. On the other hand, from time 
to time, he stresses that there is no conflict with our traditional idea of 
individuals as creators and critics of culture (e.g. Dennett 2001b). He then 
stresses that the traditional explanation is not opposed by, but included by 
meme selectionism. I will state that he indeed has to claim this, but for a reason 
he himself ignores. Dennett has to claim this in order to give memes any 
explanatory role at all: As any Darwinian explanation of change that refers to 
the ‘survival of the fittest x,’ the claim that cultural diffusion can be explained 
by pointing to the ‘survival-of-the-fittest-memes,’ is in danger of being 
tautological. This follows from what I illustrated with respect to the tautology 
problem in section 2.4. I will address in which sense meme selectionism faces 
a tautology problem in the next section 5.2.  
Discussing the tautology problem for memes directly leads to my main 
critique of the explanatory units of selection analogy, which I will present in 
section 5.3: The tautology problem leads the explanatory units of selection 
analogy into an explanatory dilemma: The tautology charge cannot be solved 
for memetics without giving up the second main claim, namely that memetics 
provides an alternative to the traditional explanation. If meme explanations 
want to get out of the tautology problem, they inevitably end up with the 
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traditional explanation of diffusion. There is no general independence of 
memes from characteristics of minds, be they preferences, beliefs, or other 
structural features of the mind. The meme’s point of view is thus no alternative 
explanation: It does either not explain anything, or it is a redundant retelling of 
what we can explain, and can only explain, if we give a version of the 
traditional explanation: Individuals select memes and it depends totally on 
them which memes spread, i.e., have a higher fitness. The dilemma is: 
‘survival-of-the-fittest-meme’-explanations are either tautological or – if this is 
not the case – they are redundant, since they have to refer to the traditional 
explanation. In both cases the analogy is trivial, either because nothing is 
explained, or because the explanation is heuristically trivial, explaining 
diffusion in the same way we have always explained diffusion. I will also show 
where one of the central errors of the explanatory units of selection analogy 
lies: Memeticists tend to misconstruct the role that individuals play in culture 
by wrongly transferring the units of selection analogy to culture.  
In section 5.4, I will then discuss whether the limited independence 
claim can give back some explanatory force to the units of selection analogy. 
There are indeed cases where memes are adopted by people, despite the fact 
that these memes are – as a matter of fact – not useful for them, or are at least 
not judged useful by them. I call these cases ‘conflict cases’ and will state that 
even for these cases, it is often possible to find a traditional explanation – a 
reason why the individual wanted to adopt the cultural item. I will also state 
that even in these cases, it is not memes that explain the patterns, but the 
relation between memes and the features of the mind that constitute the 
selective environment of these memes. The explanatory units of selection 
analogy still faces the before-mentioned explanatory dilemma. Discussing the 
conflict cases will make explicit where the second central error of the 
explanatory units of selection analogy lies: Meme selectionism fights against a 
straw man, namely a too rigid concept of rationality.  
The last section 5.5 concentrates on the third claim that has been used to 
justify the second main claim of the explanatory units of selection analogy, 
namely that persons are build by memes. I will show that this argument does 
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not provide a way out of the explanatory dilemma. Not everything in an 
individual – building up the main selective environment for a specific meme – 
is itself a meme. Furthermore, even if other memes – already in the mind of a 
selecting human person – make up an important part of the selective 
environment, the fitness of that meme, whose spread is at issue, is not 
independent of the individual who adopts the meme or not. The thesis that 
minds are nothing else than memes is wrong, and for those parts of the mind 
that are indeed build by memes the thesis is trivial, since we knew all the time 
that minds incorporate ideational units, now called memes. The explanatory 
dilemma still holds: In order to explain anything at all, the explanatory units of 
selection analogy has to refer to the traditional explanation of diffusion.  
5.2  TAUTOLOGY PROBLEM OF MEMETICS 
The tautology problem applied 
What explanatory work do ‘survival-of-the-fittest-meme’-statements do? As 
we saw in section 2.4, explanations that make reference to ‘survival of the 
fittest x’ are in danger of being tautological. Meme selectionism has been 
criticized for facing exactly this problem. After rejecting the tautology charge 
for biological evolution, basically on the grounds explained in chapter 2, Kim 
Sterelny and Paul Griffiths, while adopting an argument from Elliott Sober 
(1993), claim that “a variant of the tautology objection” applies to memetics: 
“We can call a tune ‘a meme with high replication potential’ rather than 
‘catchy’ if we like. But without source laws, this adds nothing to our 
understanding of musical trends” (Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 334). Source laws 
are general statements about the relationship between genes, organisms or 
species, and their respective selective environment. As explained in section 2.4, 
this relationship between the units who are supposed to have a fitness and the 
respective selective environment builds the causal basis for fitness differences 
that provides a way out of the tautology problem.  
David S. Wilson makes the same point in his review of Blackmore’s 
Meme Machine (1999):  
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“The oft-repeated accusation that natural selection is a tautology fails because 
fitness is not defined in terms of whatever evolves but in terms of the 
properties that enable organisms to survive and reproduce in their 
environments. […] For the meme concept to escape the same problem, we 
must define cultural fitness independently of what evolves. If the first four 
notes of Beethoven's fifth is a powerful meme only because it is common, we 
have achieved no insight” (Wilson 1999: 206).  
As long as ‘survival of the fittest x’ statements do only refer to actual survival 
of memes, the statement that diffusion is explained by the survival-of-the-
fittest-meme is tautological, since it explains survival by survival. Sober 
himself writes with respect to scientific theories as memes: “It seems harmless 
to agree that fitter theories spread, the question is what makes a theory fitter” 
(Sober 2000: 218). This tautology objection has often been stated, but not 
analyzed in detail.
10
  
Talk of ‘selfish’ genes or memes and their ‘interest’ is considered by 
memeticists as a useful ‘shorthand’ for what the units of selection analogy 
actually is about:  
“We can say that memes are ‘selfish’, that they ‘do not care’, that they ‘want’ 
to propagate themselves, and so on, when all we mean is that successful 
memes are the ones that get copied and spread, while unsuccessful ones do 
not. This is the sense in which memes ‘want’ to get copied, ‘want’ you to 
pass them on and ‘do not care’ what that means to you or your genes.” 
(Blackmore 1999: 7; Emph. added)  
If this is what it says, the explanatory units of selection analogy is indeed 
stating a tautology: “that successful memes are the ones that get copied and 
spread, while unsuccessful ones do not” is one variant of the Darwinian 
principle ‘survival of the fittest x.’ Such a statement merely says that the 
successful ones are the successful ones (i.e., the ones that get copied and 
spread). Such a statement is tautological if successful is defined, measured or 
explained by ‘being copied.’ Hence, the relevant question is how memeticists 
define, measure and explain successfulness of memes, if looked at more 
closely?  
They specify the fitness of memes via reference to longevity, fecundity, 
fidelity, and more concrete qualities such as attractiveness. As outlined in 
section 2.5, Dawkins defined genes as active replicators. Something is an 
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 See also Conte (2000) and Henrich, Boyd & Richerson (forthcoming). 
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active replicator, if it replicates in the narrow sense, and if it does this in an 
active way. It is active, if its “nature has some influence over its probability of 
being copied” (Dawkins 1982a: 83). According to Dawkins, memes are such 
active replicators. Furthermore, memes – like genes – direct evolution towards 
their ‘interest,’ since they are the units that ultimately are responsible for the 
features selection acts on. The meme with the highest survival value can persist 
over time and spread through the population of individuals. Thus, a good 
replicator is one that has a high “survival value” (Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 193). 
Note, that the term ‘survival value’ takes the place of the term ‘fitness’. 
Contrary to Dennett (see quotations above), Dawkins uses the term fitness only 
for individuals, and uses ‘survival value’ for replicators instead (Dawkins 1989 
[1976]: 136-37). And as fitness can be differentiated into viability and fertility, 
Dawkins differentiates survival value into three criteria that mark a good 
replicator: fidelity, fecundity, and longevity. For memes he writes:  
“But just as not all genes that can replicate do so successfully, so some 
memes are more successful in the meme-pool than others. This is the 
analogue of natural selection. I have mentioned particular examples of 
qualities that make for high survival value among memes. But in general they 
must be […]: longevity, fecundity, and copying-fidelity” (Dawkins 1989 
[1976]: 194).  
In the case of memes, the concrete qualities that account for high survival value 
are for instance ‘attractiveness,’ ‘being catchy,’ ‘memorable,’ or ‘tempting,’ 
etc. Dawkins writes for instance:  
“If the phenotypic effect of a meme is a tune, the catchier it is the more likely 
it is to be copied. If it is a scientific idea, its chances of spreading through the 
world’s scientific brains will be influenced by its compatibility with the 
already established corpus of ideas. If it is a political or religious idea, it may 
assist its own survival if one of its phenotypic effects is to make its bodies 
violently intolerant of new and unfamiliar ideas” (Dawkins 1982a: 110). 
Since his most favorite example is the “god meme”, i.e., a religious belief in a 
supernatural being like the Christian deity, let me quote a passage from The 
Selfish Gene:  
“The survival value of a god meme in the meme pool results from its great 
psychological appeal. It provides a superficially plausible answer to deep and 
troubling questions about existence. […] God exists, if only in the form of a 
meme with high survival value, or infective power, in the environment 
provided by human culture” (Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 193).  
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This is how Dawkins specifies the ‘survival value,’ in other words, the fitness 
of memes. Now, do ‘being catchy,’ having ‘great psychological appeal,’ having 
‘infective power, in the environment provided by human culture’ explain why 
certain beliefs spread and not others, or are these qualities mere re-descriptions 
of the high survival value of memes and thus not providing a way out of the 
tautology problem?  
Fitness of memes beyond actual survival  
The debate about the tautological character of Darwinian explanations in 
section 2.4 showed that a Darwinian explanation that refers to ‘survival of the 
fittest x’ can only escape the tautology objection, if (a) fitness is defined as a 
supervening propensity for survival and reproduction, if (b) it is possible to 
differentiate systematically and empirically between frequency changes that are 
caused by drift (frequency changes that are not due to fitness differences) and 
those that are caused by Darwinian selection according to differential fitness, 
and if (c) it is possible to give independent evidence of fitness by pointing to 
the causal basis of fitness differences, in order to really explain those selection 
processes that are due to differential fitness.  
(a). Fitness as supervening property. Even if memeticists usually do not 
care about such details, it would be no problem to interpret the survival value 
of memes as a propensity for survival and reproduction. Dual-inheritance-
theorists, using memes not as replicators in the wide sense have defined 
survival value as propensity: Durham (1991: 194), for instance, defines the 
fitness of memes as “replicability.”
11
 He explicitly refers to the tautology 
problem and acknowledges that this does not solve the tautology problem, 
since replicability does not “reveal why variant 2 is the most readily transmitted 
and used” (Durham 1991: 195).  
(b). Memetic drift and memetic selection. A systematic differentiation 
between drift and selection has no prominent place in memetics, but it should 
also be no real problem for them. What Dawkins says in the last quotation 
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 See also Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981: 15), who define “cultural fitness” of a cultural 
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about the god-meme is that people who believe in God do this, because a belief 
in God has a high probability of spread, given the environment of human 
minds. He ignores that the persistence might be due to factors similar to drift. 
He assumes that it is due to fitness differences.
12
 Henrich, Boyd & Richerson 
(forthcoming) linked their claims about biases in the transmission of memes to 
the tautology issue. Conformist biases (i.e., biases to follow the majority) or 
prestige biases (i.e., biases to follow the prestigious) are factors that affect the 
probability of spread of a meme, but irrespective of the content of a meme. 
According to Henrich, Boyd & Richerson, the units of selection analogy, 
singling out memes as the causal agents whose properties explain why they 
spread, ignores that such non-content biases affect spread of memes in a way 
that is analogous to drift. The memes spread although no quality of the meme 
explains the increase of the spread. Some diffusion of memes is thus ‘survival 
of the lucky meme’ and not the survival of the fittest meme. The lucky meme 
spreads, because it happens to be in the mind of a prestigious person and not 
because of its content. It does not spread because of an intrinsic property of the 
meme itself that would make it more attractive for humans. An example is the 
spread of the Western business four-in-hand tie. According to Henrich, Boyd & 
Richerson, this cultural item did not spread because “the four-in-hand tie is 
intrinsically more attractive than its many alternatives, but because it happens 
to be associated with the economic and military prowess of the West” 
(Henrich, Boyd & Richerson, forthcoming).
13
 Be it as it may, let me assume, 
for the sake of argument, that meme selectionism could differentiate between 
drift and selection.  
(c). Basis of fitness differences. Given that memes are defined as 
propensity and that drift and selection can be distinguished, the important 
question is the following: Does meme selectionism explain the supposed fitness 
differences by providing an account of the causal basis of the different survival 
value, for those cases where drift can be excluded? As said, without giving an 
account of the causal basis of fitness differences any explanation based on the 
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 Gil-White (forthcoming) makes the same point about ‘lucky’ memes.  
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principle ‘survival of the fittest x’ is deemed to be vacuous. Where do these 
fitness differences come from? In other words, can we identify the fittest 
beforehand, independently of actual survival, as Wilson asks for in his critique 
of Blackmore? These are the questions that need to be focused on.  
In biological evolution the causal basis for fitness of organisms lies in 
the adaptedness of the organism, given a certain environmental setting. As I 
said in section 2.5: Adaptedness is a property of an organism that emerges from 
the relationship between an organism and its selective environment. To be ‘fit’ 
in the qualitative sense means to ‘match’ the selective environment. This 
property of the organism is independent of actual quantitative fitness, in terms 
of survival and reproductive output, but it is not independent of the relationship 
of the organism to the environment, since the relationship is the cause of the 
adaptedness of the organism, and adaptedness, in turn, is the causal basis for 
the fitness of the organism. As with genes, the ultimate cause of fitness 
differences lies in the relationship between memes and their selective 
environment. This relationship always determines the fitness of memes. That is 
the reason why Dawkins writes about “infective power, in the environment 
provided by human culture.”  
In order to escape the tautology problem, meme selectionism has to 
point to the selective environment of memes. Now, the decisive selective 
environment of cultural items is the human mind. That is consensus within and 
beyond memetics.
14
 The human mind has a certain structure, incorporates 
certain abilities and not others, houses already acquired beliefs, decision 
heuristics, and values. On the one hand, memeticists acknowledge that. But on 
the other hand, when memeticists give an account of what determines 
attractiveness (meme fitness at the concrete level), they give a slightly different 
account of the role of the human mind – and this difference is important.  
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 Certainly, some memes can spread in computers without a human mind ever noticing it. But 
these computer memes cannot be counted as ‘cultural,’ since they would in no way be part of 
human culture, i.e., shared between people. 
Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity 
256 
Memeticists’ factors – influencing the fitness of memes 
Balkin (1998: 74-88), defender of memetics as a new theory of ideology, 
correctly differentiates between three kinds of factors that influence the fitness 
of memes: First, “substantive factors” – the content of memes; second, 
“psychological factors – the cognitive structure of human minds and their 
comparative susceptibilities;” third, “ecological factors” that, according to him, 
include other memes, as well as the “nature of social institutions, methods of 
storing information, and technologies of communications.”  
According to Balkin, psychological factors mainly include ease of 
memorization, ease of comprehension and ease of communication. Ecological 
factors, such as social institutions, involve skills and standards that change the 
selective environment for memes by changing the minds of individuals. 
Science and universities are the best examples for such an ecological factor: 
These institutions are responsible for keeping alive the skills and standards that 
are used in these institutions to decide what to consider as a reasonable belief 
or action. Models and authorities, as said above, also influence the fate of 
memes, since we might adopt an idea not because of the content, but because 
of the prestige of the model. This is how drift enters the picture. Media 
influences the pattern as well: Writing, for instance, made possible that ideas 
that are less easy to memorize can spread more easily. Let me add a note on the 
importance of social structure: Human mind has to be brought in contact with a 
meme, as Laland & Odling-Smee (2000: 134) stress for instance. Contact is 
determined by social structure, institutions, media technology, and so on. If a 
person is studying at a university, the likelihood that it adopts the Darwinism-
meme is increased since the likelihood of contact is increased. Thus, the fitness 
of memes also depends on this ecological factor. Other memes, however, do 
only belong to an ecological factor if they influence the distribution of memes 
via these ecological factors. But they mainly influence the diffusion of memes 
via the psychological factors, since they are normally represented in the minds 
of individuals. Although ecological factors are important, I would like to focus 
on the relationship between Balkin’s substantive factors and his psychological 
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factors, since what is at issue in this chapter is the alleged independence of 
memes from their human carriers.  
Blackmore, for instance, concentrates on these two factors. At one 
point, she explicitly asks which factors influence the survival value of memes. 
She mentions various factors: memory capacity and “fidelity of the brain,” 
imitative capacities, properties of the meme itself (e.g. the property of being 
easy to imitate), and, last but not least, human preferences (Blackmore 1999: 
58). On a different occasion, she is more systematic and says:  
“There are many reasons why some memes succeed and others fail. These 
reasons fall roughly into two categories. First, there is the nature of human 
beings as imitators and selectors. From the memetic point of view the human 
being (with its clever thinking brain) acts both as the replicating machinery, 
and as the selective environment for the memes. Psychology can help us 
understand why and how this operates. There are the properties of our 
sensory systems that make some memes obvious and others not, the 
mechanisms of attention that allow some memes to grab the available 
processing capacity, the nature of human memory that determines which 
memes will be successfully remembered, and the limitations of our capacity 
to imitate. We can, and will, apply this to understanding the fate of memes 
but it is more properly the domain of psychology and physiology than 
memetics. The other kinds of reasons concern the nature of the memes 
themselves, the tricks they exploit, the ways they group together and the 
general processes of memetic evolution that favour some memes over others. 
These have previously been studied by psychology and are an important 
aspect of memetics” (Blackmore 1999: 15-16; Emph. added).  
In a nutshell, according to Blackmore, there are two categories of reasons for 
the fitness of memes: properties of the mind (i.e., Balkin’s psychological 
factors) and properties of the meme (i.e., Balkin’s substantive factors). This is 
correct but confusing at the same time.  
The essential relation between memes and minds 
The important point is to see that these two categories are not alternative or 
complementary in the sense that they are two kinds of independent influences. 
The two categories specify the above-mentioned essential relation between the 
meme and its environment that accounts for the ‘survival value’ of memes. 
Blackmore does not see this. Certainly, in analogy to organisms and their 
fitness, certain ‘adaptive’ intrinsic properties of the meme are the basis of the 
fitness of memes. However, these adaptive properties are adaptive only relative 
to a selective environment. And that means that the properties of a meme are 
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adaptive, leading to a high fitness of memes, only because of properties of the 
human mind, which build the main part of the selective environment of memes. 
The two factors build the essential relation between memes and minds – that 
very relation that accounts for adaptedness, which builds the causal basis for 
fitness differences of memes.  
Blackmore, however, presents the two factors as two independent 
factors, while acknowledging at the same time that humans are the “selective 
environment for the memes.” Balkin seems to acknowledge that the factors are 
“linked in practice.” He writes, for instance: “[T]he kinds of substantive 
content that make memes more attractive or more often discussed may depend 
on structural features of the human mind and existing religious or educational 
institutions” (Balkin 1998: 74). But he ignores, that the fitness of memes not 
only may depend on structural features of the human mind and on already 
acquired beliefs. The fitness of memes definitely has to depend on these 
features, since any fitness of any entity depends on the properties of the 
selective environment of this entity. And the selective environment of memes is 
mainly determined by properties of the human mind. Although Balkin regards 
the substantive and the psychological factors as ‘linked in practice,’ he also 
presented them in the way Blackmore did, namely as two independent factors.  
Both do not take into account that the substantive factors do not 
constitute an own factor. They are factors determining the fitness of memes in 
the way they do only because of their relation to the psychological factors. 
They ignore that the content of a meme stands in the same relation to certain 
properties of the mind, as an opposable thumb stands in relation to properties 
of the environment of the organism that exhibits this opposable thumb. That 
memes have the property of ‘attractiveness’ is thus the outcome of the relation 
between content (substantial factor) and properties of the mind (psychological 
factor), given a number of other conditions like social structure, institutions 
and media. This is the first essential point that must be taken into account in 
order to get an answer to how memetics can get rid of the tautology charge.  
The consequence of this point is the following: Attractiveness is indeed 
just another word for ‘fitness’ as a propensity for replication of a specific 
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meme. We can only explain this attractiveness, when we explain why the 
individuals find the respective meme attractive. As Sterelny says with respect 
to the god-meme and Dawkins argument that its spread is due to the high 
replication potential of the god-meme:  
“Suppose we agree with Dawkins that religious ideas are both fundamentally 
irrational and costly to their hosts. Even so, the argument would go, we 
explain nothing by labelling religious ideas as cognoviruses or memes. To 
explain the prevalence of religion in human life we need to know why 
humans in so many cultures find religious ideas salient, credible, memorable. 
Religion would not be part of human social life if people found religious 
ideas absurd or unintelligible. The crucial problem is one of human 
psychology: explaining why we find occult-force explanations credible. Once 
we find out why humans find credible explanations of their environment in 
terms of occult forces, what else is there to explain?” (Sterelny, forthcoming 
a).  
Despite the fact that other factors, like the kind of media or institutions, also 
influence the probability of spread, this is the cornerstone of the problem the 
explanatory units of selection analogy has to face. Memes cannot have a fitness 
that is independent of properties of the human mind, since the human mind is 
the selective environment, without which we cannot explain why memes are 
attractive. Consequently, there is no general independence of meme spread 
from humans – with their preferences, beliefs, and other structural features of 
their minds.  
Let me explain this point with a further example. Imagine two memes, 
one is easy to remember, another less easy to remember. And assume that this 
is the only thing that makes them different. Which one will spread more likely? 
The one that is easier to remember. Why? Because easy-to-remember memes 
have a higher survival value than less-easy-to-remember ones. Despite the fact 
that this is a property of the meme, this property of a high survival value arises 
only from the relationship between the precise content of the meme and the 
minds that remember these memes and thereby select them. Memes are not 
easy to remember on their own. They are easy to remember for somebody or 
something. If we were, for instance, like a computer that can easily remember 
long chains of numbers, memes with long chains of numbers would have a 
higher survival value than they have in their human environment. They don’t 
have such a high survival value, because we have problems with remembering 
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long chains of numbers. That something is easy to remember can depend on an 
innate bias towards certain contents, as researchers like Sperber 1996 and 
Atran 2001 would claim. It might well be that the reason why we cannot easily 
remember long chains of numbers is such an innate bias. However, the 
probability of memorizing a meme is likely to depend as well on general 
structural features of the mind (e.g., that we can learn from others at all). And 
most importantly, the probability of meme spread depends on what we 
incorporated into our web of belief before. A sentence from Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason might be easy to memorize for a philosopher, but hard to 
memorize for a layman. Furthermore, already acquired beliefs not only 
determine what we can easily memorize or understand at all. They also 
determine our goals in acquiring memes. Only if I want to find the truth of 
something, is the property of ‘seem to be true’ a factor that influences my 
adoption of the respective meme. If we value certain aspects of life, then a 
religious idea might be more attractive than a competing non-religious one. If 
we value others, it might not be attractive at all.  
Let us go back to Dawkins’ example of the god-meme. The god-meme 
has a high survival value only because the god-meme provides an answer to 
“deep and troubling questions about existence” of humans (Dawkins quote 
above). As Sterelny writes, if we changed the respective cognitive 
environment, then these religious ideas would no longer spread socially, 
though others would (Sterelny, forthcoming a). Present the god-meme to 
Martians and it might have no chance at all. The fitness of memes is always 
dependent on the selective forces the individual imposes on it.  
The problem is not that Dawkins, Dennett, and Blackmore do not know 
that the environment is the factor, or at least a factor, that determines or 
influences the spread of memes. The problem is that they do not realize that 
this constitutes a problem for their claims about memes and diffusion. If they 
acknowledge that the fitness of memes is determined by their selective 
environment, that the selective environment is the human mind, and that the 
relation between mind and meme is constitutive for the causal basis of fitness 
differences of memes, then they end up with the following: What explains the 
Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity 
261 
fitness of memes and hence diffusion is not the fitness, but the causal basis for 
fitness. Reference to ‘fitness’ of memes is just a placeholder for the actual 
explanation of fitness differences by pointing to the relation between the 
evolving unit and its selective environment. The fitness of memes is thus never 
independent of ‘psychological factors.’ In addition, fitness of memes is not 
even a factor. It merely is a supervening propensity that follows from other 
properties of the memes itself that are enhancing fitness only because of the 
essential relation between the substantive properties of the meme and its 
selective environment.  
The essential thing to see is that there can thus be no explanatory 
primacy of one factor over the other. From this it follows that if the claim that 
the fitness of memes explains diffusion wants to circumvent the tautology 
problem, it cannot – at the same time – claim any causal priority of memes 
over humans, since they are the selective environment of memes. This is the 
central point I want to draw from the critique that meme selectionism is subject 
to a tautology charge.  
As just mentioned, Dawkins, Dennett, and Blackmore know this, but 
they do not seem to see the consequences for their claims. One of the reasons, 
why they cannot see it lies in the following: They simply define what I call the 
selective environment in human individuals as ‘other memes’: memes are thus 
selected by other memes, which we acquired before. The human mind is thus 
crossed out of the picture. But, first of all, this is true only if all things that 
constitute the selective environment can be reduced to memes. That this is not 
the case will be defended in section 5.5. But even if that were the case, my 
essential point against memeticists would still hold: What is at issue in 
explaining an instance of cultural change is the fitness of a specific meme, 
given its selective environment. It is important not to forget that the selected 
meme is different from the selecting memes, the latter making up the selective 
environment of the selected meme, together with other factors. The fitness of 
each individual meme is thus never independent of what makes up the mind – 
its structure and already acquired beliefs and preferences. The general 
independence claim is wrong. Not the meme whose diffusion is at issue 
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determines its own fitness. The relationship between this meme and its 
environment determines its fitness. This holds for all cases, since otherwise 
‘survival-of-the-fittest-meme’-statements would be tautological.  
Conclusion 
The point I want to make against memetics with respect to the tautology 
problem is that simply referring to the fitness of memes, to a high survival 
value, or to memes’ attractiveness is not giving any answer to the question why 
certain ideas spread or not. Although memeticists cite the human mind as one 
factor that determines, apart from intrinsic properties of the meme, the fitness 
of memes, they ignore that memes and minds are not two different factors. 
They ignore that it is the relation between minds and memes that constitutes 
the fitness of memes. Fitness of memes is a consequence of the relation of 
memes to their selective environment, which is dominated by human minds. 
Fitness of memes is thus not a ‘cause’ that explains diffusion on its own. 
Fitness of memes can only explain diffusion, if the fitness is explained by the 
causal basis of the differential propensity for the survival of memes. This 
causal basis, a property of memes, arises from the relationship of the meme to 
human minds. There is thus no survival value of memes that is independent of 
the human mind as selective environment.  
5.3  THE EXPLANATORY DILEMMA 
Caught in a dilemma 
It follows from the conclusion of the last section that memetics needs an 
‘ecology of memes’ that investigates the adaptivity and selective environment 
of memes. But it also follows, and this is the important consequence, that the 
second main claim of meme selectionism cannot be defended. Memetics does 
not provide an alternative to the traditional explanation via memes that have a 
fitness of their own that is independent of our interests. For if memetics wants 
to get out of the tautology problem, it gives a redundant retelling of the 
traditional explanation by pointing to the mind as the selective environment of 
memes. In other words, if the first basic claim that the fitness of memes 
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explains diffusion is true and non-tautological, then the claim that this 
explanation provides an alternative to the traditional model of explaining 
diffusion is wrong. This leads memeticists into a dilemma: The explanatory 
units of selection analogy either rests on a tautological statement of the 
‘survival-of-the-fittest-meme’ and is thus explanatorily trivial, or, if memetics 
wants to escape the tautology problem, it ends up with the traditional 
explanation and is thus heuristically trivial, re-phrasing the traditional 
explanation. It cannot defend the two basic claims (1) and (2) at the same time. 
This is what I call the explanatory dilemma of the explanatory units of 
selection analogy. Although this conclusion should be evident as a 
consequence from the last section, let me illustrate in this section: first, the 
dilemma itself in more detail; second, why memetics ends up with this 
dilemma; and, third, what follows from it.  
If we have a traditional explanation, citing all the psychological factors 
that determine the selection of certain memes, we get the following kind of 
explanation of diffusion: There are human individuals, with minds that can 
easily remember or learn certain things and not others, minds that make their 
decisions about adopting a meme or not according to previously acquired 
skills, beliefs and values. Humans then select memes, because they understand 
these memes, can remember them, and because they appreciate the properties 
they see in them. Now, is there some explanatory work left to do for memetics? 
I think there is nothing left to do at this level of explanation, a level of 
explanation that is typical for social science and folk-psychology. The 
explanatory units of selection analogy does not say more than that we adopt 
memes because of the way we are. So it is not enough to acknowledge, as 
Aaron Lynch does, that memetics 
“is hardly offered as a replacement for all existing social science. 
Historiography, psychology, economics, sociology, anthropology, political 
science, and other fields remain as vital as ever. It is simply inappropriate to 
demand that memetics explain everything about a social phenomenon” 
(Lynch 1996: ix) 
It is not enough to acknowledge this, since at the same time Lynch presents 
memetics as “an important and long overdue addition to social science” (Lynch 
1996: xi). Nobody expects memetics to explain everything, but their two basic 
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claims should at least be valid. Given the explanatory dilemma, memetics is 
not even an important addition to social science. It is a redundant and therefore 
trivial rephrasing of the traditional social science and folk-psychological 
explanation of diffusion – a rephrasing in Darwinian terminology, i.e., in terms 
of the fitness of memes.  
While a traditional explanation does not need this rephrasing in 
Darwinian terms, the rephrasing in Darwinian terms does indeed need the 
traditional explanation, in order to give the first basic claim, that fitness of 
memes explains diffusion, some explanatory force. Explanations in terms of 
‘actual survival,’ i.e., explanations in terms ‘being catchy,’ ‘having great 
psychological appeal,’ or ‘infective power’ explain why we believe what we 
believe and not something else, only if these explanations refer at the same 
time to the essential relation between the properties of the meme and the 
respective selective environment in human minds, which is part of a traditional 
explanation.  
Misleading analogies 
The latter point can also be illustrated by simply playing out the analogy-game 
a little further. This will also show why meme selectionism ends up with the 
above-mentioned dilemma. Saying that memes replicate independently of the 
individuals who set the selective criteria – consciously or unconsciously – 
would be analogous to saying that genes replicate independently of their 
selective environment. That this does not make sense should be obvious. 
Formulating the issue in this way shows that the answer to the ‘who’s in 
charge’ and ‘cui bono’ question should be the following in the case of cultural 
diffusion: The entity that plays the role of the environment; the entity that 
‘does’ the selecting. In the case of culture this is the individual. ‘Mother 
Nature’ does not have preexisting preferences and she does not replicate, albeit 
she does persist. We do have preferences, but – as ‘Mother Nature’ – we do not 
replicate like memes or genes. Nevertheless both – the selective environment 
of biological evolution and the selective environment of cultural evolution – 
select and in this sense direct the evolution of the replicators. And both do this 
always; it cannot be other. The selective environment of a meme is thus a 
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primary causal factor in the replication of ideas, a factor that is not reducible to 
properties of the ideas whose selection is at issue. This is what ‘selecting’ 
means. Therefore, it is wrong that ‘no one is watching,’ as Blackmore says.  
It just does not make sense to speak of memes replicating irrespective 
of the interests of individuals, as it would not make sense to speak of genes 
replicating irrespective of properties of their selective environment. 
Memeticists almost directly transmit the units of selection debate to cultural 
change. For gene they insert meme. For phenotype or vehicle they insert person 
or mind. For genes versus organisms as units of selection, they insert memes 
versus person or mind. And since we learned to talk about ‘selfish genes,’ we 
now talk about ‘selfish memes’ and their ‘interests’ in replication. For the 
fitness of the organism, and the corresponding interest of the organism in its 
survival and reproduction, memeticists insert interests, values, or beliefs of the 
person. They ask ‘cui bono’ and ‘who’s in charge’ and answer: the unit of 
selection of culture, which is the meme. But the whole units of selection issue, 
the whole talk of ‘interests’ of memes versus individuals, of memes as being 
the more fundamental causal agent, is misleading, since meme selectionism 
tends to misconstruct the role of the individual. They tend to stress the role of 
humans as culture bearers. Yet the most important causal role of a human 
person in diffusion is its role as selective environment.  
The latter point directly leads to another reason why the explanatory 
units of selection analogy ends up in the described dilemma. Memeticists tend 
to ignore that the relationship between individuals and memes is a different one 
than the relationship between organisms and their genes. The ‘vehicles’ of 
genes do not play the same role in biological evolution as people play in 
cultural evolution. It would thus be better not to regard people as ‘vehicles’ of 
memes. As illustrated in chapter 3, when the ontology of memes is at issue, 
memeticists tend to regard artifacts or patterns of behavior as the ‘vehicles’ or 
‘phenotype’ of memes. These entities interact with the selective environment 
(humans) and make the replication of memes differential in their selective 
environment. For instance, the ‘organism’ (i.e., the phenotypic expression) of 
the idea of a hammer is a hammer and not the person who uses the hammer.  
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Furthermore, the original debate about units of selection refers to the 
question which unit is the ultimate unit that survives over the long run and is 
selected because of certain properties. Memeticists wrongly transfer the debate 
about units of selection to the cultural realm not only because they tend to 
misconstruct the role of individuals. The debate is also wrongly applied to 
cultural selection, since it was never at question whether individuals or memes 
are selected because of certain effects. Although individuals change or evolve 
through culture, since they incorporate memes, identify with some of them, and 
can be said to change through this process, individuals just are not selected by 
cultural diffusion. Hence, if we want to use Darwinian thinking for culture at 
all, then the only real evolutionary role humans can take in this game is the role 
of the environment.  
All this shows that, first, for culture as well as for biological evolution, 
it is ridiculous to state a conflict between a gene or a meme and its selective 
environment, even if the environment includes other genes or memes. Second, 
for culture it would be ridiculous to state a conflict between the meme and the 
cultural analog of the organism, which is the hammer. These are the deeper 
reasons why the explanatory units of selection analogy states a false contrast 
between fitness of memes and individuals.  
Memeticists swing back and forth between two perspectives: from 
describing the individual as a ‘host’ or a ‘vehicle’ of memes, to describing the 
role of individual as selective environment. Take the two following statements 
from Dennett:  
“The likelihood of a recipe getting any of its physical copies replicated 
depends (mainly) on how successful the cake is. […] at getting a host to 
make another cake […] at getting the host to make another copy of the recipe 
and passing it on” (Dennett 2002: E-88).  
“The fate of memes – whether copies and copies of copies of them persist 
and multiply – depends on the selective forces that act directly on the 
physical vehicles that embody them” (Dennett 1991: 204).  
It is not that Dennett changed his mind between making these two statements, 
the first in 2002 and the latter in 1991. He constantly changes between these 
descriptions. This creates confusion and shows the central tension in the 
explanatory units of selection analogy: The passive vehicle of memes is at the 
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same time the active, selective force that determines the fitness. Whether the 
memes can get the host as passive vehicle to replicate them depends totally on 
the same host as the main active selective environment.  
I suggested above that it is better to leave out the vehicle-metaphor and 
the host-metaphor altogether, since the real evolutionary role individuals take 
in cultural diffusion is the role of the selective environment. The vehicle- and 
host-metaphor do no explanatory work, since for the goal of explaining the 
fitness of memes this role of humans is irrelevant. What is relevant for this goal 
is their role as selective environment. In addition, to call humans ‘vehicles’ is 
heuristically trivial for another reason: It adds nothing to the traditional 
conception of humans as culture bearers. The metaphorical language of 
humans as passive vehicles or hosts is only motivated by a misguided 
application of the units of selection debate to culture – an application of 
Darwinism to culture that leads nowhere.  
Bookkeeping 
In culture, all the active work is done by humans: They generate memes; they 
generate the phenotypic expressions of memes (artifacts etc.); they learn 
memes through inferential reconstruction from others; and – most importantly 
– they select them. Humans are the ultimate agents of cultural change. Recall 
that critics objected to gene selectionism that gene selectionism ignores the 
causal role of organisms as interactors. Whether that is right has not been 
addressed in this study. The only thing I do claim is an analogous critique 
against meme selectionism: Meme selectionism ignores the causal role of 
humans as creators and selectors of memes. If we take these roles into account, 
memes are mere bookkeepers of cultural change.  
Meme selectionism, as a description of diffusion, does indeed work 
always, as gene selectionism as a description of biological evolution does work 
always. We can describe diffusion as the differential spread of memes due to 
their fitness differences. However, to state that this shows that memes and not 
minds are the primary causal factors, or ‘selfish,’ i.e., the sole beneficiaries of 
the diffusion process, is distorting the causal picture. Just as the meme’s eye 
perspective, the traditional perspective works equally well. Every case can be 
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described at the same time from the meme’s point of view and from the 
individual’s point of view. Saying that there are cases that cannot be explained 
by reference to facts about the individual would be similar to saying that there 
are selective processes that cannot be explained by reference to a selecting 
environment. The traditional view can explain every instance of meme 
selection. And only the traditional perspective explains such instances of 
diffusion. The individual’s point of view is not yet a full explanation. It 
certainly is a ‘placeholder’ for a deeper explanation – a placeholder for basic 
cognitive processes, and a million of different neurological, sociological, or 
ecological factors. Nonetheless, the meme’s point of view alone does not give 
any explanation, except when it is combined with the traditional explanation.  
In addition, since memes are also created by individuals, meme 
origination and meme survival are, all things considered, the effects of the 
causal power of individuals. Origination and diffusion of memes is caused by 
humans. Memes exist and spread because of the meme-creating, meme-
transmitting and meme-selecting power of humans. 
The role of content  
In order to prevent misunderstanding, I would like to add a last clarifying 
point. The content of memes certainly plays a role in determining the diffusion 
of memes, even though memes are created, transmitted, and selected by 
humans. The meme’s eye perspective and the traditional perspective of 
explaining diffusion are no alternatives because the answer is not ‘either – 
or.’
15
 In reaction to meme selectionism some might say that the selective 
environment itself is the cause of the adaptedness and hence of the diffusion of 
memes. This is true in one sense, but not in another one. It is true in the sense 
that memes cannot have a fitness that is not dependent on their selective 
environment. If we, however, then say that the selective environment has a 
total priority, merely by being the selective environment, we end up with 
                                                
15
 Midgley (2002: 130-133), for instance, makes this mistake in claiming that it is the 
complexity of human motivation that explains why memes spread.  
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another too radical claim. Contents of memes certainly play a role in 
determining the fitness of memes.  
Again, a clear comparison with biological evolution helps to see the 
point: The selective environment of organisms is not alone determining the 
replication of genes and reproduction of organisms in biological evolution. 
There are two reasons for this: First, the organism is not only a passive thing 
that faces an environment. The organism selects his selective environment.
16
 If 
I am correct, this cannot be transferred to culture, albeit, in culture, memes take 
the role of genes. Memes and their ‘organisms’ (i.e., ideational units and their 
outward expression) are passive in the sense that they are mere consequences 
of the agencies creating them, making decisions and conducting actions. In the 
case of culture the only active thing, making decisions, having desires etc., is 
the selective environment, human beings.  
But, secondly, for biological evolution as well as for cultural diffusion, 
it is imprecise to say that it is the environment that determines fitness and 
thereby causes evolution. As I said in section 5.2, what determines fitness is 
the relation between a selective environment and the respective entity whose 
evolution is at issue. What explains the frequency changes and the 
corresponding evolution of organisms? – Neither the environment, nor the 
traits of the organism. Asking ‘what explains the trait, the environment or the 
trait’ is ridiculous, since the opposition is ridiculous. Why do giraffes have 
such long necks? – Because they lived in an environment with high trees? 
Because there were some giraffes with long necks? In both cases the answer is 
‘No.’ Giraffes with long necks have spread and persist until today, since long 
necks in an environment with high trees leads to a higher propensity for 
survival and reproduction of the individuals with these necks, and hence to a 
higher replication of the genes that are connected with this trait.  
The same holds for memes: The relation between memes and minds – 
and not minds or memes – explains the fitness, as the relation between the long 
neck of the giraffe and the respective environment explains why the giraffes 
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 Well-known for his critique of adaptationism that interprets the organism as totally passive is 
Richard Lewontin (e.g. 1985 [1983]).  
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with long necks have survived. Content plays a role. But since memes are not 
only selected by humans, but also created by humans, they are explanatorily 
secondary, mere consequences of the activity of humans. The ultimate agents 
of culture who are to charge for cultural change are humans, not memes.   
Conclusion 
Because of the tautology problem, the explanatory units of selection problem, 
faces an explanatory dilemma: If meme selectionism wants to get out of the 
tautology problem, it ends up with the refutation of its second basic claim, 
namely that memetics is an alternative to the traditional explanation. The 
explanatory units of selection analogy is either tautological or heuristically 
trivial. Memeticists end up with this dilemma, since they misconstruct the role 
of individuals in diffusion. A transfer of the units of selection debate to culture 
does not make sense, since the relation between memes and minds is 
significantly different from genes and their organisms: Minds are not the 
analogue to phenotypic effects of memes. They are – first and foremost – the 
selective environment of memes. To explain diffusion as the replication of 
‘selfish genes’ is thus distorting the causal picture, because the selective 
environment is a primary causal factor in any evolutionary change. In addition, 
since memes are not only selected, but created by humans, their fitness is a 
mere consequence of the power of humans. Memes ‘keep the book’ of 
diffusion, but they are not ultimate causal agents that replicate irrespective of 
what we are, think and want, even if their content certainly plays a role in our 
selective choices.  
5.4  MEME FITNESS AND IRRATIONALITY 
Limited independence 
What I have stated so far provides a general argument that applies to any 
cultural item that is remembered, talked about, or adopted by individuals. But 
as indicated in section 5.1, meme selectionism is sometimes restricted to cases 
of irrationality. This claim is used to provide justification for the claim that 
meme selectionism provides an alternative to the traditional explanation: At 
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least for cases of irrationality, meme selectionism provides a striking new 
perspective. Dennett (1995, 2001a, 2001b) and Dawkins (1976, 1993) 
frequently cite examples of ideas that spread in spite of “our judging them 
useless” (Dennett 1991: 203). These are the “viruses of the mind” (Dawkins 
1993). According to Dennett and Blackmore,
17
 these are the cases that need a 
special explanation that can only be given, if we invoke memes as the selfish 
units of selection of culture. In those cases memes can spread, even if they are 
useless or judged useless. On this basis, memeticists could answer that the 
critique I developed above only applies to memes that are useful for us, but not 
to those memes that spread independently of our “fitness by whatever standard 
we judge that” Dennett (1991: 203). 
What is the fitness of humans, if not judged by the standard of their 
biological survival and reproduction? ‘Fitness by whatever standard we judge’ 
is what we value as useful for various goals. Fitness in this context can only 
mean benefit. Whatever benefit individuals have from their mental and 
behavioral operations can be considered as contributing to their ‘fitness’ in an 
abstract sense, as they judge it. On this interpretation, the core of the limited 
independence claim is that there are instances where the individual selects 
certain memes, where the relation between properties of the individual and 
properties of the meme determines thus the fitness of memes, but where, at the 
same time, the resulting fitness of memes does not correspond with a benefit 
for the individual. The ‘interests’ of memes and the interests of individuals 
stand in conflict. Recall that gene selectionism also claimed that there are 
outlaw genes, i.e., selfish genes in the narrow sense that circumvent the 
Mendelian fair lottery of reproduction. They can spread, although they do not 
provide an advantage or even a disadvantage for the organism. The ‘interests’ 
of these genes are thus in conflict with the interests of the organism. 
Analogously, meme selectionism states that there are memes that spread, 
although they are not useful for us. Now, if this should give the explanatory 
units of selection analogy a heuristic value, it must hold that these conflict 
cases can be predicted and explained only from the meme perspective. Only 
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then is Dennett correct in stating that the gene-meme-analogy provides a 
striking new perspective.  
Conflict cases  
In order to show that the conflict cases can also be predicted from a perspective 
that does not involve any reference to an analogy between genes and memes, I 
will look at three kinds of cases, where memes spread, although they do not 
provide benefits for the person who adopts the respective meme. The three 
categories are: (a) cases, where people think it is advantageous for them to 
adopt a meme, but where the outcome of the selective process comprises no 
benefit for the individuals – from a perspective that is not the perspective of the 
individual adopting a meme; (b) cases, where people think it is advantageous 
for them to adopt a meme, but where the outcome of the selective process 
comprises no benefit for the individual from the perspective of the individual; 
(c) cases, where the people do not even think that adopting the meme is 
advantageous and do it nonetheless.   
(a). False or costly but subjectively appreciated memes. Cases of the 
first category can easily be reconstructed from a traditional perspective. The 
whole issue depends on what it means that something provides a benefit for 
somebody. Given the goal of having scientifically justified beliefs, a belief in 
God might not provide a benefit for the person and might thus be an irrational 
belief – from a scientific perspective. But the person believing in God might 
just not value scientifically justified beliefs as high as other people do. The 
person might well have other basic preferences and believing in God might 
provide indeed a benefit for the person, given these preferences. From the 
perspective of the person, it might thus be rational in a subjective sense to 
believe in God. Adopting the meme would thus not be a case where a meme 
spreads despite the fact that it is useless for that person. The person might well 
think that he has a benefit from believing in God and so adopts the meme for 
that reason. And the person might think so, even if the belief has led to 
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considerable costs, e.g., to a life that others would judge negatively.
18
 In a 
nutshell, adopting the god-meme might be adopting a false belief from the 
scientific perspective, or might lead to a costly life, and nonetheless be 
subjectively rational – given certain goals and preferences. Take an example: A 
person that wants to circumvent its existential anxiety about death might have a 
benefit from believing in life after death and the supernatural deity 
guaranteeing this eternal life. The person might simply not care so much about 
scientifically justified beliefs or worldly costs that follow from the belief in a 
supernatural deity and life after death. The highest value of the person is to 
circumvent the anxiety. Hence, the belief serves a major goal in the person’s 
belief-value system. Given what the person tries to achieve, given which 
memes are available in a certain culture, given what the person knows already, 
the belief of the person in such a deity can be reconstructed as ‘rational’ from 
the subjective perspective of this person, as long as the person is rational in the 
sense that it calculates its utility function according to the procedural standards 
mentioned in section 5.1. Whether the memes that are adopted according to the 
belief-value system of that person are objectively justified or not is a totally 
different question. But as I explained, the traditional perspective, regarding 
humans as the creators and selectors of culture, does not refer to such an 
objective standard of rationality. We can regard what the person does as 
objectively irrational or as rational, in both cases the traditional perspective 
could explain and predict such a case, since the person does what he does 
because he thinks that it is useful for him.  
Now, does meme selectionism provide us with something that gives an 
alternative explanation of such a case? No, since it would have to claim that the 
individual had no reason at all for choosing the meme, i.e., that we cannot give 
a story in terms of subjective reasons of the individual. But a religious person 
surely has a reason for selecting the god-meme. This reason constitutes the 
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subject to standards that would guarantee that science is objectively rational.  
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relation between mind and meme that accounts for the fitness of the god-
meme. As long as we assume that religious people adopt the god-meme for a 
subjective reason, whatever that reason is, and as long as they appreciate what 
follows from believing in God, then adopting the god-meme is in fact not a 
‘conflict case’ where a person adopts a meme, although it does not have a 
benefit from it. The case is just a standard case where a person does what he 
does, because he wants to do it.  
(b). Unintended consequences. Cases of the latter kind have to be 
distinguished from cases that involve unintended consequences of adopting a 
certain meme. These are cases where somebody thinks that it is beneficial to 
adopt a meme, but it turns out that it is not. The person has to admit that 
adopting the meme has led to outcomes that are judged negatively from the 
perspective of the person adopting the meme. Such cases of unintended 
consequences are not unusual. We constantly make errors in our decisions. If 
we assumed a kind of perfect rationality, with perfect foreknowledge, then 
such unintended consequences of adopting ideas or patterns of behavior would 
indeed be irrational. But we just are not perfectly rational and we know that. 
Being subject to a chain letter is a simple and perfect example that memeticists 
like to use as an example of a meme that behaves like a ‘virus’ – invading our 
mind despite the fact that it is useless for us. Imagine that somebody comes 
into contact with a chain letter for the first time in his life. The person believes 
that adopting a chain-letter-meme and acting accordingly provides a benefit for 
him, given his belief-value system. It turns out that this is wrong. Can we 
explain such cases with the traditional intentional stance perspective, which 
assumes that people do what they do because they think it is useful? We can, 
since such cases of irrationality can be explained by acknowledging that 
humans often do not have an objectively justified basis for evaluating certain 
memes. It might also turn out that the person was inconsistent in his preference 
system. But first, as I have illustrated in section 5.1, this is not part of the 
contemporary concept of rationality used in social sciences. Our rationality is 
bounded. Second, individuals select memes for a reason, or a couple of 
reasons, and these reasons, even if sub-optimal reasons, build the selective 
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criteria according to which these people select memes. The meme spreads 
according to these reasons and not despite these reasons. Thus, these cases of 
irrationality can also be reconstructed as normal cases of the traditional belief-
preference model of choice, where a meme spreads because somebody thinks 
that it provides a benefit. The traditional explanation does not fail in these 
cases and the claim that memes spread despite our disapproval of them can 
simply not be applied.  
(c). Weakness of will. Memeticists might answer that this is correct and 
restrict their claim to cases where we do not even think that a meme provides a 
benefit, when we adopt it. These cases would be cases, where we do not want 
to believe or think something, where we do not want to do something, and 
think or do it nonetheless. This is weakness of will. There are sometimes 
conflicting interests in a person and one interest gains predominance, though 
the person does not want that this interest gains predominance. The person has 
higher-order evaluations that structure the list of his first-order values or 
interests. There might be motivations that drive the person towards a certain 
behavior, although he – from a reflective perspective of his higher-order values 
– does not approve these first-order motivations. In addition, the driving 
motivation might even be an unconscious motivation. Unconscious motivation 
leads to unconscious selection. Take the example of computer games. 
Memeticists would say that ‘playing computer games’ spreads because this 
meme is a good replicator, and not because we select it according to our beliefs 
and values. Indeed, ‘playing computer games’ seems to be a pretty good 
replicator, at least in the wide sense, and with respect to some humans. If a 
person does not want to play a computer game and does it nonetheless, the 
person is definitely irrational, since the person is not consistent. But even if 
somebody falls victim to that meme, the person still plays computer games for 
a reason in the wide sense: unconscious motivation or a first-order motivation 
that gains predominance despite higher-order conflicting values. Imagine that 
somebody wants to do his work at the computer. Eventually the person ends up 
playing computer games. Why? Maybe there was a need in the person for 
relaxation or an irresistible desire for this particular game. The game is played, 
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because it fulfills these needs or desires, even if the person – in principle – 
dissociates from these desires. The person does it, although the person does not 
identify with these actions. The person does not want that he wants to play the 
game. But the computer playing is not explained by a fitness of the computer-
play-meme that is disconnected from the person’s reasons. The fitness arises 
from a relation of this meme to certain reasons, in the wide sense, that the 
person has for playing the game. The computer playing is explained by 
weakness of will or unconscious selection. That means that the traditional 
belief-value explanation of the behavior does not fail for such cases of 
irrationality. 
I would like to draw a first conclusion about the limited independence 
claim. The important point is that memetics can only be an alternative to the 
traditional explanation, if we exclude weakness of will and unconscious 
motivation from the traditional explanation. Yet a traditional explanation does 
not have to exclude it. The traditional explanation does fail, only if we 
construct it in the form of a straw man. If the traditional explanation is 
considered to refer to a too rationalistic picture of the human mind that 
assumes that humans have perfect knowledge and foresight, that humans are 
always consistent and never subject to weakness of will, then this traditional 
intentional stance perspective does indeed fail for the conflict cases. But as I 
illustrated in section 5.1, neither empirical research, such as diffusion studies, 
nor the contemporary concept of rational choice assume such rigid standards as 
a realistic model for decisions processes.  
Let me add a note on cases that most directly remind one of ‘viruses of 
the mind,’ penetrating our mind, despite the fact that we do not want them to 
do so. We all know ear candies – tunes, sentences, or thoughts that just do not 
want to get out of our mind. We hear something and hum it over and over 
again. We want to concentrate on something else, but the melody comes back. 
They are so easy to memorize and catchy so that we cannot do otherwise. We 
are attracted by it, as we are attracted by other things, for instance, by another 
person. Certainly, the attractive person or the attractive meme plays a role in 
the explanation why I am attracted to this person or meme. It is because of 
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certain properties that I am attracted, but my predisposition to be attracted by 
such a person or meme plays an equally important role. As I said already, in 
accordance with Sterelny, change the selective environment and other ideas or 
persons are attractive. Take again the memes with long chains of numbers. 
They are unlikely to become an ear candy, since we are not built to memorize 
them easily. That is why they do not have a chance to become a meme with a 
high replication potential. In computers or in Martian creatures, they might 
have a good chance to find a good selective environment, and a tune from 
Mozart might in turn have no chance at all to find a good selective environment 
in computers or Martian creatures.  
These cases point to the fact that there are factors that determine the 
selective environment of memes, factors that are not reconstructable as part of 
the belief-value system of a person: properties of the mind that determine what 
we can easily comprehend, or what we can easily memorize. These properties 
of the mind are not connected to any kind of benefit for the individual, except 
the benefit one gets from the good feeling of being able to understand or 
memorize something. The fact that we cannot remember long chains of 
numbers is such a property of human minds. However, as said already in 
section 5.2, that easy-to-remember memes spread more likely than others does 
not follow simply from an intrinsic property of the memes. It follows from 
their relation to our minds. This relation makes them easy to remember for us. 
Therefore, these cases can also not provide an explanation that is not given by 
a traditional explanation, since this traditional explanation does not have to 
exclude such properties of the mind.  
Explanatory dilemma still holds 
I have discussed examples that might be considered as cases where a meme 
spreads despite the fact that it does not provide a benefit for the person 
adopting the meme. For all cases, however, it could be shown that there is an 
explanation that refers to certain pre-existing values, beliefs, and features of the 
human mind that are not reconstructable as values or beliefs. In all cases, we 
can refer to these factors in order to explain why the respective people do what 
they do. Hence, it can be concluded that, first, there is not even a limited 
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independence of memes from properties of the mind that holds for those cases 
of irrationality.  
Second, we have to refer to these properties of the mind, since the 
explanatory dilemma also holds for these cases: If meme selectionism wants to 
get out of the tautology charge, it ends up with the refutation of their second 
main claim that the spread of memes is due to the fitness of memes and not due 
to individuals – due to their ‘interests’ and causal role. Meme selectionism can 
thus not provide an alternative to this traditional perspective. The limited 
independence claim is therefore as explanatorily trivial as the general 
independence claim.  
Third, we do not need an analogy between ‘selfish genes’ and ‘selfish 
memes’ in order to explain these cases of supposed irrationality. We do not 
need the analogy to show that we are rational, and we do not need it to show 
that we are irrational. It is correct that we are not always perfectly and 
objectively rational, since we are subject to limited knowledge, to weakness of 
will, and certainly to a myriad of other shortcomings. It is also true that we 
humans sometimes like to think of ourselves as the rational controllers of what 
we think and do. But although the idea of a perfect rational mind exists as an 
ideal, it is at the same time clear that we actually are not always rational in an 
objective sense, and often not even in a subjective sense. Furthermore, our 
conscious preferences and conscious beliefs do not explain everything, we 
have to take other properties of the mind into account as well, for instance that 
we cannot easily remember long chains of numbers. In short, there is no perfect 
rational subject that is the ultimate master of its mind.  
A rational choice model that assumes perfect subjective or objective 
rationality could thus not explain all cases of human decisions. But today social 
sciences, psychology, economy, as well as philosophy do take this into 
account. To say that the traditional perspective, which has the human mind at 
the center, cannot explain cases of irrationality is thus fighting against a straw 
man of a theory that relies on the idea of a perfectly rational human mind. If 
such a rigid rational choice model were all the traditional explanation comes 
down to, memetics would indeed have a point. But since the traditional belief-
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value model does not assume a perfectly rational human mind, as I illustrated 
in section 5.1, we do not need the explanatory units of selection analogy in 
order to see that we are not perfectly rational. That humans are not perfect is a 
fact we know from history; and it is a fact that is easily visible from theoretical 
perspectives that do not involve any Darwinian analogical reasoning from 
nature to culture. The limited independence claim is also in this sense 
heuristically trivial.  
Last but not least, a model of the human mind that takes into account 
that our rational capacity is limited, that our will is sometimes weak, that our 
rationality is bound by numerous structural facts of our human mind, can 
indeed offer an explanation of irrationality, at least at the level of the 
intentional stance perspective, which is typical for social sciences and folk-
psychology. Certainly, this is not a full explanation. The difficult task – from 
within the traditional model of explaining diffusion – is to find out more about 
human minds as selective environment of memes. For a deeper explanation, 
one would have to find out which facts and which reasons influence the 
understanding, memorizing, and adopting of memes; one would have to find 
out why the selective environment is the way it is, how this relates to basic 
cognitive processes, how this relates to the material level of the brain etc. For 
instance, if we explain a certain behavior by saying that the person made a 
mistake, or that the person did not confirm to his second-order beliefs, 
standards or values, these explanations still have to explain why a person 
makes mistakes, why the person does things or believes something that he – in 
his reflective identification with himself – does not want to do or believe etc. 
Or consider an explanation why we cannot remember long chains of numbers. 
Or why can’t we just ignore ads? Why can’t smoker not just stop smoking? 
Why aren’t we more rational? What are the basic cognitive processes 
accounting for our decision processes? Each of these questions needs careful 
investigation, covering many research areas in social sciences, psychology, and 
philosophy. In short, the entire social sciences and the humanities are dealing 
with these questions and the answers will vary with the kinds of irrationality at 
question. In principle, these disciplines can give an answer. They would 
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provide the ‘ecology of memes’ needed to find out why certain memes are 
fitter than others, given a certain selective environment.  
Conclusion 
I have explained that even in cases of irrationality, ‘survival-of-the-fittest-
meme’-explanations have to refer to diverse properties of the mind and to the 
respective reasons that individuals have for adopting a meme. They have to do 
so in order to escape the traditional tautology problem of evolutionary theory. 
A traditional explanation that is not based on a too rigid concept of rationality 
can account for these cases and does not need the explanatory units of selection 
analogy in order to explain these cases. What such a traditional explanation 
needs to make progress is not the explanatory units of selection analogy, but 
further investigations about decisions on the basis of limited knowledge, about 
structural features of the mind, about weakness of will etc. The explanatory 
units of selection analogy cannot offer any new insights because of the 
explanatory dilemma. If meme selectionism wants to give any explanation of 
diffusion, it merely gives a re-telling of the traditional story in Darwinian 
terms.  
5.5  MINDS AS BUILT BY MEMES 
Reducing the selective environment to memes  
My critique of the explanatory units of selection analogy rests on the following 
claim: The tautology problem shows that the replicative power of memes is 
merely the consequence of the relation between these memes and the 
respective individuals that are their selective environment. Since the content of 
ideas is created and selected by individuals, the fitness of memes is only a 
consequence of the activity of individuals. This is tantamount to what Dennett 
has called the traditional explanation. Dennett has offered an argument that 
would make this critique pointless. According to him, a human mind is nothing 
else than a conglomerate of memes. Therefore, the contrast or conflict between 
us with our interests and memes with their ‘interests’ in their survival, is 
resolved through reducing us to memes. In Dennett’s own words:  
Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity 
281 
“The haven all memes depend on reaching is the human mind, but a human 
mind is itself an artifact created when memes restructure a human brain in 
order to make it a better habitat for memes. […] But if it is true that human 
minds are themselves to a very great degree the creations of memes, then we 
cannot sustain the polarity of vision with which we started; it cannot be 
‘memes versus us,’ because earlier infestations of memes have already 
played a major role in determining who or what we are. The ‘independent’ 
mind struggling to protect itself from alien and dangerous memes is a myth. 
[…] Our existence as us, as what we are as thinkers are – not as what we as 
organisms are – is not independent of these memes” (Dennett 1991: 207f; 
Emph. in the orig.). 
First of all, it is important to be precise with respect to what kind of thing is in 
fact created by memes and is, therefore, only a consequence of them. 
Blackmore says that memes show that there is “no one watching,” meaning a 
‘conscious designer’ (Blackmore 1999: 242).  In other places, she talks about 
the self as being a “memeplex” (Blackmore 1999: 219) or a “pack of memes” 
(ibid.: 235). Dennett talks about ‘mind’ that is partly build by memes and 
memes playing a “major role” in determining ‘what we as thinkers are.’ In 
other places, he talks about the “self” or “ego,” the “I” as the “captain of my 
vessel” (Dennett 1995: 366-368). According to the latter, it is not the mind as 
such, but the conscious self that is made out of memes. And this is also why 
Dennett included memes in his naturalist explanation of consciousness 
(Dennett 1991). Memes install a ‘virtual machine’ in our brains. This virtual 
machine only seems to do all the meaning, believing, decision-making etc.  
I will first of all explain in more detail which role memes play in 
Dennett’s naturalistic philosophy of mind and consciousness. I will then show 
that the strategy to reduce minds to memes fails to provide a way out of the 
explanatory dilemma and the critique I have built on this dilemma.  
Dennett’s naturalistic theory of consciousness 
According to Dennett’s naturalistic theory of mind and consciousness (Dennett 
1991), there is no conscious Cartesian ego that is free, that does all the 
thinking, decision-making, meaning etc.
19
 The folk-psychological impression 
that there is such a central I or self is considered by him to be a mere useful 
illusion. What he means by this can best be explained the way he does, by 
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using an analogy to computers: The only two things that exist in our minds are 
a serial working “virtual machine,” analogous to a computer program, and a 
parallel processing brain, on which this ‘virtual machine’ is installed. Despite 
the existence of this virtual “user interface,” which is as real as a computer 
program, all the work that is actually done – at a causal level – is done by the 
brain, as the computing in a computer is at the basic level done by the hardware 
of the computer (Dennett 1991).   
The important issue for this study is how the brain acquired such a 
virtual machine of consciousness. According to Dennett, it evolved. Conscious 
minds are “cranes” – created by evolution and speeding it up, since they are 
useful devices. They are not “skyhooks,” falling out of heaven, i.e., emerging 
out of nothing like a miracle that is unexplainable by a naturalistic perspective 
(Dennett 1995: 73ff). Recall from section 4.4 that Dennett believes that there is 
a “tower of generate-and-test” (Dennett 1995: 373-381): The trial-and-error of 
biological evolution, where each trial is selected by death of the organism, is 
replaced by other trial-and-error processes. This is how we are “losing our 
minds to Darwin” (Dennett 1995: 370). Evolution went from genes, simple 
replicators, over Skinnerian creatures, up to Gregorian creatures. Humans are 
Gregorian creatures. They have an inner representation of the external world 
and internalized mind-tools, such as words and numbers. On the basis of this, 
we produce Campbellian ‘thought trials’ and select them.  
Such internalized selection processes presuppose consciousness. 
Evolution has led to a consciousness that makes conscious internal selection 
processes possible. This includes that we can describe the evolved ‘virtual 
machine’ of consciousness as a Cartesian ego that consciously communicates 
its own processes. Mind has intentional states and makes decisions about what 
to believe and what to do. What the virtual machine does is as real as what my 
word processor does, even though all what it does is due to basic electronic 
processes at the level of the hardware. The ascription of consciousness and 
intentionality is made from what Dennett has called the intentional stance 
(Dennett 1987), which detects certain ‘real patterns’ that are not observable at 
the level of the brain.  
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In Consciousness explained (Dennett 1991), Dennett explains how 
evolution has led to a plastic brain with ‘autosimulation’ of a conscious self. 
The details of how the plastic and conscious human mind evolved are not 
important here. What is important is how memes enter the picture. According 
to Dennett, memes are important in two senses: phylogenetically and 
ontogenetically.  
Some habits that – back in the times of the early homo sapiens – were 
socially transmitted, have become innate. In the language of the computer-
analogy: They became hardwired. One of the so-called ‘just-so-stories’ Dennett 
tells about what happened in the evolutionary past is, for instance, the 
following: Creatures with proto-language started to give information to others, 
when they were asked to do so. This has then led to the ‘invention’ of auto-
simulation: Talking to oneself. Later, some of these habits or abilities got hard-
wired. In this way, consciousness and language co-evolved. A little bit of mind 
leads to proto-language, proto-language leads to a more efficient mind, to more 
language, to a more efficient mind, and so on, until we reach a human mind 
with consciousness and all the abilities that we have as a matter of fact. What is 
important for this investigation is that ‘habits of minds,’ such as the habit of 
talking to each other, are regarded as memes. These memes have furthered the 
phylogenetic evolution of a conscious self that is able to talk to itself silently. 
This is the phylogenetic role that memes play in Dennett’s philosophy of mind.  
Ontogenetically memes still play the same role. Given the product of 
evolution so far (i.e., the already hard-wired basic machinery of 
autosimulation), further abilities or ideas will be invented somehow. When a 
human being is born, its mind, which is still plastic to some degree, will be 
filled with further memes. This happens either by individual or by social 
learning. These memes are thus like ‘software’ and ‘data’ that are 
ontogenetically acquired. Starting with hardware and ‘basic software,’ each 
human creates or ‘downloads’ further memes – further ‘software’ and ‘data.’ 
Humans learn, for instance, the habit-like meme of using symbolic notations 
(e.g., musical notations), and they learn data-like memes (e.g., a tune from 
Beethoven). Another example for such an ontogenetically acquired meme is 
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language, in Dennett’s terminology, a meme-like ‘habit of mind.’ On the basis 
of a general innate language ability, we learn to speak English or Japanese, 
which would be a habit-meme, and we learn the specific words with their 
meaning, which are different kinds of memes.  
Much more could be said on Dennett’s philosophy of mind. I only 
briefly presented those aspects that are important for an evaluation of the 
explanatory units of selection analogy. I will not say much more, and I will 
also not take sides whether his account of consciousness and his account about 
its evolutionary origin make sense or not.
20
 I will, however, justify why I will 
not take sides. Philosophy of mind deals with all these questions in detailed and 
complex ways. Some of the most important questions are: What is a conscious 
self? What is the exact relation between mind and brain? What about qualia 
and intentionality? Dennett’s claim that there is no Cartesian ego, no ‘subject’ 
that eludes a naturalistic explanation, can be criticized from various 
philosophical points of view. To elaborate on the arguments against a 
naturalistic perspective on mind as such, would lead much to far away from the 
present concern. Furthermore, even from within a naturalistic perspective, 
critical issues arise: Hypothesis about the evolution of mind and language 
should be taken as what they are, namely speculations. This holds, for any 
phylogenetic hypothesis that has almost no empirical evidence from fossils, 
even if one is very well disposed towards a naturalistic explanation of mind. 
We will never find out how it really was. Therefore, whether Dennett’s 
evolutionary suggestions on the evolution of mind, consciousness, language, 
are good speculations, would demand careful analysis, which cannot be given 
here and need not be given here.
21
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 That is also the reason why I totally ignore Blackmore’s just-so-stories about the evolution 
of language, conscious selves, and altruism (Blackmore 1999). She uses the same strategy as 
Dennett: She speculates how they could have evolved. See Dennett’s (1995) strong defense of 
adaptationist explanations in general and for some of his hypotheses in particular, e.g., the 
evolution of mind, language, meaning, or morality. See Gould’s (1997a, 1997b) equally 
forceful critique of what has called ‘Darwinian fundamentalism.’ For a good introduction to 
debates about adaptationist explanations see Godfrey-Smith (2001).  
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The only thing that is important for this study is what he says about the 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic role of memes. But it is not whether memes 
indeed have the phylogenetic and ontogenetic role he states what is important 
here. Even if Dennett were correct about the role of memes, it would not help 
him out of the explanatory dilemma. This is my central critique against the 
claim that minds are built by memes, be it phylogenetically with respect to the 
evolution of consciousness, or ontogenetically with respect to the mental 
contents humans acquire during life. My critique rests on two arguments: 
Given all that Dennett says about the evolutionary role of memes, it still holds 
that, first, not everything that makes up the selective environment of a specific 
meme is itself a meme. Second, even already acquired memes in our minds do 
not provide a way out of the explanatory dilemma.  
Not everything is a meme 
My claim that not everything is a meme can be defended from outside of a 
naturalistic frame as well as from within. Let us assume, for the sake of 
argument, that Dennett’s naturalistic frame is wrong. There is a conscious self 
that cannot be explained as a mere ‘virtual machine’ of a brain. This Cartesian 
ego does the ‘believing,’ ‘meaning,’ ‘adopting,’ ‘deciding’ etc. If this is the 
case, then there is ‘something’ that (a) is itself not a meme, that (b) is not 
created by memes, and that (c) is more then the mere locus where memes 
interact, as Clark (1993: 13-14), for instance, has objected to Dennett’s claim 
that minds are built by memes. If such a Cartesian ego exists, minds are not 
built by memes.  
Be it as it may, even if we do not assume such a non-naturalistic 
Cartesian ego, it stands to question whether everything in the mind is a meme. 
Although Clark referred to a non-naturalist Cartesian ego, he makes an 
important point:  
“For genes to work […] there must be cells. For ideas to infect the mind, 
there must be minds to infect. Cells are not constructed out of genes, but by 
earlier cells, partly in accordance with the genetic ‘instructions’. Minds, by 
analogy, are not made up of memes, even if they are often influenced or 
infected by them” (Clark 1993: 12). 
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Even if we regard, for the sake of argument, minds as being nothing but the 
vehicles of memes, memes ontologically need minds, as genes need cells.
22
 
Whatever theory of mind we assume, almost everybody would admit that the 
mind of an individual stands in an ‘intimate’ relation with (a) the brain of this 
individual; (b) there are certain capacities, abilities, and competences, such as 
consciousness, intelligence or rationality. The latter rest on competences such 
as language production, understanding, memory, inference making, social 
cognition, etc. These in turn, rest on basic cognitive mechanism, such as the 
basic cognitive processes mentioned with respect to creativity in section 4.5. 
Each book of cognitive psychology is full of descriptions of these basic 
processes or mechanisms. Finally, there are (c) cognitive contents (i.e., beliefs, 
values etc.).  
Even from a naturalistic standpoint, the processes involved in (a) or (b) 
are not memes as defined in chapter 3. These processes work with memes and 
they are influenced by memes, but they are not these memes. Memes are the 
contents the mind is fed with, but memes are not the mind as such – as genes 
are not the cells that ‘house’ these genes, even if these genes help to build these 
cells. Memes certainly played some role in shaping the brain and its abilities, 
such as to think consciously, to memorize, to learn on one’s own, to learn from 
others. These abilities and processes are also constantly filled with further 
memes. Nonetheless, these abilities are not memes. I can neither transmit my 
brain to somebody else, nor can I transmit my ability for conscious thinking. I 
cannot even transmit my ability to speak Japanese.  
Recall what I have said in chapter 3 on memes and the triggering 
problem. Applied to the question whether mind is made out of memes the 
following holds: If our language ability is innate, then the evolution of the 
capacity to use and understand Japanese might well have been influenced in the 
evolutionary past by the social transmission of certain communication habits, 
which were transmitted from person to person. But the human language ability 
is not a meme anymore and the ability to speak Japanese involves triggering of 
this innate ability. I might transmit ‘memes,’ in this case words, to somebody 
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 Jeffreys (2000: 229f) made a similar point.  
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else. This transmission helps this person to learn Japanese. But these memes 
are not the ability itself. The ability is a consequence that follows from the 
innate ability and the transmission of particulate memes. At each point in time, 
there are not only memes that have been acquired before; there is always 
‘something’ that is not a meme itself. This ‘something’ is part of the category 
(a) or (b) or both.  
Dennett seems to see this, when writing, for instance, that  
“the evolution of memes could not get started until the evolution of animals 
had paved the way by creating a species – Homo sapiens – with brains that 
could provide shelter, and habits of communication that could provide 
transmission media for memes” (Dennett 1991: 202).  
The evolution of memes could not get started and it will not get on even today, 
if a selective environment is not already present – a mind that can learn, think 
about, and adopt these memes. Dennett does not seem to see, or does not want 
to see the consequence of this for the claim that memes provide an alternative 
to the traditional explanation of diffusion, which always refers – at the same 
time – to properties of the ‘shelters’ and to properties of the memes, in order to 
explain why certain memes spread.  
It follows from what I have said on the tautology problem that we 
explain why a certain meme has a certain propensity for survival, only if we 
understand in which way the brain and those basic competences of the mind 
involved in acquiring a meme determine the selective environment of the 
memes whose spread is at issue. To use again an example we have met already: 
That the meme ‘1096z4i5p094 zh8t46 8re9puzh’ is not easy to memorize – that 
it has a low fitness – is not explained by merely pointing to the properties of 
this meme. The low survival value is only explained, if we look at the fact that 
our mind has problems with memorizing such chains of symbols, because 
memory in humans works in certain ways. And, as I illustrated in this section, 
the properties of the mind that account for our memory or language abilities 
are not memes themselves.  
 
Autoselection is selection nonetheless 
Darwinism, Memes, and Creativity 
288 
All this said, it is still true that the selective environment of memes does not 
only comprise the structure of our brain and basic abilities. Memes are also part 
of the selective environment. The fitness of memes is therefore also determined 
by the kinds of things summarized above under category (c): those ideas, 
heuristics, rules, and values that govern belief-acquisition and decisions for 
actions. Yet these mental contents are memes in the narrow sense, only if they 
are socially acquired. They need not be socially acquired, since they may also 
be innately specified or mental contents that are not transmittable to others. If 
we understand mind as comprising only those memes that are acquired and 
transmittable, then Dennett has a point in claiming that memes are selected by 
other memes. These memes, previously acquired knowledge, make up an 
important part of the selective environment of memes. In this sense diffusion is 
autoselection of memes: memes selecting memes.   
But it is of utmost importance that the fitness of each meme is not 
independent of its selective environment. In each case some memes partly 
make up the selective environment, and these other memes are relevant for the 
fitness of the meme whose spread is at issue. These other memes are not the 
meme whose spread is at issue. Therefore, any singular meme cannot be a 
‘selfish’ replicator, since its fitness is dependent on something else. This 
‘something else’ has always been, and should still be called an important part 
of ‘mind.’ As I already said at the end of section 5.3, the tautology problem 
exists even if part of the selective environment is made out of other memes. 
This is so because the selected meme has to be distinguished from the selecting 
memes. The fitness of each individual meme is never independent of what 
makes up the mind at a given point in time: its structure and content. The 
relationship between a certain meme and its environment determines its fitness 
and not the meme itself, in all cases.  
That, in culture, much of the current selective environment of memes is 
made out of previously acquired memes, is why creativity exhibits coupling, as 
I explained in chapter 4. Human cultural evolution in this sense relies on a kind 
of autoselection. This shows that cultural change is different from biological 
evolution, since the presence of previously acquired memes in the selective 
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environment of newly occurring memes leads to coupling of variation and 
selection. The origination analogy fails because of this kind of autoselection. 
With respect to the explanatory units of selection analogy, autoselection has 
been used to justify that minds are built by memes. That this is not a plausible 
view of mind and that it would not help solve the explanatory dilemma, even if 
it were plausible, was the purpose of this last sub-section.  
Conclusion  
Memeticists claim that memes are the ‘selfish’ causal agents of cultural 
diffusion, the units of selection of culture, since the human mind is built by 
these memes in two senses: phylogenetically, memes are claimed to have 
furthered the evolution of mind and consciousness; ontogenetically, memes are 
claimed to fill mind and consciousness with content. There is nobody 
watching. There are only memes, evolving in our mind, which is a mere 
vehicle built by them. I have shown that this is a crude overstatement that does 
not help meme selectionism out of its explanatory dilemma. First, a human 
mind is more than its contents. Second, even if memes are involved in the 
generation of things like consciousness, intelligence, rationality, or basic 
competences of minds, it still holds that these things are not memes. Third, 
even for those parts of minds that are memes, the claim mixes up those memes 
whose selection is at issue with memes who are part of the selecting 
environment. No given meme has a fitness of its own – a fitness that explains 
its diffusion and is – at the same time – not dependent on what a human person 
is and regards as his interests, beliefs, values, etc.  
5.6  SUMMARY 
The original two basic claims of the explanatory units of selection analogy 
were (1) that the survival-of-the-fittest-memes and therefore their ‘selfish’ 
interest in their survival explain diffusion. Such a meme selectionist 
explanation has been presented (2) as a striking new alternative to a traditional 
perspective, which explains diffusion by pointing to human beings that have 
certain abilities and belief-value systems according to which these humans 
select cultural units. This claim was justified by saying that humans are not the 
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‘beneficiaries’ of cultural evolution, since the only benefit, which is fostered in 
all cases of diffusion of memes, is the fitness of memes. If one takes the 
tautology problem into account, this view cannot be sustained, since the fitness 
of memes is determined mainly by memes’ relation to us – persons with minds, 
building a major part of the selective environment of memes. There is thus no 
general independence of memes from the interest of the individuals invoked, 
since these interests are part of the selective environment. There is also no 
limited independence: Even if there are irrational cases that show an 
independence from certain values of a person, there are some beliefs or 
preferences in the mind of the respective person that do account for the 
behavior. The meme is always dependent on beliefs or preferences of the 
person. That humans are irrational is no new insight that can be seen and 
explained only with the help of a Darwinian analogy from genes to memes. 
The defense strategy that human minds are built by these memes fails, since 
not every part of mind is itself a meme, and since a specific meme does not 
build its own selective environment. Thus there cannot be a selfish meme that 
can spread irrespective of its selective environment.  
Given that there is no independence of meme diffusion from human 
individuals, the explanatory units of selection analogy ends up in an 
explanatory dilemma: Either the analogy is heuristically trivial, because it 
loses its main claim, namely that memetics presents an alternative to the 
traditional explanation, which is given in terms of properties and interests of 
humans, or the explanatory units of selection analogy is trivial in explanatory 
terms, because it is tautological – it does not explain anything, since it merely 
states that those memes that have a high actual survival are those memes that 
have a high propensity for survival, without explaining where this high fitness 
emerges from.  
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EPILOGUE 
Descriptive and explanatory force of the analogies  
Darwin’s theory has proved to be a very successful theory in explaining 
biological evolution. Darwinian analogical reasoning from this natural domain 
to other scientific domains has proved to have its merits as well. It played an 
important heuristic role in immunology and computer programming, leading to 
powerful theories and applications in these domains, as briefly mentioned in 
section 1.1. However, the same does not hold for memetics and the Darwinian 
approach to creativity. The three basic analogies, on which these Darwinian 
approaches to culture are based on, are deficient in descriptive as well as 
explanatory terms. The three basic analogies are either wrong or trivial. All 
things considered, these Darwinian approaches to not provide a fourth Freudian 
insult for mankind, a ‘second Darwinian revolution,’ by which not only God’s 
creating power, but also our authorship of culture is demystified as illusory. 
Although we do not have a God-like creativity, we are nonetheless the authors 
of culture, creating, transmitting, and selecting ideational units that are not 
replicators in a narrow sense and have no existence and causal force that is 
independent from their authors.  
In particular, I have illustrated that memes – the ideational units of 
culture – have a dubious ontological status, that they are not easy to observe if 
taken as generative units of culture, and that they do not replicate in a narrow 
sense. The ontological analogy, claiming that memes are gene-like replicators 
fails. With respect to the origination analogy, I looked at creativity as one 
source of novelty in culture. I claimed that creativity is not based on undirected 
variation and that this provides a major argument against a close analogy 
between origination of novelty in culture and origination of novelty in nature. 
This holds even if culture itself is a variational system and even if creativity 
comprises a cognitive selection process. With respect to the units of selection 
analogy, I explained in which sense memes fail to be ‘selfish’ replicators 
whose fitness is independent of their human carriers. Since humans are 
necessarily the selective environment of these memes, these memes cannot 
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spread independently of their human carriers. Without taking the relation 
between memes and their selective environment into account, the claim that 
diffusion can be explained by the differential survival-of-the-fittest-memes 
becomes tautological. A transfer of the units of selection debate to culture does 
not make sense, since the role that individuals play in culture in relation to 
memes is not comparable to the role organisms play in biological evolution in 
relation to genes. Since humans create, transmit, and select memes, they are the 
primary causal agents of cultural change. Memes are necessarily a mere 
consequence of their causal influence, even though memes keep the book of 
cultural change, since they are the units that are selected by humans. All three 
basic analogies lack descriptive adequacy. Central claims of the analogies were 
thus shown to be wrong.  
 Nonetheless, I also showed that there are other statements about 
creativity and culture that are part of the ontological, the origination, and the 
explanatory units of selection analogy and that are indeed correct. But for these 
statements, all three analogies rely on insights from other research schools, to 
which the Darwinian approaches do not contribute new insights. The analogies 
are thus trivial – in heuristic as well as explanatory terms. With respect to the 
ontological analogy, I admitted that culture relies on social transmission of 
ideational units. Social transmission can be regarded as replication in the wide 
sense: Ideational units are transmitted over time. However, this is no new 
insight; on the contrary, it is a mere restatement of the contemporary 
anthropological concept of culture, which assumes social transmission of 
ideational units independently of a Darwinian point of view. Thus, if the 
ontological analogy is taken to refer to replication in the wide sense, the 
analogy is heuristically trivial, a mere reformulation of what is visible from any 
perspective on culture that assumes the contemporary concept of culture. In 
addition, if one wants to explain social transmission, one has to acknowledge 
all the findings of the psychology of social learning. This research does not 
need an analogy between genes and memes, and the analogy does not provide 
new insights for this research. The ontological analogy thus does not contribute 
to an explanation of social learning. On the contrary, in order to give any 
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explanation of the transmission of memes, memetics has to use all the insights 
carefully investigated by the social sciences and philosophy. I have also shown 
that the same holds for the origination analogy. The analogy relies and 
reinvents the psychology of creativity, which assumes a concept of creativity 
that excludes that we have foresight of which of our ideas prove worthwhile. In 
addition, psychology of creativity tries to explain creativity by pointing to basic 
cognitive processes. If the analogy is taken as pointing to a close analogy 
between creativity and biological evolution, demanding that creativity is based 
on undirected variation, and if the analogy is offered as a claim about a 
cognitive process involved in creativity, then the claim is unjustified so far. It 
is unjustified, since the evidence cited for such a blind Darwinian cognitive 
process is not convincing. If, however, the analogy is understood as not 
requiring undirected variation, as merely pointing to guesswork, and 
interpreted as a mere perspective about creativity, then the analogy is trivial in 
descriptive as well as explanatory terms. The analogy is trivial, since it mere 
assumes the narrow concept of creativity that does not need the Darwinian 
approach, and since it does not provide an explanation for the processes 
involved. This version of the analogy merely re-describes the findings of the 
research in psychology of creativity in Darwinian terms, not offering any new 
insights that demand an analogy between creativity and biological evolution, 
since the assumed concept of creativity and the findings are independent of the 
analogy. The origination analogy is thus trivial in heuristic as well as 
explanatory terms. Last but not least, the explanatory units of selection analogy 
is tautological and in this sense trivial in terms of its explanatory force, as long 
as it does not refer to the traditional explanation of cultural diffusion, which 
states that diffusion is explained by the decisions of humans. If it does, 
however, offer a non-tautological explanation, the explanatory units of 
selection analogy ends up with that traditional explanation. It can thus not 
provide an alternative to this standard social-science explanation of diffusion 
and does not provide any new insights for the study of diffusion.  
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A sheep in wolf’s clothing 
All things considered, Darwin’s theory is not a “universal acid” – a “dangerous 
idea” or a “wolf in sheep’s clothing,” as Daniel Dennett (1995: 521) called it, 
an idea that provides frightening and striking new insights for studying 
creativity and culture. On the contrary, it is a ‘sheep in wolf’s clothing,’ so to 
speak, that pretends to be dangerous, whereas, if looked at closely, it turns out 
not to be dangerous but trivial. The individual only disappears in the Darwinian 
approaches to creativity and culture because the causal role of the individual is 
divided up into many roles, which appear disconnected to each other on 
different places of the overall evolutionary picture of culture, leading to the 
impression that evolutionary theory destroys our image of ourselves as the 
primary agents of culture, as it destroyed the image of God as the creator of the 
world. The human being is then described as a mere ‘vehicle’ of memes in 
which these memes somehow arise when humans are creative and which then 
invade the minds of others. Although memes certainly exist, I tried to show 
that nobody has to be afraid of them.  
 The idea of ‘selfish memes’ is currently very popular. The reasons for 
this may be various. I think that one reason lies in a new trend towards anti-
individualism. The modern Western world is characterized by radical freedom 
of choice. But for some people this freedom seems to be too much: The more 
options some people have, the more confused and anxious they get: One could 
make the wrong choices. One can have too many options and having options 
also means that one is responsible for choosing one of the options. Those 
religions that claim that our fate is predestinated have always served as a relief 
from the burden of choice and responsibility. Genes and memes can do the 
same. Once it was the devil, now it is the gene or the meme that made you do 
it. And – as in a curious reiteration – memeticists could even say that they are 
not responsible for all the analogical reasoning, since they are themselves 
victims of a selfish replicator, namely victims of the idea of memes. Analogical 
reasoning can be a fruitful source of insight, but we should be careful in using 
it, otherwise it would indeed be a ‘dangerous idea’ – preventing a very 
important habit of mind: critical thinking.  
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The Wittgensteinian ladder 
At the end of chapter 3, I conceded that there is one positive role Darwinian 
analogical reasoning can play. It can serve as a link between diverse 
disciplines. It can connect such different disciplines as philosophy, psychology, 
anthropology, economical diffusion studies, and evolutionary theory. It can 
bring these disciplines together – to study mankind in its totality. Memetics and 
the Darwinian approach to culture can therefore provide a general starting-
point for an interdisciplinary perspective on culture and creativity. 
Nonetheless, the three basic analogies, which lie at the foundation of these two 
Darwinian approaches to culture, are still mere Wittgensteinian ladders. We 
can and should throw them away as soon as we come to the details.  
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